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Abstract 
 
Influences upon judgment revision are issues of both theoretical and applied interest.  Many 
studies in the extant literature have been categorized as Judge Advisor Systems (JAS) research, 
and algorithmic decompositions of estimation problems.  JAS researchers acknowledge the 
differentiated social roles of advisor(s) and decision-makers; and seek to isolate the influence 
of advice from advisor(s), upon the deliberations of decision-makers or judges.  JAS research 
commonly operationalizes advice in solely numeric terms, which undermines the JAS 
paradigm‘s claims of ecological validity.  Algorithmic decompositions of estimation problems 
provides judges with knowledge of the process of advice generation, and differs from advice 
provided by advisors in JAS studies, as advice is self-generated by users of algorithmic 
decompositions.  The current work sets out why both the JAS paradigm, and algorithmic 
decompositions are limited (particularly in terms of single judge-advisor information exchange 
episodes), as means to aid beneficial judgment revision.  Six studies are reported that frame, 
and operationalize research questions that extend understanding of potentially beneficial 
judgment revision.  ‗Conformity to advice‘ emerges as an important explanatory factor in 
judgment revision.  Chapter 4 examines participants‘ preferences for solely numeric or 
reasons-based advice, and explores process measures of depth of information search.  
Participants report an overwhelming preference for reasons-based advice.  Chapter 5 
investigates the cognitive weighting strategies participants utilize when considering reasons-
based or solely numeric advice.  Here, participants are insensitive to the type of advice, and 
discount advice to the same extent - irrespective of type.  Chapter 6 investigates the influence 
of algorithmic decomposition upon beneficial judgment revision.  Here, participants were 
provided with a step-by-step process for solving seemingly intractable estimation problems, or 
given advice constituted as a testimonial assertion.  Results highlight conformity to advice, and 
the limitations of experimenter generated algorithmic decompositions of estimation problems 
xvii 
 
of unknown effectiveness.  Chapter 7 and 8 sought to develop the idea that algorithmic 
decompositions should influence judgment revision (both for extremely large, and small 
numerical quantities).   Results show that algorithmic decompositions did not facilitate 
beneficial judgment revision.  Instead conformity to advice, irrespective of the quality of 
advice, was observed only for estimates of large numerical quantities.  Chapter 9 was framed 
as a final attempt to establish if people are able to successfully distinguish between objectively 
beneficial, and spurious advice.  Results indicate that people are unsuccessful in doing so, and 
find such a task cognitively demanding. Methodological limitations of both the current state of 
the JAS paradigm, and research involving algorithmic decompositions of estimation problems 
are identified, in addition to the limitations of the work presented here.  Ultimately, 
methodological suggestions are formulated that may improve understanding of advice giving 
and taking, in the context of JAS research. 
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Chapter 1:   Introduction 
 
It is uncontroversial to observe that human judgment is sometimes fallible, and that methodologies for 
enhancing appropriate judgment change are of enduring interest to researchers from a variety of 
disciplinary backgrounds.  The problem of human judgment then, viewed from a psychological 
perspective, has received much attention in the last 30 years.  The insights that have emerged from such 
a programme of research are valued both in terms of the development of theory and in an applied sense.  
It is becoming increasingly clear, for example, that human judgment can be modelled upon the idea of 
the mind being a limited processor of information, and hence sub-optimal when compared to normative 
judgments based upon logic and statistics.  Further, people tend to use cognitive shortcuts, or 
‗heuristics‘, that generally work well in simplifying the demands of informational input and cognitive 
processing, to arrive at a judgment appropriate to the environmental context.  However, psychological 
research has suggested that the use of heuristics may simultaneously introduce systematic biases into 
human judgment in some circumstances (Tversky and Kahneman, 1982).  Given the preceding 
discussion of the problems of human judgment, it is encouraging to discover that the development of 
various judgmental aids and strategies has been effective in improving the reliability and accuracy of 
human judgment.  In this thesis, I focus upon two approaches that potentially may be beneficial in 
improving human judgment – Judge Advisor Systems (JAS) research, and knowledge of the process of 
advice generation.  Here knowledge of the process of advice generation is operationalized by providing 
people with step-by-step algorithms for solving seemingly intractable estimation problems (algorithmic 
decomposition).  First, however it is necessary to look at the insights psychological research has 
provided about human judgment.          
 
1.1 The problem of human judgment 
This thesis concerns human judgment, and some potentially useful ways in which human 
judgment can be enhanced.  Judgment can be defined as inferences people make about the 
world utilising logic, but based upon imperfect and uncertain informational inputs (Weber and 
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Johnson, 2006, p55).  Judgment can be distinguished from choice, as choosing between 
dichotomous, or multiple choices, is qualitatively different from exercising judgment.  This 
distinction is based upon good evidence from the extant decision making literature - the mode 
of response in empirical studies has influenced the decision making process (Payne et al. 1993; 
Gigone and Hastie, 1993, 1997; Hinsz, 1999).  This implies that the cognitive mechanisms of 
the human mind that facilitate choice may be different from the cognitive structures that 
underpin judgment (Billings and Scherer, 1988).  This distinction is important, as what follows 
in this thesis is concerned with the judgments individual‘s make.  The next section considers 
the issue of the parameters of human judgment, based upon the analogy of the human mind as 
a limited information processor.        
 
1.2 Bounded rationality 
Empirically, psychologists have studied human judgment by comparing ‗actual‘ judgments to 
normative benchmarks.  In other words, human judgment has often been monitored and 
compared to an optimum case determined by logic and statistics.  Observed deviations from 
optimum judgments suggest that human judgments are not always facilitated by the application 
of formal logic and statistics.  Often this is because judges may not have access to all the 
relevant information about a particular issue, or have the time or resources to collate and 
deliberate upon such information.  Herbert Simon (1982) suggested that this behaviour should 
not necessarily be regarded as ‗irrational‘ (despite the axioms of classical economic theory e.g. 
von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944; Savage, 1954).  Rather, Simon proposed the notion of 
‗bounded rationality‘, whereby people behave rationally within certain cognitive and task 
imposed constraints.  In this view of judgmental behaviour, people tend to ‗satisfice‘ (accept 
the first satisfactory solution to an issue of judgment), or alternatively utilise 'rules of thumb' or 
cognitive heuristics in order to make judgments (Gleitman et al. 2004; Tversky and Kahneman, 
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1982).  Instead of applying complex cognitive processing of information, only a limited 
number of simple cognitive heuristics are employed on judgmental tasks, in order to make 
judgments quickly and easily (Tversky and Kahneman, 1982; Hollyoak and Morrison, 2005).  
Often these heuristics are sufficient to provide adequate judgments to meet the requirements of 
a given cognitive task; however, as Kahneman and Tversky demonstrated, the use of cognitive 
heuristics can also introduce systematic bias into human judgment.  
 
1.3 Heuristics and biases 
In a series of insightful studies in the 1970‘s, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky identified 
three important heuristics which could account for some aspects of sub-optimal human 
judgment – representativeness, availability, and anchoring.  The idea of ‗representativeness‘ is 
that people judge the likelihood of an event based on how 'representative' such an event is of a 
particular category of events or other similar examples (Tversky and Kahnmeman, 1982).  
Kahneman and Tversky operationalized this idea experimentally by tasking participants with 
judging the probability that individuals had particular occupations (see below).   
"Tom W. is of high intelligence, although lacking in true creativity. He has a need 
for order and clarity, and for neat and tidy systems in which every detail finds its 
appropriate place. His writing is rather dull and mechanical, occasionally 
enlivened by somewhat corny puns and by flashes of imagination of the sci-fi type. 
He has a strong drive for competence. He seems to feel little sympathy for other 
people and does not enjoy interacting with others. Self-centered, he nonetheless 
has a deep moral sense.  This personality description has been chosen, at random, 
from those of 30 engineers and 70 social scientists.  What is your probability that 
Tom W is an engineer?" 
 
Participants typically concluded that Tom W was an engineer – despite the information 
provided in the description (that only 30% of the population from which the description of 
Tom W was drawn were indeed, engineers).  Hence, Kahneman and Tversky concluded that 
people are typically systematically insensitive to base-rate information when making 
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judgments - leading to judgmental error.   
   
A second heuristic that potentially introduces systematic error into the process of human 
judgment is the ‗availability‘ heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman, 1982).  Here, the probability 
of the occurrence of an event is determined by the ease by which similar instances can be 
recalled from memory.  Events that are perceived to be vivid, recent, or unusual, are easily and 
quickly recalled from memory and hence are assigned a high likelihood of occurrence.  Events 
that are less easily recalled from memory are assigned a lower probability of occurrence.  
Therefore a key factor that emerged from this study (and others) is that whilst the availability 
heuristic serves as an effective strategy in many situations, it can also lead individuals to make 
systematic errors, particularly when judging frequency (Tversky and Kahneman 1982).  In 
part, this is because some events may be more easily recalled from memory merely because 
they are unusual or rare; but this implies that such events are inherently improbable.  
Lichtenstein et al. (1978) showed that although people in the US made moderately accurate 
probability estimates about the likelihood of various causes of death, there were some serious 
judgmental errors.  These errors of judgment appeared to have been influenced by 
contemporary newspaper reports of deaths caused by animal bites and stings.  Hence, 
Lichtenstein et al. found that participants seriously overestimated the probability of death by 
animal bites and stings.  Similarly, people regarded death by accident or disease to be equally 
probable, when in fact death by disease is greatly more probable than a fatal accident.  
  
A third heuristic argued by Kahneman and Tversky (1982) to account for judgmental error is 
called ‗anchoring and adjustment‘.  Here, Kahneman and Tversky observed that when making 
estimates of how long a job may take to complete, or when forecasting next month‘s sales, or 
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estimating some numerical quantity, individuals tend to fixate upon an initial value and 
subsequently adjust their estimate from this value.  Experimentally, Kahneman and Tversky, 
manipulated their participants‘ perceptions by tasking them with making an estimate of the 
percentage of African nations who were members of the United Nations - by asking 
participants if the percentage was above or below a randomly generated value.  The randomly 
generated value had a clear effect upon participants‘ probability estimates – lower random 
values were associated with lower probability estimates.  
 
However, Gigerenzer has been critical of the work of Kahneman and Tversky, and has argued 
that it is inappropriate to regard human judgment to be riddled with systematic cognitive biases 
- instead judgment should be conceived as an adaptive system not bound by formal logic, or 
the probability calculus (Gigerenzer, 2006).  Human rationality, in this view is not measured 
by its consistency with formal logic and statistics, but rather by its adaptive ‗fit to reality‘.  
Gigerenzer strongly argues that measuring human judgment in terms of probabilistic reasoning 
is mistaken, as probability theory cannot apply to single events.  Hence, experimentally tasking 
participants in 1986 with judging the probability that Saddam Hussein would invade Kuwait 
within five years is a pointless exercise, because this event is singular.  Judging the probability 
that a 17-year old motorcyclist will make an insurance claim for an accident however, is an 
entirely appropriate question from a probabilistic perspective; as such claims have a historic 
relative frequency.  Gigerenzer then, makes an important distinction between single-event 
probabilities and relative frequencies.  In this view, judgments about the environment are 
arrived at in a ‗fast and frugal‘ fashion.  Judgments are fast because they are frugal in terms of 
what information is taken into account.   
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1.4 Can human judgment be influenced? 
Whilst it is important to stress that unaided human judgment is largely ‗fit for purpose‘, the 
biases and heuristics literature is one way of approaching the issue of how human judgment 
might be influenced/improved.  An important contribution to this debate was first articulated 
by Meehl in 1954.  Meehl pointed out that Statistical Prediction Rules (SPRs) consistently 
outperformed clinicians who made holistic unaided diagnostic judgments.  A great deal of 
supporting evidence has accumulated in support of Meehl‘s view over the last half century 
(Dawes, Faust and Meehl, 1989; Grove, Zald, Lebow, Snitz and Nelson, 2000; Grove and 
Meehl, 1996).  Despite the clear superiority of SPRs and actuarial tables in clinical diagnosis, 
some clinicians still prefer a holistic approach (Meehl, 1993).   Given that unaided holistic 
clinical judgment is inferior to SPRs on average, health researchers have attempted to design 
procedural interventions to enhance human judgment (Green and Mehr, 1997).  These authors 
observed decision making procedures in two Michigan hospitals in the US where patients were 
admitted with chest pains.  In these circumstances, physicians must decide whether to send the 
patient to a coronary care unit, or to a hospital ward where the patient can be observed via 
electrocardiographic (ECG) telemetry.  In approximately 90% of these types of hospital 
admissions, patients were referred to the coronary care unit.  Unfortunately, the consequences 
of such a high rate of referrals was that the coronary care unit was often overcrowded, resulting 
in a reduction in the quality of care, and potentially greater health risks for patients.   
 
Health researchers developed the Heart Disease Predictive Instrument (HDPI) in an attempt to 
relieve the pressure on the coronary care unit.  The HDPI consisted of a logistic formula that 
combined approximately fifty probabilities to arrive at a single probability that could reliably 
determine whether a patient should be referred to the coronary care unit or not.  Should the 
output value of the HDPI exceed a criterion value, then the patient was admitted to the 
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coronary care unit, if not the patient was admitted to an observation ward.  Unfortunately, this 
system was avoided by physicians, as it was alien to their intuitive thinking, and in addition, 
was not well understood.  This finding suggests that clinicians are not intuitive ‗Bayesian‘ 
statisticians (i.e. from the work of Thomas Bayes [1702-61] - clinicians did not identify some 
probability of a patient‘s coronary problems a priori and update this probability in the light of 
new information).  Indeed, these clinicians may be susceptible to systematic biases in clinical 
decision-making (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982).  Holistic clinical judgment in the two 
hospitals identified by Mehr (1997) clearly resulted in sub-optimal admission decisions.  The 
introduction of the HDPI, whilst improving the reliability and accuracy of diagnosis, was 
unpopular with clinicians possibly because it was non-intuitive and demanded cognitive effort 
in terms of the inputting of probabilities to a formula, and the subsequent calculation of a 
criterion value.   
 
Based upon the heuristics and biases research findings discussed previously, and specifically 
upon the idea that people make judgments in a ‗fast and frugal‘ fashion, health researchers 
developed a further intervention designed to enhance the reliability and accuracy of clinical 
admission judgments in the two US hospitals discussed previously.  A ‗fast and frugal‘ 
decision tree was produced (see Fig 1), that allowed clinicians to make admission judgments 
based upon a series of dichotomous choice questions. 
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Fig 1 Fast and frugal decision tree for coronary care unit allocations (adapted from Green and 
Mehr, 1997). 
 
 
 
Fig 1 shows that the decision tree is a simple device made up of a series of yes/no questions.  
The first stage of the decision tree shows the ST segment changes (the ST segment refers to the 
portion of the ECG trace that can indicate a restriction of the blood supply [ischemia]).  Here, 
if a patient has a reading from an ECG that is outside the normal range of typical readings, then 
the patient is immediately referred to the coronary care unit.  No further enquiry is necessary at 
this stage under this diagnostic system.  If the ECG reading is not anomalous, a further cue is 
considered from the decision tree – whether the patient is suffering from chest pains or not.  
Should the patient not be suffering from chest pains, then the patient is immediately assigned 
to a bed in an observation ward.  No further diagnostic information is required at this stage.  
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However, should the patient be complaining of chest pains then a third diagnostic cue is 
considered from the decision tree (any one other factor?).  Here, should the presence of 
additional factors (in addition to chest pain) be detected, then the patient would immediately be 
assigned to the coronary care unit.  If no additional factors be detected, then the patient would 
be assigned to a bed in an observation ward.    The results of this intervention were 
encouraging; the proportion of patients correctly assigned to the coronary care unit was greater 
than chance, but also greater than either holistic clinical judgment, or the HDPI.  Holistic 
clinical judgment (perhaps unsurprisingly) was the least accurate method of differentiating 
between patients who should be admitted to the coronary care unit, and those who should be 
assigned a bed in an observation ward.  These results suggest that decision aids can be devised 
that are effective in enhancing human judgment.   
 
1.5 Advice giving and advice taking 
The preceding discussion has highlighted some of the cognitive limitations of human 
judgment, and has shown that interventions designed to enhance human judgment can induce 
appropriate judgment change in certain circumstances.  Inducing appropriate judgment change 
through interventions designed to enhance human judgment is clearly of applied utility, and 
can also be thought of in terms of advice.  The preceding discussion of the work of Green and 
Mehr, (1997), can be thought of as an example of advice from a single anonymous advisor on 
how to think about a decision to admit a patient to either a coronary care unit, or an 
observation ward.  The advantages (or otherwise) of utilising advice from other people is 
central to advice giving and advice taking research (Dalal and Bonaccio, 2006).  Here, 
judgments are perceived as the product of an interaction between a decision-maker and 
advisor(s).  The extant literature in advice giving and taking is relatively recent and 
underdeveloped, and no comprehensive theoretical account currently exists.  This is 
10 
 
unfortunate, as the focus of this thesis is individual judgment change facilitated by 
consideration of advice.   However, two approaches from the extant advice giving and advice 
taking literature emerge as potential influences upon individual judgment revision, and hence 
will inform the empirical studies reported later in this thesis - Judge Advisor Systems 
(hereafter JAS) research, and knowledge of the process of advice generation (algorithmic 
decomposition).  JAS research is significant in this discussion as it is premised upon the idea 
that few decisions of import are made solely autonomously by individuals.  This implies that 
human judgment - and aids to human judgment - must acknowledge the social context of 
decisions.  On another level, knowledge of the process of advice generation allows people to 
judge the veracity and validity of advice; if people view the process of advice generation as 
valid and coherent, then advice generated by this process is likely to be influential.  
Subsequently, people can either choose to incorporate such advice in their deliberations, or not.  
This idea is operationalized as ‗algorithmic decomposition‘ in this thesis, and is based on the 
idea that deconstructing an estimate of some quantity into more tractable sub-component 
estimates, and mechanically combing the sub-component estimates to produce a final estimate, 
should result in a less error prone estimate (than an estimate derived from holistic estimation).  
First, the findings from JAS research are considered. 
 
1.6 Overview of JAS Research 
People make numerous important decisions in their everyday lives.  However, many important 
decisions are not made by individuals without the benefit of advice.  Examples of typical 
decisions that involve the solicitation of advice are easy to bring to mind – strategic decisions 
in the context of organizations, decisions by companies to employ people, or the decisions of 
students over which university they should apply to.  Hence, the influence of advice upon 
decision-makers (hereafter judges) has important implications for the quality of decision 
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outcomes.  Of considerable interest to researchers therefore, are the potential improvements in 
the quality of human judgments potentially facilitated by judgment revision in response to 
advice (i.e. beneficial judgment revision).  This is particularly so where an individual judge 
may not possess complete decision relevant knowledge, and where advice is formulated in the 
context of a social interaction (and information is exchanged in a structured manner).  
Unfortunately, the social context of advice giving and advice taking is an area of enquiry that 
has not been systematically investigated by researchers in the field of judgment and decision-
making (Dalal and Bonaccio, 2006). 
  
Acknowledging the social context of advice giving, and advice taking, is an important 
development in JAS research, and clearly differentiates the area from other nominal group 
techniques (such as Delphi – which will be discussed later).  This is because JAS research 
recognises that the ultimate arbiter of advice is the judge, in many typical advice giving and 
taking situations in the real world; and it is the judge who weights different informational 
inputs from advisor(s), prior to a decision, and remains accountable for the outcome of any 
decision.  Research into nominal group decision techniques, such as Delphi, has not 
differentiated between the different contributions that a judge and advisor make to a particular 
judgment.  Hence, JAS researchers, such as Sniezek and Buckley (1989), have claimed that 
JAS research is of greater ecological validity than other similar group decision techniques.  
Acknowledging the different roles that judges and advisor(s) occupy in the decision making 
process places individual (and group) judgment revision in a social context.  JAS theorists 
argue that this adds explanatory power to their analysis of judgment revision.  This is because 
one robust finding in JAS research is that individual judges are disposed to revise their 
judgments even when advisor(s) are less expert than the people they are advising (Harvey and 
Fischer, 1997; Yaniv and Kleinberger, 2000; Yaniv, 2004).  If it is accepted that judges are 
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motivated to estimate accurately, then it follows that such judgment revision is due, at least in 
part, to judges conforming to social factors - such as not wishing to appear to reject advice that 
is freely given (Sniezek and Buckley, 1995), and sharing responsibility for the outcome of the 
decision (Harvey and Fischer, 1997; Yaniv, 2004a, 2004b).    
 
Conforming to advice then, may be a powerful influence upon judgment change, but up till 
now has not been the topic of systematic investigation.  I argue that social conformity is a 
significant and robust influence upon judgment change across a variety of estimation tasks in 
several task domains – people are constrained in their abilities to distinguish poor advice from 
good, and in these circumstances, tend to conform to any available advice.  This highlights the 
constraints, and limitations of, current knowledge and understanding of advice giving and 
taking, in terms of JAS research.  Largely, this is due to the hetereogeneity of approaches, 
concepts, and methods, employed by researchers within the JAS paradigm.  Most importantly, 
researchers have almost unanimously operationalized advice in solely numerical terms - the 
role of qualitative variables in the process of judgment change is less than fully acknowledged.  
It is this consideration that motivates the current work, largely because conceptualizing advice 
in solely numeric terms, in a social context does not appear ecologically valid.  This is because 
it does not appear parsimonious to suppose that people are able to determine the quality, or 
utility, of advice on the basis of solely numeric advice.   
 
Some of the experimental manipulations in the area of JAS studies have included appeals to 
expertise (Harvey and Fischer, 1997), agreement and disagreement amongst advisors (Sniezek 
and Buckley, 1991), and varying the degree of confidence that judges perceive advisors to 
possess (Sniezek and Buckley, 1995).  I argue that such manipulations are really a proxy for 
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advice quality – and it would probably be more useful (in terms of facilitating beneficial 
judgment revision) to provide judges with intrinsic information regarding the quality of 
available advice, in terms of supporting arguments or rationales.  As an alternative to the 
operationalization of advice articulated in the extant JAS literature, I have incorporated 
qualitative variables within a prototypical JAS experimental framework.  These qualitative 
variables include reasons in support of numerical estimates of varying accuracy, where the true 
answer was a known quantity.   
 
The issues identified in the preceding discussion are addressed in the first two (of six) 
empirical studies reported here.  Chapter 4 is an exploratory study that frames and 
operationalizes research questions that concern the preferences people have for different types 
of advice in a single judge-advisor(s) information exchange episode.  Specifically, the study 
addresses an individual‘s preference for solely numeric advice, or numeric advice with 
additional reasons.  Moreover, this study explores whether people can separate out ‗poor‘ from 
‗good‘ advice when revising judgment or, are prone to the influence of social conformity.  
Intuitively, reasons-based advice is an important determinant of beneficial judgment revision, 
and Chapter 5 examines whether people conform to advice (in a single judge-advisor 
information exchange episode), to the same degree, (when they revise judgment), when in 
receipt of solely numeric advice, or reasons-based advice.  Should people revise their 
judgements to the same degree, on average, irrespective of whether they receive solely 
numerical, or reasons-based advice, this would show that people are constrained in their 
abilities to evaluate advice in a single judge-advisor episode, whilst simultaneously 
highlighting the limitations of the current JAS paradigm as a lens for studying these issues, and 
lend support to the idea that conformity is a powerful influence upon judgment revision.  
Moreover, this study also distinguishes between accurate and inaccurate numerical advice – 
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should people not easily be able to recognise ‗poor‘ or ‗good‘ numerical advice - then 
conformity to accurate advice will result in potentially beneficial judgment revision on 
average, whilst conformity to inaccurate advice will result in judgment revision that is not 
beneficial, on average.  The second approach that I examine, in terms of potentially beneficial 
judgment revision, is research premised upon ‗algorithmic decomposition‘. 
 
1.7 Knowledge of the process of advice generation (algorithmic decomposition) 
I argue that providing judges with information about the process of advice generation, conveys 
a means by which judges are able to evaluate advice.  Should judges deem that the process of 
advice generation is logical, and valid, such information should be a more powerful influence 
upon judgment revision, than factors such as appeals to expertise, or the perceived confidence 
of advisor(s).  The empirical work in Chapters 6, 7 and 8 concentrates upon the idea that 
knowledge of the process of advice generation should be influential in participants‘ 
deliberations over the potential benefits of judgment change.  Chapter 6 examines the idea that 
providing participants with knowledge of the process of advice generation (step-by-step 
algorithms offering possible solutions to four estimation problems provided by an anonymous 
advisor), could result in greater beneficial judgment revision, than another group of 
participants in receipt of numerical advice supported by a testimonial assertion from an 
anonymous advisor (responding to the same estimation problems as the former group).  Should 
the result of this manipulation be that the degree of judgment revision is not significantly 
different between experimental conditions, it would support the idea that conformity to advice 
is an important determinant of individual judgment revision.  A potential limitation of this 
study might be that the algorithms provided to the participants were not known a priori to be 
effective.  This methodological limitation is addressed in Chapter 7.   
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Chapter 7 addresses the main methodological limitation of Chapter 6 by providing participants 
with algorithms that were known to be effective in improving estimation of numerical 
quantities (MacGregor et al. 1988, 1991).  These studies show that participants in receipt of 
algorithmic decompositions of estimation problems beneficially revise their judgments.   
However, the data can also be explained by the idea that people consistently underestimate 
large numerical quantities, and consistently overestimate small numerical quantities.  Hence, it 
is not clear whether algorithmic decomposition facilitates beneficial judgment revision, or that 
conformity - due to the relative positions of the values of pre-advice initial estimate, output-of-
algorithm (advice), and the true (but unknown answer) - is influential in terms of beneficial 
judgment revision. 
 
Chapter 8 examines a further methodological issue.  Knowledge of the process of advice 
generation should enable judges to evaluate the utility of the output-of-algorithm (advice), 
against the same judge‘s pre-advice initial estimate.  Subsequently, judges should be in a 
position to decide whether judgment revision will be beneficial.  This reasoning should not just 
apply to estimates of extremely large numerical quantities, but also to estimates of extremely 
small numerical quantities (relative frequencies).  A relative frequency can be defined as the 
incidence of one instance of an event, from a target population of events (e.g. the chance of 
winning the UK National Lottery can be expressed as 1/40,000,000).  Proponents of the 
algorithmic approach (MacGregor et al.) argue that beneficial judgment revision for estimates 
of extremely small quantities follows the same process as that of estimates of extremely large 
numerical quantities – deconstructing the problem into more tractable sub-component 
problems and mechanically combining these estimates, leads to beneficial judgment revision, 
on average.  Chapter 8 tests this proposition by presenting participants with estimation tasks 
that involve calculating the relative frequency of rare events, and subsequently providing 
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participants with algorithmic decompositions (of unknown effectives a priori) of these tasks as 
an estimation aid.  Hence, this study adds to an understanding of the circumstances in which 
knowledge of the process of advice generation can influence judgment revision. 
 
1.8 Discriminating between objectively ‘good’ and ‘poor’ advice 
Chapter 9 investigates whether people are able to adequately discriminate between objectively 
‗good‘ (i.e. numerical advice that is correlated with the target quantity to be estimated), and 
‗poor‘ advice (i.e. numerical advice that is not correlated with the target quantity to be 
estimated).   Should people appear constrained in their abilities to distinguish between ‗good‘ 
and ‗poor‘ numerical advice, then  beneficial judgment revision could be expected where 
people conform to ‗good‘ numerical advice, illustrating the robust influence of conformity.   
 
The final chapter of this thesis will consider how the results of the studies that have been 
described in the preceding sections, in sum show enhanced understanding of the potential of 
beneficial judgment revision through the lens of JAS research and research involving 
algorithmic decompositions of estimation problems.  By contextualizing these findings in the 
extant literature, implications for future JAS studies, and studies involving algorithmic 
decomposition, will be drawn – both for laboratory based experimentation, and field studies in 
the real world.  Limitations of the current work will be scrutinized, and some methodological 
improvements will be suggested. 
 
It is to the literature of advice giving and taking that I now turn in order to contextualize the 
empirical work reported in Chapters 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9. 
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Chapter 2:  Theoretical background 
 
In this section I will review the extant advice giving and taking literature, focussing upon the 
insights JAS research, and then studies involving algorithmic decomposition, offer to an 
understanding of aspects of human judgment.  Initially, this will involve a discussion of the 
development of the JAS paradigm.  Next, I consider how advice has been operationalized in 
JAS research, before discussing the merits of incorporating qualitative variables into 
prototypical JAS experimental manipulations.  One theme that emerges from these 
deliberations is the importance of supporting reasons, or rationales, in addition to solely 
numeric advice for people tasked with estimating numeric quantities.  I next discuss the central 
findings from JAS research.  In this section I draw on research evidence that considers if, and 
to what extent, people are disposed to follow numeric advice (advice utilization and advice 
discounting).  Subsequently, I consider the degree of confidence (both prior to the receipt of 
advice, and post-advice) held by judges in typical JAS studies.  These findings are relevant to 
the current discussion as it seems plausible that judges faced with an estimation problem for 
which a solution is not immediately available, may have little faith in their own intuition.  In 
these circumstances, judges may consider judgment revision (which may be sub-optimal), 
whilst simultaneously feeling increased confidence.  This lack of calibration between ultimate 
estimation accuracy and confidence is discussed in terms of the findings of ‗overconfidence‘ in 
the extant literature.  Ultimately, beneficial judgment revision results in outcomes that are 
more accurate, than the accuracy of pre-advice estimates.  Clearly then, ultimate estimation 
accuracy is an issue of interest to JAS researchers, and I discuss some variables that are 
theorized to mediate judge‘s post-advice accuracy.   
 
A second theme of interest is the potential of beneficial judgment revision where estimators 
have access to knowledge of the process of advice generation.  This issue draws upon several 
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studies that have examined the circumstances in which algorithmic decomposition has been 
shown to be a successful method of estimating intractable quantities.  I next consider research 
that may suggest that people are constrained in their abilities to recognize objectively ‗good‘ 
and ‗poor‘ numerical advice, before examining some of the methods of enquiry prevalent in 
JAS research.  Finally, this discussion considers research concerned with the Delphi technique 
of group decision making, and makes clear how insights from Delphi research inform 
understanding about what factors influence human judgment. 
 
2.1 JAS research and ecological validity 
 
JAS research is not the only approach to acknowledge the social context of decision-making - 
one stream of research, in the existing extant decision-making literature, focuses on the social 
context of human decision making in ‗small groups‘ (Kerr and Tindale, 2004).  Here, it is 
acknowledged that few decisions of any import are reached by autonomous individuals; rather 
the decision-making process is modelled upon the interactions of members of small groups.   
However, this research is based on the assumption that all group members are 
‗undifferentiated‘, (i.e. group members are equally involved, and equally responsible for the 
group decision).  One criticism of the ‗undifferentiated‘ assumption is that it is uncontroversial 
to observe that in many social structures and organizations, social roles are formalized, which 
may imply that individual contributions to decisions are often unequal (Katz and Kahn, 1966).  
This leads to the conclusion that many important decisions are difficult to model upon the idea 
of individuals acting autonomously, or on the idea that contributions in a group decision task 
are always undifferentiated.  Of interest to decision researchers, therefore, is the growing 
number of studies that consider how combining one‘s own estimate(s), or forecasts, with that 
of others results in changes in judgment.  The search for an ecologically valid approach to this 
issue has lead to the development of the JAS paradigm (Sniezek, 1992; Sniezek and Buckley, 
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1995; Budescu, and Rantilla, 2000; Budescu, et al. 2003).   
 
2.2 The JAS paradigm 
 
The JAS paradigm represents collaborations in which a decision-maker or Judge, receives 
information and recommendations from others in the role of Advisor.  It is argued that this 
representation of the decision process is more ecologically valid than models of individual 
decision making as few decisions of any import are arrived at solely on an individual basis.  
JAS research starts from the premise that the naturalistic environment of decision makers is 
inherently determined by their social role (e.g. in organizations, or the marketplace etc.).  JAS 
research models the decision making process in a social context where the person responsible 
for a decision or forecast (the Judge) seeks or receives some form of input from one or more 
persons in the role of Advisor.  Although there are various motives for using advice from 
others, the motive of greatest interest is the desire to improve the quality of the decision 
(Harvey and Fischer, 1997).  Whilst acknowledging that both Judge and advisor(s) are 
involved in the decision-making or forecasting process, JAS assigns the judge as the final 
arbiter and accountable for the decision or forecast. Hence, the rules for combining individual 
contributions are at the individual level of the judge and individual contributions from 
members in the advisor role are known as advice.  Hence, the JAS paradigm differentiates the 
social role of judges and advisors in the decision-making process.  In sum, the general thrust of 
JAS research is to isolate the influence of advice upon judges‘ final decisions. 
   
JAS studies are typically operationalized so that participants are randomly assigned to either 
the role of the judge, or the role of advisor.  Participants are informed that the final decision 
about a given experimental task rests with the judge, but that advice is solicited from 
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advisor(s).  It is up to the judge whether to accept advice or not, and what weight to attribute to 
any advice that is accepted, prior to making a final determination.  Often (but not always) 
judges make an initial decision about a given task prior to receiving advice.  Advice is then 
made available to the judge, who is then afforded the opportunity to revise their unaided 
judgment (if the judge wishes to do so).  Next, the issue of how advice has been 
operationalized in JAS research is addressed. 
 
2.3 Operationaliizing ‘advice’ 
 
The operationalization of exactly what constitutes ‗advice‘, in the extant JAS literature, is 
dependent upon the variety of tasks that researchers have utilized to investigate decision 
behaviour.  Advice was operationalized in Sniezek and Buckley (1995), for example, as an 
advisor‘s recommendation to a judge; where the participants in an experimental task made a 
dichotomous choice (i.e. in the United States, 41% of all money spent on food is spent in (A) 
supermarkets or (B) restaurants?).  Here, the advisor‘s recommendation of choice option (A), 
or choice option (B), constitutes the advice available to a judge.  However, this is not the only 
way in which advice is operationalized in the extant JAS literature - advice has also been 
operationalized as the confidence advisors express in their intuitive recommendations 
(Salvadori et al. 2001; Sniezek and Van Swol, 2001), or where advisors provide confidence 
intervals that include a point estimate (Yaniv and Kleinberger, 2000).  Conceptualizing advice 
as a point estimate (i.e. solely numerical) is also prevalent in JAS research (Sniezek, 1992; 
Harvey et al. 1997, 2000; Budescu, and Rantilla, 2000; Yaniv and Kleinberger, 2000; Budescu, 
et al. 2003; Yaniv 2004b), and is understandably attractive for reasons of mathematical 
tractability.  Yet, this operationalization of advice in solely numeric terms is problematic for 
reasons that are discussed in the following section. 
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Clearly, in many everyday situations solely numeric advice is uncommon (i.e. a judge seeking 
advice upon whether to appoint a particular job applicant, may not find the advice of ‘77.08‘ 
useful in any way).  It is perhaps more likely in this scenario that advisors would provide a 
cogent rationale in support of appointing or not appointing a particular job applicant.   Whilst 
such a rationale, in this scenario, does not necessarily exclude numeric information, it is 
unlikely to only include numeric information.  Hence, it is clear that limited progress can be 
made in isolating the influence of advice, on a decision maker‘s final judgment, where solely 
numerical information is the total advice package.   
 
Operationalizing advice in purely numeric terms obscures two main avenues of interest from 
consideration.  First, it is parsimonious to suppose that both in mundane everyday matters, and 
also in matters of some import, that ostensibly ‗quantitative‘ advice often incorporates reasons 
that speak to the validity and veracity of the advice, and hence, it is at least possible, for judges 
in receipt of advice, to evaluate the quality of the advice.  If one accepts this premise, then 
claims made for the superior ecological validity of JAS research are hard to sustain.  This is 
because up till now, the majority of JAS studies have modelled the advice exchange in an 
impoverished way – in this framework advice has been almost exclusively operationalized in 
numerical terms.  Secondly, purely numerical advice disguises the reasoning process that 
resolves in a quantitative output.  Ultimately, the reasons that support quantitative advice are 
components of the persuasiveness of the advice package; and the inclusion of qualitative 
variables (such as reasons), in addition to solely numeric information, is necessary to enhance 
the claims of ecological validity, advocated by JAS researchers.  The potential merits of the 
inclusion of qualitative variables into experimental manipulations in the context of JAS 
research is considered next.    
 
22 
 
2.4 Qualitative advice 
 
Few JAS studies have considered the qualitative effects of ‗reasons‘ in addition to solely 
numerical advice, upon a quantitative estimate of some quantity (as discussed in the preceding 
section, this is because studies loosely grouped under the label of JAS research, largely 
conceptualizes advice in solely numerical terms).  Even in the few studies where non-
numerical advice has been made available to participants, such advice has been impoverished 
and superficial (Van Swol and Sniezek, 2001).  These authors were interested in the 
relationship between trust, confidence, and expertise, in a typical JAS system.  Their design 
included a 40 item multiple-choice set, that tested their participants‘ knowledge about 
computing, and IT issues.  Participants were allocated to the role of either advisors or judges, 
where one party had the power to determine the division of financial rewards.  In addition to 
their recommendations over which of the multiple-choice items was correct, advisors were free 
to elaborate on their recommendations, by writing comments to the judge.  In the minority of 
instances where advisors elaborated upon their recommendations, such elaborations amounted 
to little more than comments such as ‗I‘m definite about this‘, or ‗This is a guess‘ (p297).  This 
is unfortunate, because a substantial literature outside the area of decision research, points to 
numerous qualitative variables that can potentially make advice more or less persuasive 
(Reinard, 1988; Flugstad and Windschitl, 2003).  A conceptualization of what exactly 
constitutes ‗advice‘, then, is an important issue in developing a fuller understanding of advice 
giving, and advice taking, at the level of individual interactions (Bonaccio and Dalal, 2006).  
Next I consider the significant findings reported by JAS researchers. 
 
2.5 Central findings of JAS research 
 
Perhaps the most unifying theme in the extant JAS literature is the study of advice utilization 
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or discounting.  Here, advice utilization refers to the extent that judges attend to, and ‗follow‘ 
the advice of advisor(s), whereas advice discounting refers to the degree to which judges do 
not follow advice.  Empirical studies have identified potential advantages to judges in 
incorporating the informational inputs from advisors prior to making a final determination.  
Utilizing advice from advisors can enable judges to consider a decision issue in a different way 
(Schotter, 2003), and can allow judges to consider new information, or alternatives previously 
unknown (Heath and Gonzales, 1995). Researchers also assert that potential accuracy benefits, 
in certain decision tasks, are available to judges by integrating advice that originates from 
multiple uncorrelated sources (Soll, 1999).  Further, there are diminishing returns, in terms of 
accuracy improvements, for judges when the number of uncorrelated sources of advice exceed 
five or six (Budescu and Rantilla, 2000: Yaniv, 2004a, Yaniv and Kleinberger, 2000).   
However, JAS authors who considered advice utilization, established that judges incorporate 
advice in their deliberations not just to improve the quality of judgment, but also to share 
accountability for the outcome of the decision(s) (Harvey and Fischer, 1997; Yaniv, 2004a, 
2004b), and for social reasons (avoiding the impression of rejecting freely offered advice) 
(Sniezek and Buckley, 1995). 
   
Advice discounting is a particularly robust finding in the JAS literature (Dalal and Bonaccio, 
2006).  Here, people are either unable, or unwilling, to benefit optimally from advice that is 
made available to them.  Instead people are predisposed to overweigh their own judgment 
(irrespective of its veracity or accuracy); in contrast to the weight (if any) they place upon 
advice.  Moreover, consistent with the social context argument discussed previously (Sniezek 
and Buckley, 1995), a ‗token shift‘ (20-30%) of judgment revision on the part of judges, 
towards that of the advisor(s) has been observed (Harvey and Fischer, 1997; Soll and Larrick, 
1999).   
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Yaniv (2004a, 2004b; Yaniv and Kleinberger, 2000) argue that one explanation of ‗egocentric 
discounting‘ of advice by judges, can be explained through a differential reasoning 
perspective.  In a situation where a judge is only able to access numerical advice from an 
advisor, the reasoning behind such advice will be unavailable.  Hence, a judge‘s own initial 
judgment will dominate any numerical advice.  This is because one‘s own judgment implicitly 
contains the reasons for a stated numerical judgment, whereas, numerical advice from advisors 
does not contain the reasons underlying the advice.  Egocentric discounting of advice by 
judges has also been viewed from an ‗anchor and adjust‘ perspective (Harvey and Fischer, 
1997; Lim and O‘Connor, 1995).  Here, it is argued that egocentric discounting of advice 
occurs because judges ‗anchor‘ upon their initial unaided judgment, or estimate, and 
insufficiently ‗adjust‘ this estimate post-advice (Kahneman and Tversky, 1974).  However, 
Krueger (2003), and Harvey and Harries (2004) criticize the anchor and adjust account of 
egocentric discounting, on the grounds that individuals applying the anchor and adjust strategy, 
are utilizing a temporary and short-term cognitive process to evaluate new stimuli.  Instead, 
these authors point to the concept of ‗egocentrism‘ (a long term belief that one‘s own 
judgments are superior to those of others – including those of advisors), as the mechanism that 
facilitates egocentric discounting of advice on the part of judges.  Krueger (2003) argues that 
people exhibit egocentrism when (i) making judgments about novel situations and (ii) when 
advice is made available prior to a judge making an unaided estimate.  This implies that judges 
are unable to adequately evaluate advice, and adjust judgment accordingly; and also that a 
judge‘s initial unaided estimate is unavailable to serve as an anchor (Clement and Kreuger, 
2000).  Hence, there are conflicting accounts of how the cognitive mechanisms of egocentric 
discounting of advice by judges occur in the extant JAS literature.  I now turn to the issue of 
the degree of confidence held by judges about their estimates pre-advice, and post-advice.  
 
25 
 
Commonly, confidence is defined as the degree to which either the judge expects their 
decision, or the degree to which an advisor expects their advice, to be correct, in JAS studies.  
This expectation has been expressed as a probability estimate, in some form of rating on a 
Likert-type scale, or as confidence interval within which the true answer is contained 
(Klayman, et al. 1999).  The levels of confidence reported by advisors will be discussed first.  
It is clear that judges regard expressions of confidence by advisors, as proxies for the 
knowledge, expertise, ability and accuracy of advisors (Sniezek and Buckley, 1995: Sniezek 
and Van Swol, 2001).  Moreover, the narrowness, or width of such confidence intervals are 
argued to be a cue to the advisor‘s self-perceived task relevant knowledge (Yaniv and Foster, 
1997; Yaniv 1997).  Judges have been found to more often follow the recommendations of 
advisors, where advisors express levels of confidence in excess of that held by judges 
(Lawrence and Warren, 2003; Phillips, 1999; Sniezek and Buckley, 1995; Sniezek and Van 
Swol, 2001; Van Swol and Sniezek, 2005; Yaniv, 1997).  Further, judges have been reported to 
prefer overconfident advisors to appropriately confident advisors (Price and Stone, 2004).  
However, there are limits to the extent that confidence can dominate advice quality.  Judges 
perceived advisors‘ expressions of confidence that were close to 100%, in a probabilistic 
forecast (dichotomous choice) task, as reckless, rather than confident (Yates et al. 1996).  
Whilst there is evidence of a relationship between the confidence expressed by advisors, and 
the accuracy of their advice (Sniezek and Van Swol, 2001: Van Swol and Sniezek, 2005); 
judges‘ attribution that confident advisors are the source of accurate advice is not always found 
to be appropriate (Gibbons et al. 2003; Phillips, 1999). 
 
The confidence of judges is also of interest to JAS researchers.  Less confident judges have 
been observed to seek advice to a greater extent, than confident judges, prior to making a final 
determination in a decision task (Cooper, 1991).  Post-advice, the degree of confidence held by 
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judges appears to be influenced by the accuracy of advisors, the extent of information available 
to advisors, and the degree to which advisors have access to the same information (Budescu et 
al. 2003).  Agreement between advisors also appears to be a determinant of the level of 
confidence held by a judge post advice, where disagreement amongst advisors is evident to a 
judge, the level of post-advice confidence held by the judge is low (Budescu et al. 2003; 
Savadori, Van Swol and Sniezek, 2001).  The degree to which a judge processes advice 
information is a further factor that may influence post-advice confidence, which may explain 
the common finding that judges‘ post-advice levels of confidence exceed pre-advice levels of 
confidence (Heath and Gonzales, 1995; Savadori et al. 2001).  Such findings suggest that 
judges may be overconfident in their judgments post-advice. 
 
JAS research has not systematically investigated inappropriate levels of confidence in either 
judges or advisors.  This is regrettable, as there are many studies in the realm of judgment and 
decision-making that examine both ‗overconfidence‘ and ‗under-confidence‘.  Overconfidence 
can be defined as the relationship between judgmental accuracy, and the confidence of a judge.  
If the relationship between judgmental accuracy, and an individual‘s confidence in their own 
judgment was perfect, then judgments with 100% confidence would be correct 100% of the 
time (judgments with 90% confidence would be correct 90% of the time etc.).  However, 
research findings suggest that a perfect match between judgmental accuracy and confidence is 
not the default position of human cognition (Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, and Phillips, 1982; Alpert 
and Raiffa, 1982; McClelland and Bolger, 1994; Brenner, et al. 1996; Teigen and Jorgenson, 
2005).  Indeed, these authors report that, participants in their studies were overconfident in 
their judgments, relative to the degree of accuracy they were able to achieve (i.e. an individual 
participant might report 100% confidence in a judgment, and yet achieve only 75% accuracy, 
on average).  An exemplar of overconfidence is presented by Adams and Adams, (1960).  
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Here, participants in a spelling task were only correct about 80% of the time, when they 
reported their confidence as being ―100% certain".  In other words, participants expected 0% 
error, when the actual error rate was 20%, on average.  Further, confidence exceeds accuracy; 
markedly so, where judges have incomplete domain knowledge.  Alpert and Raiffa (1982) 
tasked their participants with estimating quantities and providing confidence intervals that 
included the correct answer (i.e. an upper bound, and a lower bound, within which the true 
answer can be found), for quantities such as the total egg production of the US economy, or the 
total number of surgeons and physicians in the Boston telephone directory.  Not only did 
participants report overconfidence in their estimates for these uncommon quantities, but, in 
addition, this finding was robust, even when participants were explicitly warned of the 
detrimental effects of overconfidence upon accurate estimation.  It is clear that overconfidence 
is observable where people attempt to make judgments, but have incomplete domain 
knowledge.  The few JAS studies that incorporate some analysis of overconfidence are not 
inconsistent with the findings reported from the judgment and decision-making literature.  
Advocates of the JAS paradigm, such as Sniezek and Buckley (1995), for example, observed 
that judges with little access to task specific information, and who subsequently relied to a 
large extent on the advice made available from advisors, were overconfident in their 
judgments.  Yet judges who received conflicting advice from two or more advisors did not 
report overconfidence.  Further, interactions between judges involving the exchange of advice, 
may not necessarily increase the ultimate quality of judgments, but may increase confidence in 
those judgments, and hence overconfidence (Heath and Gonzales, 1995).  The quality of 
judges‘ judgments post-advice is the issue to which I discuss next. 
  
The post-advice decision accuracy of judges is of interest to researchers working within the 
JAS paradigm, primarily, to ascertain if judges that utilize advice are able to improve upon the 
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accuracy of estimates, or decisions, made prior to the receipt of advice.  Clearly, for beneficial 
judgment revision to occur judges must have some means to distinguish between ‗good‘ 
(advice that potentially enhances the quality of judgment), and ‗bad‘ (advice that potentially 
degrades the quality of judgment).  Dalal and Bonaccio (2006) propose three ‗core JAS –level 
variables‘ (p19) that mediate judges post-advice decision accuracy (i) the amount of task 
relevant information available to advisors (ii) the accuracy of advice (iii) the weight judges 
attribute to advice in their deliberations.  This articulation of how judges may discriminate 
between good and poor advice pre-supposes that advisors who possess greater task relevant 
information are more accurate on average, which subsequently influences the post-advice 
accuracy of judges, to the extent that they are able to distinguish between good and poor 
advice.  However, judges may be limited in their abilities to distinguish between good and poor 
advice for several reasons (constraints upon the task relevant knowledge held by the judge; 
limitations upon human cognition in terms of processing multiple decision relevant cues 
simultaneously; and the level of motivation held by a judge to achieve optimal accuracy in the 
decision outcome).  However, one variable that does influence the accuracy of decision 
outcomes is ‗feedback‘, which is discussed next. 
 
Feedback has been shown to influence judges‘ post-advice decision accuracy in the JAS 
literature.  Where judges receive feedback on the accuracy of their quantitative estimates 
across multiple trials, decision accuracy has been reported to improve (Fischer and Harvey, 
1999).  Moreover, where feedback is provided about the accuracy of an advisor who is 
untypical of a group of advisors (i.e. their advice can be described as a statistical outlier), 
judges learn to discriminate between poor and good (outlying) advisors (Harries et al. 2004).  
Harvey and Fischer (2005) have proposed that feedback can potentially improve the post-
advice decision accuracy of judges, by providing judges with information about how 
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performance can be improved in a format that is cognitively undemanding.  Next I consider the 
potential of knowledge of the advice generation process (algorithmic decomposition) for 
judges in terms of beneficial judgment revision. 
 
2.6 Knowledge of the process of advice generation (algorithmic decomposition) 
 
The second approach that is influential upon individual judgment change is argued here to be 
knowledge of the process of advice generation.  Knowledge of the process by which advice is 
generated should enable judges to better discriminate between good and poor advice.  Whilst 
this issue has not been systematically investigated in the advice giving and advice taking (or 
the JAS) literature, the ideas behind the common notion of ‗divide and conquer‘ provide a 
useful analogy (Armstrong, et al. 1975; Fischer, 1977; Henrion et al.1993; (Kleinmuntz et al. 
1996; Morera, and Budescu, 1998).   Here, it is argued that it is less demanding (and less error 
prone) to produce estimates to the constituent parts of a problem - and subsequently re-
combine these responses to form an overall estimate - than to produce an overall ‗holistic‘ 
evaluation.  The ‗divide and conquer‘ principle is widely used to enhance estimation, or 
forecasting, in various contexts, from medicine to accounting.  Early studies in clinical 
judgment showed that a linear model of clinical judgment outperformed holistic judgment 
(Meehl, 1957; Goldberg, 1968, 1970).   
 
The divide and conquer principle also underpins ‗algorithmic decomposition‘, a technique used 
to deconstruct seemingly intractable estimation problems into more tractable sub-component 
problems, and then subsequently mechanically re-combine sub-component estimates, into a 
final determination of some quantity (Armstrong, Denniston and Gordon, 1975; MacGregor, 
Lichtenstein and Slovic, 1988; MacGregor and Lichtenstein, 1991; MacGregor and Armstrong, 
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1994; MacGregor, 2001).     Results indicate that judges benefit from using the approach; for 
example, auditors‘ assessments of conditional probabilities were improved by algorithmic 
decomposition, in comparison to list-type aids, in the context of accounting (Bonner, Libby 
and Nelson, 1996). Similarly, studies (such as JAS) that task participants to make point 
estimations of target quantities in almanac-type tasks (where the answer is known to the 
experimenter, but not to the participant), show estimation improvements for participants 
utilizing the decomposition approach, above that achieved by holistic evaluation (Armstrong, 
Denniston and Gordon, 1975; MacGregor, Lichtenstein and Slovic, 1988; MacGregor and 
Lichtenstein, 1991; MacGregor and Armstrong, 1994; MacGregor, 2001).  The results from the 
preceding studies suggest that people make less accurate assessments through intuition, than 
they do using simple linear models (Dawes, 1979; Dawes, Faust and Meehl, 1989).  
 
Algorithmic decomposition is theorized to facilitate improved estimation performance for 
judges, because the attributes of an estimation problem are broken down into various 
constituent parts, allowing consideration of the attributes of the problem individually, or as 
sub-groups of attributes.  The decomposition of complex or uncertain estimation problems, 
aids decision making and estimation, because holistic judgments deteriorate over time due to 
the limits on human information processing capacity.  The systematic decomposition of 
complex or uncertain estimation problems, however, relaxes the information processing 
demands upon an estimator, potentially allowing a more rigorous consideration of the 
attributes of an estimation problem, (Fischer, 1977; Kleinmuntz, 1990). 
 
It is not necessary, for the purposes of the current discussion, to accept entirely the explanation 
of theorists who advocate the algorithmic approach as a route to improved estimation; 
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however, I argue that judges should be able to distinguish between approaches to successful 
estimation on the basis of knowledge of the process by which advice is generated.  In sum, 
where people are provided with an algorithmic decomposition of an estimation problem, they 
are able to judge its logical coherence against their own intuition, and come to a view of the 
utility of the provided algorithm.  If the logic of an algorithmic decomposition is accepted by a 
judge, and the output of the algorithmic decomposition is dissimilar to an individual‘s unaided 
holistic estimate, then it is likely that a judge will adopt the output of the algorithm, and 
subsequently revise their unaided pre-advice estimate of the quantity in question (i.e. 
appropriate judgment change is induced by the triumph of a superior rationale).  People may 
however, effortlessly and flawlessly, recall accurate information that leads to an optimal 
estimate, or retrieve sufficient information to self-construct a viable cognitive algorithm that 
‗solves‘ the problem sufficient for the purposes of the environmental context, without the need 
for any external intervention – in such cases the output of an algorithmic decomposition is 
likely to be ignored.  Hence, the process by which advice is formulated provides an important 
cue to judges over whether advice is beneficial (and should be adopted by the judge in 
deliberating over an estimate of an uncertain quantity), or whether advice is poor (the advice 
does not enable a judge to improve upon the judge‘s unaided estimate, or may even degrade 
judgment in comparison to the judge‘s unaided estimate).  Whether judges are able to 
adequately discriminate between ‗poor‘ advice and ‗good‘ advice in a general sense is the issue 
discussed in the following section. 
 
2.7 ‘Poor’ vs. ‘Good’ advice 
 
The idea that judges utilize environmental cues in a decision, or estimating task, as proxies for 
knowledge, has previously been referred to in the discussion of confidence levels held by 
advisors and judges, both pre-advice, and post-advice.  Of interest to the present discussion, is 
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whether in addition to knowledge of the process by which advice has been generated, people 
are able to adequately recognize, and utilize environmental cues, to adequately discriminate 
between good and poor advice.  Put simply, can people recognize and utilize objectively good 
advice, when it is ‗staring them in the face‘?  For judges, the answer to this question depends 
on several factors (existing knowledge of the decision or estimation task; cognition; 
motivation).  Moreover, where people hold little confidence in their ability to make accurate 
estimates of target quantities, they may be disposed to attend to any advice (irrespective of its 
quality) from a credible source in attempting to improve estimation accuracy (Yaniv and 
Kleinberger, 2000; Yaniv, 2004b).  These findings suggest that people find distinguishing 
between potentially beneficial, and poor advice, cognitively demanding.  Judges may seek to 
relax the constraints upon cognition, by recognizing environmental cues that potentially serve 
as substitutes for direct feedback about the veracity, and accuracy of unaided estimate(s) - 
recall that ‗feedback‘ is one environmental cue that does facilitate estimation performance 
improvements.  Previous research has shown the influence of trust (Van Swol et al. 2001), 
advisor confidence (Sniezek et al. 1995), and source credibility (Reinard, 1988), as some of the 
cues that are inferred to relax cognitive demands, and potentially influence the estimation 
performance of judges.   
 
Lee (2007, unpublished) sought to develop the idea that people utilize ‗proxy‘ cues when 
attempting to make quantitative estimates under conditions of uncertainty.  This author 
reasoned that people may generate quantitative estimates on the basis of ecologically valid 
proxy cues, and that people will successfully distinguish between potentially beneficial and 
unhelpful cues.  Such a rationalization was operationalized in terms of a task where 
participants sought to estimate the Infant Mortality Rate (hereafter IMR) of several countries.  
IMRs are defined as the number of children who die (irrespective of cause) prior to reaching 
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one year old, per every one thousand live births.  Hence, an IMR of 35.8 would indicate that, 
on average, in every 1000 live births, 35.8 children under the age of twelve months die.  Some 
participants were aided in this task through the provision of numerical information of each of 
the target countries‘ per capita (US$) Gross Domestic Product (hereafter GDP).  It was 
theorized that ‗national wealth‘ is an objectively good cue to national IMRs as, on average a 
nation‘s GDP is negatively correlated with its IMR.  Other participants were similarly aided in 
making estimates of countries‘ IMRs; by the provision of accurate population estimates of each 
of the target countries (there was no correlation between population estimate statistics and 
IMR).   Such an operationalization facilitated a comparison in terms of post-advice estimation 
accuracy between people in receipt of GDP advice, and people in receipt of Population 
estimate advice.  Results indicated (Study 4) that people in receipt of GDP advice were able to 
use this knowledge to enhance estimation performance.  Participants in receipt of population 
estimate advice were not able to use this advice to significantly improve estimation 
performance, on average.   
 
Lee (unpublished 2007), interpreted these findings as evidence that people are able to utilize 
environmental proxy cues to successfully distinguish between good and poor advice.  
However, an alternative ‗conformity to advice‘ account can also explain these findings.  The 
‗conformity to advice‘ account proposes that people are unable to adequately distinguish 
between good and poor advice, and that it is expected that merely by ‗following‘ advice people 
in receipt of GDP information (if attended to, and acted upon) would improve performance 
(the advice is objectively ‗good‘). Similarly, people in receipt of population estimate 
information would not significantly improve performance, (the advice is not correlated with 
IMR), merely by following advice.   The idea that in conditions of uncertainty people who 
revise their judgment post-advice are disposed to incorporate any advice (irrespective of its 
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veracity or quality) (Yaniv and Kleinberger, 2000), is one that will be developed in the main 
body of this thesis.  Methodological issues in JAS research will now be considered.  
 
2.8 Methods of enquiry in JAS research 
 
From a methodological viewpoint, JAS studies are difficult to compare and evaluate due to the 
heterogeneity of experimental designs and tasks that researchers have reported.  However, 
there are four key areas that emerge strongly from the extant JAS literature – the variety of 
experimental tasks JAS researchers have utilized; the various conceptualizations of advice; 
characteristics of, and number of advisor(s); and the characteristics of judges.  First, it is 
important to re-iterate the distinction between tasks involving choice, and tasks involving 
judgment.  Experimental tasks in JAS research have been operationalized in terms of 
dichotomous, or multiple choice, where an advisor(s) recommendation constitutes ‗Choose 
option A‘ or ‗Choose option C‘, from an array of possible alternatives (Sniezek and Buckley, 
1995; Schrah et al. 2004; Savadori et al. 2001; Sniezek and Van Swol, 2001; Koehler and 
Beauregard, 2005).    JAS researchers have also utilized tasks that involve judgment - often 
point estimates, or estimates of subjective probability (Harvey and Fischer, 1997: Harvey et al. 
2000; Yaniv and Kleinberger, 2000; Yaniv 2004a, 2004b; Budescu and Rantilla, 2000; 
Budescu et al. 2003; Budescu and Yu, 2006).  The distinction between choice and judgment is 
an important one, as there is good evidence from the wider decision making literature that the 
mode of response in empirical studies has influence in the decision making process (Payne et 
al. 1993; Gigone and Hastie, 1993, 1997; Hinsz, 1999).  This implies that the cognitive 
architecture that facilitates choice may be different from the cognitive structures that underpin 
judgment (Billings and Scherer, 1988).  Critically, for JAS research, ―many studies did not 
provide a rationale for selecting one type of task over another (e.g. judgment over choice, or 
vice versa)‖ (Dalal and Bonaccio, 2006, p31).  This observation serves to highlight the 
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underdeveloped status of JAS research, in that it would seem difficult to argue that the 
experimental findings from JAS tasks involving choice are directly comparable to the JAS 
findings involving judgment. 
 
Two secondary issues are also relevant to the discussion of the variety of tasks that 
characterize JAS research – the timing of advice, and task complexity. First, recall that the 
basic paradigm of JAS research was previously outlined (a judge makes an unaided judgment 
or estimate prior to receiving some advice, then subsequently makes a final determination over 
the issue of interest).  However, some JAS studies have manipulated the timing of advice so 
that a judge is prevented from forming an unaided estimate prior to receiving advice (Budescu 
and Rantilla, 2000; Harvey et al. 2000; Sniezek and Van Swol, 2001).  Here, judges are tasked 
with familiarizing themselves with a decision problem whilst simultaneously receiving advice.  
Whilst such a manipulation is useful where the object of study is to examine how judges 
aggregate multiple pieces of advice, under conditions of uncertainty (Budescu and Rantilla, 
2000), it is less helpful when trying to establish both the amount, and degree of judgment 
change, and ultimate accuracy of post-advice judgments (Yaniv and Kleinberger, 2000; Yaniv 
2004a, 2004b).  A further consideration is the degree of complexity of tasks in JAS research.  
Few researchers have considered this variable in the extant literature, but results indicate that 
people overweigh advice when deliberating on ‗difficult‘ tasks, but underweight advice when 
considering ‗easy‘ tasks (Gino and Moore, 2007).  Gino and Moore (2007) tasked their 
participants to estimate the weight of individuals from a series of photographs; task difficulty 
was varied by presenting clear images in the ‗easy‘ condition, and blurred images in the 
‗difficult‘ condition.  
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The preceding discussion sets out an argument for why JAS studies are limited, and points 
towards a framework that can be utilized for incorporating qualitative variables into future JAS 
studies.  Clearly, for any advice to be beneficial in terms of a judge‘s estimation performance, 
then it must be timely, plausible, and more useful than any estimate that the judge could 
achieve alone.  Advice that does not fulfill these criteria is likely to degrade the quality of 
estimation – should a judge choose to attend to the advice.  Hence, the real problem for judges, 
when faced with a problem for which they do not know the true answer, (and may not have the 
time, or resources, to find the true answer), is distinguishing between beneficial advice, and 
poor advice.    
 
2.9 Delphi - an alternative paradigm in which to examine judgment revision. 
This thesis focuses upon the factors that influence individual judgment change, but it is useful 
to examine what insights about judgment revision have emerged from studies of group 
decision making.  Given this proviso, a similar and more widely recognized technique (than 
either JAS or algorithmic decomposition) for combining estimates in a forecasting or decision-
making context is the ‗Delphi‘ technique.  Delphi is a forecasting technique originally 
developed by the RAND Corporation during the 1960s in the US.  The technique is designed to 
counter the sub-optimal performance of face-to-face interacting groups when making forecasts 
(e.g. the ‗loudest voice‘ phenomena, ‗groupthink‘, and the formation of political alliances).  It 
is argued that assembling a panel of heterogeneous experts to consider some issue of interest - 
in which the anonymity of panellists is assured by removing extraneous social factors - may 
minimise the effects of the ‗loudest voice‘, and curtail the influence of majorities (and 
minorities) upon individual reasoning.  This is facilitated by the elicitation of estimates (often 
numerical) in response to question(s) of interest.  Individuals‘ responses are collated and 
analyzed by a facilitation team, and feedback is distributed (usually the mean, or median figure 
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of the panels‘ estimates).  Subsequently, individuals re-consider their initial estimate in the 
light of the new information provided through feedback.  In addition, those panellists whose 
estimates fall in the upper and lower inter-quartile range, are required to provide a reason or 
rationale for their estimate.  The process output of several iterations is the aggregate response 
of the panel.   
 
It is claimed that the success of the Delphi technique is based upon the analogy of the ‗Theory 
of Errors‘ (Dalkey, and Helmer, 1963).  The ‗Theory of Errors‘ explains improvements in 
judgmental accuracy facilitated through judgment revision in the following way.  Delphi 
studies have typically involved an initial estimation round, following which, an individual 
participant would receive feedback consisting of the median group estimate.  Participants 
would then be asked to make a further estimate in the light of this new information.  This 
process was repeated until participants‘ responses became stable - little or no judgment change 
between iterations.  On average responses converged over rounds, and there was a tendency for 
participants whose estimates were furthest from the group median to change their judgments in 
the light of feedback.  These panellists were categorized as ‗swingers‘; a second category of 
panellist was categorized as ‗holdouts‘ as they tended not to change their judgment in the light 
of feedback.  Hence, both the true answer (T), and the median estimate of the group (M) 
became poles of attraction for participants receiving numerical feedback.  Improvements in 
accuracy could be expected - on average - as long as the pull of (M) did not overshadow the 
pull of (T).    
  
The ‗Theory of Errors‘ is a possible explanation for improvements in judgmental accuracy 
where advice is solely numerical.  However, even within these parameters a ‗Theory of Errors‘ 
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does not fully explain all the permutations of ‗holdouts‘ and ‗swingers‘.  It is certainly true that 
panellists who make accurate estimates of some quantity, and are highly confident in their 
judgments are desirable in any group judgment seeking accuracy.  However, it is also entirely 
possible that some panellists make inaccurate estimates, but remain convinced of the veracity 
of such an estimate (i.e. inaccurate holdouts).  This group could potentially degrade overall 
group accuracy.  Similarly, swingers who make accurate judgments, but are predisposed to 
revise judgment in the light of panellists‘ feedback due to low confidence, may also degrade 
overall group judgment (i.e. accurate swingers).  Swingers who make inaccurate judgments, 
but simultaneously have low confidence in such judgments are likely to move towards the 
judgments of holdouts.  Hence, if practitioners of the Delphi technique wish to maximise the 
accuracy of process output from the Delphi panel, it is desirable to minimise the influence of 
highly confident panellists who make inaccurate judgments, and minimise the influence of 
unconfident panellists who make accurate judgments (as the judgments of these panellists are 
likely to be dominated by more confident panellists).   
 
One way in which Delphi researchers have attempted to enhance the accuracy of the output of 
Delphi panels is by going beyond solely numerical feedback, and incorporating additional 
reasons-based advice where a participant‘s estimate fell in the upper, or lower, inter-quartile 
range of Delphi panel estimates.  The addition of reasons-based advice caused ‗significant 
improvements in accuracy‘ (Parente and Anderson-Parente, 1987, p136).  This may imply that 
reasons-based advice offers enhanced diagnosticity to participants‘ receiving statistical 
feedback, facilitating improvements in accurate estimation.  Further, the idea that reasons-
based advice may be influential in enhancing judgmental accuracy has an evidential basis; Best 
(1974) found that for one of two task items a Delphi group given reasons-based advice in 
addition to means and medians, outperformed a group given only statistical feedback.  
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Furthermore, Rowe and Wright (1996) compared performance accuracy in a forecasting task 
between the feedback conditions of iteration, statistical, and statistical plus reasons-based 
advice.  Their findings indicate that participants in the statistical plus reasons condition were 
less likely to change their estimates over rounds, but when they did change, it was in the 
direction of greater accuracy.  One explanation for these results might be that purely statistical 
feedback is likely to induce indiscriminate conformity in some participants – they may change 
their judgment merely to conform to the majority judgment of the group.  In contrast, feedback 
of qualitative reasons may offer greater diagnosticity and hence provide a route to enhanced 
accuracy.  From these findings it is possible to infer that Delphi works partly through iteration 
(Boje and Murnighan, 1982; Parente et al. 1984), where panellists have the opportunity to 
reflect upon their estimates; and partly through the diagnosticity of the feedback provided 
(Parente and Anderson-Parente, 1987).  This implies that the structured exchange of reasons in 
a Delphi-like task may lead to greater judgmental accuracy than the structured exchange of 
statistical information (group means or medians).  
 
These findings indicate that where the social context of nominal group decision making is 
controlled, the confidence held by panellists in the veracity of their own estimates is an 
important factor in any subsequent propensity to revise judgment in the light of 
advice/feedback.  Further, where supporting reasons were provided for estimates that were in 
the upper or lower inter-quartile range of panellists estimates, accuracy improved.  Arguably 
then, there appears to be a case for controlling social influences in small decision making 
groups if the factors that effect judgment revision are to be examined.  If this is so, it may 
extend to JAS-type manipulations and render the paradigm as an inappropriate one in which to 
examine the potential factors that influence judgment revision.   
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However, despite the claims of some researchers, participants in Delphi studies may not be 
immune from the robust effects of social influence – despite the anonymity of Delphi panellists 
and non-verbal means of communication.  Harvey and Fischer (1997) have shown that people 
do not weight advice and form judgments - even when presented with exclusively statistical 
information from anonymous advisor(s) – outside of a social context.  These authors examined 
the factors that determine the influence that (numerical) advice has on judgment utilising the 
JAS approach.  A hypothetical scenario was developed in which participants were tasked with 
forecasting the potential mortality rate amongst cattle following an outbreak of an unspecified 
bovine disease.  This assessment had further ramifications in that participants were told that 
these forecasts were to be used to calculate the amount of financial compensation farmers 
could receive (in reality this was an experimental manipulation).  Following a training session, 
participants responded to pictorial stimuli representing the extent and severity of the disease 
outbreak, and made a forecast of the number of bovine fatalities.  This was facilitated by the 
display of a circle for 0.5 seconds on a computer monitor: the colour of the circle represented 
the type of viral outbreak under consideration, and the area of the circle designated the extent 
of the disease outbreak.  Subsequently, anonymous statistical advice and information of the 
advisor‘s level of training was supplied to the decision-maker prior to his/her final forecast.   
 
One experimental finding to emerge from this study, is that people are reluctant to dismiss 
advice from people less knowledgeable than themselves (determined experimentally by level 
of training) when the advice is freely offered.  Even ‗experienced‘ judges (determined by level 
of training) altered their initial estimates by up to 20% when offered advice from others less 
knowledgeable than themselves.  Normatively this may appear inconsistent with the objective 
of judgmental accuracy, given that experienced advisors could be expected to possess greater 
expertise in this particular task, and give more accurate advice facilitating judgmental accuracy 
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on the part of the judges.  That this was not the case may imply that judges make inferences 
about the nature of statistical advice beyond the numerical information presented to them.  
Such inferences appear inconsistent with the ‗Theory of Errors‘ that is cited to explain the 
success of the Delphi technique – more accurate decision makers are hypothesised to ‗holdout‘ 
in the face of estimates produced by Delphi panellists of lesser accuracy.  One insight offered 
by JAS research for the Delphi method, is that some sources of extraneous social influence 
persist even in scenarios where judges and advisors communicate non-verbally.  This insight 
may explain some of the sub-optimality in judgmental accuracy that Delphi groups typically 
exhibit.   
 
In sum, the insights that research into the Delphi technique of group decision making offers to 
a greater understanding of individual judgment revision, in the light of advice, are somewhat 
limited.  It is true however, that both JAS and Delphi research emphasise the importance of the 
perceived confidence judges hold in their own judgments, and the relationship between 
individual confidence and judgmental accuracy, as influences upon judgment revision.  
Distinct from JAS, Delphi research also highlights the influence of majorities, and minorities 
upon judgment revision, and it is argued by Delphi researchers that these influences operate 
through the mechanism of iteration.  However, it is clear from the extant Delphi literature that 
the cognitive mechanisms that facilitate judgment revision are not fully understood.  Hence, 
the ‗Theory of Errors‘ is an incomplete account of group judgment revision.  Similar to JAS 
research, this may be in part due to the largely unacknowledged role of reasons in addition to 
solely numerical advice.  The importance of reasons-based advice in Delphi research has been 
acknowledged in Delphi studies that have successfully manipulated reasons-based advice to 
enhance the accuracy of aggregate process output.  This insight suggests that reasons-based 
advice may well be influential in instances of individual judgment revision – unfortunately the 
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extant JAS literature reveals few examples of such a manipulation.  A further insight about 
judgment revision that is addressed by the extant Delphi research concerns the social nature of 
advice giving and advice taking – temporarily isolating individuals for the purposes of 
experimentation is unlikely to entirely remove the social context in which judgments are made.  
In this scenario, the JAS paradigm may offer greater ecological validity for researchers than 
Delphi, as typical JAS manipulations are designed to recognise the different social roles of 
judge and advisor(s).  
 
In the next section I consider the methods that were utilized in carrying out the experimental 
work reported in Chapters 4 - 9, and a justification for the methods used.  
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Chapter 3:  Common Methods 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Six studies are reported in Chapters 4-9 of this thesis, where various experimental 
manipulations are carried out to investigate the central issue of this work – appropriate 
judgment revision.  The purpose of this section is to argue why the experimental methods used 
were centred within a philosophically positivistic paradigm, and further why an interpretivist 
methodological approach would be inappropriate for the purposes of the current work.  
Further, justification is provided for the general approach adopted in this thesis.  Next, 
consideration is given to the size and characteristics of the population sample that participated 
in the current experimental work.  Procedural issues are then addressed, before consideration 
of inferential statistical tests is discussed.  
 
3.2 Philosophical assumptions 
 
The research area that is the focus of this investigation concerns ways in which appropriate 
individual judgment revision can be induced.  Several key assumptions underlie the approach 
taken to investigate questions of interest within the parameters of the research area.  In terms of 
ontology, this study recognizes an objective reality independent of individuals and individual 
cognitions (Morgan and Smircich, 1980).  However, further clear ontological distinctions are 
somewhat more difficult to assert.  The notion of an entirely ‗harmonious‘ reality is brought 
into question.  ‗Irrationality‘ in some definitions would seem to imply a degree of conflictual 
reality - at least at the individual psychological level.  Hence, although there is a strong 
assumption of ‗atomism‘ (understanding the whole on the basis of the parts) there is also 
recognition of a conflictual reality in so far as dissonant cognitions can be said to lead to sub-
optimal judgment (Psillos, 1999).  The epistemological assumptions that underlie this approach 
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are almost entirely positivist; whereby knowledge is represented as real and precise (Popper, 
1959).  The positivistic paradigm has been chosen in the context of the parameters of the area 
of study for several reasons.  Firstly, it is consistent with the aforementioned ontological 
assumptions that are made about the nature of reality.  The implications of the key fundamental 
assumptions and the consequent ontological and epistemological positions adopted for the 
proposed research are distinct.  The scope of the research is bounded both by the area of 
interest and the positivist paradigm through which it is examined.  In essence, the 
measurability of the phenomena under investigation is critical in deciding what to include in 
the study and what to ignore.  A research design incorporating a hypothetico-deductive 
methodology indicates the development of testable propositions that will either be supported 
by data analysis or not supported (Popper 1959).  Moreover, a significant amount of data from 
participants will be responses in numerical form.  This leads directly to the use of both 
descriptive and inferential statistical techniques for the analysis of data.  However, other forms 
of responses are not precluded from the analysis and form important parts of the rationale and 
argument developed through the study. 
 
A fundamental ontological assumption that underpins the current work is that reality is 
objective, not subjective.  Reality can be perceived as - at least - external to individual 
consciousness (Myers and Avison, 2002; Burrell & Morgan, 1979; Hirschheim, 1985; 
Hirschheim and Klein, 1989).  An illustration might be that gravity exists whether an 
individual likes it or not.  Although gravity is invisible, no matter where any individual person 
may be in the world, gravity‘s effects are essentially the same and not variable by an 
individual‘s subjective evaluation of it.  Despite this assertion, the ontological assumption that 
objective reality is essentially harmonious is questioned (Chalmers, 1999).   It does not appear 
impossible to suggest that at both the individual psychological level and as part of any 
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organizational culture, that a conflictual reality exists.  An objective definition of reality has 
epistemological implications in so far as knowledge can be represented as real, certain and 
precise.  In broad terms such an approach may be characterized as philosophically objective 
and positivistic in terms of a scientific paradigm (Donaldson, 2003). 
 
Whilst acknowledging that there may be alternative ways of approaching this area of interest 
through different paradigms and methodologies, positivism offers some attractive qualities.  It 
seeks to induce generalizations or laws by gathering and ordering data, developing explanatory 
theories, deducting and testing hypotheses to test theories, which in turn either supports theory 
or leads to an adjustment of theory.  What positivism does not seek to do is to provide certain 
‗proof‘ of the correctness of a proposition (Donaldson, 2003).  Hypothetico-deduction aims to 
manipulate one or more features of reality (the independent variable[s]) whilst holding 
everything else constant.  If this manipulation results in a measurable effect, upon the 
dependent variable above the level of chance occurrence, then the hypothesis is said to be 
supported.  Positing the null hypothesis - any effect is due to chance occurrence - usually tests 
hypotheses (Lee, 1991).  By disconfirming the null hypothesis, support is given to the initial 
hypothesis (Popper, 1959).  Research conducted through a positivist paradigm is incremental 
and cumulative.  Studies are rigorous and replicable, demonstrating the robustness of the 
propositions tested and the establishment of ‗facts‘. 
 
The consequences of these ontological and epistemological positions for the area of research 
are philosophical and pragmatic.  A positivistic paradigm - by its very nature - excludes many 
forms of data (which may include elaborated social interactions) that may well be important 
research issues.  However, by concentrating on real and demonstrable phenomena positivism 
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provides a measurable and testable basis for inferences about reality.  Importantly, positivism 
makes a distinction that the researcher is largely independent from the phenomena under 
investigation (Donaldson, 2003).  Pragmatically, the self-imposed boundaries that positivism 
sets itself, encourages a focused and achievable research project.  The limitations of positivism 
could be described as strengths rather than weaknesses and have some bearing upon the scope 
of the current project.  The scope of this study encompasses the development of theory from 
the extant literature, formulation of a series of testable (and falsible) hypotheses, experimental 
studies involving samples from selected populations of people, data analysis and tentative 
conclusions.  The study is empirical, and involves (largely numerical) data analysis.  
Descriptive and inferential statistics are utilized as means to interpret results.  
 
3.3 Alternative philosophical approaches 
 
Despite the strength of the positivist position outlined above it is certainly possible to 
investigate the research area through the lens of another philosophical research paradigm.  
However, a possible caveat might be that one would have to formulate variations on the 
questions asked, to fully benefit from any differing approach.  Interpretivism - as a research 
philosophy - differs in many ways from the fundamental assumptions that underpin the 
positivist paradigm (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994).  Ontologically, interpretivism regards reality 
as subjective and as socially constructed.  Individuals are regarded as ‗sense-making‘ 
participants rather than as objects of study and as such there are multiple, local and specific 
‗constructed realities‘.  Crucially, an interpretivist paradigm views the researcher as an integral 
part of the socially constructed reality under investigation - and it is arguably the case that it is 
difficult for an observor to perceive another person entirely separate from social reality 
(Khlentzos, 2004).  Researchers in the interpretivist paradigm view knowledge as a social 
constructed process produced through the interaction of enquiry and participation (Orlikowski 
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and Baroudi 1991).  Hence, how revisions of judgment occur that arise from factors such as 
politics, society, culture, ethnicity, and gender are all relevant questions that could profitably 
be pursued through an interpretivist framework.  Interpretivism could fruitfully explore the 
socially constructed foundations of judgment and judgment revision in terms of individual and 
organizational meaning.  The consequence for such a project ontologically and 
epistemologically would be a subjective view of reality encompassing differing socially 
constructed multiple realities (Wenger, 1998).  Analysis would involve questions of knowledge 
representation, and a conceptualization of multiple levels of ‗three-dimensional‘ meaning for 
participants. 
 
There are many compelling reasons why researchers might choose interpretivism as a 
paradigm in which to investigate influences upon appropriate judgment revision, judgmental 
biases, and (perceived) irrational decision-making.  However, interpretivism has limitations 
that would exclude some avenues of enquiry.  Interpretivism - almost by definition – is 
concerned with subjectivity, and hence seeks to understand social reality often by interacting 
with people better to understand the subjective meaning people may attach to judgment and 
appropriate judgment revision, in the environment in which these issues are addressed on a 
day-today basis (ecological validity).  However, in practice, researchers adopting an 
interpretivist approach face considerable obstacles.  First, the integrity of any data collected 
where a researcher is (i) part of a complex social interaction and (ii) perceiving and imposing 
meaning upon real-time and real-world events whilst simultaneously trying to collect data is 
open to question.  Second, the practicalities of data collection for researchers using an 
interpretivist approach limit samples of people from any given population, to sole individuals 
or very small groups of people – hence it is difficult to see how findings can be generalized to 
a wider population.  Third, given the unique quality of any specific social interaction, it is very 
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unlikely that findings from one interpretivist study can be replicated by the findings of another.  
Interpretivist researchers may possibly counter these criticisms by claiming that as their subject 
matter is subjective meaning, then issues of validity, generalization, and replicability do not in 
any way undermine the findings of their studies.  Without elaborating upon the circularity of 
such a position, or the historical debate between the merits of positivism and interpretivism 
further, it is parsimonious to assume that in order to study influences upon human judgment 
and appropriate judgment revision, a useful starting point might be to adopt an approach where 
judgment can be measured and judgment revision can be verified.   
 
A further limitation of an interpretivist project seeking to determine (some) of the influences 
upon judgment and appropriate judgment revision, is (in purely practical terms) its size and 
complexity.  Such a project would probably be far wider in the nature of participant 
involvement and the types of data sought than a project centred in a positivistic framework.  
Adopting an interpretivist approach would probably involve high levels of discourse analysis 
following in-depth interviews with participants (Edwards and Potter, 1999).  In this context 
any research design is likely to be multi-faceted and ‗immersive‘ in that the researcher would 
become part of what one is trying to study (Agar, 1996).  A further difficulty is likely to be that 
theoretical constructs are difficult to define to a singular meaning and would probably be 
subject to a form of hermeneutics as a way of coping with what is meant by meaning.  The 
type of data arising from studies utilizing the interpretivist paradigm is likely to be qualitative 
in nature, and indeed may raise questions over what can and cannot be classified as research 
data.  Data analysis is likely to be multi-layered given the ethnographic and phenomenological 
nature of interpretivist investigations.  The interpretation of results derived from the 
interpretivist approach is by nature somewhat subjective, involving extensive discourse 
analysis and hermeneutics (Agar, 1996), and as such is difficult to analyze to determine the 
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influences upon judgment and appropriate judgment revision. 
 
As has been shown, the issues of judgment and appropriate judgment revision can be 
approached from more than one research paradigm.  However, there are both philosophic and 
practical reasons that dictate that a positivistic approach may be more fruitful in investigating 
the phenomena under discussion in this thesis.  ‗Rationality‘ in the context of judgment can be 
a measurable construct in terms of experimentation (i.e. the degree to which people 
underweight information that could potentially improve judgment).  Hence, systemic 
deviations from normative models - biases - can also be measured.  This may imply that 
underlying processes or causes may be discoverable through a systematic and rigorous 
approach encapsulated by positivism.  Interpretivism, in contrast, would serve as an extremely 
useful tool in exploring the sociology of judgment, but would appear less useful in examining 
both the individual and group psychological processes that lead to sub-optimal judgmental 
outcomes.  
   
 3.4 Justification of the general approach 
 
The preceding section examined the philosophical basis of the positivistic approach adopted in 
this thesis to the issues under consideration.  In this section, the focus is narrowed to justify the 
general experimental approach adopted in this thesis, with specific reference to methods that 
are utilized widely in the advice giving and taking extant literature.  As the issue of interest in 
this thesis is the process of judgment change, both in terms of amount and degree, that can be 
attributed to the provision of reasons-based advice, the studies were designed to investigate 
human judgment, rather than choice (as discussed in the preceding literature review the 
cognitive mechanisms theorized to facilitate judgment are not the same as the cognitive 
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architecture that enables choices to be made).   Recognising the distinction between judgment 
and choice has implications for the design of empirical studies, in that participants in the 
studies reported here were not asked to make choice(s) from an array of potential alternatives.  
Instead, participants were asked to make judgments (numerical estimates) of uncertain 
quantities.  This basic premise was useful in terms of mathematical tractability, and allowed 
the use of a variety of statistical techniques (discussed later) to be employed to explore 
relationships between variables.  The issue of judgment change also implied (in terms of 
experimental design) repeated measures (at least two measures are necessary to measure 
judgment change).  Here, experiments in JAS research provide a useful template - a judge 
makes an unaided estimate, then receives advice, and subsequently is able to decide whether to 
revise his/her unaided estimate with the benefit of advice (Dalal & Bonaccio, 2006).  Albeit 
with variations that encompass the idea that knowledge of the process of advice generation 
(algorithmic decomposition) should influence judgment- the studies reported in the empirical 
chapters follow this basic JAS paradigm.  Consideration is now given to characteristics of the 
population from which participants were drawn.    
 
3.5 Participants 
 
In all, 834 people participated in the six studies reported in this thesis.  These participants were 
drawn from staff and students at Durham Business School, University of Durham, UK.  
Participants were mostly undergraduate students undertaking courses of study at Durham 
Business School, and many were non-native English speakers.  It was assumed that the 
linguistic requirement of the University for admittance to undergraduate, and post-graduate, 
courses was sufficient to allow the linguistic abilities of the sample to be treated as one 
population.   
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3.6 Recruitment of participants 
 
Participants (N = 73) in the first study reported in this thesis (Chapter 4) were made up entirely 
of academic and non-academic staff from Durham Business School who held a valid email 
organizational email address.  An invitation email was sent to all Durham Business School 
staff, and respondents became participants in the study by self-selection (if staff wished to 
participate they clicked on an internet link within the invitation email that subsequently opened 
the online survey).  This process meant that participants were recruited without the physical 
presence of the experimenter. 
   
The recruitment of participants to the study reported in Chapter 6 followed a different process.  
Here, the sample was made up entirely of undergraduate students (N = 255) that I had access to 
through my teaching role at Durham Business School.  Here, questionnaire booklets were 
prepared and distributed to large groups of students in lecture theatres and classrooms at both 
Durham, and Queen‘s Campus (Stockton).  Participants completed the questionnaire booklets 
individually, and returned them to me on the same occasion. 
 
Participants recruited to the study reported in Chapter 7 made their responses both online (N = 
60) and on paper (N = 82).  Participants responding online were recruited by the distribution of 
an email to Durham Business School staff that contained an internet link, clicking on which 
allowed staff to become participants in the study.  Similarly, students responding online were 
recruited by the distribution of an email to students that the author had access to through his 
teaching responsibilities – by clicking on an internet link in the email students were able to 
become participants in the study.  In both cases participants were ‗self-selecting‘ in so far as 
respondents could either choose to become participants, or ignore the invitation.  Participants 
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responding online were incentivized to take part in the study by receiving an Amazon voucher 
worth £4 for completing the online survey.  Participants responding on paper received no 
incentive.  Participants responding online made their decision over whether to take part or not, 
without the presence of the experimenter, participants responding on paper completed the 
questionnaire in the presence of the experimenter. 
 
Durham Business School staff and students (N = 105) taking part in the study reported in 
Chapter 7, completed and returned questionnaire booklets in the presence of the experimenter.  
Staff were approached directly by the experimenter and asked to participate in the study; 
students were asked to complete and return the questionnaire booklets during lectures.  There 
was a far greater number of undergraduate student participants, than staff. 
 
The recruitment of participants in the study reported in Chapter 8 of this thesis excluded staff 
and only included students.  Here, the experimenter received permission from colleagues to 
invite students who were attending lectures to become participants in the study.  Questionnaire 
booklets were distributed and completed by individual students (whilst in the proximity of 
many other students) in lecture theatres in the presence of the experimenter. 
 
Similarly, in the final study of this thesis reported in Chapter 9, Durham Business School staff 
and students were invited to become participants in the study by completing a questionnaire 
booklet.  Identical to the recruitment strategy employed in the study reported in Chapter 7, staff 
were approached directly by the experimenter and asked to participate in the study; students 
were asked to complete and return the questionnaire booklets during lectures.  There was a far 
greater number of undergraduate student participants, than staff. 
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3.7 Instruments 
 
As the data to be collected from participants was predominantly numerical, and as 
numerical data is conveniently captured by ‗closed questions‘, questionnaires were 
formulated for each experimental manipulation, so that raw numerical data was available 
for analysis after the completion of the experiment.  Data was collected from participants 
‗electronically‘ in Chapter 4 and Chapter 6.  Data was collected in the traditional ‗paper and 
pencil‘ questionnaire format in Chapter 5, 7, 8 and 9.  First, consideration is given to 
‗electronic‘ experimental instruments. 
 
Participants submitted their responses ‗on-line‘ in Chapter 4.  Chapter 4 was designed to 
explore whether participants sought out reasons-based advice, in preference to solely 
numerical advice, when tasked with estimating the dates of historical events.  Participants 
responded to the historical quiz on-line, by mouse-clicking a hyperlink in an email that 
invited Durham Business School staff to participate in the experiment.  The on-line 
interface was adapted from ‗MouseLabWeb‘ process tracing software (Willemsen and 
Johnson, 2004), and data was electronically recorded in a MySQL database (see Appendix I 
for details of the on-line web pages).  The advantage of using ‗MouseLabWeb‘ software 
was that it allowed construction of a distinct sequence of web pages.  Once a participant had 
accepted an electronic invitation to participate in the experiment, the same participant was 
directed to a web page, where the participant input their name into a text field.  By clicking 
on a ‗Next page‘ icon, the participant was then presented with an estimation problem (i.e. In 
which year did event x take place?), and directed to enter their estimate in a text box.  On 
clicking another ‗Next page‘ icon, the participant was next presented with a digital 
information board, where participants could examine all, some, or none, of eight 
information boxes.  Four information boxes contained solely numeric advice, the remaining 
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four information boxes contained numeric advice and additional supporting reasons (of four 
distinct types).  The participant was then free to choose to revise their unaided estimate, or 
continue without revising their unaided estimate, in the light of the information available to 
them from the eight digital information boxes.  The participant then clicked one from an 
array of nine radio buttons indicating which piece of advice (the option ‗No advice useful‘ 
was available), was most useful to them in formulating an answer to the estimation 
problem.  Participants could then revise their unaided estimate, and enter a new estimate in 
the provided text box.  On clicking the ‗Next page‘ icon on this page, a participant was 
presented with a text box in which they were invited to type in text explaining why they 
had, or had not, revised their unaided estimate.  A further web page thanked participants 
and exited the experiment. 
 
Similar to the instruments described in Chapter 4, the questionnaire in Chapter 6 was 
programmed in ‗aspx‘, (by David Challener, IT Consultant, Waterstons).  Here, participants 
were tasked with making estimates of almanac type quantities (e.g. the number of 
passengers that transit through Durham Tees airport annually).  The questionnaire tasked 
participants with making an unaided estimate, advice was then made available (by 
mouseclicking ‗next page‘), and participants could then choose whether or not to revise 
their unaided estimate by incorporating advice into their deliberations.  Data was captured 
and stored in an electronic database, and could be subsequently recovered for the purpose of 
analysis.  Again, participants were able to access the questionnaire from a computer 
terminal by ‗clicking‘ on a link in an email invitation.  As the author is unfamiliar with 
many aspects of the appropriate computer programming languages necessary to fully take 
advantage of this media, the traditional ‗pencil and paper‘ questionnaire form was used in 
Chapters, 5, 8, and 9.  One issue that needs to be addressed at this juncture is whether 
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participant responses systematically vary according to whether people provide responses in 
a ‗pencil and paper‘ format or online.   
 
There has been considerable research on whether there are systematic differences in 
responses depending on whether people respond online, or in the more traditional ‗paper 
and pencil‘ format.  Whilst the issue has not been definitively settled there is considerable 
evidence that there are few systematic differences between the responses of people online, 
and the responses of people to an identical questionnaire presented in ‗hard copy‘ (Chuah, 
Drasgow, & Roberts, 2006; Cronk & West, 2002; Knapp & Kirk, 2003; Pettit, 2002; Truell 
et al. 2002).  Clearly online surveys offer researchers many practical advantages in terms of 
data collection, and where differences have been found between surveys presented online 
and paper-based surveys, they are often connected to an enquiry linked to sensitive personal 
issues which may attenuate a social desirability bias in respondents (i.e. respondents may 
answer questions in a way that appears socially desirable, rather than answering honestly) 
(Turner, Ku, Rogers, Lindberg, & Pleck, 1998).  This thesis does not seek to collect 
sensitive personal information from participants, and hence assumes that the responses from 
participants to my experimental manipulations can be pooled for the purposes of analysis. 
 
The study in Chapter 5 was conducted entirely in the traditional ‗paper and pencil‘ format 
of questionnaire surveys.  Here, a 14-item questionnaire was formulated that tasked 
participants to ascertain the correct date - or a best estimate of the correct date - of historical 
events that occurred in the last 300 years.  In addition, two conditions were derived under 
which advice would be available to participants:  First, numerical advice 
(accurate/inaccurate), second, numerical advice and supporting additional reasons (very 
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weak/weak/strong).  The categorization of supporting reasons was based upon the 
Elaborative Likelihood Model theory (ELM) advocated by Petty and Cacioppo (1986).  
Here, the experimenter (or pilot group, if practical) generates convincing and specious 
arguments about the question(s) of interest.    These reasons are then independently rated on 
a 5-point Likert scale of persuasiveness (1 = unconvincing; 5 = compelling).  In ELM 
studies of message persuasiveness these ratings would then be passed to a second rating 
group who would write down how favourable or unfavourable these ratings are to the 
advocated reasons (thought listing)  i.e. very weak/weak/strong.  As reasons are of interest 
and not persuasive messages, only the first step of Petty and Cacioppo‘s methodology was 
retained.  Subsequently the reasons generated by the experimenter were categorized as ‗very 
weak‘, ‗weak‘, and ‗strong‘ by two independent coders.  These categories serve as 
methodological proxies for the argumentative quality of the generated reasons.  Participants 
were given no information regarding the identity of the advisor beyond the description, 
‗advisor C‘, or ‗advisor P‘.  For each of the fourteen questionnaire items in the two advice 
conditions the alphabetic designation of the advisor was varied (creating the illusion of 
fourteen different advisors).   The questionnaire items were counterbalanced across 
participants and conditions in order to offset any systematic presentation order effects of the 
questionnaire items.  The experimental task was divided into two phases; initially 
participants were tasked with estimating the correct date (or best estimate) for a 
questionnaire item; secondly, participants were tasked with re-considering their estimate in 
the light of available advice.  Each phase of the questionnaire was printed on a separate 
sheet of the questionnaire booklet; so that advice was not available to participants in phase 
one.  Participants were instructed to attempt each of the 14 questions sequentially, so that on 
completion of the first experimental phase participant‘s proceeded to the second phase, 
where a final estimate was made in the light of the available advice.  
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Chapter 6 was devised to compare the estimates of people who received advice in the form 
of a testimonial assertion, with the estimates of people who received advice in the form of a 
step-by-step procedure (algorithmic decomposition) to formulate estimates to almanac 
questions.  The almanac questions were selected on the basis of issues where a true answer 
existed, but is not widely known.  Consistent with the manipulations in the preceding study, 
participants made an unaided estimate, were exposed to advice from an anonymous advisor, 
and could then revise (or not revise) their unaided estimate with the benefit of advice.  
Some participants responded on-line, by clicking a hyperlink in an invitation email, others 
completed a questionnaire booklet ‗by hand‘.  One important distinction was that people in 
receipt of algorithmic decompositions (recommended by advisors as a method of forming 
an estimate) of the estimation problems, ultimately produced their own advice (output-of-
algorithm), whereas participants in receipt of testimonial assertions were provided with a 
fictitious advisor‘s rationale. 
 
Chapter 7 sought to extend the idea that knowledge of the process through which advice is 
generated, is a cue that may facilitate enhanced estimation performance.  Participants 
completed one of three versions of the questionnaire booklet.  Initially, participants made an 
unaided estimate of the number of pieces of mail handled by the US postal service in 1989 
(hereafter the US Mail problem), or the number of Forested Miles in the US state of Oregon 
(hereafter the Forested Miles problem).  Subsequently participants were randomly allocated 
to (i) a control condition (participants made an unaided estimate, completed a distractor 
task, and then were tasked with revisiting their unaided estimate) (ii) a condition where an 
algorithmic decomposition of the US Mail problem constituted advice (iii) a condition 
where an algorithmic decomposition of the Forested Miles problem constituted advice.  No 
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participant was allocated to more than one experimental condition.  The number of ‗steps‘ 
in the algorithmic procedure differed between conditions. 
 
Chapter 8 examined the issue of whether knowledge of the process of advice generation 
was a means by which participants could evaluate the utility of advice, where the numerical 
quantities to be estimated were extremely small (i.e. relative frequencies).  Participants in 
Study 5 completed questionnaire booklets by hand.  Initially all participants made unaided 
estimates of either the incidence of multiple maternities, or the incidence of pedestrian 
fatalities as the result of road traffic accidents (no participant estimated the incidence of 
multiple maternities and pedestrian fatalities).  Participants were randomly allocated to the 
treatment conditions of estimating the relative frequency of multiple maternities, or the 
relative frequency of pedestrian deaths attributed to road accidents in the UK, in the same 
way that participants had been allocated to experimental conditions in Chapter 7.  After 
inputting information into the algorithms (or completing a distractor task for those 
participants allocated to a control condition), participants could, if they so wished, revise 
their unaided estimate with the benefit of advice (output-of-algorithm). 
 
Questionnaire booklets were completed by hand by participants in Study 6 - the same 
pattern of unaided estimation, provision of advice, and revision of judgment was utilized in 
a similar fashion to previous manipulations.  Although participants in Study 6 who received 
advice were given advice that (i) was positively correlated with the target quantity, another 
group of participants was given advice that was (ii) not positively correlated with the target 
quantity.  This was to investigate whether participants were able to adequately distinguish 
between potentially beneficial advice, and poor advice, on average. 
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3.8 Common Measures and Data analysis 
 
Participant‘s estimates of target quantities were recorded pre-advice, and post-advice.  An 
ordinal measure of ‗perceived utility of advice‘ was recorded on a 5 point Likert scale in 
Chapters 5-9.  In Chapter 4 ‗perceived utility of advice‘ was operationalized as the radio 
button that participants clicked in the on-line survey (each button was allocated a value).  
Participants were also tasked with providing a confidence interval, within which they were 
95% certain that the true value of the target quantity could be found (Chapters 4-8), both 
prior to the receipt of advice, and post-advice. 
 
Data was recorded in Chapter 4 by ‗MouseLabWeb‘ software, and stored in a MySQL 
database.  In addition to the measures outlined in the preceding paragraph, process measures  
- such as where the on-screen cursor came to rest, how long the cursor remained stationary, 
what on-screen items were ‗clicked‘ upon, and the time from the start of the experiment (in 
milliseconds) to any of these events – were recorded.  Data was captured by an electronic 
interface in Chapter 6, and stored in a MySQL database, where participants completed the 
on-line version of the questionnaire. 
 
Both parametric and non-parametric statistical tests of significance were used in analyzing 
the data from the experimental manipulations.  Both techniques were necessary as much of 
the raw data did not meet the assumption that the data was normally distributed about the 
mean.  Where appropriate, such data was Log, or Log(10) transformed prior to any test of 
significance.  Statistical tests from the General Linear Model (GLM) were applied to the 
data (ANOVA, Multiple Linear regression, correlations, t tests).  In addition, Mann-
Whitney U, and Kruskal-Wallis non-parametric tests of significance were utilized where 
60 
 
appropriate.  In Chapter 9, it was necessary to compare the strength of the relationship 
between pre-advice rank ordering of target items, and the true rank order of target items, 
with the strength of the relationship between post-advice rank ordering of target items, and 
the true rank order of target items - this was facilitated by the use of Steiger‘s Z1 statistic.  
Chapter 4 reports the findings of an initial exploratory investigation. 
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Chapter 4:  Do people prefer purely numerical advice or numerical advice qualified by 
reasons? 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
It is contended that conformity to advice is an important determinant of judgment change, and 
this first study sets out to explore the influence of reasons-based advice, and solely numeric 
advice, upon participants‘ deliberations, and subsequent estimation, of the dates of three 
historical events.  The motivation for this enquiry is that up till now, advice in JAS research 
has been operationalized in solely numeric terms (as set out in Chapter 2).  Hence, it is not 
clear, in the absence of adequate environmental cues such as reasons, if people are able to 
distinguish between accurate, and inaccurate numerical advice.  In these circumstances, where 
people revise their judgment post-advice, social conformity to advice can be expected.  
Further, intrinsic information of the quality of advice is made available to participants in the 
form of supporting reasons for the numerical component of advice in this study.  This implies 
that should participants be sensitive to the quality of advice available to them, then this advice 
could be incorporated into their deliberations; reflected in any reported evaluations of the 
utility of advice, and measured in terms of judgment change.  For the purposes of the study, 
reasons-based advice is operationalized to be broadly consistent with the work of Toulmin 
(1958) and more specifically, Brockriede and Ehninger (1960).  These authors indicate that 
only a limited number of arguments are available to people advocating specific claims – 
arguments of parallel case, analogy, motivation, and authority.  Each of these argument forms 
is discussed in the following section. 
 
4.2 Argumentative forms 
 
Arguments of parallel case rely upon a warrant in which it is asserted that an instance reported 
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in the data is essentially similar to a second instance in the same category.  A typical example 
of an argument of parallel case might be the media debates over US, and allied, military 
strategy in the Persian Gulf War of 1991, extrapolated from the negative parallel case of US 
military strategy in Vietnam.  Here, US military strategy in the Persian Gulf is deemed to be 
from the same category of strategic cases as the Vietnam conflict.  In a similar vein, analogous 
arguments rely upon the idea that, if two things have certain attributes in common, then they 
are likely to have one, or more, additional traits in common.  Hence, if a person likes the music 
of Oscar Peterson, Miles Davis, and Ella FitzGerald, the same individual will probably also 
like the music of Amy Winehouse, Gato Balbieri, and Gil Scott Heron.  In this instance, the 
former group of musicians pioneered the musical form of jazz, whilst the latter perform music 
that is overtly influenced by jazz, with additional elements (i.e. traits) of pop and soul music.  
Each of the two groups of musicians have traits in common, yet it cannot be said that all of the 
musicians perform music that can be categorized as jazz (hence the comparison is not a parallel 
case, but an analogy).  Contrastingly, motivational arguments rely upon a warrant that 
motivates acceptance of the claim by appealing to inner drives or values, emotions or 
aspirations.  So, the statement ‗rich people are only wealthy because they are inherently 
greedy‘ is an argument from motivation, where the advocate links the internal motivations of 
rich people (greed), to the outcome of wealth.  Finally, arguments of authority are based upon a 
statement made in the data, made credible by identifying the source of the statement.  Here, the 
credibility of a proposition is enhanced (or diminished), by knowledge of the source that 
substantiates the proposition (i.e. ipse dixit – he, himself, said it).  An example might be that, 
the theory of evolution explains the origins of humankind, according to Charles Darwin.  The 
implication here is that Charles Darwin is an expert on the origins of humankind, and as such, 
his views in this area should carry more weight than people less expert.   
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Each of the argument forms discussed in the preceding section can be persuasive in a given set 
of circumstances, but a comprehensive taxonomy of such arguments is unlikely, given the 
difficulties of delineating argumentative form from content.  This is because it is entirely 
possible to have a perfectly reasonable form of argument (e.g. a syllogism), but variations in 
the quality of the content of the argument.  The quality of the content of an argument can be 
gauged against its truthfulness.  An example might be that ‗I have never seen a black swan, 
therefore all swans must be white‘ is a reasonable syllogistic argument, yet the argument fails 
as soon as a black swan appears.  Hence, the persuasiveness, or otherwise, of a particular 
argument form is difficult to disentangle from its contents.  Nevertheless, there is some 
evidence to suggest that arguments of analogy are more persuasive than messages without any 
comparative content (McCroskey and Combs, 1969).  Here, McCroskey and Combs presented 
their participants with three analogy messages critical of US foreign aid policy towards Brazil.  
A ‗literal‘ analogy compared US foreign aid policy to Brazil, with the US urban renewal 
programme; a ‗figurative‘ analogy message compared US foreign policy towards Brazil to a 
snowstorm - whilst a ‗no-analogy‘ condition (control) contained no comparative messages 
(instead the message contained descriptions of the failures of the US foreign aid program in 
Brazil).  Further, source credibility was manipulated by attributing the statements (literal 
analogy, figurative analogy, no analogy), to either a highly credible source (Charles. L. 
Wilson, former US ambassador to Brazil), or a low credibility source (Lin Tai, ambassador to 
Brazil from Red China).  Prior to the experimental manipulations, participants completed an 
attitude pre-test.  This test tasked participants with evaluating statements such as, ―The U.S. 
has a well administered foreign aid program for Brazil‖.  Participants were subsequently asked 
to evaluate this statement on scales of ―Right-Wrong‖, ―False-True‖, ―Yes-No‖, ―Incorrect-
Correct‖, ―I agree-I disagree‖.  After completing the attitude measure, participants received the 
experimental message manipulations, and completed an attitude post-test.  Measures of attitude 
change scores, and source credibility ratings, indicated that both the ‗literal‘ analogy message 
condition and the ‗figurative‘ analogy message condition produced greater attitude change than 
messages without comparative content (no-analogy).  Similarly, Smith (1972) established that 
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desirability evidence (motivational arguments in our terminology) was more persuasive than 
controls and truth evidence (evidence that establishes that something is actual).  Further, 
Reinard (1988) indicates that source credibility can enhance or diminish the persuasiveness of 
an argument; whilst Stanchi (2006), asserts that arguments of parallel case, or precedent, are 
persuasive in a legal context.   
 
For the purposes of this study, it is not helpful to attempt to hypothesize, and predict, a priori, 
which of the four arguments types discussed in the previous section (analogy, parallel case, 
authority, and motivation), is more persuasive, rather it is preferable to formulate research 
questions exploring whether an advice package that includes numerical advice in addition to 
one of these argument types, will be regarded as more helpful, or useful by people, than solely 
numerical advice, when people are faced with estimation problems.  Exploration of this issue 
may reveal that participants value solely numerical advice (recall this is the common 
operationalization of advice in JAS research) less so than reasons-based advice.  That JAS 
research has so far not systematically considered this issue underscores the limitations of the 
paradigm.  Hence, the main thrust of the initial empirical study reported in Chapter 4 is to 
explore the preferences that people hold towards different types of advice.  This approach 
allows consideration of several issues that would either be excluded, or not add to the clarity of 
a hypothesis driven experimental design.  The next section discusses the exploratory issues 
addressed in Chapter 4. 
 
One issue worthy of further investigation concerns whether people are sensitive to the 
asymmetries in the quality of available advice.  Should participants be able to adequately 
distinguish between potentially beneficial advice, and poor advice, then reported perceived 
ratings of the utility of advice should reflect the sensitivities participants report regarding the 
asymmetries of the quality of available advice.  Alternatively, people may not be sensitive to 
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the asymmetries of the quality of available advice, and hence regard all advice as 
approximately equal in terms of its potential to enhance estimation performance.  Under this 
latter scenario, people may conform to advice irrespective of its quality when they choose to 
revise their judgments post-advice.  Subsequently, individuals‘ expressed preferences for 
particular advice packages (i.e. a preference for solely numerical advice over reasons, or a 
preference for analogous advice, over advice based upon some authority etc.) can be 
considered.  One issue that this study explores, is whether people exhibit a preference for one 
particular type of advice, when responding to an estimation problem, and subsequently 
consistently prefer the same advice type, when faced with further estimation problems.  The 
issue of what advice ‗package‘ individuals may prefer, also potentially speaks to the question 
of whether people are able to discriminate between potentially beneficial advice (advice that if 
followed, enhances estimation performance), and poor advice (advice that potentially degrades 
estimation performance).  These exploratory issues are explored in the following section.   
 
 
4.3 ‘Poor’ vs ‘Good’ advice 
 
In part, it is possible that an individual‘s preference for reasons-based advice over solely 
numeric advice, might be because the former simply contains more information; and it is 
parsimonious to suppose that people might find the former more ‗helpful‘, than the latter, 
irrespective of the numerical accuracy of the advice (this is not to say that the perceived utility 
of reasons, however elaborate those reasons might be, correlates with advice that is beneficial).  
This implies that either reasons, or solely numerical advice, will be beneficial for participants 
whose unaided estimates are more inaccurate than the available advice.  However, where 
participants‘ initial unaided estimates are more accurate than the advice, any post-advice 
revision of judgment that results in an estimate that is less accurate, than a participant‘s initial 
unaided estimate, maybe be attributable to the influence of poor advice (i.e. revising one‘s 
judgment in the ‗direction‘ of poor advice is detrimental to estimation performance, in this 
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scenario).  If people are successfully able to distinguish between potentially beneficial advice, 
and poor advice, then it might be expected that beneficial advice would be incorporated into an 
individual‘s deliberations (provided individuals are motivated to estimate accurately), resulting 
in enhanced estimation performance.  However, should individuals be unable to successfully 
distinguish between beneficial and poor advice, then people are likely to be attracted to 
reasons-based advice - as it contains more information - in preference to solely numerical 
advice.  However, in these circumstances, if people do revise their judgment, an individual‘s 
estimation performance is unlikely to be any more accurate than the advice.  One way to 
observe if people do not easily discriminate between potentially beneficial and poor advice; is 
to simultaneously present people with several pieces of advice that varies in accuracy; so that if 
people are able to successfully distinguish between beneficial and poor advice, they might at 
least reject the poor quality advice.  Investigating this question is appropriate, as where advice 
is solely numeric it is possible to discover if improvements in estimation performance occur, 
because participants are merely conforming to advice.  In sum, one of the research question 
that is explored here is to discover whether people can discriminate between beneficial advice, 
and poor advice, in circumstances of incomplete domain knowledge.   
 
4.4 Confidence 
 
The role that judges‘ confidence may play in judgment revision is an issue discussed in 
Chapter 2.  This discussion serves to motivate research questions that are formulated here.  
First, it is of interest to discover if people who are highly confident pre-advice, are less 
disposed to change their judgment, post-advice, than people who are less confident, pre-advice.  
People who are less confident pre-advice may be disposed to change judgment post-advice 
because (i) the judge appreciates the superior logic of the advice given to him/her by the 
advisor where the advice is reasons-based or (ii) the judge is able to bring so little ‗world 
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knowledge‘ to bear upon the issue of interest, that any advice (either reasons-based or solely 
numeric) is potentially useful.  Second, it is of interest to discover if people report greater 
degrees of confidence post-advice, compared to the degrees of confidence they report pre-
advice (i.e. whether people become more overconfident).  Third, whether people in receipt of 
reasons advice will become more confident in their intuitive estimates post-advice, than people 
in receipt of solely numeric advice.  In order to address the research questions formulated in 
the preceding discussion, a simple 3-item historical quiz was devised. 
 
4.5 Method 
 
Participants 
 
The sample was drawn from staff at Durham University (UK).  A total of 74 participants 
attempted the on-line questionnaire – three participants were omitted from the analysis due to 
incomplete data entry.  One participant only attempted Question 1, entered no data for a pre-
advice estimate and entered ‗1920‘ for a pre-advice upper confidence bound, the post-advice 
lower confidence and upper confidence  bound, without entering a post-advice estimate.  This 
participant was excluded from further analysis.  A second participant only partially completed 
Question 1 and omitted to enter values for a pre-advice estimate, lower and upper confidence 
bounds, and a post advice estimate, but did enter values for post-advice lower and upper 
confidence bounds.  Hence, this participant was excluded from further analysis.  A third 
participant attempted to complete Questions 1 and 2.  For Question 1 this participant provided 
no initial estimate or confidence bounds, and where data was provided for a post-advice 
estimate the lower confidence bound was numerical greater than the post-advice estimate.  For 
Question 2, the same participant provided data for a pre-advice estimate, lower and upper 
confidence bounds, but where data was provided for a post advice lower and upper confidence 
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both entries were identical and outside the permitted range of values (i.e. ‗2050‘ has not yet 
occurred) - hence this participant was excluded from any further analysis.  Hence, a total of 71 
participants were tasked with completing three estimation problems resulting in 213 responses 
for analysis (regrettably not all respondents provided all the requested data)..  
 
Stimuli and Materials 
 
A ‗historical quiz‘ was devised consisting of three questions – 
Question 1 – In what year was the first Japanese railway opened? 
Question 2 – In what year did Britain receive a mandate to govern Palestine? 
Question 3 - In what year was the first Camp David summit between Egypt and Israel 
hosted by the United States? 
 
These questions were piloted on 10 individuals (subsequently not included in our experiment), 
to check that people could not easily recall the true answer to each of these questions, whilst 
still reporting some familiarity with the historical events.  Participants responded to the 
historical quiz on-line, by mouse-clicking a hyperlink in an email that invited Durham 
Business School staff to participate in the experiment.  The on-line interface was adapted from 
the ‗MouseLabWeb‘ process tracing software (Willemsen and Johnson, 2004), and data was 
electronically recorded in a MySQL database.  See Appendix 1 for details of the on-line web 
pages. 
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Procedure 
Participants responded to the historical quiz on-line, by mouse-clicking a hyperlink in an email 
that invited Durham Business School staff to participate in the experiment.  The presentation 
order of the historical quiz questions was randomized (a ‗php‘ script that randomized question 
presentation was activated when participants clicked on the hyperlink in the invitation email).  
Subsequently, participants were tasked with estimating the date at which each of the three 
historical events occurred (see Appendix 1 for details of the on-line web pages).  Participants 
were also tasked with providing a range of values that bracketed their estimate, within which 
they were 95% certain that the true answer (whatever that might be) could be found.  
Participants estimated a number that provided a lower estimate bound, and also a number that 
provided an upper estimate bound, as the parameters of their range of values.  The range of 
values (that contained both a participant‘s estimate and the true answer) was operationalized as 
a dependent measure of our participant‘s confidence, (where greater confidence was indicated 
by a smaller range of values that bracketed an individual‘s estimate and the true answer).  
 
On completion of this first phase, participants clicked a ‗Next page‘ icon and proceeded to the 
following web page of the survey.  Here, participants were presented with solely numeric 
advice, and reasons advice.  There were four advice boxes containing solely numerical pieces 
of advice, and four boxes containing pieces of advice that consisted of a number with an 
additional reason.  Participants could view the advice contained in the advice boxes by simply 
moving the on-screen cursor over the box and ‗clicking‘ the computer mouse on the box.  
When participants moved the on-screen cursor out of a particular advice box, the advice 
became concealed once more.  Participants were free to click on all, or none of the advice 
boxes, and could re-visit any, or all, of the advice boxes at any time.  Where an advice box 
contained a number and a reason, the type of reason was one of the following - a parallel case, 
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an analogy, evidence by an authority, or justified by motivation.  Explanation of, and examples 
of, each reason type (see Appendix I, Screen 4 for details) were presented to participants as 
they completed the first historical quiz question; when completing the remaining two historical 
quiz questions, participants could access this information by clicking, and holding a ‗Show 
help‘ icon.  The accuracy of the advice was varied so that some advice was more accurate than 
others (see Table 1 below).  With the exception of Question 2, the accuracy of the advice was 
balanced in terms of its sign relative to the true value.  Hence, Question 1 contained four 
underestimates of the true value, and four overestimates of the true value.  Question 3 
contained six underestimates of the true value, and two overestimates of the true value (three 
underestimates were in the solely numeric advice condition, and three in the reasons advice 
condition), whilst Question 2 contained four underestimates of the true value, three 
overestimates of the true value, and the true value.  Further, the position of the advice boxes 
was varied between participants, to counteract potential presentation order effects. 
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Table 4.1.  Advice accuracy variations – numbers in parentheses indicate the variation of the 
advice around the true value 
 
Once participants had considered the available advice, they were asked to click one of an array 
of nine ‗radio-type‘ buttons to indicate which piece of advice they had found most helpful in 
forming an estimate to the historical quiz question (‗0‘ was included as an option where ‗no 
advice was useful‘).  Next, participants were asked to indicate if they wished to revise their 
estimate.  If participants clicked the radio button ‗Yes‘ then they were provided with a text box 
Question True answer Advice box 
Solely 
numerical 
advice 
Advice box 
(including reason 
type) 
Reasons-based 
advice 
1 1872 A  1861 (- 11) E - analogy 1890 (+18) 
  B 1849 (- 23) F – parallel case 1869 (- 3) 
  C 1883 (+ 11) G - authority 1835 (- 37) 
  D 1895 (+ 23) H - motivation 1902 (+30) 
2 1920 A 1899 (- 21) E - analogy 1946 (+ 26) 
  B 1955 (+ 35) F – parallel case 1918 (- 2) 
  C 1911 (- 9) G - authority 1902 (- 18) 
  D 1933 (+ 13) H - motivation 1920 (0) 
3 1978 A 1955 (- 23) E - analogy 1960 (-18) 
  B 1979 (+1) F – parallel case 1971 (-7) 
  C 1967 (-11) G - authority 1950 (-28) 
  D 1945 (-33) H - motivation 1982 (+4) 
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in which to enter their revised estimate (post-advice).  A mouse-click on a ‘Next page‘ icon 
then allowed participants to proceed to the following web page.  Here, a text box was provided, 
so that participants were able to enter an explanation as to why they either revised their 
estimate, or did not revise their unaided estimate.  Another ‗Next page‘ icon, when clicked 
allowed participants to access the penultimate web page, where they were asked to provide 
numerical estimates of the upper, and lower bounds, within which they were 95% certain 
contained the true answer to the historical quiz question.  These upper and lower bound 
estimates also bracketed our participant‘s revised (or un-revised) estimate.  Once completed, a 
‗thank you‘ message was displayed on the participant‘s computer monitor, allowing the 
browser to be closed.  As each page of the web site was loaded onto a participant‘s computer 
monitor screen, the participant‘s data entries from previous completed web pages were 
simultaneously displayed for the purposes of clarity (i.e. unaided estimate, confidence range, 
revised estimate, and revised confidence range).  The ‗MouseLabWeb‘ interface is designed to 
capture a wealth of data, which is temporarily stored in an HTML form, and saved to the 
MySQL database when a participant clicks on ‗submit‘ (see Fig 4.1 below).   
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Fig 4.1. ‗MouseLabWeb‘ data capture 
 
Form field Description 
expname Name of MouseLabWeb page 
subject Name of subject 
condnum Number of the counterbalancing condition 
IP Address of participant‘s computer 
choice Choice made by the participant (should 
choice buttons be added to the 
MouseLabWeb table) 
procdata Process data – a serial list of events 
Event 
 
Name 
 
Value 
Time 
 
OnLoad 
Order 
Type of event (mouseover, mouseout, 
click) 
Name of the event (Name of 
MouseLabWeb cell, or form element that is 
captured) 
Value of the event 
Time in milliseconds measured from the 
moment the page was started 
Time the page was fully loaded and 
displayed 
Exact order in which columns and rows 
were presented 
nextURL The name of the next page that the browser 
will go to after submission of the current 
page. 
addvar Additional form elements 
Adddata Values of additional form elements 
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The inputs participants made (i.e. unaided estimate, confidence range, revised estimate, 
comments, and revised confidence range), were programmed into MouseLabWeb as ‗addvar‘ 
(additional form elements), and their values recorded in the ‗adddata‘ form field, prior to 
submission to the MySQL database. 
 
4.6 Results 
 
The following results section is primarily focused upon the main argument contended in this 
thesis - that conformity to advice is an important determinant of judgment change.  This 
implies that people are constrained in their abilities to distinguish between potentially 
beneficial advice, and poor advice.  As a measure of perceived utility of advice was taken, it 
was possible to determine if people were sensitive to the variations in the quality of advice 
made available to them.  This is because it might be expected that if people were sensitive to 
the quality of advice, then ratings of the perceived utility of advice should reflect this 
sensitivity.  If this is found to be so, then the argument that people are able to adequately 
discriminate between potentially beneficial advice, and poor advice, would be supported.  
However, if (as is contended here) people are constrained in their abilities to distinguish 
between potentially beneficial advice and poor advice, then reported perceived utility of advice 
ratings will not reflect the asymmetries in the quality of the available advice.  Further evidence 
for the notion that people do not successfully discriminate between potentially beneficial 
advice and poor advice will be examined in terms of the influence of advice upon judgment 
change.  Here, it is possible to determine the absolute amount of judgment change, and 
determine if there are significant differences between (i) people who report that they found no 
advice useful and (ii) people who report that they found solely numeric advice useful (iii) 
people who report that the found reasons-based advice useful.  Further, the data of only 
participants who found reasons-based advice useful is analyzed to determine if there are 
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significant differences between argument types (parallel case, analogy, authority and 
motivation) in terms of the absolute amount of judgment change.  These analyses will 
determine if participants were sensitive to the asymmetries in the quality of reasons-based 
advice.  Subsequently, analyses on the direction of judgment change are performed to 
determine whether people revise their judgment post-advice, in the direction of that advice, 
where they report that they value it.   Moreover, analyses are performed on the data of 
participants who revised their judgments post-advice to ascertain if such judgment was 
beneficial in terms of changes in estimation accuracy, and ultimate estimation accuracy.  
Ultimately, it is necessary to determine if conformity to advice is an adequate explanation for 
the observed data, before considering further exploratory analyses. 
 
Further exploratory analysis are considered in this study, and can be broadly characterized by 
analyses upon the process data generated by the ‗MouseLabWeb‘ software, and analyses 
concerning participants‘ confidence both prior to receipt of advice, and post-advice.  First, 
process measures are considered.  One issue that is investigated is whether participants were 
consistent in their preferences for advice.  As participants clicked upon a radio button 
indicating which type of advice they found most helpful when responding to each of the three 
estimation questions, it was possible to calculate the number of instances in which participants 
chose the same type of advice (i.e. as indicated by clicking the radio button that such advice 
was most useful), on subsequent estimation questions, as they did when responding to the first 
estimation question.  This analysis determines whether participants were consistent, or 
inconsistent, in their preference for particular types of advice.  Consistency in participants‘ 
preferences for advice might indicate that participant‘s information search was not random.  A 
second analysis, based upon the process measures generated by ‗MouseLabWeb‘, concerned 
whether participants held preconceptions of the utility of the available advice.  The 
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‗MouseLabWeb‘ software recorded time in milliseconds (calculated as the absolute difference 
from the start of the questionnaire until a particular event).  Given that both question order, and 
advice box presentation was randomized across participants, it is possible to determine the 
order in which people first accessed advice.  Should participants hold preconceptions of the 
utility of any particular advice type, this should be reflected, on average, in the speed in which 
advice is first accessed.  A third analysis based upon the results of the process data generated 
by ‗MouseLabWeb‘ concerned what advice participants examined prior to revising (or not 
revising their judgment).  The ‗MouseLabWeb‘ software recorded which advice boxes 
participants ‗clicked‘ on as they completed the questionnaire, and subsequently it was possible 
to determine the total number of advice ‗acquisitions‘ and ‗re-acquisitions‘ participants made, 
prior to revising (or not revising), their ultimate estimate.  It might be inferred from this 
analysis, that greater cognitive processing of advice is indicated by the number of times 
particular advice types are acquired, and re-acquired by participants prior to any judgment 
revision.   
 
Finally, measures of confidence, and changes in confidence, are considered.  Confidence was 
operationalized here as the interval between an upper and lower bound within which 
participants were 95% certain that the true answer to the three estimation problems fell.  The 
degree of confidence held by participants is inferred by the ‗width‘ of the confidence interval 
(i.e. the greater the absolute difference between the lower and upper bound of the confidence 
interval, the less confidence participants are inferred to hold).  This operational definition of 
confidence allows exploration of the issue of whether attending to advice increases or 
decreases confidence in participants‘ estimation abilities.  Second, it is possible to determine 
whether participants low in confidence, are more or less likely to revise their judgment post-
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advice.  Thirdly, whether attending to advice results in changes in the degree of confidence 
held by participants is an issue addressed here.   
 
The first issue that needs to be addressed in analyzing the data generated by the MouseLabWeb 
software concerns the response rates of participants in the study.  Seventy-one participants 
provided data, in response to three estimation problems, optimally this provides 213 responses 
(71 x 3).  The observed number of questions answered was 163.  Hence, participants responded 
to 76.5% of questions, on average.  This sub-optimal rate of response can be attributed to the 
failure of the author, and the limitations of the MouseLabWeb software, to ensure that all data 
entry fields were subject to ‗validation‘ before a participant could complete the online 
questionnaire (validation is a line of software programming code that ensures that data entry is 
present and within certain bounds, before a participants can complete the online questionnaire).  
The author was able to successfully validate some, but not all, of the data entry fields in the 
online questionnaire.  This limitation had an unexpectedly large influence upon the data that 
was collected from participants.  Recall that each participant could potentially provide seven 
pieces of data for each estimation question (initial unaided estimate, pre-advice lower 
confidence bound, pre-advice upper confidence bound, perceived utility of advice rating, post-
advice estimate, post-advice lower confidence bound, and post-advice upper confidence 
bound).  Hence, optimally, each participant should have entered twenty-one pieces of data (3 
questions x 7 data entries) to the online interface.  Hence, 71 participants should have entered 
(21 x 71) 1491 pieces of data.  The observed number of data entries was 1124, giving an 
overall response rate of 75.39% (see Table 4.2). 
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Table 4.2 Number of responses 
N = 71 
Unaided 
estimate 
Pre-
advice 
Lower 
bound 
Pre-
advice 
Upper 
bound 
Advice 
rating 
Post-
advice 
estimate 
Post-
advice 
Lower 
bound 
Post-
advice 
Upper 
bound 
Total 
out of 
497 
Question 1 
(Date of 
Japanese 
Railway) 
60 
(84.5%) 
60 
(84.5%) 
60 
(84.5%) 
57 
(80.3%) 
60 
(84.5%) 
59 
(83.1%) 
58 
(81.7%) 
 
414 
(83.3%) 
Question 2 
(Date of GB 
mandate over  
Palestine) 
55 
(77.5%) 
55 
(77.5%) 
55 
(77.5%) 
51 
(72%) 
55 
(77.5%) 
53 
(74.6%) 
53 
(74.6%) 
377 
(75.9%) 
Q3 (Date of 
the first Arab-
Israeli Camp 
David) 
48 
(67.6%) 
48 
(67.6%) 
48 
(67.6%) 
45 
(63.4%) 
48 
(67.6%) 
48 
(67.6%) 
48 
(67.6%) 
333 
(67%) 
Totals 
(out of 213) 
163 
(76.5%) 
163 
(76.5%) 
163 
(76.5%) 
153 
(71.2%) 
163 
(76.5%) 
160 
(75.1%) 
159 
(74.6%) 
1124/ 
1491 
= 
75.39% 
 
Given that the dataset collected from participants in this study contains many missing 
responses, the figures and tables that follow report N responses, rather than N participants. 
 
Initially, the distribution of the data (for 163 valid responses) was examined, and it was found 
that participants‘ estimates were not normally distributed.  Log transformation of these data 
was successful in satisfying the assumptions of normally distributed data.  Hence, parametric 
statistical tests were used where appropriate in the analysis that follows. 
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Can participants discriminate between good and poor advice? 
The question of whether people are adequately able to distinguish between potentially 
beneficial advice, and poor advice, is the first issue addressed in this analysis.  Initially, it is 
important to clarify that reasons-based advice was more numerically accurate, than solely 
numeric advice.  The absolute difference between the numerical value of each piece of advice, 
and the true value, was calculated, and subsequently aggregated over the three estimation 
questions, and it is clear that reasons-based advice is less error prone (35 years, on average), 
than solely numerical advice (48 years, on average) (see Table 4.1).  Superficially, this may 
appear as an unfortunate bias that privileges participants who attend to reasons-based advice in 
terms of estimation accuracy.  In retrospect, stricter control over the variation of the quality of 
numerical advice around the true (but unknown to participants) value could (and perhaps 
should) have been applied for solely numeric advice types, and reasons-based advice types.  
Despite the exploratory nature of this study, it is important to acknowledge this methodological 
shortcoming, as aggregating the average accuracy of advice types over the three estimation 
questions may suggest that participants were subject to a demand characteristic of the situation.  
What this means is that participants may have initially been attracted to the ‗richness‘ of 
reasons-based advice in preference to solely numeric advice from the outset, and subsequently 
benefited from the greater aggregate accuracy of reasons based advice across the three 
estimation questions.  Potentially, this is a serious confound of the study.  However, this line of 
reasoning was not supported by the data.  Aggregating the mean post-advice accuracy scores of 
participants across questions (see Table 4.10), and performing a one-way ANOVA, revealed 
no significant differences between conditions (F(2, 114) = 1.28, p < 0.28).  An identical result was 
found when the aggregated mean post-advice scores  from only participants who revised their 
judgments post-advice (see Table 4.11), were entered into a one-way ANOVA - no significant 
differences were found between conditions (F(2, 50) = 1.10, p < 0.34).  These findings suggest 
that despite the author‘s failure to fully acknowledge the importance of control over the 
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variation of the quality of advice between advice types, participants were insensitive to the 
potential benefits of reasons-based advice in the aggregate.  However, the purpose of the 
manipulation was to assess the preferences participants exhibited towards advice in an 
exploratory fashion.  Recall that the accuracy of the numerical component of advice presented 
to participants was not precisely counterbalanced in terms of the number of years (greater or 
less), than the true value for each estimation question.  Rather, two of the estimation questions 
were counterbalanced in terms of the number of pieces of advice that, if followed, would lead 
participants to either overestimate, or underestimate the true value.  One of the estimation 
questions contained the true (but unknown) answer.  This issue will be discussed further when 
the post-advice accuracy of participants‘ estimates are considered. 
     
In addition to the preceding findings, the idea that participants attended reasons advice because 
they recognized that such advice was more accurate, than solely numeric advice, is not 
completely satisfactory.  This is because reasons-based advice may superficially appear more 
useful to participants due to the greater amount of information such advice contains, in 
comparison to solely numeric advice.  Further, it is possible that participants may have realised 
that reasons-based advice was constructed by the author, rather than being real advice from 
appropriate sources.  This may have been particularly true of advice evidenced by an authority.  
Should participants evaluate advice substantiated by an authority as being bogus, then such 
advice is likely to be perceived as of poor quality and unlikely to be persuasive.  Participants 
did not evaluate advice evidenced by authority as being from persons other, than the named 
authority.  This is evidenced by the comments participants entered into a text box within the 
online survey.  Of the thirty-two comments that specifically mention advice evidenced by 
authority, only two were particularly sceptical of the credibility of the source of the advice (e.g. 
‗see my previous answer - the flawed authority‘ and ‗none of the advice was persuasive - the 
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authorities behind the explanation are unknown to me‘).  Instead the remaining thirty 
comments did not question that the authorities behind the advice were real (e.g. ‗he's an expert 
and I have so little knowledge of the subject that his advice seems quickest and best to 
accept‘).                                                                                                                                                  
   
If participants are able to discriminate between beneficial, and poor advice, in circumstances of 
incomplete domain knowledge, then it follows that participants should be able to differentiate 
between the utility of solely numeric advice, and reasons-based advice.  In addition, 
participants in receipt of solely reasons-based advice should be able to distinguish between 
beneficial, and poor advice.  It was possible to determine the perceived utility of advice 
reported by participants, by aggregating individual rating scores.  Inspection of Fig 4.2 and 
Table 4.3 shows that, across the three estimation problems presented to participants, advice 
that was most accurate, on average (i.e. parallel case advice) was not perceived to be the most 
useful by participants (in fact it was perceived as the least useful of the four advice types, on 
average).  In fact, parallel case advice was only the most accurate advice on offer to 
participants in Question 1 (estimate the date of the first Japanese railway).  Providing one 
assumes that participants were motivated to estimate accurately, then these reported 
perceptions of the utility of the available advice, do not reflect the actual accuracy of advice.  
 
Seventy-one participants provided data for analysis in this study. However, only seventy 
participants clicked on a radio button in the online questionnaire indicating what advice (if 
any) was most useful to them.  In addition, nine participants (of the seventy that provided 
perceived utility of advice ratings) did not provide a value for the perceived utility of advice on 
one of the estimation questions that were attempted.  Hence, 153 responses were available for 
analysis.  One issue might be that participants were only permitted to indicate one source of 
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advice as being ‗most useful‘ to them which prevented a response when more than one piece of 
advice might have been ‗most useful‘.  However, participants in these particular circumstances 
did have the option of indicating that no one piece of advice was ‗most useful‘ by clicking on 
the ‗no advice useful‘ option.  Fig 4.2 and Table 4.3 show the advice participants found most 
helpful in the aggregate, and at the level of each estimation question. 
 
Fig 4.2 Aggregate (all estimation questions) perceived utility of advice ratings (responses  
N =153) 
 
 
Inspection of Table 4.2 shows that, in the aggregate, 32.68% of participants did not regard any 
of the advice as useful to them when formulating an estimate to the three estimation problems 
No advice  
useful 
Motivational  
advice 
Authority  
advice 
Analogy  
advice 
Numeric advice 
Parallel case advice 
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presented.  Where participants did find advice useful, 3.92% regarded solely numeric advice as 
useful, whilst 63.24% regarded reasons-based advice as useful, on average (14.23% perceived 
analogous advice as most useful, 3.92% reported parallel case advice most useful, 28.10% 
reported advice substantiated by authority as most useful, and 16.99% reported advice 
supported by motivational arguments as most useful).  
Table 4.3.  Perceived usefulness of advice (frequencies) 
N = 
70 
Number of 
valid 
responses 
No advice 
useful 
Numeric 
advice 
useful 
Parallel 
case 
advice 
useful 
Analogy 
advice 
useful 
Authority 
advice 
useful 
Motivation 
advice 
useful 
Q1 57 
12  
(21.05%) 
2  
(3.51%) 
1 
(1.75%) 
9 
(15.79%) 
22  
(38.60%) 
11  
(19.30%) 
Q2 51 
23  
(44.23%) 
2 
(3.85%) 
3 
(5.88%) 
10  
(19.23%) 
9 
(17.31%) 
4 
(7.7%) 
Q3 45 
15  
(33.33%) 
2 
(4.4%) 
2 
(4.4%) 
3 
(6.7%) 
12 
(26.7%) 
11 
(24.4%) 
Total 
153 
(100%) 
50  
(32.68%) 
6 
(3.92%) 
6 
(3.92%) 
22  
(14.23%) 
43  
(28.10%) 
26  
(16.99%) 
 
It is noteworthy that of the participants who prefer reasons-based advice, the most popular 
advice type is numerical advice evidenced by some authority, in two out of three estimation 
questions.  In this study, numerical advice evidenced by some authority, was operationalized as 
advice consisting of an estimate of the date of the historical event in question, and its source 
(i.e. a fictitious historian – e.g. Dr. Smith).  These findings strongly suggest that 
conceptualizing advice in solely numeric terms poorly reflects the preference participants here 
have reported for reasons-based advice, and in particular, reasons-based advice evidenced by 
authority.   
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If participants were sensitive to the accuracy of reasons-based advice, then it might be 
expected that the advice reported as useful reflected such sensitivity.  However, there is little 
evidence that participants were sensitive to the asymmetries of advice quality in either the 
aggregate level of analysis, or at the level of each estimation question (see Table 4.4).  Table 
4.4 shows that participant‘s perceptions of the utility of the available reasons-based advice, and 
its actual accuracy, were dissimilar.  This may imply that our participants‘ belief that they 
were able to distinguish between beneficial advice, and poor advice, was not well calibrated. 
Table 4.4  Reasons advice: Perceived utility of advice scores, and observed accuracy of advice 
(rank order). 
 
Question Accuracy:  rank order of advice 
type 
(1 = most accurate) 
Perceived utility:  rank order 
of perceived utility (1 = most 
useful) 
1 1.  Parallel case 1.  Authority 
 2.  Analogy 2.  Motivation 
 3.   Motivation 3.  Analogy 
 4.   Authority 4.  Parallel case 
2 1. Motivation 1.   Analogy  
 2. Parallel case 2.   Authority  
 3. Authority 3.   Motivation 
 4. Analogy 4.  Parallel case 
3 1. Motivation 1.  Authority 
 2. Parallel case 2.  Motivation 
 3. Analogy 3.  Analogy 
 4. Authority 4.  Parallel case 
Aggregate of Questions  
1 - 3 
1.  Parallel case 1.  Authority 
 2.  Analogy 2.  Motivation 
 3.  Authority 3.  Analogy 
 4.  Motivation 4.  Parallel case 
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Table 4.4 shows that the perceived utility of the advice that participants indicated was most 
helpful to them bore little resemblance to the actual rank order accuracy of the observed advice 
types, both at the level of individual questions and in the aggregate. 
 
It has so far been established that, in circumstances of incomplete domain knowledge, when 
participant‘s perceived advice as useful, they overwhelmingly preferred reasons, to solely 
numeric advice.  Further, this preference was obtained irrespective of the accuracy of the 
perceived useful advice.  In sum, participants were constrained in their abilities to distinguish 
between beneficial and poor advice.  The finding that people are constrained in their abilities to 
distinguish between beneficial and poor advice is perhaps not completely surprising, 
considering the ‗almanac‘ nature of the three estimation questions, the ‗one-shot‘ nature of 
each estimation question and that feedback to participants was unavailable.  This meant that 
participants were prevented from learning how accurate their unaided estimates were prior to 
examining available advice, and given the ‗one-shot‘ nature of the estimation scenario also 
prevented from learning which advisor(s) were more accurate than others.  However, these 
considerations may not be the most influential factors in determining the abilities of people to 
differentiate between potentially beneficial advice and poor advice.   
 
For the findings discussed previously to have any general utility it is necessary to ascertain 
whether people are, on average, constrained in their abilities to differentiate between 
potentially beneficial, and poor advice beyond the narrow confines of the manipulations 
reported in this study.  A striking example of how people with expertise in a particular area are 
simultaneously constrained in their abilities to differentiate between potentially beneficial 
advice and poor advice is provided by Ayres (2007).  Ayres cites the example of economist 
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Orley Ashenfleter who claimed to be able to predict the quality, and ultimately the price, of 
Bordeaux wine on the basis of a simple statistical model that acknowledges the influence of 
winter, harvest rainfall, and growing season temperatures.  Ashenfleter‘s methodology was 
derided by many experts in the wine industry including the wine critic Robert Parker (Ayres, 
2007).  However, it was Ashenfleter‘s predictions that proved to be more accurate about the 
1986, 1989 and 1990 vintage Bordeaux wines, than Parker‘s.  This example shows that even 
people with domain knowledge expertise may not always recognise potentially beneficial 
advice, and be able to separate it out from poor advice. 
 
In a more general sense, it is entirely possible that people may not be able to discriminate 
between potentially beneficial and poor advice, on the basis of individual preferences – 
irrespective of the quality or veracity of advice, people may choose not to accept it.  Such a 
position acknowledges individual differences perhaps, but makes the idea of advice giving no 
less complex.  Many other examples of both the limits of human cognition, and decision-
making guided by individual preferences displayed by people when trying to discriminate 
between potentially beneficial and poor advice can be found in the extant literature of the 
management of organizations.  Unsurprisngly, this literature is replete with many types of 
advice (Checkland, 1981; Warfield, 1990).  Indeed, one area of the organizational literature 
that seeks to improve advice to managers is ‗action research‘ Denzin, and Lincoln, 1994; 
Reason, 1988).  The results of this program of research has not conclusively shown either that 
people are able to adequately discriminate between potentially beneficial and poor advice in 
any global cognitive sense, or that interventions designed to improve the quality of advice 
available to decision-makers has any generic utility.   
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Does attending to advice influence judgment change?  
 
Given participants‘ preferences for reasons, the degree of judgment change across advice types 
(i.e. no advice perceived as useful, solely numeric advice perceived as useful, and reasons 
perceived as useful) was examined.  As only 70 participants had entered a value for perceived 
utility of advice, 153 responses were available for analysis.  Moreover, analyzing the data at 
the level of each estimation question is made problematic by the fact that only two responses in 
each estimation question favoured solely numeric advice.  Judgment change was measured as 
the absolute numerical difference between participants‘ unaided estimates, and their estimates 
post-advice (see Table 4.5 for means and standard deviations).  As these scores violated the 
assumption of normality, Log(10) transformed values were used in tests of significance.   
Table 4.5.  Degree of judgment change scores (years) 
N = 70 
Number of 
valid 
responses  
(N = 153) 
 sd 
 
(Log(10)  
transformed) 
sd 
Solely numeric advice 
perceived as useful 
6 12.83 14.96 0.69 0.76 
Reasons-based 
perceived as useful 
97 17.52 30.91 0.67 0.75 
No advice perceived as 
useful 
50 4.42 12.79 0.19 0.51 
 
The Log(10) transformed degree of judgment change scores were input to a one-way ANOVA 
test of significance to ascertain if the differences between groups reached significance.  A main 
effect of advice group was found (F(2, 150) = 8.33, p < 0.0005).  Follow-up planned comparisons 
were performed on the data and the only conditions that differed significantly were where 
participants indicated that no advice was useful, and people who indicated that they found 
reasons useful (t = 4.56; df = 134.21; p < 0.0005).  Perhaps unsurprisingly, this finding 
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indicates that people in receipt of reasons-based advice changed judgment to a greater degree 
than people in who did not find any advice useful.  However, caution should be used when 
drawing inferences from this analysis due to the low number of participants in the solely 
numeric advice condition. 
 
I next examined the absolute difference scores only for people who perceived reasons-based 
advice (analogy, parallel case, authority, motivation) to be useful (see Table 4.6).  The Log (10) 
transformed values of these scores met the assumption that the data was normally distributed.  
A one-way ANOVA was performed on these data, but no main effect of advice type was found 
(F(3, 93)  = 2.16, p < 0.10).   
Table 4.6.  Judgment change scores (years) for participants who perceive reasons to be useful. 
N = 70 
Reason type 
Number of 
valid 
responses 
N=97 
 sd 
 
(Log(10)  
transformed) 
sd 
Analogy 6 14.67 14.23 0.86 0.69 
Parallel case 22 13.32 23.17 0.46 0.75 
Authority 43 25.77 40.19 0.85 0.79 
Motivation 26 8.08 15.41 0.49 0.60 
 
However, follow-up planned comparisons reveal a significant difference in the degree of 
judgment change between people who preferred numerical advice substantiated by parallel 
case advice and participants who preferred advice evidenced by authority (t = - 2.03; df = 93; p 
< 0.05).  Also, a significant difference was found in the degree of judgment change between 
people who preferred reasons-based advice substantiated by some motivation, and participants 
who preferred reasons-based advice substantiated by an authority (t = 2.01; df = 93; p < 0.05).  
People in receipt of advice substantiated by authority changed judgment to a greater degree, 
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than people in receipt of advice evidenced by a parallel case, and people in receipt of advice 
evidenced by authority changed judgment to a greater degree than participants who found 
motivational advice useful.   
Do participant’s who value advice, follow it?  
The preceding analysis has shown the influence of advice upon the degree of judgment change. 
I now turn to the direction of judgment change in relation to advice.  The measure of judgment 
change relative to advice was calculated as the absolute difference between participants‘ 
unaided estimates and the advice, subtracted from the absolute difference between participants‘ 
post-advice estimates and the advice.  As these data met the assumptions that the data was 
normally distributed, it was appropriate to use parametric methods in tests of significance.  
Table 4.7 provides means and standard deviations of participants judgment change relative to 
advice scores.  
Table 4.7.  Mean judgment change relative to advice scores 
N = 37 
Number 
of valid 
responses 
 
 
sd 
Solely numeric advice 4 - 0.75 23.84 
Reasons-based advice 51 10.92 56.51 
 
Table 4.7 shows that only four valid responses of people who indicated that solely numeric 
advice was most helpful to them were available for analysis.  Hence, comparing the responses 
of people who indicated that solely numeric advice was most useful to them with the responses 
of people who indicated that reasons-based advice was most useful to them, is not likely to be 
meaningful given the low N in the former condition.  Instead, it is possibly more appropriate to 
determine whether the mean judgment change relative to advice scores of participants in the 
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reasons-based advice group are significantly different from zero (t = 1.38, df = 50, p < 0.17).  
This analysis shows that where participants who indicated that they found reasons-based 
advice most useful and subsequently revised their judgments post-advice, such judgment 
revision reduced the absolute numerical difference between a participant‘s pre-advice estimate 
and advice, and the same participant‘s post-advice estimate and advice, on average.  However, 
the amount of this judgment revision is not significantly different from no judgment revision.  
 
Next, the preceding analysis was repeated only for participants who had clicked on a radio 
button in the online survey, indicating that they had found one of the four types of reasons-
based advice (i.e. analogy, parallel case, authority, motivation) to be most useful to them in 
formulating an estimate to the historical quiz questions (see Table 4.8).   
Table 4.8.  Mean judgment change relative to advice scores for people who perceived reasons 
to be useful. 
Reason type 
 
Number of 
valid responses 
(N = 51) 
 
 
sd 
Analogy 4 22.00 11.17 
Parallel case 10 29.10 53.71 
Authority 25 5.12 70.72 
Motivation 12 4.17 27.18 
 
Table 4.8 shows the responses of participants‘ (N = 37) who revised their judgment post-advice 
and who indicated that they found reasons-based advice most useful in their deliberations.  The 
judgment change relative to advice scores, were entered into a one-way ANOVA.  No 
significant main effect of reason type was found (F(3, 47) = 0.53, p < 0.68).  Follow-up planned 
comparisons were performed on the judgment change relative to advice data for participants 
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who indicated that reasons-based advice was most useful to them, and no significant 
differences were found between advice types.  It is difficult to have confidence in this finding 
however, due to the low N for participants who indicated that they found analogous advice 
most useful in their deliberations. 
  
In sum, the preceding analysis of judgment change has shown that participants in receipt of 
reasons-based advice, change judgment more often, than participants who did not perceive any 
advice to be useful.  Moreover, participants in receipt of reasons-based advice tend to revise 
their judgments in the ‗direction‘ of advice, whilst participants in receipt of solely numeric 
advice tend not to revise their judgments to any great extent.  Of the participants who 
perceived reasons to be most useful, no differences between advice types was found in terms 
of judgment change relative to advice.   
   
Consideration was next given to whether people who attributed some utility to the available 
advice, changed judgment post-advice, as a consequence.  People who had indicated that they 
had found ‗no advice useful‘ were excluded from this analysis.  Recall that participants 
indicated which piece of advice was useful to them in formulating an estimate, by clicking on a 
radio button in the online survey.  Each piece of advice was assigned a different whole integer 
of (1-8), which was unknown to participants. The four pieces of solely numeric advice were 
assigned integers 1-4; whilst the four pieces of reasons-based advice were assigned integers 5-
8.  Hence, it was possible to determine the median value of the reported utility of advice 
measure for each participant, responding to the three historical quiz questions (see Table 4.9). 
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Table 4.9.  (N = 37) Median utility of advice ratings 
Historical quiz 
question 
 
Perceived 
utility of 
advice rating 
(Median) 
Range 
Scores 
> 
Median 
Scores 
<= 
Median 
Date the first 
Japanese railway 
opened (N = 45) 
Participant 
revised 
judgment 
(N = 18) 
7 7 4 14 
 
Participant did 
not revise 
judgment 
(N = 27) 
7 7 7 20 
Date of the 
British mandate 
over Palestine 
Participant 
revised 
judgment 
(N = 16) 
6 7 7 9 
 
Participant did 
not revise 
judgment 
(N = 12) 
6 7 6 6 
Date of the first 
Camp David 
summit 
Participant 
revised 
judgment 
(N = 21) 
7 7 6 15 
 
Participant did 
not revise 
judgment 
(N = 9) 
8 7 0 9 
All questions 
(aggregated) 
(Participants N = 
61) 
Participant 
revised 
judgment 
(N responses = 
55) 
7 7 12 43 
 
Participant did 
not revise 
judgment 
(N = responses  
48) 
7 7 14 34 
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Table 4.9 shows that the median scores of the utility attributed to advice by participants are 
very similar.  The aggregated scores show that irrespective of whether participants changed 
judgment or not, post-advice, there were more utility of advice scores reported below the 
median than above it.  In other words, there appears to be little evidence that the perceived 
utility of advice scores – considered in isolation from other variables – were related to 
subsequent judgment revision.   
 
Does attending to advice ultimately lead to more accurate estimation?  
 
Finally, the accuracy of our participants‘ estimates was examined.  Prior to examining 
participants‘ accuracy scores, it was necessary to revisit the issue of counterbalancing the 
numerical value of advice discussed earlier.  Recall that the counterbalancing scheme 
employed in this study was to provide participants with equal numbers of advice that 
overestimated, and underestimated the true value in two out of three questions.  The remaining 
historical quiz question contained equal numbers of underestimates, and overestimates in the 
solely numeric advice boxes, and two underestimates, one overestimate, and the true answer, in 
the reasons advice boxes. As a manipulation check, the responses of participants who did not 
change judgment (and hence are inferred not to attend to advice), were compared with the 
responses of participants who did change judgment post-advice (see Table 4.10).  
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Table 4.10  Overestimates and underestimates of participants who did/did not change judgment 
post advice 
 
Historical quiz question 
Participants who did not 
change judgment post-
advice 
Participants who did change 
judgment post-advice 
Question 1 
Post-advice estimate is less 
than true value 
Post-advice estimate is less 
than true value 
Question 2 
Post-advice estimate is 
greater than true value 
Post-advice estimate is 
greater than true value 
Question 3 
Post-advice estimate is less 
than true value 
Post-advice estimate is less 
than true value 
 
Table 4.10 shows that the provision of numerical advice that varied around the true answer of 
the three historical quiz questions, appears to have had little influence upon whether 
participants, either underestimate, or overestimate, the true answer post-advice.  This is 
because the same pattern of overestimation, and underestimation, obtained irrespective of 
whether participants changed judgment, or not, post-advice, on average.  Whilst there may well 
have been alternative ways to counterbalance numeric advice, the scheme utilized here at least 
did not confound the results of the analysis.   
 
Next, the accuracy of participants‘ estimates was examined post-advice.  Absolute accuracy 
was calculated as the absolute difference between the correct historical date in each estimation 
problem, and participant‘s post-advice estimates.  To satisfy the assumption of normality in the 
data, the Log10 transformed values were used in tests of significance.  Recall that participants 
clicked on a radio button during the experiment indicating which piece of advice they had 
found most useful in formulating an estimate to each of the estimation problems, this data was 
aggregated into the conditions of (i) no advice perceived to be useful (ii) solely numeric advice 
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perceived to be useful (iii) and reasons advice perceived to be useful (see Table 4.11).  Seventy 
participants provided data, and although 163 responses were recorded by the MouseLabWeb 
software, only 153 post-advice estimates were available for analysis as ten data entries were 
omitted from the advice utility radio button field.  The absolute accuracy scores for participants 
in each advice type condition were entered into a one-way ANOVA, and no significant 
differences between conditions were found (F(2, 150) = 0.17, p < 0.85). 
Table 4.11.  Mean absolute accuracy scores (years) post-advice 
Reason type N= 153 
responses 
 
 
sd 
 
(Log(10)  
transformed 
sd 
No advice 
perceived to be 
useful 
50 45.74 27.29 1.52 0.47 
Solely numeric 
advice perceived to 
be useful 
6 38.83 20.80 1.52 0.31 
Reasons-based 
perceived to be 
useful 
97 41.04 22.57 1.47 0.45 
 
Despite a non-significant main effect, follow-up planned comparisons were performed on the 
data so that any differences between specific conditions should not be missed – no significant 
differences were found. 
 
The distribution of data points for the post-advice accuracy scores for participant‘s who 
changed judgment post-advice, approximated a normal distribution.  Hence, a one-way 
ANOVA was performed on the untransformed post-advice accuracy scores of participants (N = 
43) who revised their judgment post-advice (see Table 4.12).  Sixty-three responses were 
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available from participants who revised their judgment post-advice, however one response 
could not be included in the analysis as this participant had not provided a advice utility rating 
– leaving a total of 62 responses from 43 participants.  For participant‘s who revised their 
judgment post-advice, there were no significant differences found between conditions (F(2, 59) = 
2.69, p < 0.08).  However, follow-up planned comparisons revealed a significant difference in 
the post-advice accuracy scores of participants in receipt of reasons based advice and 
participants who did not find any advice to be useful (t = 2.29, df = 59, p < 0.03).  This finding 
is difficult to accept at face value, as the condition in which participants indicated that they 
found no advice to be useful, only contained seven responses.  Hence, this finding is 
undermined by low statistical power. 
Table 4.12 Participants who changed judgment post-advice: Mean absolute accuracy scores 
Reason type N= 62 
responses 
 
 
sd 
 
(Log(10)  
transformed 
sd 
No advice 
perceived to be 
useful 
7 26.43 24.52 1.10 0.71 
Solely numeric 
advice perceived to 
be useful 
4 39.50 13.33 1.58 0.13 
Reasons perceived 
to be useful 
51 46.29 21.56 1.58 0.35 
 
 
Hence, although these results are not inconsistent with a conformity effect (participants in 
receipt of solely numeric advice, are ultimately no more accurate post-advice, than participants 
in receipt of reasons-based advice), it is difficult to accept this finding as definitive, due to the 
low N in the no advice perceived a useful condition.  
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Does attending to a particular advice type, advantage participants in terms of changes in 
accuracy? 
 
Consideration was next given to the absolute accuracy scores of only participants (N = 50) who 
perceived reasons to be most useful (see Table 4.13).  The distribution of data points of these 
scores satisfied the assumption of normality, so the untransformed scores were used in analysis 
of significance.  The absolute accuracy scores of participants who perceived particular advice 
types to be useful (analogy, parallel case, authority, motivation), were entered into a one-way 
ANOVA, but no significant main effect of group was found (F(3, 93) = 0.39, p < 0.76).   
Table 4.13.  Absolute accuracy scores post-advice 
 N = 97 responses  
 
 
sd 
Analogy 6 36.33 16.32 
Parallel case 22 37.36 24.22 
Authority 43 42.74 23.95 
Motivation 26 42.42 20.57 
 
Follow up comparisons were performed on the data in Table 4.13 in order to check that the 
lack of a main effect of group did not mask significant differences between pairs of advice 
types.  However, no significant differences between advice types were found. 
 
Similarly, no significant main effect of group (in terms of absolute accuracy scores) was found 
when the preceding analysis was repeated, only for those participants who changed judgment, 
post-advice (F(3, 47) = 1.86, p < 0.15) (see Table 4.14).   
 
98 
 
Table 4.14.  Participants who change judgment: absolute accuracy scores post-advice 
 N 
 
 
sd 
Analogy 4 38.00 4.00 
Parallel case 10 34.80 27.07 
Authority 25 52.50 12.41 
Motivation 12 46.33 19.36 
 
In order to determine that the non-significant main effect of group did not mask significant 
differences between pairs of advice types, follow-up planned comparisons were performed on 
the data in Table 4.14.  This analysis revealed a significant difference in post-advice accuracy 
scores between participants who reported a preference for reasons-based advice evidenced by 
an analogy, and participants who reported a preference for reasons-based advice evidenced by 
an authority (t  = - 3.12, df = 25.27, p < 0.004).  However, given that only four responses were 
available for analysis in the analogy condition, it is difficult to have confidence in this finding.    
 
Next, participants‘ accuracy change scores were examined.  The measure of accuracy change 
was calculated as the absolute difference between the true value and a participant‘s post-advice 
estimate, subtracted from the absolute difference between the true value and a participant‘s 
pre-advice estimate.  Negative scores indicate that participants, where they do change 
judgment, make less accurate estimates, than they were able to formulate unaided.  Low scores 
(i.e. scores that are close to zero), describe participants, who, where they do change judgment, 
do not make estimates that are very much more accurate, than estimates participants made 
unaided.  High (positive) scores indicate participants who revise their judgment, so that their 
post-advice estimate is more accurate than their pre-advice estimate.  The scores of participants 
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who did not revise their judgments were excluded from the following analysis, as was the 
response of a single participant who had not indicated if any advice or no advice had been 
useful.  This meant that 63 responses from 43 participants were available for analysis.  These 
scores were aggregated into the conditions of (i) no advice perceived to be useful (ii) solely 
numeric advice perceived to be useful (iii) and reasons advice perceived to be useful (see Table 
4.15).  In the interests of clarity the sign of the means scores were reversed – positive scores 
indicate accuracy improvements.   
Table 4.15.  Accuracy Change (Participants N = 43) 
Reason type N = 63 
responses 
 
 
sd 
No advice perceived to be useful 7 20.14 32.01 
Solely numeric advice perceived 
to be useful 
4 1.75 26.42 
Reasons-based advice perceived 
to be useful 
52 13.87 46.76 
 
The distribution of data points from Table 4.15 approximated a normal distribution and hence 
the necessary assumptions for the use of parametric statistical tests were met.  A one-way 
ANOVA was performed on the accuracy change data and no significant main effect was found 
(F(2, 60) = 0.22, p < 0.81).  The analysis was repeated only for participants (N = 38) who 
perceived reasons to be most useful (see Table 4.16). 
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Table 4.16.  People who perceive reasons to be useful: mean accuracy change scores 
 
N = 51 
 responses 
 
 
sd 
Analogy 4 22.00 11.16 
Parallel case 10 8.70 40.03 
Authority 25 18.48 60.33 
Motivation 12 8.83 24.67 
 
A one-way ANOVA was performed on the data in Table 4.16 and no main effect of group was 
found (F(3, 47) = 0.19, p < 0.90).  Follow-up planned comparisons were performed to check for 
significant differences between advice types and none were found to be significant.  These 
findings suggest that where participants did change judgment, post-advice, there was no clear 
advantage to having attended to any one of the four types of reasons advice.  Some caution 
should be exercised in the interpretation of this finding however, due to the low numbers of 
participants in some of the cells of Tables 4.15 and 4.16.   
 
Are participants in this study merely conforming (to a degree) to any available advice?  
 
Finally, analyses were performed to establish the effect upon accuracy, of the relative positions 
of participants‘ pre-advice estimates, the true answer, and the available advice. Recall that 
there are six possible permutations of pre-advice estimate, advice, and true answer (see Table 
4.17).  If, as I have argued, participants are constrained in their abilities to discriminate 
between potentially beneficial advice and poor advice, then we might expect improvements in 
accuracy in permutations A, B, C, and F, but increases in error in permutations D, and E.  
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Should this pattern of results be observed, this would provide evidence that our participants 
were indiscriminately conforming to any available advice. 
Table 4.17.  Likely judgment revisions in the possible permutations of true answer and advice, 
in relation to an intuitive pre-advice estimate 
 
Permutation 
 
Increase in 
 
numerical value   
judgment revision 
due to conformity 
effect 
 
A Estimate  True answer Advice towards ‗t‘ 
B True answer Advice Estimate towards ‗t‘ 
C Advice True answer Estimate towards ‗t‘ 
D Advice Estimate True answer opposite to ‗t‘ 
E True answer Estimate  Advice opposite to ‗t‘ 
F Estimate  Advice True answer towards ‗t‘ 
 
To explore this suggestion, the ‗permutations‘ from Table 4.17 can be thought of where (i) 
permutations B and F describe the scenario where in numerical terms, the advice lies between 
an unaided estimate, and true answer (ii) permutations A and C describe the scenario where in 
numerical terms, the true answer lies between the advice, and an unaided estimate (iii) 
permutations D and E describe the scenario where in numerical terms, an unaided estimate lies 
between the advice, and the true answer.  Support for the idea that participants indiscriminately 
conform to any available advice, would be found if improvements in estimation accuracy were 
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observed for the scenario where the advice lies between an unaided estimate, and true answer, 
and also if improvements in estimation accuracy were observed for the scenario where an 
unaided estimate lies between the advice, and the true answer.  Simultaneously, estimation 
accuracy will decrease, where an unaided estimate lies between the advice and the true answer.  
The accuracy change scores from Table 4.18 were entered into a one-way ANOVA and a 
significant main effect of condition was found (F(2, 51) = 4.30, p < 0.02).   
Table 4.18.  Accuracy change: relative positions of true answer, advice and pre-advice estimate 
(positive mean scores indicate accuracy improvements). 
 
Advice position 
N = 99 
number 
of 
responses 
 
 
sd 
(1) Advice between 
estimate and true 
answer 
(N participants = 27) 
34 23.82 45.75 
(2) True answer 
between advice and 
estimate 
(N participants = 33) 
38 1.89 25.06 
(3) Estimate between 
advice and true answer 
(N participants = 24) 
27 - 2.15 16.59 
 
Follow-up planned comparisons showed a significant difference between advice position (1) 
and advice position (3) in terms of participants accuracy change scores (t = - 2.54, df = 51, p < 
0.014).  Significant differences were found in accuracy change scores, between advice position 
(1), and (2) (t = - 2.89, df = 51, p < 0.006).  However, the accuracy change scores of 
participants (N= 24) whose unaided estimate fell between the advice and the true answer, did 
not differ significantly from zero (t = 0.67, df = 26, p < 0.51).  Hence, limited support is found 
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here for the idea that participants indiscriminately conform to advice.  This is because 
improvements in estimation accuracy were observed for the scenario where the advice lies 
between an unaided estimate, and true answer.  Simultaneously, estimation accuracy decreased 
marginally where an unaided estimate lies between the advice and the true answer.  These 
results are consistent with the idea that people are constrained in their abilities to discriminate 
between beneficial and poor advice, in circumstances of incomplete domain knowledge.   
 
Are participants consistent in their preferences for a particular type of advice? 
 
Consideration was next given to whether a participant‘s preference for (i) their own intuition, 
or (ii) any particular advice type, was a consistent feature of his/her deliberations prior to 
revising (or not revising) their unaided estimate.  A pattern of consistent advice preferences 
may indicate something more than mere curiosity about the nature of the various pieces of 
advice.  Recall, that participants clicked a radio button in the online survey that indicated 
which of the nine pieces of advice (four pieces of solely numeric advice, four pieces of reasons 
advice, and the option of ‗no advice useful‘) was useful to them in formulating an estimate to 
each historical quiz question.  Hence, the number of instances in which participants chose the 
same type of advice (i.e. as indicated by clicking the radio button that such advice was most 
useful), on subsequent estimation questions, as they did when responding to the first estimation 
question, was calculated.  The data is aggregated and tabulated below (see Table 4.19). 
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Table 4.19.  Consistent advice preferences 
Participants who 
initially cite 
reasons-based 
advice as useful, 
and continue to cite 
this advice type as 
useful when 
responding to 
subsequent 
estimation questions 
Participants who 
initially cite 
numerical advice as 
useful, and continue 
to cite this advice 
type as useful when 
responding to 
subsequent 
estimation questions 
Participants who 
initially cite no 
advice as useful, 
and continue to cite 
no advice as being 
useful , when 
responding to 
subsequent 
estimation questions 
Participants who are 
not consistent in 
their preference for 
advice. 
19/45 (42.2%) 0 7/45 (15.6%) 19/45 (42.2%) 
 
A significance test was performed, in order to determine whether the proportions tabulated 
above, were significantly different from what could have occurred by chance, finding that the 
observed proportions were significantly different from the expected proportions (χ2 = 22.72; df 
= 3; p < 0.001).  Given that people who cited solely numeric advice as most useful to them, in 
formulating an estimate to the first historical quiz question, did not subsequently find solely 
numeric advice useful on the other two historical quiz questions, this finding is perhaps not 
surprising.  However it is plausible that this finding provides some indication, that participants‘ 
preferences for advice were guided by something other than mere curiosity that declined over 
time.  If so, this provides further evidence of the limited ecological validity of conceptualizing 
advice in solely numeric terms.  Further consideration of participants‘ preferences for different 
advice types is developed in the following section.  
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Do participants hold preconceptions of the utility of any particular advice type? 
 
In order to further investigate participants‘ preferences for different types of advice, the time of 
first acquisition of advice was calculated.  Whilst participants interacted with the on-line 
questionnaire, the ‗MouseLabWeb‘ software recorded the time in milliseconds (calculated as 
the absolute difference from the start of the questionnaire until a particular event).  Given that 
both question order and advice box presentation was randomized across participants, it is 
possible to determine the order in which people first accessed advice.  However, despite Log 
(10) transformation the time data violated the assumption of normality (in addition, the 
assumption that our data was normally distributed could not be satisfied despite attempting 
arcsine, square root, Loge, and arctan transformations).  Hence, it was necessary to use non-
parametric techniques to test for significance.  
 
First, the data was aggregated across estimation problems, and collapsed into the advice 
categories of (i) the time of first acquisition of solely numeric advice, and (ii) the time of first 
acquisition of reasons (iii) the time when participant‘s first clicked on the ‗no advice useful‘ 
option.  A Kruskal-Wallis test, comparing the mean times of first acquisition of advice for 
participants who first chose solely numeric advice, for participants who first chose reasons 
advice, and for participants who first chose ‗no advice‘, was performed.  On examining this 
data, it was clear that, on average, there was no significant effect of advice type upon time of 
first acquisition of advice (χ2 = 0.54, df = 2, p < 0.76).  A similar result obtained when the data 
of only participants who subsequently changed judgment post-advice was examined (χ2 = 0.64, 
df = 2, p < 0.73), and also for people who did not change judgment post-advice (χ2 = 0.24, df = 
2, p < 0.89).   Moreover, there were no significant differences in the time that participants first 
accessed advice, when the consistency of their advice type preferences was taken into account.  
Comparison was made between participants who consistently reported that no advice was 
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useful, participants who reported that reasons advice was useful, and where participants were 
inconsistent in their preference for advice types (χ2 = 0.36, df = 2, p < 0.83).  These findings 
suggest that participants did not hold a pre-conceived idea of what advice might be useful to 
them, prior to accessing and processing advice messages. 
 
What advice did participants look at prior to revising (or not revising) their judgment?  
 
Next, consideration was given to what advice (if any) our participants elected to examine prior 
to revising (or not revising) their initial estimate.  The ‗MouseLabWeb‘ software recorded 
which advice boxes participants ‗clicked‘ on as they completed the questionnaire, and 
subsequently it was possible to determine the total number of advice ‗acquisitions‘ and ‗re-
acquisitions‘ participants made, prior to revising (or not revising), their ultimate estimate.  
These data were aggregated in order to ascertain whether participants found no advice useful, 
attended to solely numeric advice, or attended to reasons.  These data are displayed in Fig. 4.3 
below.   
107 
 
Fig 4.3.  Total number of advice acquisitions and re-acquisitions. 
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Subsequently, a significance test was performed to determine whether the observed number of 
advice box acquisitions for the categories of no advice perceived useful, solely numeric advice, 
and reasons-based advice, was different from what might be expected by chance.  A significant 
result of this test would provide evidence that participants‘ search for information was not 
random – this proved to be the case (χ2 Friedman
 = 1808, df = 2, p < 0.0005).  This finding 
demonstrates that participants gave greater consideration to reasons-based advice.  Next, the 
analysis was repeated, this time comparing the observed number of advice box acquisitions for 
people who subsequently did not change judgment (N = 5856), and participants who did 
subsequently change judgment (N = 4564), with the expected frequency of advice box 
acquisitions (N = 5210).  It was found that the pattern of observed frequencies was 
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significantly different from what might be expected by chance (χ2 = 160.20, df = 1, p < 
0.0005).  However, this pattern of non-random observations did not support the idea that 
participant‘s who did not revise their judgment post-advice, conducted a less rigorous 
information search pre-advice, than participants who did revise their judgment post-advice.  
People who did not change judgment post-advice, tended to acquire (and re-acquire), no less 
information than people who did subsequently change judgment (U = 397575.5, N1 = 853, N2 
= 955, p < 0.38).  In sum, there was no difference between conditions in terms of the depth of 
information search that participants undertook, but participants gave greater consideration to 
reasons-based advice, than either solely numeric advice, or their own intuitions.   
 
Does attending to advice bolster participants’ confidence in their estimation abilities?  
 
Recall that the measure of confidence proposed here is the absolute difference between a lower 
bound, and an upper bound within which participants are 95% certain that the true answer 
(whatever that might be) could be found.  Hence, it is possible to infer that a smaller absolute 
difference (between upper and lower bounds) is indicative of a greater confidence.  The 
confidence scores reported by participants‘ were not normally distributed, which necessitated 
the use of the Log(10) transformed values in order to meet the requirements of the assumption of 
normality.  It follows then, that if participants were more confident in the accuracy of their 
estimates post-advice; participants would report a significant difference between pre-advice 
confidence levels, and the confidence levels reported post-advice (see Table 4.20).    This is 
exactly what was observed (t = 5.12, df = 158, p < 0.0005). 
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Table 4.20.  Pre-advice and post-advice levels 
N participants = 66 
N = number of 
responses 
 
 
sd 
 
(Log(10)  
transformed 
sd 
Pre-advice 
confidence 
159 54.45 54.76 1.47 0.56 
Post-advice 
confidence 
159 36.92 35.24 1.30 0.57 
 
Overall, participants appear to be significantly more confident after considering advice, than 
they were prior to considering advice.  However, in order to determine whether this effect 
masked differences between groups in terms of pre-advice confidence levels a one-way 
ANOVA was performed on the pre-advice confidence scores of participants (see Table 4.21). 
Table 4.21.  Pre-advice confidence 
Reason type 
N participants = 71 
N= 153 
responses 
 
 
sd 
 
(Log(10)  
transformed 
sd 
No advice 
perceived to be 
useful 
50 38.62 37.82 1.32 0.57 
Solely numeric 
advice perceived to 
be useful 
6 47.00 45.76 1.49 0.45 
Reasons-based 
advice perceived to 
be useful 
97 65.46 60.81 1.60 0.49 
 
The ANOVA performed on the data in Table 4.21 revealed significant differences between 
conditions (F(2, 150) = 4.70, p < 0.01).  It was then necessary to carry out follow-up planned 
comparisons to ascertain which conditions differed.  The results of the analysis of pair-wise 
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comparisons shows that only participants who perceived reasons-based advice to be useful, and 
participants who perceived no advice to be useful to them significantly differed in terms of 
their pre-advice levels of confidence (t – 3.07, df = 150, p < 0.003).  This finding is perhaps not 
that surprising, given that the number of participants indicating that they found reasons-based 
advice useful was almost double the number of participants, who indicated that they found no 
advice useful to them in their deliberations.  Further, participants who did not find any advice 
useful in their deliberations appeared to be most confident in their deliberations pre-advice, 
and remained confident in their estimates post-advice (t = 1.30, df = 49, p < 0.20)  (i.e. these 
participants did not significantly revise their level of confidence post-advice).  Hence, 
participants who were least confident in their pre-advice estimates became more confident after 
they had considered advice. 
 
Next, consideration was given to whether there were differences in levels of post-advice 
confidence dependent upon the type of advice our participants found most useful (none, solely 
numeric, or reasons).  Table 4.21 reports means and standard deviations for participants‘ post-
advice confidence. 
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Table 4.22.  Post-advice confidence 
Reason type 
N participants = 66 
N = 
Number 
of 
responses 
 
 
sd 
 
(Log(10)  
transformed 
sd 
No advice 
perceived to be 
useful 
50 34.20 30.27 1.28 0.58 
Solely numeric 
advice perceived to 
be useful 
5 34.40 27.10 1.29 0.64 
Reasons-based 
advice perceived to 
be useful 
94 40.48 38.46 1.36 0.54 
 
Table 4.22 shows that participants who found no advice to be useful, had the least post-advice 
confidence, yet there were no significant differences between groups (F(2, 146) = 0.34, p < 0.69).  
No significant differences between groups were found when follow-up planned comparisons 
were performed on the data.  Similarly, no differences were found between groups when the 
analysis was repeated for people who had changed judgment (F(2, 57) = 0.39, p < 0.68).  Further, 
there were no differences in post-advice confidence scores, between people who changed 
judgment, and people who did not (see Table 4.23), (t – 0.94, df = 155, p < 0.35). 
Table 4.23  Judgment change: post-advice confidence scores 
N participants = 43 N = number of 
responses 
 
 
sd 
 
(Log(10)  
transformed) 
sd 
Change judgment 61 35.43 39.51 1.26 0.58 
Do not change 
judgment 
96 38.65 32.35 1.35 0.55 
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Consideration was then given to whether participants who perceived reasons as most useful, 
and who changed judgment, differed in terms of their final confidence (see Table 4.24) – they 
did not (F(3, 46) = 0.91, p < 0.45). 
Table 4.24 Post-advice confidence: Participants who perceive reasons-based advice be useful 
and change judgment 
 
N participants 
= 36 
N = 50 
number of 
responses 
 
 
sd 
 
(Log(10)  
transformed) 
sd 
Analogy 3 11.33 8.08 0.97 0.35 
Parallel case 10 39.90 29.78 1.12 0.73 
Authority 25 41.12 51.06 1.38 0.47 
Motivation 12 36.28 32.76 1.31 0.56 
 
Given the results of the preceding analysis of participants‘ post-advice confidence scores 
between groups, reported in Table 4.22, and the finding that there were no significant 
differences between groups when the post-advice confidence scores of participants who 
changed judgment, and perceived reasons to be useful, were examined (see Table 4.24); it is 
possible to tentatively infer that participants‘ confidence in the veracity of their post-advice 
estimate was bolstered to the same degree, no matter which type of advice they perceived to be 
most useful.  This finding remains tentative however, due to the low number of participants in 
three out of four cells in Table 4.24, and the subsequent detrimental effects upon statistical 
power.   
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If participants’ are less confident prior to accessing advice, are they more likely to revise 
their judgment post-advice?  
 
Next, participants‘ pre-advice confidence scores were examined.  Recall that one of the issues 
that is being explored here, is whether people who report narrow confidence intervals (i.e. are 
highly confident in the veracity of their unaided estimate), are less predisposed to change 
judgment, than participants who report wider confidence intervals in their unaided pre-advice 
estimate.  To explore this issue, the pre-advice confidence levels of participants who do not 
subsequently change judgment, were compared with the pre-advice confidence levels of 
participants who did change judgment (see Table 4.25). 
Table 4.25  Pre-advice confidence levels 
N participants = 55 
N = 103 
number 
of 
responses 
 
 
sd 
 
(Log(10)  
transformed) 
sd 
Change judgment 55 72.25 68.17 1.62 0.53 
Do not change 
judgment 
48 55.38 48.19 1.56 0.43 
 
Table 4.25 clearly shows that although participants who changed judgment had appear to have 
held less confidence initially, than participants who did not change judgment, this difference 
did not reach the level of significance  (t = 0.55, df = 101, p < 0.59).  However, the idea that 
participants (N = 71) who are less confident pre-advice are subsequently more disposed to 
revise their judgment in the light of advice, is supported when the correlation between 
judgment change, and pre-advice confidence was examined (Spearman‘s ‗r‘ = - 0.19, p < 0.02, 
N = 163).  Here the negative correlation coefficient suggests that the greater the numerical 
difference is between a participant‘s lower and upper bound confidence estimate, the more 
likely the same participant is to revise their judgment post-advice.      
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Does attending to advice, lead to changes in the degree of confidence held by 
participants?  
 
The changes in confidence that our participant‘s reported were examined next.  Recall that the 
confidence change measure here is calculated by subtracting a participant‘s initial confidence 
score from their final confidence score.  Hence, negative values indicate increasing 
confidence.  For the purposes of clarity, the sign of the mean confidence change score has been 
inverted, so that positive confidence change scores indicate increasing confidence.  After 
extracting cases where participants did not change their level of confidence from their pre-
advice estimates, to their post-advice estimates, these scores are tabulated in Table 4.26 
(below).  
Table 4.26  Changes in confidence 
 
N participants = 51 
N = 99 
number 
of 
responses 
 
 
sd 
No advice perceived to be 
useful 
20 11.05 31.27 
Solely numeric advice 
perceived to be useful 
5 20.00 34.07 
Reasons-based advice 
perceived to be useful 
74 33.31 59.20 
 
As these data did not meet the assumptions of normality, and Log(10)  transformation of 
negative values is not meaningful, it was necessary to perform a Kruskal-Wallis test of 
significance upon the data in Table 4.26 to determine if there was a significant main effect of 
condition,  in terms of the confidence change scores.  The result of this test revealed a main 
effect of condition (no advice perceived as useful/reasons advice perceived as useful/numeric 
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advice perceived as useful) (χ2 = 10.09, df = 2, p < 0.006).  Next a median test was performed 
on the data to determine which groups significantly differed from each other (see Table 4.27). 
Table 4.27  Median scores:  Frequency of changes in confidence scores 
N participants = 51 
Median = - 10 
> median <= median 
No advice perceived to be 
useful 
7 43 
Solely numeric advice 
perceived to be useful 
1 4 
Reasons-based advice 
perceived to be useful 
17 77 
 
 
However, a subsequent test upon the group medians failed to detect significant differences 
between groups (χ2 = 0.43, df = 2, p < 0.81).  Inspection of Table 4.27 only reveals that the 
majority of participants narrowed their post-advice confidence bounds in comparison to their 
pre-advice confidence bounds, but did so less so than the overall group median, on average (10 
years).   
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4.7 Discussion 
 
This study had set out to explore influences upon judgment revision (where both solely 
numeric and reasons-based advice constituted the advice that was available to participants) 
upon participants‘ deliberations, and subsequent estimation, of the dates of three historical 
events.  The results indicate the importance that participants‘ attach to reasons (irrespective of 
the accuracy of the reasons) in their deliberations.  In part, this preference may be accounted 
for by the fact that reasons are simply more elaborate than solely numeric advice, and hence 
more attractive to estimators.  However, this may not be the only reason why participants did 
not regard solely numeric advice as useful, on average.  Reinard (1988) speculates that the 
failure of statistical evidence to induce persuasion in judges is because such evidence fails to 
‗create vivid images in the minds of receivers‘ (p. 24).  Statistical evidence in this context, 
potentially allows judges to make inferences about the nature of the population that the 
statistical evidence is drawn from.  Given that the few existing studies (Harte, 1973; Ryland, 
1973), which examine the persuasiveness of solely numeric, or statistical information, in 
comparison to the persuasiveness of testimonial assertions, show no differences - I considered 
why my participants‘ clearly sought out advice that offered reasons in addition to numerical 
information.  Intuitively, advice that only consists of a simple four digit number is unlikely to 
‗fire the imagination‘ of participants – and it has been argued that effective argumentation 
relies, at least in part, in its power to create vivid images in the minds of an audience 
(Perelman and Olbrecht-Tyteca, 1969).  Further, solely numeric information is only likely to 
be influential in the context of the three historical quiz questions utilized in this study, when 
people are able to incorporate such information within their own implicit theories of causation 
(Ross and Fletcher, 1985).  The questionnaire devised in this study presented solely numeric 
advice, which is perhaps even less likely to create vivid imagery in the minds of participants 
than statistical information, as beyond an individual‘s world knowledge, few inferences about 
some target population can be made on the basis of an isolated historical date.  Moreover, there 
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is a body of evidence to suggest, that on average, anecdotal reports are more persuasive than 
solely numeric advice, or statistics (Bar-Hillel, 1975; Kahneman and Tversky, 1972, 1973; 
Nisbett and Borgida, 1975).  The findings of this study are consistent with those of these 
authors - in so far as participants in this study clearly found reasons more useful than solely 
numeric advice. 
 
Moreover, participants in this study also tended to ‗stick‘ with their initial advice preferences 
over subsequent estimation questions.  Such inflexibility on the part of participants did not 
reflect accurate estimation however.  Rather, participants may have been so constrained in their 
abilities to evaluate the veracity of advice substantiated by reasons, that investing cognitive 
resources in evaluating further advice options did not appear any more beneficial than 
persisting with the initial advice preference.  If the assumption that participants were motivated 
to estimate accurately is correct, it follows that participants saw no reason to invest cognitive 
resources and adapt their estimation strategy to the demands of each individual historical quiz 
question; but neither were they guessing blindly – participants were at least motivated to 
estimate in an internally consistent manner (by persisting with an initial advice preference over 
later estimation questions).  Self-consistency of advice preference, in this context, is best 
explained through a cognitive dissonance perspective.  When faced with an estimation problem 
for which advice is available, participants scanned their previous decisions in order to make 
consistent future decisions about advice (Harmon-Jones, 1981), and hence reduce internally 
perceived cognitive dissonance. 
 
A strong finding in this study is that in circumstances of incomplete domain knowledge, people 
seek cues from which an evaluation of (i) the accuracy of a participant‘s unaided estimate can 
be made, and (ii) the potential benefits of attending to advice.  Of the advice substantiated by 
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reasons in this study, advice backed up by some authority clearly emerged as influential.  Here, 
participant‘s sought out such advice, and inferred that the advice was useful on the basis of the 
credibility of the source.  Recall that in the context of this study, numerical advice evidenced 
by some authority, was advice substantiated by the authority of three fictitious historians.  This 
finding is consistent with the work of Yalch and Elmore-Yalch (1984).  These authors 
presented their participants with messages that varied on the dimensions of quantity and 
expertise.  The presentation of quantitative information in the Yalch and Elmore-Yalch study 
stimulated participants to rely upon source credibility cues as the basis of judgment.  Here, 
advisors perceived by judges as ‗expert‘ elicited greater persuasive effects, than advisors 
perceived as possessing less expertise.  In contrast, participants in receipt of advice that did not 
include numeric information in the Yalch and Elmore-Yalch study, were uninfluenced by the 
perceived expertise of the advisor.  Here, source credibility did not influence the 
persuasiveness of the message.  Yalch and Elmore-Yalch (1984), contend that the quantitative 
component of reasons elicits the processing of peripheral cues such as source credibility.  
These findings imply that persuasion may be undermined where numerical advice is evidenced 
by some non-expert authority.   In contrast, the advice substantiated by authority presented to 
participants in this study, explicitly highlighted the expertise of the source (see Appendix 1, 
Screen 4).  Here, persuasion was enhanced, as participants‘ focused on the credibility of the 
source of the advice, and not on the accuracy of the numerical component of advice.  In sum, 
people became disinterested in numbers and stopped paying attention to the content of the 
message (Anderson and Jolson, 1980).   In our study, participants‘ rated advice evidenced by 
authority as most useful (even though it was not the most accurate), and people responding to 
this advice changed judgment to a greater extent (in the direction of the advice), than people 
who were not in receipt of reasons.  In sum, our participant‘s responded to the credibility of the 
source of the advice, as a proxy for the veracity of the advice.   
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The findings discussed in the preceding section consistent with the idea of two routes to 
persuasion – central and peripheral processing of message arguments (Chaiken, 1980; Petty et 
al. 1981; Petty et al. 1983).  Here, it is theorized that central processing of message arguments 
involves considerable cognitive resources, and results in detailed scrutiny of the merits of the 
message.  In contrast, where the message is of little personal importance to the recipient, 
cognitive resources are sparingly allocated to the processing tasks, and judgment is based upon 
peripheral cues (such as the credibility of the source of the message).  
 
Ultimately, the improvements in estimation accuracy reported by participants, can be explained 
by the idea that people conform to any available advice (to a degree), under conditions of 
uncertainty.  This is because improvements in estimation accuracy were observed for the 
scenario where the advice lies between an unaided estimate, and the true answer.  
Simultaneously, estimation accuracy decreased where an unaided estimate lies between the 
advice and the true answer.   
 
However, not all participants were swayed by the eight pieces of advice available to them in 
this study – 33.12% of our participant‘s rejected any advice and relied entirely on their own 
intuition.  In these circumstances I observed that people who were highly confident in their 
own intuition were unlikely to change judgment post-advice.  Similarly, people who were not 
confident in their own intuition were disposed to change judgment post-advice.  These findings 
suggest that the reports of participant‘s confidence may also be a proxy for participants‘ pre-
existing knowledge of the three historical quiz questions that they were tasked with estimating.  
However, there is no evidence that initial confidence is correlated with ultimate estimation 
accuracy.  This implies that participants may have erroneously believed that their intuition was 
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accurate i.e. their confidence was not well calibrated with their estimation accuracy 
(Lichtenstein, Fischhoff and Phillips, 1982).   
 
This study is exploratory in nature, and no specific predictions were made as to the estimation 
behaviour of participants post-advice.  In this respect the study was severely limited, and future 
research should be based on experimentation where the influence of one set of independent 
variables upon various dependent measures can be closely controlled and measured.  On 
reflection, it would have been appropriate to develop a more elegant counterbalancing scheme 
for the numeric component of advice, than the one utilized here – despite the fact that the 
counterbalancing scheme utilized here does not appear to have confounded the results of the 
study.  A secondary, but highly important issue was the failure to successfully disentangle the 
influence of reason-based advice on judgment changes, from simple conformity to advice 
effects.  In part, this is attributable to a conceptualization of what constitutes ‗advice‘.  Here, 
the use of solely numeric advice, and reasons, was not entirely successful, as participants 
overwhelmingly discarded the solely numeric advice.  Future studies should carefully consider 
and evaluate the potential benefits of using solely numeric advice.  The findings of this study 
suggest that, solely numeric advice was not perceived as meaningful by our participants.  The 
use of statistical advice however (and/or a description of the process from which the statistic is 
derived), allows participants to make inferences about the target population that a statistic is 
drawn from.  Further, such elaboration may allow people to place advice within the context of 
their ‗implicit theories of causation‘, and facilitate deeper processing of the message content of 
the advice – even though this remains at best an indirect route in facilitating enhanced 
estimation accuracy.  
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The limitations of this study serve also to highlight the underdeveloped status of the JAS 
paradigm.  Recall, that JAS theorists argue that acknowledging role differentiation between 
judges and advisors, and placing judge/advisor interactions in a social context, enhances the 
paradigm‘s ecological validity in comparison to alternative nominal group decision-making 
techniques.  However, these claims are difficult to substantiate, given there is currently no 
comprehensive theoretical framework of advice taking, and advice giving (Bonaccio, and 
Dalal, 2006).  Moreover, it is perhaps not surprising that no comprehensive theoretical 
framework exists, given the heterogeneity of tasks, stimuli, and methods that characterize JAS 
studies.  Hence, claims of the superior ecological validity of JAS research are difficult to 
sustain.  Further, as the interaction between judge and advisor is impoverished and artificial in 
the extant JAS literature, it is difficult to isolate the cognitive mechanisms that underpin 
persuasion and judgment change.  This is because of loose conceptualizations of what 
constitutes ‗advice‘ (to date, advice has been largely operationalized in solely numeric terms).  
Further, the existing conceptualization of advice disguises the reasons that underpin 
deliberations that ultimately resolve in a numeric estimate of some quantity of interest.  In sum, 
future studies should conceptualize and operationalize exactly what constitutes ‗advice‘, and 
predict a priori its likely effects upon accuracy, judgment change and confidence.  Further, 
future studies will also have to address the issue of the persuasive strength of any particular 
rationale that is included in an advice package.  It is also clear that participants are able to use 
source credibility as a proxy for the veracity of advice, and simultaneously report confidence 
levels that may be based upon pre-existing knowledge of the quantity to be estimated.  In such 
circumstances it will be necessary to take some measure of participants‘ general knowledge, in 
addition to a measure of the specific knowledge participants are able to bring to bear upon an 
estimation question. 
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Given the preceding discussion, and the clear need for further development of the JAS 
paradigm, the initial exploratory study outlined here, serves as the basis for future empirical 
work.  One robust finding from the extant JAS literature (and a finding partially replicated in 
this study – 33.12% of participants did not find any advice useful in this study - see Table 4.2), 
is that people are not predisposed to revise their judgments in the light of advice.  Yaniv and 
Kleinberger (2000), have described this phenomena as ‗egocentric discounting‘ of advice.  As 
advice is operationalized in solely numeric terms, it is argued that judges in the Yaniv and 
Kleinberger study, are aware of their own reasoning that resolves in a numerical estimate, but 
unaware of the reasoning behind any solely numeric estimate that any advisor(s) may offer.  
Hence, it is possible to envisage an empirical study that would extend understanding of the 
mechanisms of judgment change within the parameters of the JAS paradigm.  Such a study 
will examine the influence of reasons in addition to numerical advice, upon egocentric 
discounting of advice, accuracy and confidence. 
   
The present study also points to areas where the structured exchange of information may aid 
estimation performance.  Participants in the present study clearly preferred reasons advice, in 
preference to solely numeric advice.  Investigation of this finding could fruitfully be extended, 
by examining the circumstances in which further structuring information exchange, for both 
large and small highly uncertain quantities, may be beneficial, in terms of estimation 
performance.  Such a study would both extend the parameters of the JAS paradigm, and build 
upon the existing findings of authors who have investigated the ‗divide and conquer‘ principle, 
or ‗algorithmic decomposition‘ for uncertain quantities. 
 
Finally, the findings of the present study highlight the constraints upon human cognition, when 
people are tasked with differentiating between beneficial and poor advice, under conditions of 
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incomplete domain knowledge.  This finding will be further tested in an empirical study, where 
both beneficial and poor numerical advice, is presented to participants under circumstances of 
incomplete domain knowledge.  
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Chapter 5:  The Benefit of an Additional judgment. 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Seeking or using advice from a friend or colleague in a personal, work or social context seems 
very much in the realm of the commonplace.  However, studies exploring the possible effects 
of advice upon decision-making are relatively few and largely concentrated in the Judge-
Advisor Systems (JAS) stream of research (Sniezek, 1992; Sniezek and Buckley, 1995; 
Budescu and Rantilla, 2000; Budescu, Rantilla and Yu, 2003).   Chapter 4 demonstrated that 
people tend to discount advice in favour of their own judgment; but where participants chose to 
revise their judgment post-advice, (where advice was constituted as both solely numeric, and 
reasons-based), participants tended to conform to advice, in an estimation task concerning the 
date of notable historical events.  Further, participants overwhelmingly preferred reasons-based 
advice, when they chose to revise their judgment post-advice.  The current chapter will focus 
upon the cognitive weighting strategies people employ, when deliberating upon solely numeric 
or reasons-based advice.  It follows then, that if people persist in conforming to advice 
(irrespective of the quality of advice) over a range of tasks, they will place equal cognitive 
weight, upon either solely numeric advice, or reasons-based advice.  Further, this study tests 
whether participants are able to adequately distinguish between potentially beneficial advice, 
and poor advice.  Should people fail to distinguish between potentially beneficial advice, and 
poor advice, then this would lend further support to the idea that where people revise their 
judgment post-advice, it is likely that they are indiscriminately conforming to advice 
irrespective of its quality.  A decision-making dyad consisting of an advisor and a judge is the 
simplest form that such a model takes, and is what is of concern here; the influence of an 
additional judgment, in terms of beneficial judgment revision.  
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Judgment Change and Egocentric discounting 
Perhaps the most obvious way in which the benefit of an additional judgment can be 
demonstrated is where a judge changes his/her initial judgment following the receipt of advice 
- perhaps leading to a more accurate, or more beneficial final estimate.  This implies for 
reductions in the mean error of judges‘ post-advice judgment, judgment change is necessary.  
Judgment change can be described as an instance where a judge gives an estimate that is 
different, post-advice, to the response made pre-advice.  It follows that people who change 
judgment after receipt of advice are likely to change judgment in the direction of the available 
advice, on average.  Further, if people are able to evaluate the quality of proffered advice, then 
such judgment change will also be in the direction of the correct answer.   Whilst the receipt of 
advice may lead to improved estimation accuracy - on average - judgment change will be the 
process through which such improvements are realized.  A further psychological mechanism, 
which may underlie a judge‘s degree of judgment change, is the weight that a judge puts upon 
advice – particularly in relation to his/her initial judgment.   
 
Yaniv and Kleinberger (2000), and Yaniv (2004a; 2004b), have developed a measure 
delineating the Weight of Advice (WOA) to examine the degree to which judges revise their 
judgments post-advice.  They argue that a final estimate is the product of a weighted 
combination of a judge‘s initial estimate and advice, and can be defined as ¦f – i¦ / ¦a – i¦, where 
i, f, and a, represent initial, final and advice respectively.  Further, it is argued that the weight 
of advice is well defined if the final estimate falls between the initial estimate and the advice.  
Expressed as a proportion, WOA reflects the weight that a participant places upon advice (it is 
inversely related to the extent that the advice is discounted).  Hence, advice weighted as ‗0‘ 
indicates that a participant has completely discounted the advice and is fully convinced of the 
veracity of their own judgment, whereas a WOA of ‗1‘ indicates that a participant has 
126 
 
jettisoned their own initial judgment and entirely adopted the advice available to them in 
determining a final estimate.  A WOA of 0.5 would indicate that both the advice and a 
participant‘s initial judgment were weighted equally.  Yaniv et al. argue that people are likely 
to egocentrically discount advice in favour of their own judgment.  This conceptualization has 
two possible explanations.  The first, a cognitive explanation, argues that integrating advice 
into a global determination of some issue imposes a greater cognitive load than assessing the 
quality of the advice proffered (Harvey, Harries and Fischer, 2000).  Hence, advice may be 
recognized as useful but may be under-utilized.  A second explanation explores the idea that 
advice is egocentrically discounted relative to a judge‘s initial judgment (Yaniv and 
Kleinberger (2000); Yaniv 2004a, 2004b).  This second task specific explanation, notes that in 
a situation where a judge is only able to access numerical advice from an advisor, the 
reasoning behind such advice will be unavailable.  Hence, a judge‘s own initial judgment will 
dominate any numerical advice.   
 
The findings from the JAS avenue of research do not, as yet, differentiate between the 
preceding two accounts, but simply support the notion that whilst advice is influential – and 
there is judgment change in the judge‘s estimates post-advice - judges grant their own 
judgments greater weight in the decision or forecasting process (Harvey et al. 2000; Yaniv and 
Kleinberger, 2000).  Why should this be so?  One explanation is that one‘s own judgment 
implicitly contains the reasons for a stated numerical judgment whereas, to date, advice in the 
JAS paradigm has been simply numerical estimates.  Such numerical advice from advisors 
does not contain the reasons underlying the advice.  Furthermore, numerical advice consistent 
with a judge‘s own judgment or forecast is likely to be given greater cognitive weight than 
discrepant advice (Harvey et al. 2000).  Studies that have examined advice quality also 
highlight the sensitivity that judges exhibit towards, what is presumed to be, accurate advice.  
127 
 
Advisors that have a history of accuracy (or have more information at their disposal than 
judges making a final determination), are likely to be given more credence than advice 
proffered by, what is perceived, as a less accurate advisor (Budescu et al. 2003).  However, 
reason-based advice has not been utilized in the extant JAS studies, and it is unknown whether 
such advice will be given more weight – relative to pure numerical advice, in the judge‘s post-
advice judgment.  The issue of what constitutes reason-based qualitative advice (in addition to 
purely numerical information) compared to other forms of qualitative advice is of significance 
here; it is contended that reason-based qualitative advice may convey not only information that 
a judge may be unaware of, but also a logic or rationale of how such information supports a 
numerical estimate received as advice (see Appendix II).  In short, if reasons are attached to 
numerical advice, the effects of egocentric discounting should be mitigated, as judges would 
have access to the advisors‘ reasoning.  If egocentric discounting is lessened then it will 
support the task specific account.  Conversely, if there were an obtained persistence of 
egocentric discounting - despite the provisions of reasons in addition to numerical advice – it 
would lend support to the cognitive account of sub-optimal advice use.  Utilizing the WOA 
measure allows some insight into how participants regard the advice available to them in 
relation to their own judgment given numerical advice with additional supporting reasons.   
H1:  Participants with purely numerical advice available to them will egocentrically 
discount that advice in favour of their own judgment.  Participants with reason-based 
advice and numerical information available to them will egocentrically discount the 
advice to a lesser extent (than participants receiving purely numerical advice). 
 
 
Advice and accuracy 
 
Advice in the context of JAS has been almost exclusively numerical in nature 
(means/medians), and largely aimed towards the accuracy of forecasts extrapolated from time 
series data (Sniezek, 1989, 1990; Sniezek and Buckley, 1995; Harvey, 1995; Harvey et al. 
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2000).  Where non-numerical advice has been utilized it has been of a superficial nature – 
qualitative ‗advice‘ consisting of comments such as ‗this is a guess‘ or ‗I‘m definite about this‘ 
(Sniezek and Van Swol, 2001).  Hence, the potential beneficial effects of improved estimation 
facilitated by the introduction of reasons in addition to numerical advice is unexplored in the 
JAS literature.  This is unfortunate, since one of the most obvious motives individuals may 
have for using advice is the desire to improve the quality of the decision (Harvey and Fischer, 
1997).  Intuitively, advice that is an elaboration of numerical estimates will contain important 
qualitative information (e.g. ―I think that man will land on Mars in 2020.  This is because my 
father works for NASA and I have seen their plans‖).  In the present study, I focus on an 
evaluation of the benefit of an additional judgment through advice available to judges from a 
single anonymous advisor.  The advice is either (i) numerical advice or (ii) reasons-based 
advice.  Further, the provision of qualitative reasons in addition to purely numerical advice 
may allow judges to discriminate between useful and spurious numerical advice, resulting in 
greater accuracy.  One way to examine these assertions is to look at the error that an individual 
participant makes on the experimental task.  Such errors can be averaged across participants 
and conditions (Mean Absolute Error).  Subtracting the final MAE from the initial MAE is 
indicative of the degree accuracy that participants achieve.  Alternatively, should participants 
revise their judgment and merely conform to any available advice, then the potential estimation 
performance improvements of attending to beneficial advice, may be negated by the decreases 
in estimation accuracy brought about by attending to poor advice.  In this scenario, there will 
be little difference between the post-advice accuracy of participants in receipt of solely 
numeric advice, and participants in receipt of reasons-based advice.   
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This discussion leads to the hypothesis that –  
H2:  There will be significant differences (in MAE scores) between the condition where 
participants have numerical advice available to them, and the condition where 
participants have reasons in addition to numerical advice available to them.  Specifically, 
participants who receive reasons in addition to numerical advice will improve their 
estimate (i.e. reduce their error) to a greater degree.   
 
5.2 Method 
 
Participants 
 
Participants in the study (N = 256) were undergraduate and postgraduate students at Durham 
Business School from both the Durham and Queen‘s Campus (Stockton).  Participation in the 
experiment was voluntary and no payments were made.  Participants were students who the 
author recruited by visiting a lecture theatre (with the permission of staff colleagues) where 
students were gathered to attend their studies.  All participants took approximately the same 
amount of time to complete the questionnaire.   
 
Stimuli and materials 
 
Following the work of Yaniv and Kleinberger (2000), and Yaniv (2004a; 2004b), I developed 
a 14-item questionnaire (see Appendix II) that tasked participants to ascertain the correct date - 
or a best estimate of the correct date - of historical events that occurred in the last 300 years.  
In addition, I derived two conditions under which advice would be available to participants:  
first, numerical advice (accurate/inaccurate), second, numerical advice and supporting 
additional reasons (very weak/weak/strong) (see Appendix II). 
 
The problem of defining what is the essence of a compelling message or argument is a debate 
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that is longstanding and ongoing in social psychology.  This is unfortunate for the purposes of 
the present study, as one of the objectives of the research was to examine the differential 
effects of reasons feedback/advice (i.e. reasons at different degrees of persuasiveness) upon 
accuracy, and judgment change.  One way to approach this issue might be to adopt the 
perspective of the Elaborative Likelihood Model theory (ELM) advocated by Petty and 
Cacioppo (1986).  Here, the experimenter (or pilot group, if practical) generates convincing 
and specious arguments about the question(s) of interest.    These reasons are then 
independently rated on a 5-point Likert scale of persuasiveness (1 = unconvincing; 5 = 
compelling).  In ELM studies of message persuasiveness these ratings would then be passed to 
a second rating group who would write down how favourable or unfavourable these ratings are 
to the advocated reasons (thought listing).  i.e. very weak/weak/strong.  As reasons are of 
interest and not persuasive messages I only retain the first step of Petty and Cacioppo‘s 
methodology; subsequently the reasons generated by the experimenter were categorized as 
‗very weak‘, ‗weak‘, and ‗strong‘ by two independent coders.  These categories serve as 
methodological proxies for the argumentative quality of the generated reasons. 
 
Procedure 
 
Participants were randomly allocated to one of three experimental conditions (i) a control 
condition (where no advice was available to participants), (ii) a numerical advice condition 
(where only numerical advice is available to participants) (iii) a reasons-based advice condition 
(where reasons in addition to numerical advice is available to participants).  Numerical advice 
was further delineated as accurate or inaccurate (participants received either accurate or 
inaccurate advice– not both - for each of the 14 items).  This permutation of advice was held 
constant in the reasons-based and numerical advice condition, so that accurate numerical 
advice available to participants in the accurate numerical advice condition was identical to the 
accurate numerical advice in the accurate numerical advice and supporting reasons condition.  
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Exactly the same permutation of advice was maintained for inaccurate numerical advice, and 
reasons-based advice with inaccurate numerical information.  The correct date for a specific 
historical event constituted accurate numerical advice.   Inaccurate numerical advice varied the 
degree of inaccuracy from question to question, but was approximately balanced in terms of 
the sign of inaccuracy around the correct value (+ years or – years) (see Appendix II).  
Participants were given no information regarding the identity of the advisor beyond the 
description, ‗advisor C‘, or ‗advisor P‘.  For each of the fourteen questionnaire items in the two 
advice conditions the alphabetic designation of the advisor was varied (creating the illusion of 
fourteen different advisors).  
 
In the reasons-based advice condition, the quality of reason-based advice was manipulated so 
that one third of participants received very weak supporting reasons; one third received weak 
supporting reasons, and one third received strong supporting reasons as advice, after making an 
initial estimate, and prior to making a final estimate. 
  
In the control condition, participants estimated the date of particular historical events, and were 
then asked to reconsider their estimates after a short period of reflection before moving to the 
next question.  Across conditions, all participants took approximately the same amount of time 
to complete the task.   
  
The questionnaire items were counterbalanced across participants and conditions in order to 
offset any systematic presentation order effects of the questionnaire items.  The experimental 
task was divided into two phases; initially participants were tasked with estimating the correct 
date (or best estimate) for a questionnaire item; secondly, participants were tasked with re-
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considering their estimate in the light of available advice.  Each phase of the questionnaire was 
printed on a separate sheet of the questionnaire booklet; so that advice was not available to 
participants in phase one.  Participants were instructed to attempt each of the 14 questions 
sequentially, so that on completion of the first experimental phase participant‘s proceeded to 
the second phase, where a final estimate was made in the light of the available advice.  An 
outline of the general procedure is shown below – 
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REASONS ADVICE CONDITION 
 
Phase I (series of 14 questions) 
 
In what year was the Suez Canal first opened for use? 
 
Your best estimate _____   
 
Please give full details of the reasons that have lead you to this estimate. 
 
 
 
 
 
Phase II (same 14 questions) 
 
In what year was the Suez Canal first opened for use? 
 
Your previous best estimate was 1905   
 
The best estimate of advisor K was 1830 
 
Advisor K bases the estimate upon the notion that the Suez Canal was first opened for use 
during the 19th century colonial era to facilitate European trade between the Mediterranean 
and the Middle East. 
 
Your final best estimate  ______ 
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5.3 Results 
 
Prior to analyzing the data, response rates were considered to determine if missing data might 
influence the outcome of statistical analysis.  Inspection of Table 5.1 shows that whilst 
response rates were not uniformly 100%, the responses rate reached 91.48% on average.  This 
seemed high enough to proceed to analyze the data. 
Table 5.1 Number of responses 
Participants N 
= 255 
Unaided 
estimate 
Pre-advice 
Lower 
Bound 
Pre-advice 
Upper 
Bound 
Post-advice 
estimate 
Post-
advice 
Lower 
Bound 
Post-
advice 
Upper 
Bound 
Responses 
N 
3359/3570 
(94.01%) 
3266/3570 
(91.48%) 
3277/3570 
(91.79%) 
3368/3570 
(94.34%) 
3164/3570 
(88.63%) 
3164/3570 
(88.63%) 
 
 
Judgment Change and Egocentric discounting  
 
The purpose of the results section which follows is to report data that addresses H1 and H2, and 
to ascertain whether the observed behavior of participants is consistent with the idea that where 
people revise their judgment post-advice, they do so by conforming to any available advice.  
First, a number of manipulation checks are reported that confirm that the experimental 
manipulations had an effect upon dependent variables.  Second, the analysis examines the 
amount of judgment change reported by participants (i.e. the number of judgment revisions), 
before considering the cognitive weight participants placed upon advice (the WOA measure).  
Finally, the appropriateness of judgment revision is considered, in order to ascertain whether 
participants were able to distinguish between potentially beneficial advice and spurious advice. 
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Does attending to advice influence judgment change?  
 
That the manipulations had some effect beyond that that might be expected simply by people 
‗thinking again‘ is demonstrated by the finding that there was no significant decrease in the 
mean absolute error that participants in the no advice condition made between their initial 
estimate ( x  = 44.51, sd = 16.36 years), and their final estimate ( x  = 43.82, sd = 16.28), 
indicating that ‗thinking again‘ is insufficient to improve accuracy in the experimental task (t = 
1.29, df = 29; p = 0.21).  Further, by comparing the average mean differences between 
participant‘s initial and final estimates in the experimental conditions, with the average mean 
difference between participant‘s initial and final estimates in the no advice (control) condition, 
I was able to establish that the manipulations had had an effect upon the accuracy of 
participants‘ estimates (F(8, 246) = 4.62, p = 0.0005). 
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Table 5.2 Bonferroni comparison of error reductions (years) between control and experimental 
conditions 
Advice N 
Initial 
estimate 
x  
sd 
Final 
estimate 
x  
sd 
Error 
reduction 
x  
sd 
Mean 
difference 
Std. 
Err 
p 
Control (no 
advice) 
30 44.51 16.36 43.82 16.28 0.68 2.90    
Accurate 
numerical  
24 28.91 16.00 10.84 7.76 18.07 15.09 -17.39 3.73 0.0005* 
Inaccurate 
numerical  
26 35.66 13.99 20.05 7.75 15.61 14.66 -14.93 3.65 0.002* 
Accurate 
numerical and 
v.weak reasons 
27 27.22 11.28 16.93 9.18 10.29 10.31 -9.61 3.61 0.30 
Inaccurate 
numerical and 
v.weak reasons 
32 31.61 15.45 22.35 12.62 9.26 11.60 -8.58 3.46 0.50 
Accurate 
numerical and 
weak reasons 
33 37.03 25.04 20.20 18.57 16.83 16.40 -16.15 3.43 0.0005* 
Inaccurate 
numerical and 
weak reasons 
25 34.04 16.85 20.23 8.96 13.82 13.29 -13.13 3.69 0.02* 
Accurate 
numerical and 
strong reasons 
24 33.95 17.21 13.92 12.27 20.03 16.35 -19.35 3.73 0.0005* 
Inaccurate 
numerical and 
strong reasons 
34 35.26 18.51 21.99 12.87 13.28 16.33 -12.59 3.41 0.01* 
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From the table above, it can be seen that apart from numerical advice with very weak 
supporting reasons, post-hoc Bonferroni tests reveal that all the experimental conditions 
significantly differ from the control condition (in terms of the reduction in error between the 
initial and final estimates), which supports the idea that the manipulations were successful.  A 
further way of examining the reduction in error that participants made from the initial estimate 
(e1) to the final estimate (e2) is to look at the average error question by question.  Collapsing 
the data across participants revealed a significantly reduced mean error on all of the 14 
questions, post-advice – indicating the lack of a ‗ceiling effect‘ due to the specific 
characteristics of the experimental task.  Table 5.2 also shows that participants in receipt of 
inaccurate numerical advice were initially even more inaccurate than the advice on average.  It 
should be no surprise therefore, that judgment revision in the direction of advice would benefit 
these participants.  However, of interest to the present discussion is whether participants in 
receipt of accurate numerical advice were able to reduce their error post-advice, to a greater 
extent than participants in receipt of inaccurate numerical advice – irrespective of 
accompanying reasons.  To ascertain whether this was so, a one-way ANOVA was performed 
on the error reduction scores of participants in receipt of advice.  If people were sensitive to the 
asymmetries of the quality advice, then it might be expected that significant differences would 
be detected between conditions in terms of the extent to which participants were able to reduce 
their pre-advice error, post-advice.  However, no significant differences between conditions in 
terms of error reduction scores were found F(7, 217) = 381.45, p = 0.08).  Hence, it is 
parsimonious to suppose that participants‘ estimates of historical events became more accurate 
(the average error decreased) from the initial estimate to the final estimate.   
 
Another way that these data might be considered is by examining the average error participants 
made pre-advice with the average error that advisors committed in each experimental condition 
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(see Table 5.3).  Examining the data in this way, reveals that participant‘s pre-advice estimates 
were more inaccurate than advice on average – hence judgment revision in the direction of 
advice should improve estimation accuracy, on average. 
Table 5.3 Mean Pre-advice, and advisor error (years) 
 
Next, the amount of judgment change reported by participants was examined.  Initially, I 
looked at the amount of judgment change in our analysis.  Participants were able to change 
judgment on each of the 14 questions.  Hence, the number of potential judgment changes per 
participant could range from ‗0‘ (an individual participant did not change judgment from their 
original estimate) to ‗14‘ (an individual participant changed judgment on all of the 
questionnaire items).  The mean amount of judgment change is defined by the number of 
Participants  
(N = 255) 
N = number of valid responses 
Pre-advice error Advisor error 
x  sd x  sd 
Control 30 45 16   
Accurate statistical 24 29 16 0 0 
Inaccurate statistical 26 36 14 14 1 
Accurate statistical & v. weak reasons 27 27 11 0 0 
Inaccurate statistical & v. weak reasons 32 32 15 14 2 
Accurate statistical & weak reasons 33 37 25 0 0 
Inaccurate statistical & weak reasons 25 34 17 15 0 
Accurate statistical & strong reasons 24 34 17 0 0 
Inaccurate statistical & strong reasons 34 35 19 15 1 
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judgment changes per participant divided by the number of valid responses for each 
participant.  This score was subsequently averaged across conditions and the results are shown 
below (as some participants did not respond to all 14 of the questionnaire items these scores 
are presented as a score between 0 and 1).  The table below shows that judges in receipt of 
advice change judgment approximately 50% of the time, whilst judges without advice change 
judgment approximately 20% of the time.  A one-way between-subjects ANOVA confirmed 
that there are significant differences in the mean amount of judgment change between 
conditions (F(2, 252) = 11.84, p = 0.0001).  Employing the Bonferrroni post-hoc test, significant 
differences were found between the no advice (control) condition and (i) the numerical advice 
condition (p < 0.0001) and (ii) the reasons-based advice condition (p < 0.0001).  However 
there was no significant difference in the mean amount of judgment change between 
participants in receipt of purely numerical advice, and participants in receipt of reasons-based 
advice (p = 1). 
Table 5.4  Mean Amount of judgment change 
 N 
Mean 
x  
sd 
Control 29 0.22 0.22 
Numerical 
advice 
50 0.49 0.27 
Reasons-based 
advice 
175 0.48 0.29 
 
If participants in the reasons-based advice condition were to discount advice to a lesser extent 
than participants in the purely numerical advice condition, then it may follow that participants 
in the reasons-based advice condition are likely to have changed judgment more often than 
participants in receipt of purely numerical advice.  As such, these findings do not support 
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hypothesis H1 that participants in receipt of purely numerical advice egocentrically discount 
that advice to a greater degree than participants in receipt of reasons-based advice.  Table 5.4 
shows that participants in the purely numerical advice condition do not change judgment, any 
more or less, than participants in the reasons-based advice condition, on average.  Whilst this 
finding does not lend support to H1, it is consistent with the idea that participants who revise 
their judgment post-advice, indiscriminately conform to any available advice. 
 
I next examined the extent of judgment change and egocentric discounting utilizing the WOA 
measure.   Yaniv (2004a) argues, in the task specific account, that one of the underlying 
conditions for the occurrence of egocentric discounting is the inability of a judge to access the 
reasons behind an advisor‘s numerical estimate.  Hence, in a situation where reasons are 
attached to numerical estimates egocentric discounting should dissipate.  WOA is considered 
well defined if the values fall between 0 and 1 (i.e. if a participant‘s final estimate fell 
somewhere between his/her initial judgment and the advice).  This was the case for 95% of the 
participants in advice conditions in this study; the remaining 5% of participants made estimates 
that were greater than the advice (e.g. if the initial estimate was 1900 the advice was 1940, but 
the final estimate was 1960).  The overall mean WOA was 0.46 (sd = 0.31); by comparing the 
overall WOA to 0.5 (equal weighting of advice and a participant‘s own judgment) I found that 
participants discounted advice and preferred their own judgment (t = -1.92, df = 224, p = 0.03, 
1 tailed).    The extent of egocentric discounting reported here is far less than that of Yaniv and 
Kleinberger (2000), (WOA = 0.29), and Yaniv (2004), (WOA = 0.27). The difference in the 
extent of egocentric discounting between that found in the current study, and that found in 
previous research, is an issue taken up in the discussion section.  Returning to the current 
study, there were no significant differences in the mean WOA of participants receiving reasons 
in addition to numerical advice ( x  = 0.46, sd = 0.32), and participants receiving numerical 
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advice only ( x  = 0.45, sd = 0.28), (t = -0.334, df = 223, p = 0.37, 1 tailed).  Comparing the 
mean WOA of participants in receipt of purely numerical advice, with 0.5 (equal weighting of 
advice and a participant‘s own judgment), revealed that participants did not discount the 
available advice in favour of their own judgment (t = -1.33, df = 49, p = 0.095, 1 tailed).  
Similarly, participants in receipt of reasons-based advice also did not choose to ignore the 
advice available to them (t = -1.494, df = 174, p = 0.07, 1 tailed).  The table below compares 
the mean WOAs of the advice conditions against the scenario where people give equal weight 
to both their own, and an advisor‘s judgment (0.5 weighting).   
 
Table 5.5  Mean WOA scores compared to 0.5 (equal weighting of own judgment and advice). 
Advice N 
Mean 
x  
sd t df p (1 tailed) 
Numerical  50 0.45 0.28 -1.33 49 0.09 
Numerical and additional 
reasons  
175 0.46 0.32 -1.49 174 0.07 
Accurate numerical  24 0.44 0.30 -1.03 23 0.16 
Inaccurate numerical  26 0.46 0.27 -0.82 25 0.29 
Accurate numerical and 
very weak reasons 
27 0.42 0.31 -1.29 26 0.10 
Inaccurate numerical and 
very weak reasons 
32 0.35 0.25 -3.39 31 0.001* 
Accurate numerical and 
weak reasons 
33 0.42 0.29 -1.61 32 0.059 
Inaccurate numerical and 
weak reasons 
25 0.61 0.35 1.56 24 0.07 
Accurate numerical and 
strong reasons 
24 0.57 0.31 1.15 23 0.13 
Inaccurate numerical and 
strong reasons 
34 0.47 0.35 -0.55 33 0.29 
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The preceding analysis suggests little support for H1 in that participants in the numerical advice 
condition and participants in the reasons-based advice condition had nearly identical mean 
WOAs.  Whilst participants did significantly discount advice in favour of their own judgment 
on average, the introduction of additional reasons to numerical advice did not diminish 
egocentric discounting anymore than participants in receipt of purely numerical advice, 
contrary to the position outlined by Yaniv et al. (2000, 2004a, 2004b).  Recall that Yaniv 
(2004) reported that his participants discounted purely numerical advice by a WOA of 0.27.  
Indeed, plotting WOA by the experimental conditions (Fig. 5.1) reveals that only participants 
in the numerical advice with very weak supporting reasons condition, significantly discounted 
the advice (compared to 0.5 weighting of a participant‘s own judgment and the advice).   
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Figure 5.1  Mean WOA by condition   
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Whilst these results do not provide strong support for H1 they are consistent with the idea that 
participants place equal cognitive weight upon either solely numeric or reasons-based advice.  
Hence, irrespective of the type of advice available to participants, where an initial judgment is 
revised, the advice is equally influential in participant‘s deliberations‘ – which is supportive of 
the conformity to advice account.   
 
Advice and accuracy 
 
I next examined the appropriateness of judgment change.  On average, those participants who 
changed judgment did so in the direction of the correct answer.  The mean absolute error was 
calculated for participants who changed their judgment (N = 235) at their initial estimate ( x  = 
35.46 years, sd = 17.87 years), and their final estimate ( x  = 20.59 years, sd = 14.64 years).  
Similar results were obtained by examining those conditions where participants were in receipt 
of advice (N = 210); estimation error was reduced from ( x  = 34.45 years, sd = 17.77 years), at 
the initial estimation phase, to ( x  = 17.92 years, sd = 11.82 years) for the final estimate.  A 
one-way within-subjects repeated measures ANOVA showed that there was a significant 
beneficial effect of judgment change (F (1, 202) = 266.21, p = 0.0005).  This finding supports H2 
in so far as of those participants who changed their judgment, advice (irrespective of its 
quality) improved the accuracy of participants‘ estimation.  However, there is little support for 
H2 when the appropriateness of judgment change is examined by condition.  There is no 
significant difference in beneficial judgment change between participants in the reasons-based 
advice condition (N = 162, x  = 15.93, sd = 14.91 years), and participants in receipt of purely 
numerical advice (N = 48, x  = 18.53, sd = 14.58), (t = 1.07, df = 208, p = 0.29).  Figure 5.2 
below shows that my participant‘s accuracy improved over iterations.  
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Figure 5.2.  Error reduction (years) post-advice 
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Further support for the idea that participants were constrained in their abilities to distinguish 
between potentially beneficial advice, and poor advice (and where judgments were revised, 
tended to conform ultimately to any advice) is found when the appropriateness of judgment 
revision is examined.  Taking average error as a dependent variable, it appears that the 
provision of reasons by a single anonymous advisor in addition to numerical advice, offers 
little in the way of greater diagnosticity in terms of accurate estimation.  Whilst reasons in 
addition to numerical information do not appear to have facilitated enhanced accuracy in 
estimation, it is clear that participants were unable to discern the difference between accurate 
and inaccurate numerical advice.  If participants were able to make such a distinction, no 
difference in the average error post-advice of the two groups would be expected.  Instead it 
appears that participants receiving inaccurate numerical advice made nearly double the mean 
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average error ( x  = 20.05 years, sd = 7.75), than participants who received accurate numerical 
advice (mean error of x  = 10.84 years, sd = 7.76) - a statistically significant difference (t = - 
4.19, df = 48, p = 0.0005).  Similarly, participants in receipt of numerical advice 
(accurate/inaccurate), accompanied by supporting reasons were unable to distinguish between 
beneficial or spurious advice.  Participants in receipt of accurate reasons-based advice were 
more accurate (N = 108, x  = 15.78 years, sd = 13.49) on average, than participants in receipt 
of inaccurate reasons-based advice (N = 117, x  = 21.27 years, sd = 10.94).  This indicates that, 
on average, participants were unable to identify spurious advice; participants in receipt of 
inaccurate numerical advice and reasons-based advice, were less accurate than participants in 
receipt of accurate numerical and additional reasons-based advice (t = -3.37, df = 223, p = 
0.001). 
 
Logically, for advice to be beneficial overall, then the ‗pull‘ of accurate advice (i.e. judgment 
change in the direction of the true answer), must be greater than the pull of inaccurate advice in 
the direction away from the true answer.  As numerical accurate advice is the same as the true 
answer in the current study, the only scenario of interest that delineates between the pull of 
advice and the pull of the true answer, is where an individual‘s initial estimate falls between 
the true answer and the advice (i.e. initial estimate is 1880, the true answer is 1900, but the 
advice is 1860).   I extracted those cases from the data that were consistent with this scenario, 
and looked at whether participants moved from their initial estimate towards the true answer, 
or from their initial answer towards the advice (see Table 5.6).  Support for the cognitive 
account of egocentric discounting might be forthcoming should participants not become more 
inaccurate post-advice despite the availability of inaccurate advice.  This is because this 
account is based upon the idea that the quality, or accuracy of advice, is of secondary 
importance to the potential benefits available to participants through deeper cognitive 
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processing of a particular problem and its relevant attributes (Brehmer and Hagafors, 1986).  
However, if participants merely conform to any available advice, then attending to poor advice 
must result in decreases in estimation accuracy post-advice, according to this account.  Table 
5.6 shows the number of cases extracted from the dataset where a participant‘s estimate (N = 
117) fell between the true (but unknown) answer and the advice.  The number of responses 
participants made in response to each question (that fulfilled the criteria that a participant‘s 
estimate fell between the true answer and advice) was tabulated in Table 5.6.    
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Table 5.6  Pre-advice error and post-advice error:  Increases in error indicate movement 
towards advice. 
Participants  
(N = 117) 
N = number of valid responses x  sd t df p 
Question 1 – pre-advice error 32 7.84 5.66 -3.455 31 .002* 
Question 1 - post-advice error 32 11.19 6.727    
Question 2 – pre-advice error 52 1.71 2.43 - 2.41 51 0.02* 
Question 2 – post-advice error 52 2.46 3.32    
Question 3 – pre-advice error 33 3.18 2.34 - 1.77 32 0.09 
Question 3 – post-advice error 33 4.91 5.80    
Question 4 – pre-advice error 28 4.96 2.10 - 2.21 27 0.04* 
Question 4 – post-advice error 28 5.71     
Question 5 – pre-advice error 29 15.72 7.53 - 3.54 28 0.001* 
Question 5 – post-advice error 29 19.41 8.25    
Question 6 – pre-advice error 43 24.05 12.31 - 3.83 42 0.0005* 
Question 6 – post-advice error 43 30.05 12.11    
Question 7 – pre-advice error 21 3.67 2.42 - 1.45 20 0.16 
Question 7 – post-advice error 21 4.14 2.33    
Question 8 – pre-advice error 35 2.49 1.34 - 2.00 34 0.05 
Question 8 – post-advice error 35 2.80 1.28    
Question 9 – pre-advice error 21 5.62 6.05 - 2.11 20 0.05* 
Question 9 – post-advice error 21 7.90 6.95    
Question 10 – pre-advice error 24 2.58 1.77 - 1.89 23 0.07 
Question 10 – post-advice error 24 3.67 3.12    
Question 11 – pre-advice error 19 10.63 4.06 - 1.69 18 0.11 
Question 11 – post-advice error 19 11.79 4.12    
Question 12 – pre-advice error 24 6.25 2.61 - 3.23 23 0.004* 
Question 12 – post-advice error 24 7.92 2.69    
Question 13 – pre-advice error 21 5.43 5.64 - 3.20 20 0.005* 
Question 13 – post-advice error 21 9.19 6.88    
Question 14 – pre-advice error 17 27.94 8.79 1.75 16 0.10 
Question 14 – post-advice error 17 24.53 6.09    
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From the preceding table, it is clear that of the 14 questions answered by my respondents, 13 
questions show increases in mean error.  Of the 13 questions showing increases in error, eight 
such increases appear significant.  The participants chose to follow inaccurate advice that took 
them further away from the true answer than their initial estimate, in 8 out of 14 questions 
(57%).   Further, of the 117 participants whose initial estimate fell between the inaccurate 
advice and the true answer, 65 of them revised their judgment in the direction of the advice to 
the detriment of their final accuracy.  Put another way of the possible 1638 observed changes 
in error (117 participants x 14 questions), 910 observations resulted in decreases in accuracy 
(55.56%).   
Table 5.7  Mean absolute error (MAE) for participants whose initial estimate fell between 
inaccurate advice and the true answer. 
Where participants pre-advice estimates fell between advice and the true answer, participants in the conditions 
below followed advice on average – to the detriment of post-advice accuracy (i.e. post-advice error increased) 
Condition 
Error 
pre-advice 
sd 
Error 
post-advice 
sd t df p 
Inaccurate numerical advice (N 
= 12) 
4.63 3.77 9.29 4.90 -5.25 11 0.0005* 
Inaccurate numerical advice 
and very weak reasons                             
(N = 18) 
8.47 6.02 18.38 11.30 -4.66 17 0.0005* 
Inaccurate numerical advice 
and weak reasons    (N = 14) 
9.21 7.56 21.06 10.28 -6.68 13 0.0005* 
Inaccurate numerical advice 
and strong reasons  (N = 21) 
9.14 9.35 16.48 9.18 -6.75 20 0.0005* 
 
The above table shows that irrespective of the reasons attached to inaccurate numerical advice, 
participants made significantly greater error post-advice compared to pre-advice.  A one-way 
between subjects ANOVA revealed that there were differences between the conditions in terms 
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MAE post advice (F (3, 61) = 3.614, p = 0.018).  Employing the post-hoc Bonferroni method 
revealed that MAE of inaccurate numerical advice was significantly different from inaccurate 
very weak reasons-based advice (p = 0.015), and inaccurate weak reasons-based advice (p = 
0.015) – post-advice.  I also collapsed our data across conditions to examine if there were any 
differences between purely numerical advice and reasons-based advice.  This was non-
significant (F(1, 115) = 0.832, p = 0.48).  These findings indicate that the cognitive activation 
explanation of egocentric discounting can be dismissed, as when participants are allowed to 
revise their judgment in the light of advice, inaccurate advice can lead to decreases in 
estimation accuracy.  However, this finding is consistent with the conformity to advice account 
of the data.   
 
5.4 Discussion 
 
At the outset of this study, it was contended that should participants indiscriminately conform 
to advice, post-advice, then they would simultaneously place equal cognitive weighting upon 
solely numeric advice, or reasons-based advice.  Further, I posited two competing explanations 
of egocentric discounting – a task specific account, and a cognitive activation account.  The 
data reported here does not fully support either of these two accounts, rather it points towards a 
third explanation – indiscriminate conformity to advice (to a degree), on the basis of ‗anchor 
and adjust‘ (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).   The task specific account of egocentric 
discounting was tested by my initial hypothesis, that egocentric discounting would dissipate, 
where reasons-based advice was provided to judges, in addition numerical information.  I 
found that in terms of the weight our participants put upon advice (WOA), that there was no 
significant difference between participants in receipt of reasons-based advice, and participants 
in receipt of purely numerical advice.  This undermines the case for a task specific account of 
egocentric discounting, as it was argued that egocentric discounting occurs because people are 
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unable to access an advisor‘s reasoning - where advice is purely numerical.  Hence, judges are 
more likely to discount advice, and rely upon their own judgment in making an estimate. 
Participants had access to the advisor‘s reasoning, yet did not weight advice differently to 
participants in receipt of purely numerical advice.  
 
Such behaviour would not be inconsistent with the cognitive activation account of egocentric 
discounting - any advice is recognized as potentially beneficial, but under-utilized due to the 
cognitive load implied by integrating the advice into a revised estimate.  Further support for 
this explanation is found in the accuracy data, where participants became more accurate post-
advice irrespective of the quality of the advice available to them.  However, for the cognitive 
activation account to be accepted, accuracy would have to improve, even where a participant‘s 
initial estimate falls between the true answer and the available advice.  On examining cases 
where a participant‘s initial estimate fell between the true answer and advice, estimation 
accuracy decreased significantly in eight out of the fourteen questionnaire items.  This would 
suggest that participants revise their estimates by conforming to advice by ‗anchoring‘ upon 
the available advice and cognitively pulling themselves some way towards it from their initial 
position - to the detriment of estimation accuracy.  The apparent contradiction between the 
finding that accuracy improved irrespective of the quality of advice, and the finding that where 
a participant‘s estimate fell between the true answer and the advice, accuracy decreased for 8 
out of 14 questionnaire items, can be reconciled because of the number of possible 
permutations of estimate, advice and true answer (see Table 5.8).  This table is identical to the 
one presented in Chapter 4 (Table 4.17), but is repeated here for the purposes of clarity. 
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Table 5.8  Permutations of advice in relation to initial estimate 
Permutation 
 
Increase in 
 
numerical value   
judgment revision 
due to conformity 
effect 
 
A Estimate  True answer Advice towards ‗t‘ 
B True answer Advice Estimate towards ‗t‘ 
C Advice True answer Estimate towards ‗t‘ 
D Advice Estimate True answer opposite to ‗t‘ 
E True answer Estimate  Advice opposite to ‗t‘ 
F Estimate  Advice True answer towards ‗t‘ 
  
The above illustration shows that in only 2 out of 6 permutations (permutation D and E) is 
advice an alternative pole of attraction to the true answer.  Hence, it is not surprising that the 
pull of advice is masked by the overall pull of the true answer and advice.   
 
This account is somewhat tentative given the few studies in the extant JAS literature that have 
systematically manipulated the quality of advice available to judges.  Of these studies, none as 
far as I am aware, has specifically looked at the effect that accurate and inaccurate advice has 
on accuracy, and judgment change.  However, where the quality of advice has been 
manipulated as part of other dependent measures, there is some consistency the results reported 
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here.  Harvey and Fischer (1997) manipulated advice quality (advice equal to the correct value, 
advice less than the correct value, advice more than the correct value) that their judges 
received, and found that people are unable to assess advice quality successfully – judges were 
no more influenced by correct than by incorrect advice.  However, Yaniv and Kleinberger 
(2000), suggest that the quality of advice is influential mainly as a stimulus to further cognitive 
processing/retrieval.  Here, it is argued that inaccurate advice can be perceived as inaccurate by 
a cognitive ‗plausibility check‘ i.e. a person may not know that the American Declaration of 
Independence took place in 1776, but they may sense that advice of ‗1450‘ is not accurate.  
Further, accurate advice could potentially stimulate memory retrieval, and facilitate the 
recovery of memories that were inaccessible to an individual otherwise.  This latter argument 
is consistent with the notion of a cognitive account of advice use.   
 
This study tested the cognitive account of advice utilization through analysis of a measure of 
judgment change.  Recall that numerical advice alone could have induced judgment change for 
two possible reasons.  First, a judge is likely to make attributions about the advice beyond the 
‗numeracy‘ of the advice; second, in comparison to the condition involving reasons, numerical 
advice is ‗cognition lite‘ and relatively easily assimilated into a combined estimate.  In 
contrast, reasons-based advice is likely to have been perceived as cognitively demanding, and 
subsequently under-utilized as far as forming a final estimate is concerned.  It follows, 
therefore, that participants may have been less inclined to undertake the cognitive effort to 
assimilate reason-based advice.  For this account to be parsimonious, differences in the amount 
of judgment change between reason-based advice conditions and purely numerical advice 
conditions should be apparent.  Instead, there is little to distinguish the two experimental 
advice conditions in terms of the amount of judgment change (both conditions reveal 
significantly more judgment change than participants who did not receive advice), suggesting 
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that the quality of advice appears to have little effect upon the amount of judgment change.  I 
also examined the extent of judgment change – overall, participants beneficially changed their 
judgments (on average), irrespective of the advice that they had available to them.  However, 
this finding masked the scenario where a participant‘s initial estimate fell between the true 
historical date for a particular event and the available inaccurate advice.  Here, participants 
revised their judgments to the detriment of estimation accuracy in every permutation of 
numerical and reasons based advice, and did so for 8 out of 14 questionnaire items.  This 
finding undermines the cognitive account of egocentric discounting, as there were no 
differences in the amount of judgment change between reasons-based and purely numerical 
advice; nor were there differences in the extent of judgment change between reasons-based and 
numerical advice and purely numerical advice.  Further, for the cognitive account to be 
parsimonious any advice should have resulted in accuracy improvements – 57% of our 
participants revised their estimates inaccurately when inaccurate advice was available to them.  
Whilst both the task specific account, and the cognitive activation account do not adequately 
capture the observed behaviour of participants, such behaviour is not inconsistent with what 
might be expected under the conformity to advice explanation. 
 
The findings reported here did not entirely replicate those of Yaniv et al. (2000; 2004a; 
2004b), despite similarities in methodology and procedure.  Utilizing the WOA measure, 
Yaniv and Kleinberger (2000), and Yaniv (2004) report egocentric discounting where 
participants are observed to significantly discount advice ( x  = 0.27 and 0.29).  Whilst 
participants in this study significantly discounted advice overall, their WOA score was far 
closer ( x  = 0.46) to 0.5 than the WOA observed for participants in Yaniv and Kleinberger 
(2000), and Yaniv (2004).  However, this should not be taken as evidence for the mitigating 
effects of reasons-based advice upon the discounting phenomena.  This is because there was no 
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significant difference in WOA scores between participants receiving numerical advice, and 
participants in receipt of reasons-based advice.  The difference in WOA scores between the 
findings reported here, and that of previous research is potentially explainable by several 
factors.  Firstly, this study involved 255 participants, whereas Yaniv and Kleinberger (2000) 
utilized the responses of 25 participants in study 1 (examining the effects of egocentric 
discounting), and 80 participants in study 2 (examining the sensitivity of participants to advice 
quality).  Similarly, Yaniv, (2004), utilized the responses from 30 participants in Study 1 
(examining advice weighting as a function of knowledge).  It is possible that my findings may 
be more generalizable than those of previous research, due to a larger N.  Second, differences 
between the findings reported here, and those of previous research may have been influenced 
by how the experimental stimuli were presented to participants.  Both Yaniv and Kleinberger, 
and Yaniv, had their participants receive the experimental stimuli via computer terminals, 
whilst participants in the present study filled in questionnaires in the traditional ‗paper and 
pencil‘ format.  I offer no theoretical articulation of why this might be so, but merely highlight 
this factor as a possible source of explanation in future studies.  Third, participants in previous 
research have received financial payoffs for participation and accurate responses.  This may 
have induced egocentrism in participants as participants would be likely to attribute accuracy 
to their own internal cognitions, and be more likely to discount advice.  Participants here, 
received no payoffs for participation or accuracy, and hence may have been less egocentric in 
outlook and more sensitive to potentially beneficial advice.  Further, previous research has 
stressed the ecological validity of randomly drawn advice from a pool of estimates provided by 
pre-testing; the advice in our study was directly manipulated by the experimenter.  No 
feedback in this study was available to participants as to the accuracy of their estimates (unlike 
Yaniv and Kleinberger, Study 1 and 2), but here, accurate advice was the same date as the true 
answer (similar to Yaniv and Kleinberger; dissimilar to Yaniv).  Given the inconsistencies in 
procedure between Yaniv and Kleinberger (2000), and Yaniv (2004), it appears unlikely that a 
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confounding priming effect could partially explain the difference between the extent of 
egocentric discounting in our study and that found in previous research.  A final explanatory 
factor could potentially involve cross-cultural differences – the current research was based 
upon a sample of students drawn from the University of Durham (UK), while Yaniv and 
Kleinberger, (2000), and Yaniv, (2004), based their research upon a sample of Israeli students.    
 
One limitation of the present study is that only supportive reasons-based advice was available 
to participants.  It is possible that the cognitive activation account of egocentric discounting 
could be demonstrated in a scenario where participants‘ self-generate counterfactual reasons, 
for why their estimates may be inaccurate.  Such a manipulation could reveal that 
counterfactual reasoning may lead to enhanced estimation accuracy.  Supportive evidence for 
such an explanation can be found in the work of Koriat, Lichtenstein and Fischoff (1980).  In 
Study 1, Koriat et al. tasked their participants with a forced dichotomous choice, listing 
reasons both for and against the choice, and rating the probability that the choice was correct.  
Results suggested that the appropriateness of confidence judgments was improved.  The 
procedure was simplified in Study 2 so that participants either (i) listed one reason in support 
for the choice (ii) listed one reason why the choice was incorrect (iii) listed both a reason for 
and a reason against the choice being correct.  Here, it appeared that only the listing of 
contradictory reasons improved the appropriateness of confidence judgments.   
 
Whilst the appropriateness of confidence judgments was not the central thrust of this study, the 
depth of cognitive activity and its beneficial effect upon estimation is.  Hence, future research 
about how people utilize advice should include cognitive measures such as depth of processing 
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to discover the underlying mechanisms that determine how advice is assimilated into a 
combined estimate (Bonaccio and Dalal, 2005).   
 
The implications of these findings for judges may be that people making estimates of a 
quantitative nature are likely to anchor upon a reference point and adjust any revised estimate 
in the light of this anchor – it is this mechanism which may underpin the conformity to advice 
explanation of the observed behaviour of participants.  It is likely that such adjustments are 
‗sticky‘ (i.e. constrained by egocentric cognitions).  This finding has added significance when 
the available advice to a judge is poor and bounds both the truth and the judge‘s initial 
estimate; in such a scenario judges are susceptible to adjusting their revised estimate in the 
direction of greater inaccuracy.  Either way, supportive reasons for quantitative estimates offer 
little in the way of enhanced diagnosticity.  However, it is arguable whether these findings 
generalize to situations where more than one advisor contributes advice to a judge.  Here, the 
influence of advisor confidence, redundant reasons, majority, and appropriate minority 
judgment is likely to be significantly influential.  Moreover, the effects of multiple reasons 
upon egocentric discounting could potentially be different from the decision dyads utilized 
here.   A further limitation of this study was that the reasons-based advice was generated by the 
experimenter and subsequently rated for persuasiveness by two independent coders.  Future 
studies should examine the differences between participant generated rationales 
(supportive/counter-attitudinal) attached to quantitative estimates, and rationales 
(supportive/counter-attitudinal) generated external to participants.   
 
Ultimately, the provision of intrinsic information of the quality of numerical advice did not 
benefit the cognitive weighting policies adopted by participants.  Instead, participants are 
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observed to ‗anchor‘ upon their initial intuitions, and revise their judgments in the direction of 
available advice (to a degree).  Such behaviour is entirely consistent with social conformity to 
advice. 
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Chapter 6:  Knowledge of advice generation 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
The findings reported in the previous chapters suggest that people prefer reasons-based advice 
over solely numeric advice, are constrained in their abilities to distinguish between ‗poor‘ and 
‗good‘ advice under conditions of uncertainty, and where they do revise their judgment post-
advice, tend to conform to advice.  People ‗anchor‘ upon an initial intuition and only shift their 
judgment in the ‗direction‘ of advice, to a limited degree.  The current study examines the 
question of whether knowledge of the process of advice generation, provides participants with 
a means, by which a cognitive evaluation can be made of available advice, and participants‘ 
pre-advice intuitive estimates.  Here, knowledge of the process of advice generation is 
operationalized in two ways.  First, numerical advice supported by a testimonial assertion that 
speaks to the veracity of the advice is made available to participants from an anonymous 
advisor.  In a second experimental condition, an anonymous advisor provides participants with 
a procedural algorithm by which participants self-generate their own advice through inputting 
sub-component estimates, and multiplicatively combining these sub-component estimates to 
form advice (output-of-algorithm).  Subsequently, participants are in a position to evaluate 
advice, and choose whether to incorporate such advice into their deliberations.  Should this 
evaluation result in participants appraising advice as valid and coherent, beneficial judgment 
revision appears to be a likely outcome.  However, participants may also be unable to make 
such a determination, but choose to conform to advice, irrespective of its actual quality.  
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Judgment change and Advice 
 
Of interest then, is the degree to which reason-based advice, influences judgment change, in a 
JAS-type advice-giving situation, or whether conformity to advice extends to situations where 
information of the process of advice generation is available to judges, in addition to advice 
itself.  It is contended here that one useful deconstruction of reasons-based advice involves 
distinguishing between ‗process‘ reasoning, and ‗non-process‘ reasoning.  In this framework, 
Non-Process reasons-based advice involves broad claims to knowledge, expertise, and some 
numerical estimate of a target quantity (i.e. where a testimonial assertion constitutes advice).  
In making a ‗holistic‘ estimate of some target quantity, an estimator in receipt of Non-Process 
advice, simultaneously considers all the relevant attributes of the estimation problem – 
including the weight to place upon Non-Process advice.  In contrast, a definition of Process 
reasons-based advice, involves a specific form of reasoning – an ‗algorithmic decomposition‘ 
of some problem or issue.  Here, the attributes of an estimation problem are broken down into 
various constituent parts, allowing consideration of the attributes of the problem individually, 
or as sub-groups of attributes.  The decomposition of complex or uncertain estimation 
problems, aids decision making and estimation, because holistic judgments deteriorate over 
time due to the limits on human information processing capacity.  The systematic 
decomposition of complex or uncertain estimation problems, however, relaxes the information 
processing demands upon an estimator, potentially allowing a more rigorous consideration of 
the attributes of an estimation problem (Fischer, 1977; Kleinmuntz, 1990).  
  
In essence, algorithmic decomposition provides a specific procedural means of solving 
difficult problems, where information is uncertain or not available.  As informational 
combination is mechanical, (i.e. informational sub-components can be combined either 
multiplicatively or additively), in such an approach, it is argued that reliability is improved 
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(MacGregor and Lichtenstein, 1991). In comparisons with unaided judgment, algorithmic 
decompositions of experimental almanac-type problems show improvements in estimation 
performance (Armstrong, Denniston and Gordon, 1975; MacGregor, Lichtenstein and Slovic, 
1988; MacGregor and Lichtenstein, 1991; MacGregor, 2001).  A typical example is provided 
by MacGregor et al. (1988, 1991), whose participants were asked, ‘How many pieces of mail 
were handled by the US postal service last year?’  In order to assist participants in formulating 
an estimate in response to this question, MacGregor et al. provided their participants with the 
following algorithm  –  
A.  What is the average number of post offices per state? 
B.  What is the number of states? 
C.  Multiply (A) times (B) to get the total number of post offices. 
D.  How many pieces of mail per day are handled by the average post office? 
E.  Multiply (C) times (D) to get the total pieces of mail per day for all post 
     offices. 
F.  How many days are there in a year? 
G.  Multiply (E) times (F) to get the number of pieces of mail handled in a year 
     by the postal service.   
 
By decomposing the original question of interest (‗How many pieces of mail were handled by 
the US postal service last year?‘) into sub-components (‗A‘, ‗B‘, ‗D‘, and ‗F‘ in the preceding 
example); assigning numerical values to these sub-components, and subsequently combining 
these numerical values (‗C‘ and ‗G‘ in the preceding example), it is argued that an individual is 
able to achieve a better estimate of some troublesome quantity, than that achievable, by holistic 
unaided estimation.  
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The preceding findings are consistent with the ‗divide and conquer‘ principle (Henrion et al. 
1993; Kleinmuntz et al. 1996; Morera and Budescu, 1998), where it is argued that it is less 
demanding (and less error prone) to produce estimates to the constituent parts of a problem - 
and subsequently re-combine these responses to form an overall estimate - than to produce an 
overall ‗holistic‘ evaluation.  The ‗divide and conquer‘ principle is widely used to enhance 
estimation, or forecasting, in various contexts, from medicine to accounting.  Early studies in 
clinical judgment showed that a linear model of clinical judgment outperformed holistic 
judgment (Meehl, 1957; Goldberg, 1968, 1970); whilst auditors‘ assessments of conditional 
probabilities were improved by algorithmic decomposition, in comparison to list-type aids, in 
the context of accounting (Bonner, Libby and Nelson, 1996). Similarly, studies (such as JAS) 
that task participants to make point estimations of target quantities in almanac-type tasks 
(where the answer is known to the experimenter, but not to the participant), show estimation 
improvements for participants utilizing the decomposition approach, above that achieved by 
holistic evaluation (Armstrong, Denniston and Gordon, 1975; MacGregor, Lichtenstein and 
Slovic, 1988; MacGregor and Lichtenstein, 1991; MacGregor, 2001).   
 
The results from the preceding studies suggest that people make less accurate assessments 
through intuition, than they do using simple linear models (Dawes, 1979; Dawes, Faust and 
Meehl, 1989).  However, what is less clear is whether people are likely to revise their initial 
unaided judgment, when subsequently presented with either Process advice (an algorithmic 
decomposition of some problem), or Non-Process advice (where a testimonial assertion 
constitutes advice).  This is because many of the aforementioned studies do not measure 
judgment revision post-advice.  Moreover, if people are disposed to change their initial 
unaided judgment in the light of advice, it is unclear to what extent either Process, or Non-
Process advice influences judgment change.  Should people indiscriminately conform to 
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advice, then either advice type is likely to be influential where people choose to revise their 
unaided intuitive estimate, post-advice.  Further, the studies discussed here, do not successfully 
define the cognitive factors that facilitate judgment change (Dalal and Bonaccio 2006).  The 
potential influence of Process advice is considered in the next section.    
 
It could be argued that Process advice is more likely to facilitate judgment change, than other 
types of advice (such as a testimonial assertion), merely on the grounds that greater cognitive 
effort is involved in working through an algorithmic decomposition of some problem; in 
comparison to an holistic evaluation of a testimonial assertion.  However, algorithmic 
decompositions, such as the ‗US mail‘ problem, are based upon the assumption that the 
estimation errors of each sub-component are uncorrelated, and that these errors cancel each 
other out in the multiplicative re-composition process.  Where errors on the sub-component 
estimates of a particular algorithmic decomposition do not cancel each other out during 
multiplicative re-composition, the resulting output of the algorithm is likely to be highly 
inaccurate.  In these circumstances, people may judge themselves to be incapable of inputting 
credible inputs to the algorithm, and subsequently are less likely to revise an unaided estimate 
in the light of the output of the algorithm (MacGregor, 2001).  Hence, cognitive effort, in 
isolation, may not be a primary determinant in facilitating judgment change. 
 
A further possible determinant of judgment revision concerns the relationship between an 
individual‘s unaided pre-advice estimate of some troublesome quantity, the output of Process 
(or Non-Process advice), and the true answer to the estimation problem.  Where participants 
have the opportunity to revise their judgment in the light of advice, and choose to do so, they 
are likely to revise their unaided pre-advice estimate, so that the absolute numerical difference 
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between their unaided pre-advice estimate, and the available advice, is greater than the 
absolute difference between their post-advice estimate, and the available advice. Moreover, 
such judgment revision is likely to be beneficial, on average, because the structured exchange 
of purely numerical information in JAS research, does not disallow the possibility that 
judgment revisions, are an artifact of the structured exchange.  This might be so because any 
advice that falls between a participants‘ unaided estimate, and the true answer (or where the 
true value falls between a participant‘s initial estimate and the advice), is likely to be beneficial 
(permutations A, B C and F in the diagram below).  Only an unaided estimate that falls 
between the true answer and subsequent advice has the potential to degrade estimation 
(permutations D and E).  The diagrammatic representation below shows that in 2 out of 3 of 
the possible permutations discussed above, beneficial revisions of judgment can be accounted 
for by a conformity effect (i.e. an artifact of the structured exchange of information). 
Fig. 6.1. Likely judgment revisions in the possible permutations of true answer and advice, in 
relation to an intuitive pre-advice estimate 
Permutation  
 
 
 
> numerical value   
judgment revision 
due to conformity 
effect 
 
A Estimate  True answer Advice towards ‗t‘ 
B True answer Advice Estimate towards ‗t‘ 
C Advice True answer Estimate towards ‗t‘ 
D Advice Estimate True answer opposite to ‗t‘ 
E True answer Estimate  Advice opposite to ‗t‘ 
F Estimate  Advice True answer towards ‗t‘ 
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An important caveat to the assertion that beneficial judgment change may be attributable to the 
structure of the estimation task is that such an effect is also specific, to certain types of JAS-
type estimation situations.  Typically, such tasks are concerned with frequencies (e.g. estimate 
the total annual tonnage of lumber exported from New York in 1964), rather than judgment 
(e.g. ‗given two estimates of property X, which do you think is closest to the true value?‘).     
 
In sum, where people are provided with an algorithmic decomposition of an estimation 
problem, they are able to judge its logical coherence against their own intuition, and come to a 
view of the utility of the provided algorithm.  If the logic of an algorithmic decomposition is 
accepted by a judge, and the output of the algorithmic decomposition is dissimilar to an 
individual‘s unaided holistic estimate, then it is likely that a judge will adopt the output of the 
algorithm, and subsequently revise their unaided pre-advice estimate of the quantity in 
question (i.e. appropriate judgment change is induced by the triumph of a superior rationale).  
People may however, effortlessly and flawlessly, recall accurate information that leads to an 
optimal estimate, or retrieve sufficient information to self-construct a viable cognitive 
algorithm that ‗solves‘ the problem sufficient for the purposes of the environmental context, 
without the need for any external intervention – in such cases the output of an algorithmic 
decomposition is likely to be ignored.  Alternatively, people may recognize that they are 
unable to make meaningful inputs into a specific algorithmic decomposition, but choose to 
incorporate the output of the algorithm in preference to relying upon their intuition.  Having 
discussed the possible influence of Process advice upon judgment revision, I now turn to the 
possible influence of Non-Process advice upon judgment revision. 
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In contrast to Process advice, Non-Process advice offers little opportunity for judges to 
evaluate the internal logic of testimony.  In my framework, this is because people were not 
provided with any numerical information about any of the potential attributes identified in the 
Non-Process advice (beyond the numerical output of Non-Process advice), nor were the 
advisors described as expert.  Nevertheless, Non-Process advice is potentially beneficial to 
judges, in so far as such advice may highlight attributes of the estimation problem that judges 
were hitherto unaware of.  In such a scenario, Non-Process advice could potentially facilitate 
beneficial judgment revision.  
  
The purpose of this investigation then, was to determine the influence of knowledge of the 
process of advice generation upon judgment revision.  Specifically, to ascertain whether 
participants changed judgment more often, and/or to a greater extent when in receipt of either 
Process or Non-Process advice, or where people revise an judgment post-advice, they do so by 
indiscriminately conforming to advice (to a degree).  
 
6.2 Method 
 
Participants 
 
Participants in this study (N = 142), were drawn from members of staff, and students of the 
University of Durham, UK.  Some participants were recruited by the author circulating an 
email invitation to staff and students of Durham Business School (N = 60).  Here, participants 
accessed the questionnaire by ‗clicking‘ on a hyperlink in the invitation email, that opened the 
questionnaire on an individual‘s computer.  On completion, the data from the online 
questionnaire was saved automatically in a database on a Durham Business School server.  
However the majority of participants were students who the author recruited by visiting a 
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lecture theatre (with the permission of staff colleagues) where students were gathered to attend 
their studies.  Here, students completed the questionnaire in a ‗pencil and paper‘ format - all 
participants took approximately the same amount of time to complete the questionnaire.  The 
sample was made up of 95 males and 45 females (two participants failed to provide details of 
their gender).  133 participants provided information as to their age, which allowed calculation 
of the mean ( x  = 20.38 years, sd = 5.43), and median (= 19 years), of the sample, where the 
range was from 18 years to 54 years. 
 
Stimuli and Materials 
 
Participants were tasked with providing estimates to four questions concerning uncertain 
quantities (see Appendix III).  Some participants made their responses via a computer terminal 
connected to the internet (N = 60), and others made their responses in a traditional ‗pencil and 
paper‘ format (N = 82).  The presentation order of the four estimation questions was 
randomized to mitigate any possible learning effects.   
 
Procedure  
 
The experiment was conducted in two phases.  Initially, all participants made an unaided 
estimate of an uncertain quantity, and were tasked with providing an upper and lower bound, 
so that they were 90% certain that the interval bracketed the true answer.  At no time were 
participants made aware of the true answer.  In the second phase of the experiment, 
participants were randomly allocated to one of three experimental conditions; a control group 
(no advice), a Process advice group, and a Non-Process advice group.  Participants in receipt 
of Process advice were provided with a step-by-step algorithm that divided the estimation task 
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into sub-components.  Participants were informed that, for each question, an algorithm had 
been provided by a different anonymous advisor; identifiable only by a first name (i.e. ‗Kate‘, 
‗Joe‘, ‗Tina‘ or ‗David‘).  Participants were instructed to input sub-estimates into the system 
where indicated, and ultimately mechanically re-combine these sub-estimates to form an 
output of the algorithm.  The output of the algorithm constituted the advice that was available 
to participants in the Process advice group.  Participants were free to utilize or reject this 
advice in determining their final best estimate of the target quantity.  Participants in the Non-
Process advice group received advice that contained numerical information evidenced by a 
testimonial assertion, whose source was identified by a first name (e.g. ‗Joe‘).  Participants in 
the Non-Process advice condition could choose to attend to this advice, or rely upon their 
intuitive pre-advice estimate.  After each estimation question, all participants were given the 
opportunity to revise the intuitive pre-advice estimate they had provided in Phase I of the 
experiment, in the light of the advice available to them (or to ‗think again‘ where people had 
not received advice).  All participants were then asked to make a final best estimate of the 
uncertain quantity in the estimation task, and provide an upper and lower bound so that they 
were 90% certain that this interval contained the true answer.  Finally, participants evaluated 
the utility of the advice made available to them on a 5-point Likert-type scale (anchored at one 
end by ‗No use at all‘ and at the other by ‗absolutely invaluable‘).  In all experimental 
conditions the order of presentation of our estimation question was randomized to mitigate 
learning effects.  Participants who completed the questionnaire on-line received payment (£4) 
for taking part in the experiment; participants who completed the ‗pencil and paper‘ format 
questionnaire did not receive payment.  There is no theoretical rationale for this distinction, as 
payment was not linked to performance in the study - it was an incentive for participation.  On 
the grounds of practicality and the availability of resources, the author was happy to accept 
data from participants who did not require payment.     
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6.3 Results 
 
Before considering the data in terms of analysis, it was necessary to first inspect the rate of 
response to the four estimation tasks that participants were asked to complete.  Table 6.1 
(below) shows the number of responses collapsed across questions, indicating satisfactory 
levels of responses (even though it appears that participants fatigue may have been a factor 
post-advice as the percentage of participants providing a response falls somewhat). 
Table 6.1 Number of responses 
Participants N = 
142 
Unaided 
estimate 
Pre-
advice 
Lower 
Bound 
Pre-
advice 
Upper 
Bound 
Post-
advice 
estimate 
Post-
advice 
Lower 
Bound 
Post-
advice 
Upper 
Bound 
Responses N 
549/568 
(96.65%) 
510/568 
(89.79%) 
510/568 
(89.79%) 
434/568 
(76.41%) 
445/568 
(78.34%) 
387/568 
(68.13%) 
 
Given that there appears to be sufficient data to warrant analysis, the primary question of 
interest, in terms of the aims of this study, was to determine the influence of knowledge of the 
process of advice generation (Process, and Non-Process advice) upon judgment change, and to 
test the consistency of these results with the conformity to advice explanation, of judgment 
change.  Secondly, a regression modelling approach was adopted in an attempt to identify 
some of the cognitive mechanisms that facilitate judgment change.  Prior to proceeding with 
the analysis, it was necessary to check that the responses of participants who completed 
estimation tasks ‗on-line‘, could be treated as the same population, as participants who 
completed questionnaires by hand.  Hence, the absolute difference between a participant‘s pre-
advice estimate, and their subsequent post-advice estimates was calculated for each question.  
Subsequently, the scores for participants who responded in the traditional ‗paper and pencil‘ 
mode, were compared to the responses of participants who made their responses to the 
estimation questions online.  As the dependent variable of absolute numerical difference 
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between pre-advice estimate, and post-advice estimate did not meet the assumption of 
normality the non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test was performed to test for significant 
differences in the absolute difference scores of people responding on paper, and online (see 
Tables 6.2-6.4).  Whilst there was a significant difference between the absolute difference 
scores of people responding on paper, when compared to people responding online, for 
participants in the control condition (Question 2 only); and similarly for participants in the 
Process advice condition (Question 3 only), these differences do not appear to constitute a 
systematic pattern of variation in absolute difference scores attributable to the mode of 
response. 
Table 6.2  Controls – absolute numerical difference between initial estimate and final estimate. 
 
Estimation 
question 
N 
Mann-
Whitney 
U 
Participants responding 
on paper 
 
N1 
Participants 
responding online 
 
N2 
p 
1 51 256.50 32 19 0.07 
2 51 237.50 32 19 0.03* 
3 51 256.50 32 19 0.07 
4 51 285.00 32 19 0.27 
*p < 0.05 
The above table shows that where participants did not receive advice, in one out of four 
estimation problems, a significant difference in mean absolute difference scores between 
people responding online, and people responding in a ‗pencil and paper‘ format was reported 
(Question 2).  However, the removal of two outlying values resulted in any differences 
between people responding online, and people responding by ‗pencil and paper‘, being non-
significant (U = 237.5, N1 = 30, N2 = 19, p < 0.06). 
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Table 6.3  Process advice – absolute numerical difference between initial estimate and final 
estimate. 
 
Estimation 
question 
N 
Mann-
Whitney 
U 
Participants responding 
on paper 
 
N1 
Participants 
responding online 
 
N2 
p 
1 23 32.00 18 5 0.32 
2 24 28.50 18 6 0.08 
3 29 20.00 19 10 0.005* 
4 29 74.50 20 9 0.46 
*p < 0.05 
Table 6.3 shows that where participants received Process advice, in one out of four estimation 
problems, a significant difference in mean absolute difference scores between people 
responding online, and people responding in a ‗pencil and paper‘ format was reported 
(Question 3). 
Table 6.4  Non Process advice – absolute numerical difference between initial estimate and 
final estimate. 
  
Estimation 
question 
N 
Mann-
Whitney 
U 
Participants responding 
on paper 
 
N1 
Participants 
responding online 
 
N2 
p 
1 29 57.00 21 8 0.19 
2 35 80.0 28 7 0.45 
3 35 64.50 28 7 0.16 
4 26 39.00 19 7 0.11 
 
Table 6.4 shows that there were no significant differences in absolute difference scores 
between people responding online and people responding by ‗paper and pencil‘.  On average, 
the preceding results do not suggest systematic variation in mean absolute difference scores 
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attributable to the mode of response.  Hence, for the purposes of the following analysis the data 
from people responding online and people responding by ‗paper and pencil‘ are treated as the 
same population.  Initially, the data from participants was aggregated and tabulated (see Table 
6.5 and 6.6).  
Table 6.5  Process advice - mean scores (1,000,000s), pre-advice estimates, advice, and post-
advice estimates 
 
Table 6.5 shows that, on average, where the value of Process advice was numerically greater 
than a participant‘s pre-advice estimate, the same participant‘s post-advice estimate was 
greater than the numerical value of his/her pre-advice estimate.  However, if the ‗inflation‘ of 
participants‘ pre-advice, to post-advice, estimates, is attributable to Process advice, it is 
unfortunate that such judgment change was not beneficial in terms of accuracy.  Participants in 
receipt of Process advice, who chose to revise their judgment post-advice, appear to be 
reducing only a proportion of the absolute numerical difference between their pre-advice 
estimate and Process advice, post-advice, which is consistent with the conformity to advice 
account of the data. 
 
Question N 
Pre-
advice 
estimate 
x  
sd 
Advice 
x  
sd 
Post-
advice 
estimate 
x  
sd True 
Q1.  
Lottery 
23 17.58 25.11 15,478.66 49,928.98 488.79 1371.52 38.29 
Q2.  HE 24 3.80 10.14 543,945.69 249.93 5.42 12.56 0.41 
Q3.  Road 
deaths 
29 0.27 0.73 40,061,290 211,942,069 1.13 2.86 0.003 
Q4.  
Passengers 
29 2.78 6.65 5048.91 27108.77 7.34 17.16 1.00 
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A similar pattern of results was observed when Non-Process advice was considered.  Where 
Non-Process advice was numerically greater than a participant‘s pre-advice estimate, the same 
participant‘s post-advice estimate was greater than his/her pre-advice estimate, on average.  
Also, where Non-Process advice was numerically less than a participant‘s pre-advice estimate, 
on average, the same participant‘s post-advice estimate was less than his/her pre-advice 
estimate, on average. 
Table 6.6  Non-Process advice - mean scores (1,000,000s), pre-advice estimates, advice, and 
post-advice estimates 
 
 
Are participants in this study merely conforming (to a degree) to any available advice?  
 
Ultimately, what these preliminary observations suggest, is that participants who choose to 
revise their judgment post-advice, are indiscriminately conforming to advice (irrespective of 
condition); to the extent that, they are revising their judgment by proportionately reducing the 
absolute numerical difference between their pre-advice estimates and the advice, post advice.  
Prior to pursuing this line of argument further, it was necessary to determine if there were 
differences between conditions, in terms of both the number of judgment changes, and also the 
amount of judgment change. 
Question N 
Pre-advice 
estimate 
x  
sd 
Advice 
x  
sd 
Post-advice 
estimate 
x  
sd True 
Q1.  
Lottery 
29 12.54 19.77 20.00 0.00 15.68 8.86 38.29 
Q2.  HE 35 11.10 17.01 50.00 0.00 22.24 21.51 0.41 
Q3.  Road 
deaths 
35 0.07 0.14 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.003 
Q4.  
Passengers 
26 2.71 5.12 0.50 0.00 0.84 0.94 1.00 
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Does attending to advice influence judgment change?  
 
The number of judgment revisions for each individual question was calculated, and it is clear 
from Table 6.7 that a greater number of people did not revise their judgment post-advice, in 
comparison to those people who did revise their unaided holistic estimate.   
Table 6.7  Number of judgment revisions 
Condition Question N Change judgment 
Control 1 51 5 (9.8%) 
 2 51 7 (13.7%) 
 3 51 5 (9.8%) 
 4 51 2 (3.9%) 
Non-Process advice 1 29 23 (79.3%) 
 2 23 14 (60.9%) 
 3 23 14 (60.9%) 
 4 15 12 (80%) 
Process advice 1 23 14 (60.9%) 
 2 20 9 (45%) 
 3 20 6 (30%) 
 4 20 14 (70%) 
 
The table above clearly indicates that people in receipt of advice tended to change judgment 
more often than people who did not receive advice.  This data was next examined question by 
question.  Fig 6.2 shows the number of judgment changes for each condition, for participants 
responding to Question 1 of the questionnaire.  Here, it is clear that both advice conditions 
tended to result in more judgment changes, than participants in the control condition.  
However, there was no significant difference between the number of judgment changes that 
participants reported when in receipt of Process advice, than when in receipt of Non-Process 
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advice (χ2 = 1.91, df = 1, p < 0.17).  This finding further supports conformity to advice, as 
irrespective of advice condition, people tended to revise their judgment as often as each other, 
on average. 
 
A similar pattern of results obtained for Question 2 (see Fig. 6.3), where people in receipt of 
advice, revised their unaided pre-advice estimate, more often than people who did not receive 
any advice.  Here, the difference in the number of judgment changes between participants in 
receipt of Process advice, and participants in receipt of Non-Process advice did not reach 
significance (χ2 = 0.45, df = 1, p < 0.50).  The same pattern of results was observed for 
participants who responded to Question 3 (see Fig. 6.4).  Once more there were no significant 
differences in the number of judgment changes between participants in the two advice  
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conditions (χ2 = 3.67, df = 1, p < 0.06).   
 
 
 
Condition 
Do not change judgment Change judgment 
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
p
ar
ti
ci
p
an
ts
 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0 
Fig 6.4.  Q3 Judgment change 
Non-process advice 
Process advice 
Control 
Condition 
Condition 
Do not change judgment Change judgment 
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
p
ar
ti
ci
p
an
ts
 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0 
Fig. 6.3  Q2 Judgment change 
Non-process advice 
Process advice 
Control 
Condition 
176 
 
The same pattern of results that had been observed on the first three questions of the 
questionnaire was once more observed on the fourth question (see Fig. 6.5). 
 
Participants responding to Question 4 clearly changed judgment more often, when in receipt of 
advice, than when not in receipt of advice.  However, there was no significant difference 
observed between the number of judgment changes reported by people in receipt of Process 
advice, and the number of judgment changes reported by people in receipt of Non-Process 
advice (χ2 = 0.45, df = 1, p < 0.50).  The preceding findings strongly suggest that people are 
more disposed to revise their judgment when in receipt of some advice, and that where people 
revise their initial unaided estimate post-advice, knowledge of the process of advice generation 
does not appear to directly influence the number of judgment revisions.  This finding is 
consistent with the conformity to advice account of these data. 
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Can participants discriminate between good and poor advice? 
 
The preceding findings are not particularly illuminating – even though participants in Question 
3 and in receipt of Process advice changed judgment less often than not, no significant 
difference between conditions was observed.  Consideration was next given to the extent of 
judgment revision post-advice.  Here, the dependent variable of amount of judgment change 
was not normally distributed, and it was necessary to Log transform the data to meet the 
assumptions of normality.  Subsequently an independent samples t-test was performed on the 
data of participants who revised their judgment post-advice, to ascertain whether there was any 
significant difference in the absolute difference scores between conditions.  Table 6.8 (below) 
shows that there was no difference in the mean absolute amount of judgment change between 
the advice conditions (t = 1.29, df = 157, p < 0.20).  
Table 6.8  Mean absolute amount of judgment change 
 
 
Observations 
N 
x  sd 
Log 
x  
sd 
Process Advice 66 155,556,698.94 816,953,860.66 14.10 2.96 
Non Process-
Advice 
93 8,132,201.40 12,975,150.35 13.45 3.23 
 
 
Table 6.8 is further evidence that where participants revise their judgment post-advice, they 
appear to be indiscriminately conforming to advice, on average.  This issue was next examined 
on a question-by-question basis (see Table 6.9). 
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Table 6.9  Mean absolute amount of judgment change 
Question 
Advice 
Condition 
N x
 
sd 
Log 
x  
sd t df p 
1 Process 15 666,040,366.67 1,654,302,311.29 16.71 2.80    
 
Non-
Process 
23 13,238,260.87 15,772,936.73 15.72 1.47 1.25 19.11 0.23 
2 Process 14 5,523,429 9981952.25 13.73 2.21    
 
Non-
Process 
23 17,112,606.52 4644241.74 15.77 1.90 
- 
2.99 
35 0.005* 
3 Process 15 1,660,622 3,250,645.87 11.57 2.83    
 
Non-
Process 
24 65,532.5 122,508.79 9.22 2.15 2.94 37 0.006* 
4 Process 22 7,904,513.64 18,881,090.67 14.28 1.99    
 
Non-
Process 
23 2,463,130.43 4,961,518.69 13.27 1.60 1.88 43 0.07 
*p < 0.05 
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From Table 6.9 it can be concluded there were significant differences in the mean absolute 
amount of judgment change between participants in receipt of Process advice, and participants 
in receipt of Non-Process advice, in Questions 2 and 3.  Participants in receipt of Non-process 
advice, and responding to Question 2, reported greater mean absolute difference scores on 
average, than participants responding to Question 2, and in receipt of Process advice (t = - 
2.99, df = 35, p < 0.005).  Conversely, participants in receipt of Process advice, and responding 
to Question 3, reported greater mean absolute difference scores on average, than participants in 
receipt of Non-process advice and responding to Question 3 (t = 2.94, df = 37, p < 0.006).   
There were no significant differences between participants in receipt of Non-Process advice, 
and Process advice, in terms of mean absolute difference scores, for participants responding to 
Question 1 and 4.  These findings strongly suggest that participants in receipt of Process 
advice, changed judgment no more often, and to no greater extent, than participants in receipt 
of Non-Process advice.  This may suggest that participants are, at least in part, indiscriminately 
conforming to advice, merely because the advice is available.  The following section discusses 
this possibility. 
 
Recall that judgment revision is possibly an artifact of the structured exchange of numerical 
information in JAS-type tasks, in so far as, if the absolute numerical difference between a 
participants‘ pre-advice estimate, and the true answer is greater, than the absolute numerical 
difference between an advisors estimate and the true answer; participants choosing to attend to 
advice will revise their judgment beneficially.  In contrast, where the absolute numerical 
difference between a participant‘s pre-advice estimate and the true answer is less, than the 
absolute numerical difference between an advisor‘s estimate and the true answer; participants 
choosing to attend to advice will not revise their judgment beneficially.  Hence, 
indiscriminately following the advice offered by advisors is not always an optimal strategy for 
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accurate estimation (in the four estimation tasks participants completed for the purposes of this 
study).  To test the possibility that participants indiscriminately attend to advice, a measure of 
judgment change relative to advice was formulated (¦pre-advice estimate – advice¦ - ¦post-
advice estimate – advice¦).  Should the values of the observations for judgment change relative 
to advice, be positive, on average, then it is possible to infer that participants have revised their 
judgments so that, the absolute numerical difference between their post-advice estimate, and 
the advice, is less than the absolute numerical difference between their pre-advice estimate and 
advice.  Similarly, should the value of the measure (judgment change relative to advice) be 
negative, this indicates that a participant has rejected the available advice.  Table 6.10 shows 
that where participants in receipt of Process advice, did revise their pre-advice estimate, they 
did so by reducing the absolute numerical difference between their post-advice estimate and 
the advice (i.e. the mean value for each question is positively signed).  
Table 6.10  Mean judgment change relative to advice - for participants in receipt of Process 
advice 
Question N x  sd 
1 14 551,124,642.86 1,227,778,216.52 
2 13 2,593,692 8,574,989.25 
3 13 1,891,064 3,448,676.26 
4 22 171,218.18 18,126,510.37 
 
Similarly, participants in receipt of Non-Process advice, who revised their judgment post-
advice, did so by reducing the absolute difference between their pre-advice estimate and 
advice; in comparison to the absolute numerical difference between their post-advice estimate 
and advice (see Table 6.11). 
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Table 6.11  Mean judgment change relative to advice - for participants in receipt of Non-
Process advice 
 
Question N x  sd 
1 23 10,151,304.35 15,701,680.37 
2 22 15,526,818.18 12,238,752.42 
3 24 65,449.17 122,541.07 
4 22 2,397,818.18 5,136,045.58 
 
 
In sum, the mean scores for judgment change relative to advice are positively signed, 
indicating that irrespective of condition, participants who revised their judgment post-advice 
did so by reducing the absolute numerical difference between their estimate and the advice.  
These findings are consistent with the idea that where participants are influenced by advice, 
they revise their judgments by moving towards the numerical value of the advice, irrespective 
of the quality of advice (Harvey and Fischer, 1997).   This finding was further supported when 
participant‘s ratings of the utility of the advice were considered.   
 
Do participant’s who value advice, follow it?  
 
Advice in this study was differentiated between Process and Non-Process advice, on the basis 
that Process advice offered a coherent algorithm for solving seemingly intractable estimation 
problems.  In contrast, Non-Process advice was constituted as a testimonial assertion.  In these 
circumstances, it might be expected – if participants were motivated to estimate accurately – 
that people would value Process advice highly.  The results of a Median test (reported in Table 
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6.12), show that there were no differences between treatment conditions, in terms of the value 
participants attributed to advice. 
Table 6.12  Median test of participants‘ perceived utility of advice ratings 
 
Question 
Process 
advice 
N 
Median 
> 
Median 
<= 
Median 
Non-
Process 
advice 
N 
> 
Median 
<= 
Median 
df χ
2
 p 
1 22 4 2 20 29 1 28 1 0.72 0.40 
2 23 3 8 15 35 15 20 1 0.38 0.54 
3 29 3 10 19 35 17 18 1 1.29 0.26 
4 29 3 13 16 26 14 12 1 0.45 0.50 
 
Given the present analysis of judgment change, where it appears that participants who choose 
to revise their judgment, do so by indiscriminately following advice; it is perhaps unsurprising 
that people appear to value different types of advice equally. 
 
Consideration was next given to whether people who revised their judgment post-advice rated 
the utility of the available advice higher than people who did not change judgment.  
Superficially, it may seem attractive to pool participant‘s utility ratings for the purposes of 
analysis.  However, this analysis is not particularly meaningful given the individual 
characteristics of each question that are pertinent to the observed results (e.g. there are very 
large differences between the absolute magnitude of the true answer and 
advice between questions).  Given this caveat, the analysis of perceived utility of advice 
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ratings was performed question by question (see Table 6.13).   In the Process advice condition, 
where people revised their judgment post-advice in response to Question 3; participants 
attributed higher utility ratings of advice, than ratings attributed by people who did not choose 
to revise their judgment post-advice (U = 37.5, N1 = 13, N2 = 16, p < 0.002).  There were no 
significant differences (between people who revised their judgment post-advice, and people 
who did not revise their judgment), in participants‘ utility ratings of advice on Questions 1, 2 
and 4 for people in receipt of Process advice.  Where people received Non-process advice, it 
was clear that people who revised their judgment post-advice, valued the advice, to a greater 
extent than people who did not change judgment for two out of four of the estimation 
problems. 
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Table 6.13  Participants in receipt of advice – perceived utility ratings of advice 
 
Advice Question 
Change 
Judgment 
N  
Median 
Do not 
Change 
Judgment 
N 
Median 
Mann-
Whitney U 
p 
Process 1 14 3 8 3 52.5 0.80 
 2 13 3 10 2 47.5 0.26 
 3 13 4 16 2 37.5 0.002* 
 4 22 3 7 3.5 57.5 0.30 
Non-
Process 
1 23 4 6 3 37 0.05* 
 2 22 4 13 3 92 0.07 
 3 24 4 11 2 74 0.03* 
 4 22 4 4 3.5 37.5 0.62 
*p < 0.05 
These findings are consistent with the idea that the perceived utility of advice is an important 
determinant in judgment change.  However, participants in receipt of Process advice 
responding to Questions 1, 2 and 4, did not report any differences in utility ratings of advice 
irrespective of whether people revised their judgment or not, post-advice.  This may have been 
because of individual differences in task relevant knowledge of the items to be estimated, pre-
advice.  In order to investigate this possibility, significance tests for differences between 
questions, in terms of the width of pre-advice confidence intervals, were carried out. 
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If participants are less confident prior to accessing advice, are they more likely to revise 
their judgment post-advice?  
 
Recall that ‗narrow‘ confidence intervals, around a pre-advice estimate, may be indicative of 
greater pre-existing knowledge of the quantity to be estimated, than wide confidence intervals. 
The data from all four estimation questions was pooled in order to check for significant 
differences in the width of participants‘ pre-advice confidence intervals.  As the dependent 
variable of initial pre-advice confidence did not meet the assumption of normality, it was 
necessary to perform a non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test to ascertain whether there was a 
significant difference between conditions.  This showed that, on average, there was no 
difference between conditions, in terms of participant‘s pre-advice initial confidence levels (χ2 
= 4.32, df = 2, p < 0.12).  This analysis was repeated for each estimation question.  Participants 
responding to Question 1 did not report any significant differences between conditions, on 
average, in terms of pre-advice initial confidence (χ2 = 2.35, df = 2, p < 0.31).  Although 
people responding to Question 1, and responding online reported higher levels of confidence, 
on average, than people responding on paper (U = 746, N1 = 63, N2 = 32,  p < 0.04).  
Participants responding to Question 2 reported significant differences in pre-advice initial 
confidence scores, on average (χ2 = 14.15, df = 2, p < 0.001).  A follow-up Median test 
revealed that this difference was between controls and participants in receipt of Non-Process 
advice (χ2 = 15.30, df = 2, p < 0.0005).   People responding to Question 2, and responding 
online reported higher levels of confidence, on average, than people responding on paper (U = 
539, N1 = 65, N2 = 30,  p < 0.0005).  Where participants responded to Question 3, there were 
no significant differences between conditions in pre-advice initial confidence score on average 
(χ2 = 1.27, df = 2, p < 0.53).  Consistent with the preceding findings, participants responding to 
Question 3 reported higher levels of confidence when responding online (U = 797, N1 = 65, N2 
= 35, p < 0.01).  Participants who responded to Question 4 reported no significant differences 
in levels of pre-advice confidence between conditions on average (χ2 = 1.43, df = 2, p < 0.49).  
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Nor did participants responding to Question 4 report any significant difference between those 
responding online, and those responding on paper, in terms of pre-advice initial confidence 
scores (U = 882, N1 = 62, N2 = 35, p < 0.13). 
 
In sum, there is little evidence to suggest systematic differences between conditions, or 
questions, in terms of participant‘s pre-advice initial confidence scores.  However, in three out 
of four of the estimation questions participants responded to online, participants reported 
significantly greater pre-advice initial confidence, than participants responding on paper.  Next, 
the relationship between pre-advice initial confidence and subsequent judgment change was 
examined.  In the aggregate there was no significant relationship between pre-advice initial 
confidence and subsequent judgment change (see Table 6.14). 
Table 6.14.  Correlation between pre-advice initial confidence and subsequent judgment 
change   
 
Question N Spearman‘s ‗r‘ p 
1 95 0.15 0.14 
2 101 - 0.37 0.0005* 
3 106 0.07 0.48 
4 106 0.01 0.90 
       *p < 0.05 
Table 6.14 shows that there was only a significant relationship between pre-advice initial 
confidence, and subsequent judgment change, for participants responding to Question 2.  Here, 
the correlation is negative, indicating that as pre-advice initial confidence become ‗wider‘ (i.e. 
decreased), so subsequent judgment change became more likely.  However, there is no strong 
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evidence in the remaining three estimation questions to suggest that pre-advice initial 
confidence is significantly correlated to subsequent judgment change. 
 
Post-advice, there were no significant differences between conditions in terms of participant‘s 
post-advice final confidence scores, on average (χ2 = 4.71, df = 2, p < 0.10).  Further, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that participants who made their responses online, reported that they were 
more confident in their estimates post-advice than participants responding on paper (U = 
13203.5, N1 = 256, N2 = 132, p < 0.0005). 
 
Recall that most participants did not revise their intuitive pre-advice estimate, post-advice.  
The data analyzed so far, seemed to suggest only that participants who changed judgment, did 
so under the indiscriminate influence of advice.  In order to determine whether this was the 
‗whole story‘, participants‘ data was re-analyzed by developing theoretical models and testing 
these models through regression analysis.  Such an analysis is likely to be uninformative where 
the data from all questions is pooled, due to the differing characteristics of each question (the 
magnitude of the true answer and the advice are notably different for each question).  It is 
preferable therefore, to perform regressions for individual questions.  The following section 
will outline the regression approach and discuss variables that will be entered into the 
regressions. 
 The main questions multiple regression answers 
 
Multiple regression is an appropriate method of data analysis in the context of this study, as the 
results of this analysis provides some answers to several questions of interest.  First, multiple 
regression attempts to explain the variation in a single dependent variable due to n independent 
variables (regressors).  The degree to which the regressors, (taken together), explain the 
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variation in the dependent variable is assessed by the value of R2adj.  It is customary to regard 
an R2adj of above 75% as very good; 50-75% as good; 25-50% as fair; and below 25% as poor.  
Multiple regression is also able to determine if the regressors, (taken together), are 
significantly associated with the dependent variable - assessed by the F statistic in ANOVA.  A 
third advantage of utilizing multiple regression in the current analysis, is that the relationship 
between a single regressor, and the dependent variable can be ascertained while holding all 
other regressors constant – by examining regression coefficients.  The conventional way to 
compare regression coefficients calculated in differing units is through z score transformation.  
This transformation results in standardized regression coefficients (betas) that are directly 
comparable.  Finally, it is possible to determine whether the relationship of the regressors with 
the dependent variable, are statistically significant with all other regressors taken into account.  
The preceding discussion sets out the appropriateness of the regression approach, I now turn to 
the specific justification for the approach in the context of JAS studies.   
 
JAS has not widely utilized the benefits of a multiple regression approach in the analysis of 
experimental data.  Those studies that have adopted the approach, acknowledge that it is 
possible to consider variables that potentially explain the percentage variance of some criterion 
variable, simultaneously (Harvey et al. 2000; Azen and Budescu, 2003; Budescu and Azen, 
2004).  In terms of developing models that can be tested through regression analysis, I follow 
the suggestion of Cronbach and Petty (1970), and Edwards (1995), who argue that endogenous 
variables should be utilized as criterion variables that control for other exogenous variables in 
regression analysis.  Put another way, variables such as a, ‗judge‘s initial estimate and the 
advisor‘s recommendation are exogenous, whereas the judge‘s final estimate is endogenous‘ 
(Dalal and Bonaccio, 2006, p42).  Having established the theoretical justification for the 
regression approach, I now turn to two issues for which models were developed and tested 
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through multiple linear regression.  First, I consider the issue of the potential predictors of 
estimation accuracy.  This issue is of importance to the central question of this thesis, as where 
people revise their judgment, neither reasons-based advice, or solely numeric advice appears to 
be any more persuasive.  Hence, it is necessary to consider if there are variables other than 
advice ‗type‘ that predict estimation accuracy.  Second, a logistic regression model is 
developed and tested that seeks to determine the variables that predict judgment change.  
Consideration is first given to the rationale for the variables selected to enter into a regression 
analysis that attempts to predict ultimate estimation accuracy.     
 
In the first instance, it is of interest to ascertain whether participant‘s ultimate estimation 
accuracy could be successfully modelled.  Clearly, a participant‘s initial estimation accuracy is 
largely dependent upon the same individual‘s capacity to muster their existing knowledge in 
order to solve the estimation problem at hand.  Moreover, it is likely that any subsequent post-
advice revision of judgment may be ‗anchored‘ upon this initial intuition (Harvey and Fischer, 
1997; Lim and O‘Connor, 1995).  Hence, ultimate estimation accuracy, will be, at least in part, 
moderated by an individual‘s initial unaided intuition.  Of interest then, in terms of multiple 
regression, is to determine (holding other variables constant) the amount of variance in 
ultimate estimation accuracy accounted for by initial pre-advice estimation accuracy.  This will 
be examined by entering the variable of unaided pre-advice estimation accuracy into the 
regression analysis.  Further, the extent to which available advice either illuminates elements 
of the estimation problem not originally considered, or merely adds cognitive ‗noise‘, is 
another factor relevant to ultimate estimation accuracy.  Recall that advice in this study is 
operationalized as Process or Non-Process.  This operationalization of advice contains 
important differences between conditions.  Process advice is generated by an individual 
participant inputting sub-component estimates into an algorithm, and subsequently combining 
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these sub-components multiplicatively to generate advice.  Hence, advice is self-generated by 
participants, and is different for each participant.  In contrast, Non-process advice is 
constituted as a testimonial assertion from an anonymous advisor, and so is constant for 
participants in receipt of Non-process advice (in reality advice was generated by the 
experimenter).  The practicalities of this distinction for multiple regression analysis, is that the 
variable of advice accuracy can only be input into a regression for participants in receipt of 
Process advice (Non Process advice is invariant and hence is not able to account for variance in 
ultimate estimation accuracy).  Given this limitation, the variable of advice accuracy was input 
to the regression analysis, as the amount of variance in ultimate estimation accuracy accounted 
for by the accuracy of advice (while holding other variables constant), is clearly important in 
ascertaining whether participants act upon advice when formulating a final estimate.    
 
Similarly, post-advice confidence in the veracity of the output of an individual‘s deliberations 
may also have a relationship with ultimate estimation accuracy.  This variable is of particular 
interest, as the relationship between ultimate estimation accuracy, and appropriate post-advice 
confidence is unclear (Rowe, Wright and McColl, 2005).  Koriat, Lichtenstein, and Fischhoff, 
(1980), for example reported that final confidence appears to be related to improvements in 
ultimate estimation accuracy.  However, there is considerable variability in the strength of this 
relationship due to task demands and testing conditions (Koehler, 1994).  Typically, people are 
overconfident in the veracity of their own judgments, so it is of interest to determine the 
variance in ultimate estimation accuracy attributable to post-advice confidence (holding other 
variables constant).  Having established the rationale for the selection of variables to enter into 
a regression analysis that attempts to predict ultimate estimation accuracy, I now turn to the 
issue of a logistic regression that attempts to predict judgment change. 
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Logistic regression is a statistical technique designed to acknowledge circumstances where a 
dependent variable is dichotomous.   Logistic regression can be used to predict a dichotomous 
variable from a set of predictor variables.  With a dichotomous categorical dependent variable, 
logistic regression is an appropriate analytical technique, if the predictor variables are a mix of 
continuous and categorical variables and/or if they are not normally distributed (logistic 
regression makes no assumptions about the distributions of the predictor variables).  For a 
logistic regression, the predicted dependent variable is a function of the probability that a 
particular subject will be in one of two categories (i.e. disease present/disease not present or 
yes/no etc.).  In the context of this study, it is appropriate to use this technique as one 
dichotomous dependent variable of interest, is judgment revision (i.e. whether participants 
change judgment, or not).   
 
One variable that is a likely predictor of judgment revision is an individual participant‘s pre-
advice level of confidence in their own intuitive estimate.  However, the measure of pre-advice 
initial confidence may simultaneously capture elements of an individual‘s pre-existing 
knowledge of the immediate estimation problem, as well as how confident the same individual 
is of that domain relevant knowledge.  Further, it is possible that elements of a participant‘s 
global sense of self-efficacy may also be captured in this measure, which implies that caution 
should be exercised in interpreting any logistic regression that utilizes this particular measure.   
  
However, despite these reservations, it is reasonable to believe, that at least in part, judgment 
revision may be mediated by the degree of confidence a participant may hold in an intuitive 
pre-advice estimate.  This is because participant‘s who report ‗wide‘ confidence intervals 
(indicative of low levels of pre-advice confidence), maybe more disposed to regard advice as 
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beneficial, than participants who report ‗narrow‘ confidence intervals (indicative of high pre-
advice confidence)  (Yaniv and Foster, 1995, 1997).  Participants who report high levels of 
pre-advice confidence, have previously been shown (in Chapter 4) to be less disposed to revise 
their judgment post-advice, than their less confident counterparts – irrespective of advice 
quality.  Given the differential effects of pre-advice confidence upon judgment revision, the 
variable of pre-advice confidence was entered into the logistic regression in order to determine 
the amount of variance in judgment change it accounted for, holding other variables constant.   
 
A second variable of interest that is likely to be influential upon judgment change is pre-advice 
estimation accuracy.  This variable was entered into the logistic regression analysis for the 
same reasons as it was selected for entry into the multiple regression analysis.  Although here, 
the selection of pre-advice initial estimate accuracy is entered into the logistic regression in 
order to ascertain the amount of variance in judgment revision attributable to this variable 
whilst holding other variables constant. 
 
The accuracy of advice is also likely to be influential upon an individual‘s decision whether to 
revise their unaided initial intuition, or not (if the same individual is able to successfully 
evaluate the quality of the proffered advice).  This issue is closely related to the measure of 
perceived utility of advice.  Here, participants were asked to rate the quality of the advice 
available to them.  Should participants successfully evaluate the quality of advice in 
comparison to their own intuitions, then positively evaluated advice is likely to loom large in 
their deliberations.  Alternatively, participants could evaluate advice positively, but be 
disinclined to incorporate such advice in their deliberations. The accuracy of advice and the 
perceived utility of advice were entered into the logistic regression, in order to ascertain the 
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variance in judgment revision attributable to each (holding other variables constant).   Prior to 
considering the results of the multiple regression analysis, and the logistic regression analysis; 
the data (i.e. residuals) was examined for evidence of multicollinearity and hetereoscedascity, 
both for Process and Non-Process advice, on a question by question basis.  
   
It is important to consider the issue of multicollinearity when performing regression analysis, 
to check for undesirable strong correlations between independent variables.  Strong 
correlations between independent variables are undesirable because small changes in data 
values may lead to large changes in the estimates of regression coefficients.  The conventional 
method for investigating the issue of multicollinearity in regression analysis is to examine 
residual values.  Should these scores not be independent, then only limited confidence in the 
estimated regression coefficients is possible.  Eigenvalues for each regression were calculated, 
and examined for values that approached zero.  Eigenvalues that are close to zero indicate the 
possibility that the independent variables entered into the regression are highly intercorrelated.  
Similarly, condition indices were calculated for each regression.  Condition indices are 
calculated by taking the square root of the ratio of the largest eigenvalue, to each successive 
eigenvalue.  Condition indices greater than 15 indicate a possible problem of intercorrelation 
between independent variables, and condition indices greater than 30 indicate a serious 
problem of intercorrelation between independent variables.  On examination of these data, no 
eigenvalues approached zero, nor did any condition index approach, or exceed 15.  Hence, it is 
possible to infer that no violation of the independence of residuals was found.  
  
Each regression for each question and condition was also checked for evidence of 
hetereoscedascity.  Hetereoscedascity is defined as differences in the variance of the error term 
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between observations. The presence of hetereoscedascity does not bias the estimates of the 
coefficients in regression analysis, but it does bias estimates of their standard errors.  One way 
of determining the influence of heteroscedascity in regression analysis is by close visual 
inspection of residual plots, and where hetereoscedascity is suspected, formally testing for it by 
performing White‘s test.  Here, a regression of the squares of the residuals is run on the 
variables suspected of causing the hetereoscedascity, their squares, and cross products.  The 
purpose of the test is to determine whether the absolute value of the residuals can be explained 
by the original independent variables.  This should not occur, as the residual values are 
supposedly random and non-predictable.  Significant hetereoscedascity can be confirmed by 
comparing the product of R2 multiplied by the number of participants N, with the appropriate 
value and degrees of freedom in a χ2 distribution.  Significant hetereoscedascity is detectable 
when the product of N*R2 exceeds the appropriate test statistic and degrees of freedom in a χ2 
distribution.  No significant hetereoscedascity was detected in the when the data was examined 
at the level of condition, and then at the level of each estimation question. 
195 
 
Ta
b
le
 6
.1
5
. P
ro
ce
ss
 a
d
vi
ce
: M
u
lt
ip
le
 r
eg
re
ss
io
n
 a
n
al
ys
is
 –
 u
lt
im
at
e 
es
ti
m
at
io
n
 a
cc
u
ra
cy
 (
*
p
 <
 0
.0
5
) 
 
 Q
ue
sti
on
 
Ex
pe
rim
en
tal
 
co
nd
itio
n 
Va
ria
ble
 
B 
SE
 
Be
ta 
t 
p 
1 
Pro
ces
s a
dv
ice
 
co
nst
an
t 
98
98
05
10
67
.96
 
95
91
60
97
65
.89
 
 
1.0
3 
0.3
2 
 
 
LN
 Fi
na
l C
I 
78
67
40
11
.01
 
24
63
05
93
4.7
1 
0.0
7 
0.3
2 
0.7
5 
 
 
LN
 A
dv
ice
 ac
cu
rac
y 
17
30
33
09
0.5
8 
10
07
22
42
6.9
4 
0.3
6 
1.7
2 
0.1
0 
 
 
LN
 E1
 ac
cu
rac
y 
-74
33
22
67
0.7
8 
54
21
89
13
0.2
5 
-0.
29
 
-1.
37
 
0.1
9 
2 
Pro
ces
s a
dv
ice
 
co
nst
an
t 
-33
38
25
91
.80
 
11
23
08
69
.07
 
 
-2.
97
 
0.0
1*
 
 
 
LN
 Fi
na
l C
I 
44
21
20
7.5
7 
19
93
80
4.1
7 
0.3
2 
2.2
0 
0.0
4*
 
 
 
LN
 A
dv
ice
 ac
cu
rac
y 
14
66
48
7.4
4 
40
15
58
.27
 
0.6
1 
3.6
5 
0.0
02
* 
 
 
LN
 E1
 ac
cu
rac
y 
87
15
34
.72
 
97
28
75
.93
 
0.1
5 
-0.
90
 
0.3
8 
T
ab
le
 6
.1
5
. 
P
ro
ce
ss
 a
d
v
ic
e:
 M
u
lt
ip
le
 r
eg
re
ss
io
n
 a
n
al
y
si
s 
–
 u
lt
im
at
e 
es
ti
m
at
io
n
 a
cc
u
ra
cy
 (
*
p
 <
 0
.0
5
) 
 
 
196 
 
 
 Q
ue
sti
on
 
Ex
pe
rim
en
tal
 
co
nd
iti
on
 
Va
ria
ble
 
B 
SE
 
Be
ta 
t 
p 
3 
Pr
oc
es
s a
dv
ice
 
co
ns
tan
t 
-2
25
27
93
.96
 
12
92
75
9.7
6 
 
-1
.74
 
0.1
0 
 
 
LN
 F
ina
l C
I 
36
75
26
.23
 
96
23
4.7
4 
0.6
7 
3.8
2 
0.0
01
* 
 
 
LN
 A
dv
ice
 ac
cu
rac
y 
18
21
1.2
1 
54
10
6.4
9 
0.0
6 
0.3
4 
0.7
4 
 
 
LN
 E
1 a
cc
ur
ac
y 
-9
89
94
.00
 
13
12
93
.00
 
-0
.13
 
-0
.75
 
0.4
6 
4 
Pr
oc
es
s a
dv
ice
 
co
ns
tan
t 
-2
96
21
47
4.5
2 
50
76
85
17
.63
 
 
-0
.58
 
0.5
7 
 
 
LN
 F
ina
l C
I 
13
56
82
1.4
0 
17
17
89
6.5
6 
0.1
9 
0.7
9 
0.4
4 
 
 
LN
 A
dv
ice
 ac
cu
rac
y 
44
05
39
.48
 
12
85
41
6.8
7 
0.0
7 
0.3
4 
0.7
4 
 
 
LN
 E
1 a
cc
ur
ac
y 
92
05
90
.92
 
37
56
08
8.7
4 
0.0
6 
0.2
4 
0.8
1 
197 
 
Ta
bl
e 
6.
16
. P
ro
ce
ss
 a
dv
ic
e:
 L
og
is
tic
 re
gr
es
si
on
 –
 p
re
di
ct
or
s 
of
 ju
dg
m
en
t c
ha
ng
e.
 
Q
u
e
s
ti
o
n
 
C
o
n
d
it
io
n
 
V
a
ri
a
b
le
 
B
 
S
E
 
W
a
ld
 
d
f 
p
 
E
x
p
 
(B
) 
1
 
P
ro
c
e
s
s
 a
d
v
ic
e
 
L
N
 P
re
-a
d
v
ic
e
 
C
I 
0
.1
0
 
0
.2
1
 
0
.2
3
 
1
 
0
.6
3
 
1
.1
0
 
 
 
L
N
 E
1
 a
c
c
u
ra
c
y
 
-0
.0
7
 
0
.8
9
 
0
.0
1
 
1
 
0
.9
4
 
0
.9
4
 
 
 
L
N
 A
d
v
ic
e
 
a
c
c
u
ra
c
y
 
0
.1
4
 
0
.2
3
 
0
.3
5
 
1
 
0
.5
5
 
1
.1
5
 
 
 
A
d
v
ic
e
 u
ti
li
ty
 
0
.1
3
 
0
.5
2
 
0
.0
6
 
1
 
0
.8
1
 
1
.1
3
 
 
 
C
o
n
s
ta
n
t 
-3
.9
0
 
1
7
.3
1
 
0
.0
5
 
1
 
0
.8
2
 
0
.0
2
 
2
 
P
ro
c
e
s
s
 a
d
v
ic
e
 
L
N
 P
re
-a
d
v
ic
e
 
C
I 
0
.0
0
6
 
0
.2
3
 
0
.0
0
1
 
1
 
0
.9
8
 
1
.0
1
 
 
 
L
N
 E
1
 a
c
c
u
ra
c
y
 
-0
.1
9
 
0
.3
5
 
0
.3
2
 
1
 
0
.5
7
 
0
.8
2
 
 
 
L
N
 A
d
v
ic
e
 
a
c
c
u
ra
c
y
 
0
.1
3
 
0
.1
2
 
1
.0
7
 
1
 
0
.3
0
 
1
.1
3
 
 
 
A
d
v
ic
e
 u
ti
li
ty
 
-0
.1
9
 
0
.4
4
 
0
.1
9
 
1
 
0
.6
7
 
0
.8
3
 
 
 
C
o
n
s
ta
n
t 
0
.8
1
 
3
.2
8
 
0
.0
6
 
1
 
0
.8
1
 
2
.2
4
 
 
198 
 
Q
u
e
s
ti
o
n
 
C
o
n
d
it
io
n
 
V
a
r
ia
b
le
 
B
 
S
E
 
W
a
ld
 
d
f
 
p
 
E
x
p
 
(
B
)
 
3
 
P
r
o
c
e
s
s
 a
d
v
ic
e
 
L
N
 P
r
e
-a
d
v
ic
e
 
C
I
 
0
.1
9
 
0
.3
0
 
0
.4
2
 
1
 
0
.5
2
 
1
.2
1
 
 
 
L
N
 E
1
 a
c
c
u
r
a
c
y
 
0
.0
7
 
0
.3
7
 
0
.0
3
 
1
 
0
.8
6
 
1
.0
7
 
 
 
L
N
 A
d
v
ic
e
 
a
c
c
u
r
a
c
y
 
0
.0
0
6
 
0
.1
1
 
0
.0
0
3
 
1
 
0
.9
6
 
1
.0
1
 
 
 
A
d
v
ic
e
 u
ti
li
ty
 
-1
.5
4
 
0
.6
7
 
5
.2
6
 
1
 
0
.0
2
 
0
.2
2
 
 
 
C
o
n
s
ta
n
t 
2
.5
6
 
2
.9
6
 
0
.7
5
 
1
 
0
.3
9
 
1
2
.9
5
 
4
 
P
r
o
c
e
s
s
 a
d
v
ic
e
 
L
N
 P
r
e
-a
d
v
ic
e
 
C
I
 
-0
.2
2
 
0
.2
5
 
0
.7
9
 
1
 
0
.3
7
 
0
.8
0
 
 
 
L
N
 E
1
 a
c
c
u
r
a
c
y
 
0
.0
5
 
0
.6
4
 
0
.0
0
7
 
1
 
0
.9
3
 
1
.0
6
 
 
 
L
N
 A
d
v
ic
e
 
a
c
c
u
r
a
c
y
 
0
.4
3
 
0
.2
7
 
2
.5
4
 
1
 
0
.1
1
 
1
.5
4
 
 
 
A
d
v
ic
e
 u
ti
li
ty
 
-0
.5
2
 
0
.5
4
 
0
.9
1
 
1
 
0
.3
4
 
0
.6
0
 
 
 
C
o
n
s
ta
n
t 
-4
.1
9
 
9
.4
1
 
0
.2
0
 
1
 
0
.6
6
 
0
.0
2
 
 
199 
 
 
Q
ue
st
io
n 
E
xp
er
im
en
ta
l 
co
nd
iti
on
 
V
ar
ia
bl
e 
B
 
SE
 
B
et
a 
t 
p 
1 
N
on
 p
ro
ce
ss
 a
dv
ic
e 
co
ns
ta
nt
 
-7
37
71
78
.8
1 
36
27
42
47
.5
6 
 
-0
.2
0 
0.
84
 
 
 
L
N
 F
in
al
 C
I 
76
52
77
1.
79
 
16
35
21
9.
97
 
0.
69
 
4.
68
 
0.
00
05
* 
 
 
L
N
 E
1 
ac
cu
ra
cy
 
14
92
62
5.
87
 
21
29
40
9.
61
 
0.
10
 
0.
70
 
0.
49
 
2 
N
on
 p
ro
ce
ss
 a
dv
ic
e 
co
ns
ta
nt
 
-1
16
05
46
14
.8
6 
24
47
10
68
.5
7 
 
-4
.7
4 
0.
00
05
* 
 
 
L
N
 F
in
al
 C
I 
35
23
71
0.
65
 
14
94
78
1.
12
 
0.
30
 
2.
36
 
0.
03
* 
 
 
L
N
 E
1 
ac
cu
ra
cy
 
57
37
53
2.
36
 
12
48
85
9.
28
 
0.
58
 
4.
59
 
0.
00
05
* 
3 
N
on
 p
ro
ce
ss
 a
dv
ic
e 
co
ns
ta
nt
 
-1
82
36
0.
42
 
41
04
2.
89
 
 
-4
.4
4 
0.
00
05
* 
 
 
L
N
 F
in
al
 C
I 
10
66
4.
32
 
45
24
.2
5 
0.
36
 
2.
36
 
0.
03
* 
 
 
L
N
 E
1 
ac
cu
ra
cy
 
13
38
5.
07
 
41
78
.0
4 
0.
49
 
3.
20
 
0.
00
4*
 
4 
N
on
 p
ro
ce
ss
 a
dv
ic
e 
co
ns
ta
nt
 
-8
23
80
6.
03
 
20
70
76
7.
31
 
 
-0
.4
0 
0.
69
 
 
 
L
N
 F
in
al
 C
I 
18
57
38
.0
4 
13
68
93
.4
2 
0.
34
 
1.
36
 
0.
19
 
 
 
L
N
 E
1 
ac
cu
ra
cy
 
-5
96
28
.9
7 
15
25
55
.3
8 
-0
.1
0 
-0
.3
9 
0.
70
 
T
ab
le
 6
.1
7.
 N
on
-P
ro
ce
ss
: M
ul
tip
le
 r
eg
re
ss
io
n 
an
al
ys
is
 –
 u
lti
m
at
e 
 
es
tim
at
io
n 
ac
cu
ra
cy
 (
*p
 <
 0
.0
5)
 
200 
 
Ta
bl
e 6
.1
8.
 N
on
-P
ro
ce
ss
 ad
vi
ce
: L
og
ist
ic
 re
gr
es
sio
n 
– 
pr
ed
ic
to
rs 
 
of
 ju
dg
m
en
t c
ha
ng
e 
 Q
u
e
s
ti
o
n
 
C
o
n
d
it
io
n
 
V
a
ri
a
b
le
 
B
 
S
E
 
W
a
ld
 
d
f 
p
 
E
x
p
 
(B
) 
1
 
N
o
n
 P
ro
c
e
s
s
 
a
d
v
ic
e
 
L
N
 P
re
-a
d
v
ic
e
 
C
I 
0
.7
2
 
0
.5
8
 
1
.5
5
 
1
 
0
.2
1
 
2
.0
5
 
 
 
L
N
 E
1
 a
c
c
u
ra
c
y
 
-
0
.4
2
 
1
.0
3
 
0
.1
7
 
1
 
0
.6
8
 
0
.6
6
 
 
 
A
d
v
ic
e
 u
ti
li
ty
 
-
1
.1
2
 
0
.8
0
 
1
.9
7
 
1
 
0
.1
6
 
0
.3
3
 
 
 
C
o
n
s
ta
n
t 
-
1
.3
7
 
2
2
.2
1
 
0
.0
0
4
 
1
 
0
.9
5
 
0
.2
5
 
2
 
N
o
n
 P
ro
c
e
s
s
 
a
d
v
ic
e
 
L
N
 P
re
-a
d
v
ic
e
 
C
I 
-
0
.2
2
 
0
.2
9
 
0
.5
6
 
1
 
0
.4
5
 
0
.8
0
 
 
 
L
N
 E
1
 a
c
c
u
ra
c
y
 
0
.3
6
 
0
.2
8
 
1
.6
8
 
1
 
0
.2
0
 
1
.4
3
 
 
 
A
d
v
ic
e
 u
ti
li
ty
 
-
0
.6
6
 
0
.3
4
 
3
.6
7
 
1
 
0
.0
6
 
0
.5
2
 
 
 
C
o
n
s
ta
n
t 
-
0
.5
9
 
3
.3
5
 
0
.0
3
 
1
 
0
.8
6
 
0
.5
5
 
201 
 
Q
u
es
ti
o
n
 
C
o
n
d
it
io
n 
V
ar
ia
b
le
 
B
 
S
E
 
W
al
d
 
d
f 
p
 
E
x
p
 (
B
) 
3
 
N
o
n
 P
ro
ce
ss
 
ad
vi
ce
 
L
N
 P
re
-a
d
vi
ce
 
C
I 
0
.2
6
 
0
.2
7
 
0
.9
0
 
1
 
0
.3
4
 
1
.3
0
 
 
 
L
N
 E
1
 a
cc
u
ra
cy
 
-0
.4
1
 
0
.3
3
 
1
.5
9
 
1
 
0
.2
1
 
0
.6
6
 
 
 
A
d
vi
ce
 u
ti
li
ty
 
-0
.5
2
 
0
.3
9
 
1
.7
7
 
1
 
0
.1
8
 
0
.6
0
 
 
 
C
o
n
st
an
t 
2
.0
4
 
1
.9
4
 
1
.1
0
 
 
0
.3
0
 
7
.6
6
 
4
 
N
o
n
 P
ro
ce
ss
 
ad
vi
ce
 
L
N
 P
re
-a
d
vi
ce
 
C
I 
0
.2
4
 
0
.7
3
 
0
.1
1
 
1
 
0
.7
4
 
1
.2
7
 
 
 
L
N
 E
1
 a
cc
u
ra
cy
 
-2
.6
3
 
1
.7
2
 
2
.3
4
 
1
 
0
.1
3
 
0
.0
7
 
 
 
A
d
vi
ce
 u
ti
li
ty
 
-1
.0
2
 
0
.9
8
 
1
.0
9
 
1
 
0
.3
0
 
0
.3
6
 
 
 
C
o
n
st
an
t 
3
3
.1
0
 
2
8
.0
7
 
1
.3
9
 
1
 
0
.2
4
 
2
.4
e+
0
1
4 
 
202 
 
The first step in the analysis was to seek to determine the amount of variance in the dependent 
variable of ultimate estimation accuracy, attributable to the predictor variables of pre-advice 
initial accuracy, post-advice confidence, and the accuracy of advice.  As pooling the data 
would not be meaningful (due to the differing characteristics of the estimation questions), the 
analysis was performed for each estimation question separately.  The model was a very poor fit 
for Question 1 (R2adj = 0.10), and there was no significant overall relationship (F(3, 17) = 1.82, p 
< 0.18).  None of the predictor variables in Question 2 met the assumptions of normality, and 
so the natural log transformed values were utilized in the regression analysis.  The regression 
was a fair fit (R2 adj = 0.56), and the overall relationship was significant (F(3, 19) = 10.19, p < 
0.0005).   Inspection of the standardized beta weights, lead to the formulation of a regression 
equation that predicts a 1% change in ultimate estimation accuracy - 
A 1% change in ultimate estimation accuracy = 0.32 LN Final confidence + 0.61 LN Advice 
accuracy + 0.15 LN E1 Accuracy  
Hence, with other variables held constant, ultimate estimation accuracy increased by 0.32%, 
for every unit decrease in post-advice confidence (this is because ‗wide‘ confidence intervals 
indicate less confidence).  Similarly, for every unit decrease in LN Advice accuracy, the 
percentage change in ultimate estimation accuracy increased by 0.61%, holding other variables 
constant (this is because values greater than zero indicate increasing inaccuracy).  Similarly, 
for every unit decrease in initial estimation accuracy, the percentage change in ultimate 
estimation accuracy increased by 0.15, holding other variables constant (this is because values 
greater than zero indicate increasing inaccuracy).  Both LN Final confidence (t = 2.20, df = 19, 
p < 0.04), and LN Advice accuracy (t = 3.65, df = 19, p < 0.002) were significant predictors of 
ultimate estimation accuracy. 
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Similarly, none of the predictor variables in Question 3 met the assumptions of normality, and 
the natural log transformed values were utilized in the regression analysis.  The model was a 
medium fit (R2 adj = 0.33), and there was a significant overall relationship (F(3, 22) = 5.17, p < 
0.007).  Examination of the standardized beta weights, lead to the formulation of a regression 
equation that predicts a 1% change in ultimate estimation accuracy – 
1% change in estimation accuracy = 0.67 LN Final Confidence – 0.13 LN Initial Estimate 
Accuracy + 0.06 LN Advice Accuracy 
Hence, with other variables held constant, ultimate estimation accuracy increased by 0.67%, 
for every unit decrease in LN Final Confidence (this is because values greater than zero 
indicate increasing inaccuracy).  Similarly, for every unit decrease in LN Initial Estimate 
Accuracy the percentage change in ultimate estimation accuracy increased by 0.13%, holding 
other variables constant.  This finding confirms that the more accurate participants‘ initial pre-
advice responses to Question 3 were, the more accurate these same participants were post-
advice.  Ultimate estimation accuracy increased by 0.06%, for every unit decrease in LN 
Advice Accuracy (this is because values greater than zero indicate increasing inaccuracy).  
Only LN Final confidence was a significant predictor of ultimate estimation accuracy (t = 3.82, 
df = 22, p < 0.001).  However, the regression for the data in Question 4 fitted the model very 
poorly (R2 adj = 0.07) and there was no overall relationship (F(3, 22) = 0.49, p < 0.70).   
 
Next, consideration was given to the determinants of judgment change for participants in 
receipt of Process advice at the level of each estimation question (see Table 6.16).  Here, a 
logistic regression was performed on the data with judgment change as the DV and initial 
participant confidence, initial estimation accuracy, accuracy of advice, and perceived utility of 
advice as sub-scales of the LSI-R, as predictor variables.  A total of 20 cases were analyzed 
204 
 
from Question 1, but the full model was not significantly reliable (χ2 = 1.13, df = 4, p < 0.89), 
although the model fitted the data adequately (Hosmer and Lemeshow χ2 = 9.07, df = 8, p < 
0.34).  This model accounted for between 5.5% and 7.6% of the variance in judgment change, 
with 92.3% of the participant‘s who changed judgment post-advice successfully predicted.  
However, only 14.3% of predictions for the group of participants who did not change judgment 
post-advice were accurate.  Overall, 65% of predictions were accurate.  None of the predictor 
variables reliably predicted judgment change.  Similarly, a total of 23 cases were analyzed for 
the data in Question 2 - the full model was not significantly reliable (χ2 = 2.47, df = 4, p < 
0.65).  However, the model fitted the data adequately (Hosmer and Lemeshow χ2 = 9.81, df = 
8, p < 0.28).  This model accounted for between 10.2% and 13.6% of the variance in judgment 
change, with 84.6% of the participant‘s who changed judgment post-advice successfully 
predicted.  However, only 50% of predictions for the group of participants who did not change 
judgment post-advice were accurate.  Overall, 69.6% of predictions were accurate.  None of 
the predictor variables reliably predicted judgment change.  A total of 25 cases were analyzed 
from Question 4, but the full model was not significantly reliable for the data (χ2 = 5.77, df = 4, 
p < 0.22), although the model fitted the data adequately (Hosmer and Lemeshow χ2 = 7.37, df = 
6, p < 0.29).  This model accounted for between 20.6% and 30.9% of the variance in judgment 
change, with 94.7% of the participant‘s who changed judgment post-advice successfully 
predicted.  However, 33.3% of predictions for the group of participants who did not change 
judgment post-advice were accurate.  Overall, 80% of predictions were accurate.  None of the 
predictor variables reliably predicted judgment change.   
 
The data from Question 3 was successfully modelled however - a total of 26 cases were 
analyzed and the full model was significantly reliable (χ2 = 12.74, df = 4, p < 0.01).  The model 
also fitted the data adequately (Hosmer and Lemeshow χ2 = 13.61, df = 7, p < 0.06).  This 
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model accounted for between 38.7% and 51.7% of the variance in judgment change, with 75% 
of the participant‘s who changed judgment post-advice successfully predicted.  However, 
78.6% of predictions for the group of participants who did not change judgment post-advice 
were accurate.  Overall, 76.9% of predictions were accurate.  Table 6.16 gives coefficients, the 
Wald statistic and associated degrees of freedom and probability values for each of the 
predictor variables.   
 
Inspection of Table 6.16 shows that only perceived utility of advice reliably predicts judgment 
change for the data in Question 3.  The values of the coefficients reveal that a decrease in 1 
unit of perceived utility of advice is associated with an increase in the odds of judgment 
change by a factor of 0.22.  This appears counterintuitive in so far as it might be expected that 
participants who rate advice highly might be expected to be more disposed to revise their 
judgments post-advice, than participants who rate advice less highly.  However, this result 
could be explained by the idea that one of the determinants of judgment change might be the 
similarity between a participant‘s pre-advice judgment and advice.  If so, participants might 
rate advice that is similar to pre-advice judgments highly, regarding such advice as 
confirmation of participants‘ pre-advice judgments; implying that participants are less likely to 
revise their judgments post-advice.  In contrast, advice that is rated less highly, may be 
divergent from a participant‘s pre-advice initial judgment, and subsequently motivate the same 
participant to re-consider their judgment post-advice.  This idea was tested by calculating the 
correlation between judgment change and perceived utility of advice (Rs = - 0.37, p < 0.03, N = 
35).  This finding supports the idea that advice which is rated highly is less divergent from a 
participant‘s pre-advice initial judgment, than advice that is rated less highly.  The correlation 
coefficient is negative, indicating that participants who did not change judgment rated advice 
more highly than people who did change judgment post-advice.  
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I next considered the data from participants in receipt of Non-Process advice, here a multiple 
linear regression was performed where ultimate estimation accuracy was the dependent 
measure and pre-advice initial accuracy and post-advice confidence, were predictor variables.  
The regression was a fair fit for the data in Question 1 (R2 adj = 0.47), and the overall 
relationship was significant (F(2, 24) = 12.61, p < 0.0005).  Inspection of the standardized beta 
weights, lead to the formulation of a regression equation that predicts a 1% change in ultimate 
estimation accuracy - 
1% change in ultimate estimation accuracy = 0.69 LN post-advice confidence + 0.10 LN 
initial accuracy  
Hence, with other variables held constant, ultimate estimation accuracy increased by 0.69%, 
for every unit decrease in post-advice confidence (this is because ‗wide‘ confidence intervals 
indicate less confidence).  Similarly, for every unit decrease in initial estimation accuracy, the 
percentage change in ultimate estimation accuracy increased by 0.10%, holding other variables 
constant (this is because values greater than zero indicate increasing inaccuracy).  Only LN 
post-advice confidence (t = 4.68, df = 24, p < 0.0005), was a significant predictor of ultimate 
estimation accuracy.  Consideration was next given to participants in receipt of Non-Process 
advice and responding to Question 2.  The model was a fair fit (R2 adj = 0.51), and the overall 
relationship was significant.  (F(2, 32) = 18.59,  p < 0.0005).  Examination of the standardized 
beta weights, lead to the formulation of a regression equation that predicts a 1% change in 
ultimate estimation accuracy - 
1% change in ultimate estimation accuracy = 0.30 LN pre-advice initial accuracy + 0.58 LN 
Final Confidence  
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Hence, holding other variables constant ultimate estimation accuracy increased by 0.30%, for 
every unit decrease in LN pre-advice initial accuracy (this is because values greater than zero 
indicate increasing inaccuracy).  Similarly, for every unit decrease in LN Final Confidence the 
percentage change in ultimate estimation accuracy increased by 0.58%, holding other variables 
constant (this is because ‗wide‘ confidence intervals indicate less confidence).  Both LN Final 
confidence (t = 2.36, df = 32, p < 0.03), and LN pre-advice initial accuracy (t = 4.59, df = 32, p 
< 0.0005) were significant predictors of ultimate estimation accuracy. 
 
The data from participants in receipt of Non-Process advice, and responding to Question 3 was 
examined next.  The model was a fair fit (R2 Adj
 = 0.48), and the overall relationship was 
significant (F(2, 25) = 13.52,  p < 0.0005). Examination of the standardized beta weights, lead to 
the formulation of a regression equation that predicts a 1% change in ultimate estimation 
accuracy – 
1% change in ultimate estimation accuracy = 0.36 LN Final Confidence + 0.49 LN Initial 
estimate accuracy 
Hence, for every unit decrease in LN Initial Estimate Accuracy the percentage change in 
ultimate estimation accuracy increased by 0.49%, holding other variables constant.  Similarly, 
with other variables held constant, ultimate estimation accuracy increased by 0.36%, for every 
unit decrease in LN Final Confidence.  This finding confirms that the more accurate 
participants‘ initial pre-advice responses to Question 3 were, the more accurate these same 
participants were post-advice.  Both LN Final confidence (t = 2.36, df = 25, p < 0.03) and LN 
Initial estimate accuracy (t = 3.20, df = 25, p < 0.004) were significant predictors of ultimate 
estimation accuracy.  Finally, the data from participants in receipt of Non-Process advice, and 
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responding to Question 4 was examined.  The model was a very poor fit (R2 adj = 0.07), and 
there was no significant overall relationship (F(2, 18) = 0.95,  p < 0.40). 
 
In order to ascertain the determinants of judgment change for participants in receipt of Non-
Process advice, a logistic regression was performed with judgment change as the DV and 
initial participant confidence, initial estimation accuracy, and perceived utility of advice as 
sub-scales of the LSI-R, as predictor variables.  A total of 27 cases were analyzed from 
Question 1, but the full model was not significantly reliable (χ2 = 6.17, df = 3, p < 0.10), 
despite fitting the data adequately (Hosmer and Lemeshow χ2 = 1.50, df = 7, p < 0.98).  This 
model accounted for between 20.4% and 33.1% of the variance in judgment change, with 96% 
of the participant‘s who changed judgment post-advice successfully predicted.  However, only 
20% of predictions for the group of participants who did not change judgment post-advice 
were accurate.  Overall, 81.5% of predictions were accurate.  None of the predictor variables 
reliably predicted judgment change.  A total of 35 cases were analyzed in Question 2, but the 
full model was not significantly reliable (χ2 = 5.97, df = 3, p < 0.11).  Further, the model did 
not adequately fit the data (Hosmer and Lemeshow χ2 = 12.64, df = 7, p < 0.08).  This model 
accounted for between 15.7% and 21.4% of the variance in judgment change, with 86.4% of 
the participant‘s who changed judgment post-advice successfully predicted.  However, only 
53.8% of predictions for the group of participants who did not change judgment post-advice 
were accurate.  Overall, 74.3% of predictions were accurate.    None of the predictor variables 
entered into the regression proved to be significant.  Similarly, the data from Question 3 was 
not modelled successfully - a total of 33 cases were analyzed (χ2 = 5.60, df = 3, p < 0.13).  
However, the model fitted the data adequately (Hosmer and Lemeshow χ2 = 15.21, df = 8, p < 
0.06).  This model accounted for between 15.6% and 22.1% of the variance in judgment 
change, with 100% of the participant‘s who changed judgment post-advice successfully 
predicted.  However, 40% of predictions for the group of participants who did not change 
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judgment post-advice were accurate.  Overall, 81.8% of predictions were accurate.  None of 
the predictor variables significantly predicted judgment change.  An identical pattern of results 
emerged from the logistic regression performed on the data from Question 4 (a total of 23 
cases were analysed) the model was not reliable (χ2 = 4.24, df = 3, p < 0.24).  The model fitted 
the data adequately however (Hosmer and Lemeshow χ2 = 5.46, df = 8, p < 0.71), and this 
model accounted for between 16.8% and 37.8% of the variance in judgment change, with 
95.2% of the participant‘s who changed judgment post-advice successfully predicted.  
However, 50% of predictions for the group of participants who did not change judgment post-
advice were accurate.  Overall, 91.3% of predictions were accurate.  None of the predictor 
variables reliably predicted judgment change.  Table 6.19 summarizes the significant 
predictors that emerged from the preceding regression analyses. 
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Table 6.19 Summary of significant predictors from regression analyses 
Advice Criterion variable Question Predictor t df p 
Process 
Ultimate 
estimation 
accuracy 
2 LN Final confidence 2.20 19 0.04 
  2 LN Advice accuracy 3.65 19 0.002 
  3 LN Final confidence 3.82 22 0.001 
Non-
Process 
Ultimate 
estimation 
accuracy 
1 LN post-advice confidence 4.68 24 0.0005 
  2 LN Final confidence 2.36 32 0.03 
  2 
LN pre-advice initial 
accuracy 
4.59 32 0.0005 
  3 LN Final confidence 2.36 25 0.03 
  3 LN Initial estimate accuracy 3.20 25 0.004 
 
In sum, the analyses of data provided by participants in receipt of Process advice showed that 
levels of confidence post-advice were influential in predicting improvements in ultimate 
estimation accuracy for Question 2 and Question 3.  However, final confidence explained more 
variance in ultimate estimation accuracy only in Question 3.  The analyses of data from 
participants responding to Question 2 showed that the accuracy of Process advice was more 
important than final confidence in Question 2.  This may indicate the mediating effect of 
perceived differences between the two estimation tasks (recall that only participants 
responding to Question 3 reported differences in the perceived utility of advice scores between 
participants who revised their judgment post-advice, and those who did not).  Further, there 
Advice 
Criterion 
variable 
Question Predictor B SE Wald df p 
Exp 
(B) 
Process 
Judgment 
change 
3 Advice utility -1.54 0.67 5.26 1 0.02 0.22 
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were no differences in pre-advice initial confidence scores between those who subsequently 
revised their judgment post-advice, and those who did not, for participants in both Question 2 
and Question 3.  This may suggest that the operationalization of measures of confidence in this 
study are ‗noisy‘, and may have captured elements of global self-efficacy, and task specific 
competence, in addition to confidence in the veracity of participants ultimate estimates.  
 
Similarly, the analyses of data from participants in receipt of Non-Process advice showed the 
influence of post-advice confidence in accounting for the variation in ultimate estimation 
accuracy.  This variable was most influential upon ultimate estimation accuracy in Questions 1 
and 2.  However, the data in Question 3 showed that although final confidence was a 
significant predictor of ultimate estimation accuracy, initial estimation accuracy was a more 
important predictor of ultimate accuracy.  These findings may not be contradictory, if one 
accepts that there are perceived differences of task characteristics between questions, and 
individual differences between participants.  Overall, final confidence appears to be related to 
improvements in ultimate estimation accuracy.  This finding is not inconsistent with the work 
of Koriat, Lichtenstein, and Fischhoff (1980), who found a similar relationship between self-
assessed confidence and accuracy; but as has been found here, there is considerable variability 
in the strength of this relationship due to task demands and testing conditions (Koehler, 1994). 
 
Little evidence has been found however, for the determinants of judgment change.  Only 
analyses of the data of participants in receipt of Process advice and responding to Question 3, 
suggested that the perceived utility of advice was influential in post-advice judgment revision.  
Whilst in isolation this finding is consistent with a conformity to advice account (if an 
individual views advice favourably, and rates it positively, it is not unreasonable to predict that 
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the same individual may revise their judgment post-advice, if their own unaided intuition 
seems weak in comparison to the proffered advice), it is caveated by the differences in 
experimental tasks that have not been controlled for here. 
 
6.4 Discussion 
 
Within the constraints of the four estimation tasks completed by participants, the preceding 
analysis shows that Process advice is no more effective in facilitating judgment change, than 
Non-process advice, either in terms of the number of appropriate judgment revisions, or the 
extent of judgment revision.  Further, the measure of judgment change relative to advice 
indicated that participants – when they did revise their judgment post-advice – did so by 
reducing the absolute difference between their initial unaided estimate and advice, post-advice.  
Both Process, and Non-Process advice was valued equally by participants, and there were no 
significant differences in pre-existing knowledge (as determined by the width of pre-advice 
confidence bounds), held by participants in each condition.  These findings suggest that 
participants who revised their judgment post-advice were indiscriminately conforming to 
advice.  Subsequently, participants‘ data was modelled through multiple linear regressions, in 
order to predict ultimate estimation accuracy for each estimation problem, in both the Process 
and Non-Process advice conditions.  Further, the determinants of judgment change were 
modelled in a logistic regression for each condition, and each estimation question.   
 
A preliminary inspection of participants‘ data in this study revealed that people tend to make 
significantly larger estimates of a target quantity, after working through an algorithmic 
decomposition, than they would otherwise make.  MacGregor et al. (1988, 1991), argue that 
such an outcome reflects the positive correlation between the errors of the component parts of 
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a poorly motivated algorithm.  However, without knowing the beneficial attributes of an 
algorithmic decomposition a priori (if this were the case it would be a simple matter to choose 
between holistic estimation and some form of decomposition), people may have found it 
difficult to assess the accuracy of advice (output-of-algorithm).  Henrion et al. (1993) 
compared the accuracy of estimates of subjective probability distributions produced by (i) 
people generating their own decompositions and (ii) people working through algorithmic 
decompositions provided by an experimenter.  They found no differences in the accuracy of 
the outputs of these two conditions.  Instead, Henrion et al. found that algorithmic 
decomposition ‗inflated‘ people‘s estimates, in comparison to a control condition.  Hence, 
people who underestimated a target quantity initially, and persisted in underestimating (to a 
lesser degree) a target quantity after working through an algorithmic decomposition can be 
expected to improve their estimation accuracy.  Conversely, people who overestimate a target 
quantity, initially, can expect to diminish their estimation accuracy after working through an 
algorithmic decomposition.  Hence, beneficial judgment revision can be accounted for by the 
nature of the structural exchange of numerical information in JAS-type tasks.  Similar findings 
are presented here, and some possible cognitive factors are discussed below.  
 
The data from participants in receipt of advice in this study was modelled to ascertain (i) the 
determinants of ultimate estimation accuracy (ii) the determinants of judgment change.  As 
Process advice was generated by participants (and was different for each participant and each 
question), whilst Non-Process advice was constituted by a testimonial assertion by a single 
anonymous advisor, each advice type was analyzed separately.  The data from participants in 
receipt of Process advice, and responding to Question 2 (an estimate of Higher Education 
enrolments in the UK 2004/5), and Question 3 (an estimate of the number of fatalities resulting 
from a road traffic accident in the UK in 2004) could be successfully modelled.  Here, a 
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participant‘s post-advice confidence, in conjunction with the accuracy of the available advice, 
determined the same participant‘s ultimate accuracy, when estimating the number of Higher 
Education enrolments in the UK 2004/5.  The ultimate accuracy of participants estimating the 
number of fatalities resulting from a road traffic accident in the UK, in 2004, was determined 
by the same participants‘ post-advice level of confidence.  Significant models for ultimate 
estimation accuracy were reported for participants in receipt of Non-Process advice, and 
responding to Question 1 (an estimate of the number of Lottery tickets sold in the first week of 
June 2006 in the UK), Question 2 (HE enrolments in the UK 2004/5), and Question 3 (an 
estimate of the number of fatalities resulting from traffic accidents).  For Questions 1 a 
participant‘s post-advice confidence determines the same participant‘s ultimate accuracy.  The 
data from participants responding to Question 2 and 3 indicates that, the accuracy of 
participant‘s pre-advice unaided estimate, in conjunction with the same participants‘ post-
advice confidence, determines ultimate accuracy.  The determinants of judgment change were 
only successfully modelled through logistic regression for participants in receipt of Process 
advice and responding to Question 3 (an estimate of the number of fatalities resulting from 
traffic accidents).  Here, participants‘ perceived utility of advice was a significant predictor of 
judgment change.  However, the correlation between perceived utility of advice and judgment 
change indicated that participant‘s attributed higher utility ratings to advice that was less 
divergent from participants‘ pre-advice initial judgments.   
 
Clearly, the success (or otherwise) of this model building exercise is sensitive to the 
characteristics of each different estimation task.  Further, the mode of response (online/paper) 
influences participants‘ self-reported levels of confidence.  In the aggregate, there were no 
reported significant differences, in the widths of pre-advice initial levels of confidence.  Here, 
it is inferred that this reflects broadly similar levels of pre-existing task relevant knowledge, 
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amongst participants randomly allocated between conditions.  However, in three out of four 
estimation questions participants responding online reported higher levels of pre-advice initial 
confidence than participants responding on paper.  One explanation for this apparent 
discrepancy might be that people responding online may have felt greater self-efficacy in their 
deliberations due to their IT skills.  Hence, participants may have held broadly similar degrees 
of task relevant knowledge, whilst simultaneously experiencing enhanced self-efficacy when 
responding online.   
 
The findings reported in this study show that, in conditions where people make estimates of 
highly uncertain quantities, they are unable to either spontaneously evaluate advice of a 
holistic nature, or, indeed, use an algorithmic decomposition to mechanically combine sub-
component estimates into a useful estimate of the quantity in question.  This may imply that in 
such circumstances people are more likely to utilize peripheral environmental cues concerning 
the source of advice, rather than invest cognitive resources, in what potentially maybe a 
fruitless effort, to evaluate the quality of advice on offer (in conditions of less uncertainty it is 
possible that people may be able to successfully scrutinize the quality of advice).  Moreover, 
where people have little or no task relevant knowledge, and are unable to input more accurate 
sub-component estimates into an algorithmic decomposition than what may be achievable by a 
global holistic evaluation of an estimation problem, then algorithmic decomposition may not 
be of any greater utility than holistic estimation.   
 
Further, people will, often as not, follow advice under conditions of uncertainty, irrespective of 
the quality of such advice.  This is because where people have little, or no, task relevant 
knowledge it is difficult to evaluate the quality of advice.  Also, evaluations of advice based 
upon ‗world knowledge‘ are insufficient for the purposes of distinguishing between poor and 
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good advice.  Lichtenstein (1990) makes a similar point in reporting the results of her second 
study, where she argues that algorithmic decomposition is of little utility where it is (i) poorly 
understood, and (ii) ‗noisy‘ due to the poor quality information generated by participants, 
coupled with a lack of arithmetic skills - which are necessary to combine the various 
component steps of the algorithm.  She goes on to argue that the conditions for the successful 
use of algorithmic decomposition are likely to involve the careful and deliberate design of 
algorithms, and various computational aids for participants.  
 
The preceding discussion is difficult to reconcile with the idea that Process advice relaxes 
cognitive demands upon people and facilitates rigorous consideration of each attribute of 
complex estimation problems (Fischer, 1977; Kleinmuntz 1990; MacGregor, 1988, 1991, 
2001).  Indeed, the benefits of a ‗divide and conquer‘ strategy (Henrion et al. 1993; 
Kleinmuntz et al. 1996; Morera and Budescu, 1998), in the four estimation tasks participants in 
this study responded to, appear to be offset by the difficulties participants encountered when 
attempting to make accurate sub-component estimates in the Process advice condition.  Recall 
that if sub-component estimate errors are positively correlated, then the output of an 
algorithmic decomposition is likely to be highly inaccurate.  In such circumstances a holistic 
estimate of some troublesome quantity may be no less effective, than algorithmic 
decomposition (and hence one strategy may appear no more valuable to participants than 
another).  Such findings are consistent with the work of Lichtenstein and Weathers (1998), 
who found that, even when people were trained to create their own algorithmic decompositions 
(to estimate uncertain quantities), performance was not improved to any great degree.  
Moreover, these authors also found that on some occasions the use of algorithmic 
decomposition could inhibit accurate estimation (Study 2).  
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The discussion so far has highlighted some of the constraints upon the decompositional 
approach to estimation, in comparison to a holistic approach.  However, the results reported in 
this study are limited in several important respects.  Firstly, the formulation of Process advice 
in this study may possibly have been weak.  The algorithms used were not known a priori to 
be effective in facilitating judgment change (beneficial or otherwise).  The formulation of 
advice utilized by MacGregor et al. (1988, 1991), however was known to be effective in 
facilitating beneficial judgment revision a priori.  However, for algorithmic decomposition to 
retain some general utility, it is unlikely that estimators will have a repertoire of accessible 
‗good‘ algorithms.  Perhaps a more significant point is that Process advice in this study, was 
generated by individual participants, and hence was different for each person and each 
question.  In contrast, Non-Process advice was not generated by participants, and hence was 
identical for each question, and for each participant.  This implies that direct comparisons 
between the two advice conditions, is imperfect (for reasons discussed previously).    
 
A further limitation of the study was that in the Process advice condition, all four algorithms 
produced advice values that were hugely discrepant from participants‘ initial estimates.  This 
may have lead participants to believe that the advice was of little use, and hence the process 
that produced such unbelievable advice was equally worthless.  Subsequently, participants may 
not have been motivated to address the procedure with sufficient seriousness.  The preceding 
discussion implies that future studies should carefully consider the issues of internal validity 
when attempting to formulate meaningful algorithms in studies of this type.  A further problem 
arises when reflecting upon the characteristics of the four estimation problems for which 
algorithms were constructed.  Although there was no a priori reason to suppose that 
participants would find one estimation problem any more difficult than another, drawing upon 
tasks from multiple task domains may risk undermining my participant‘s motivation to 
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complete the tasks.  Similarly, not fully controlling for task difficulty and utilizing obscure 
tasks from multiple domains leaves such experimental work open to criticisms on the grounds 
of ecological validity.   
 
In sum, the preceding discussion has outlined circumstances in which algorithmic 
decomposition is no more effective in facilitating judgment change than a holistic evaluation of 
a testimonial assertion, and where conformity to advice is observed.  Ultimately, the most 
effective determinant of judgment change appears to be the perceptions people hold, of the 
utility of advice, as an aid in solving an estimation problem.  One possible direction for further 
research would be to test algorithms that are known a priori to be effective estimation aids, to 
ascertain whether such algorithms were also (i) effective in facilitating judgment change (ii) 
valued highly by respondents.  
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Chapter 7:  Knowledge of advice generation with algorithms that are known to be 
effective.  
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The preceding study investigated the possibility that intrinsic information about the quality of 
advice could influence a participant‘s decision of whether judgment change is appropriate and 
beneficial.  Ultimately, in the context of the estimation tasks that participants completed, 
knowledge of the process by which advice is generated proved no more influential than 
‗holistic‘ advice (constituted as a testimonial assertion) upon judgment revision, instead 
conformity to advice was observed.  This finding was surprising, given that MacGregor et al. 
(1988, 1991), argue the case for the potential effectiveness of algorithmic decomposition (in 
estimating uncertain quantities), in comparison to holistic estimation.  However, these authors 
were solely interested in the potential benefits of algorithmic decomposition, in terms of the 
ultimate accuracy of the output-of-algorithm; whereas the issue of interest in the previous 
study was how knowledge of the process by which advice is generated could result in 
beneficial judgment revision.  Moreover, the algorithms utilized in the previous study may 
have been weak (their effectiveness was not known a priori), in comparison to the algorithms 
utilized by MacGregor et al.  Further, the previous study may not have fully acknowledged the 
constraints that MacGregor (2001) outlined as prerequisites for the appropriateness of the 
algorithmic approach in estimating uncertain quantities.  Uncertainty in this context can be 
defined as a participant‘s lack of domain relevant knowledge (as opposed to some calculation 
of risk).  Given these limitations, it seemed appropriate to replicate MacGregor et al. and 
analyze the data in terms of beneficial judgment change, instead of ultimate estimation 
accuracy.  Such a formulation of the issue would pitch two ‗good‘ (i.e. known to be effective 
(a priori) algorithms against each other in terms of beneficial judgment change.  Should 
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conformity to advice obtain, then participants will reduce the absolute difference between their 
initial intuitive estimate and advice, post-advice – irrespective of experimental condition. 
     
MacGregor et al. (1988) formulated a number of algorithmic decompositions – the ‗US Mail‘ 
problem, and the ‗Number of Forested Miles in the US state of Oregon‘ problem, being two of 
them.  These authors have argued that participants responding to the ‗Forested Miles‘ problem, 
do not show the same improvements in estimation accuracy as participants in the ‗US mail‘ 
problem, as participants in the former condition, initially gave more accurate unaided 
estimates, than participants in receipt of the US mail problem.  Hence, there was less 
opportunity for participants in the ‗Forested Miles‘ to improve their estimation accuracy.  
However, the two algorithms were not equivalent in the number of sub-component steps 
available to participants – the US Mail algorithm comprised of eight sub-component steps, 
whilst the Forested Miles problem comprised five sub-component steps.  This may suggest that 
differences in the complexity of knowledge of the process of advice generation may interact 
with the characteristics of the estimation task, leading participants to different levels of 
estimation accuracy (and judgment change).  Moreover, there are further reasons for suspecting 
that the results reported by MacGregor et al. (1988, 1991), can be interpreted by an alternative 
account.  These authors drew their participants from the University of Oregon, and hence, it is 
not impossible that their participants were able to bring ‗local knowledge‘ to bear in forming 
an unaided estimated, of the Forested Miles in the state of Oregon.  It follows then, that, 
algorithmic decomposition is unlikely to offer greater improvements in estimation accuracy, 
than unaided estimation in these circumstances.  
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Replication of MacGregor et al  
 
To control for the possibility that participants‘ in MacGregor et al. may have been able to bring 
‗local knowledge‘ to bear upon the estimation tasks at issue, MacGregor et al. (1988, 1991), 
was replicated using participants drawn from students and staff at the University of Durham 
(UK).  It is likely that UK participants would have no more pre-existing knowledge about the 
numbers of pieces of mail handled by the US postal service in 1987, than the area of the US 
state of Oregon that is forested, and hence, improvements in estimation accuracy (and 
judgment change) through knowledge of the process by which advice is generated, might be 
expected to be broadly similar.  Moreover, the preceding study of algorithmic decomposition 
has shown that, at least in part, any improvements in estimation accuracy are artifactual (i.e. 
people tend to follow any plausible advice in conditions of uncertainty); and it is of interest to 
determine whether similar patterns of results obtain in a replication of MacGregor et al.  
Further, it is arguable that differences between the two algorithmic decompositions used in 
MacGregor et al. may account for the lack of improvement in final estimation accuracy for 
participants responding to the ‗Forested Miles‘ problem.  Specifically, that the number of 
component ‗steps‘, or sub-estimates, were greater in the ‗US mail‘ problem than the ‗Forested 
Miles‘ problem, and hence participants in receipt of the ‗Forested Miles‘ problem had less of 
an opportunity, to input accurate information, that may have lead to improvements in 
estimation accuracy.  If this premise is accepted, then MacGregor et al. cannot account for the 
lack of improvement in estimation accuracy in the ‗Forested Miles‘ problem in these 
circumstances.  Further, respondents in MacGregor et al. consistently underestimated the true 
answer to the ‗Forested Miles‘ problem, and the ‗US mail‘ problem, hence post-algorithm 
estimate ‗inflation‘ can potentially explain accuracy improvements without recourse to 
explanations based upon decomposition.   
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The current study is not an absolute replication of MacGregor et al. however.  These authors 
did not adequately control for the possibility that their participants may have held differing 
perceptions of the utility of each of the two algorithms.  Subsequently, it was impossible to 
determine if the accuracy improvements reported for participants in receipt of the US Mail 
problem, are entirely artifactual, or that these participants recognized, and valued, the utility of 
the provided algorithm.  This was controlled for in the current study, by asking participants to 
rate the utility of the algorithm given to them, and hence it was possible to subsequently test, 
whether there were any differences between the ratings participants attributed to the US Mail 
algorithm, and the ratings participant‘s attributed to the ‗Forested Miles‘ problem.  In sum, the 
purpose of this partial replication is to test whether people conform to any available advice, are 
sensitive to minor differences in the characteristics of the estimation task, the degree of pre-
existing knowledge available to an estimator, and the domain from which the estimation 
problem is drawn; but relatively insensitive to the quality of any advice that may be considered 
in forming a definitive estimate of some uncertain quantity.   
 
7.2 Method 
 
 
Participants 
 
Participants were drawn from staff and students at Durham Business School, University of 
Durham (UK), (N = 105).  Members of staff were recruited by a personal invitation by the 
author to participate in the study, however the majority of participants were students who the 
author recruited by visiting a lecture theatre (with the permission of staff colleagues) where 
students were gathered to attend their studies.  All participants took approximately the same 
amount of time to complete the questionnaire.  Participation was entirely voluntary, and a 
verbal instruction by the author that participants should write their age and gender on the first 
page of the questionnaire, was given to all participants before they started the questionnaire 
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and at the completion of the questionnaire prior to collection by the author.   Verbally 
instructing participants to provide demographic data, instead of providing them with clearly 
marked text boxes in which to provide this information on the first page of the questionnaire, 
may have reduced the rate of response as 85 participants provided demographic data (20 
participants did not, or chose not, to provide demographic data) - 45 males participated (age x  
= 24.33 years, sd = 3.05), as did 40 females (age x  = 23.20 years, sd = 1.64).   
 
Stimuli and Materials 
 
Participants completed either the ‗US Mail‘ estimation problem, or the ‗Number of Forested 
Miles in Oregon problem‘ questionnaire booklets (not both) (see Appendix IV).  In each 
questionnaire booklet for both estimation problems an identical opening paragraph of text 
informed participants that the purpose of the questionnaire was to ‗determine how you go 
about estimating an uncertain quantity‘.  However, in reality the true purpose of the experiment 
was to ascertain the potentially beneficial effects of knowledge of the process of advice 
generation upon judgment revision and accuracy.  Here, knowledge of the process of advice 
generation was operationalized as step-by-step algorithms of known effectiveness for solving 
estimation problems.    On the first page of the questionnaire booklet, participants provided an 
estimate to one of the estimation problems.  Subsequently, participants were tasked with 
providing a lower, and upper bound, within which they were 90% certain that their unaided 
estimate and the true answer (whatever that might be) fell.  Before participants provided this 
information they were provided with a visual example of how they should enter the lower and 
upper bounds of the 90% confidence interval (see Appendix IV).    
 
On the second page of the questionnaire booklet, participants either received a distractor task, 
the 18-item ‗Need for Cognition (NFC) scale‘, (Petty, Kao, and Caccioppo, 1982), or advice.  
224 
 
The NFC scale is an instrument designed to differentiate between people on the grounds of 
focussed or peripheral thinking styles.  Participants circle quantitative values (ranging from 1- 
extremely uncharacteristic of you; 5 - extremely characteristic of you) in response to questions 
such as ‗Thinking is not my idea of fun‘ that characterise their own thinking style.  The use of 
the NFC scale here is limited to merely ensure that participants not in receipt of advice spend 
approximately the same amount of time thinking about the estimation problem, as those 
participants in receipt of advice.  Participants who received a distractor task in their 
questionnaire booklet were invited to reconsider their unaided estimate to the estimation 
problem on completion of the distractor task, since they had ‗had an opportunity to think about 
the issue‘ (see Appendix IV).  These participants could then choose to revise, or not revise 
their unaided estimate, and provide a 90% confidence interval within which their estimate and 
the true answer fell on the final page of the questionnaire booklet.  Where people received 
advice, it was provided by an anonymous advisor ‗Kate‘ or ‗Joe‘, whose advice consisted of a 
step-by-step algorithm that if followed, resulted in a single numeric value.  Participants then 
rated the utility of this advice on a Likert-type scale, before deciding whether to revise, or not 
revise, their own unaided judgment, and give an upper and lower bound, within which a 
participant was 90% certain that their revised estimate, and the true value fell. 
 
Procedure 
 
Participants were randomly assigned to either one of two experimental conditions, and tasked 
with completing either the US mail estimation problem, or the Forested Miles problem (not 
both).  Where participants were assigned to complete the US mail estimation problem, one 
group was provided with the algorithmic decomposition (N = 24) presented by MacGregor et 
al.  Another group of participants in receipt of the US mail problem were tasked with 
completing the estimation problem unaided (N = 30), before completing a distracter task - the 
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short form of the Need-for-Cognition scale (Petty, Kao and Cacioppo, 1982).  No participant 
was permitted to be in both the ‗algorithm‘ group and the ‗distractor task‘ group.  
Subsequently, all participants were invited to reconsider their estimate of the number of pieces 
of mail that the US postal service handled in 1987.  An equivalent procedure was followed for 
the number of Forested Miles in Oregon estimation problem, where one group of participants 
received the algorithmic decomposition (N = 25), and a second group completed the task 
unaided (N = 26), before completing the distracter task, and then given the opportunity to 
revise their estimate. 
 
7.3 Results 
 
Prior to beginning the analysis of the data provided participants, it is useful to consider the rate 
of responses to the estimation tasks participants were asked to complete.  Inspection of Table 
7.1 shows that there was a high and satisfactory rate of response. 
Table 7.1 Number of responses 
Participants N 
= 105 
Unaided 
estimate 
Pre-
advice 
Lower 
Bound 
Pre-
advice 
Upper 
Bound 
Post-
advice 
estimate 
Post-
advice 
Lower 
Bound 
Post-
advice 
Upper 
Bound 
Responses N 
104/105 
(99.05%) 
101/105 
(96.19%) 
101/105 
(96.19%) 
105/105 
(100%) 
104/105 
(99.05%) 
102/105 
(97.14%) 
 
The distribution of data points for participants‘ unaided estimates, and post-algorithm 
estimates, proved to be skewed.  Therefore, in order to meaningfully analyze the data, it was 
necessary to Log transform values where appropriate.  In the first instance, participants‘ data 
was aggregated and tabulated (see Table 7.2).  Table 7.2 indicates that the advice produced by 
both the ‗US Mail‘ algorithm, and the ‗Forested Miles‘ algorithm, was numerically greater 
than participants‘ pre-advice estimates, on average.  Subsequently, participants‘ appear to have 
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revised their estimates so that the absolute numerical difference between their post-advice 
estimate, and advice, is smaller than the absolute numerical difference between their pre-advice 
estimate, and advice – which is consistent with the conformity to advice account of judgment 
change.  The issue of conformity to advice was further explored by analyzing both the amount 
(number of judgment revisions), and the extent of judgment revision (absolute difference 
scores).  Further, a measure of judgment change relative to advice was calculated for each 
participant in each of the experimental conditions.  Positive scores, on average, would indicate 
that where people did revise their judgment, post-advice, such judgment revision was in the 
‗direction‘ of the available advice, irrespective of the quality of advice. The perceived utility of 
each of the algorithms presented to participants was a further measure of the conformity to 
advice account of these data.  Should participants report that they valued each algorithm 
equally, on average, then it is possible to infer, that people were constrained in their abilities to 
assess advice quality, in these particular estimation tasks.   
 
Further analyses were carried out to ascertain if similar advice to a participant‘s pre-advice 
initial estimate was influential in terms of judgment change.  Ultimately, the analysis 
concludes with testing potential explanatory models through regression (based on the same 
rationale set out in Chapter 6, p217-22).  The regression modelling approach is appropriate as 
it allows (i) the determination of the percentage variance in a criterion variable, based upon the 
simultaneous consideration of multiple predictor variables, and (ii) where a criterion variable 
such as judgment change (yes//no) is dichotomous, logistic regression is an appropriate 
procedure for the simultaneous consideration of multiple predictor variables.   
 
First, the aggregated data for participants‘ unaided estimates, advice, and post-advice estimates 
was inspected (see Table 7.2 below). 
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These preliminary findings are consistent with the idea that people generally under- estimate 
the size of large quantities, but overestimate the size of small quantities (Lichtenstein et al. 
1982).  Here, the algorithmic decomposition of the US mail problem acted to significantly 
inflate the median value of participants‘ estimates, post-algorithm (z = - 2.43, N – Ties = 12, p 
< 0.015, two-tailed).  As the median value of participants‘ unaided estimates was less than the 
median value of  participants‘ post algorithm estimates, estimate ‗inflation‘ can account for the 
improvement in accuracy reported by participants in receipt of the algorithmic decomposition 
of the US mail estimation problem.  However, when the estimates participants made in 
response to the Forested Miles estimation problem were considered, no significant differences 
in median values were found, pre to post algorithm (z = 0.71, N – Ties = 9, p < 0.48).  The 
issue of the similarity between pre-advice initial estimate, and advice as a factor in judgment 
change will be returned to later in the analysis.   
 
Consideration was next given to the number of judgment revisions made by participants.  This 
analysis is relevant to the conformity to advice account as should people indiscriminately 
conform to advice, then it might be expected that no differences in the number of judgment 
revisions between experimental conditions would be observed.  Initially, these data were 
aggregated and tabulated (see Table 7.3).   
Table 7.3  Number of judgment changes 
 Change judgment Do not change judgment 
US Mail problem 13 (54.2%) 11 (45.8%) 
US Mail controls 10 (33.3%) 20 (66.7%) 
Forested Miles problem 10 (40%) 15 (60%) 
Forested Miles controls 6 (23.1%) 20 (76.9%) 
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Table 7.3 shows that people not in receipt of an algorithmic decomposition change judgment 
less often than people who worked through the algorithmic decompositions, on average.  
However, people in receipt of the US Mail algorithm, changed judgment (more often than not), 
on average; whilst people in receipt of the Forested Miles algorithm did not change judgment 
(more often than not), on average.  These findings are illustrated in Fig. 7.1.   
Fig 7.1 Proportion of judgment revisions in each condition 
Condition
Forested square 
miles control
US Mail controlForested square 
miles problem
US Mail problem
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A significance test was performed in order to ascertain whether people in receipt of the US 
Mail algorithm changed judgment more often, than would be expected by chance, and this 
proved to be non-significant  (χ2  = 0.17, df = 1, p < 0.68).  However, people not in receipt of 
the US Mail problem did revise their judgment post-advice significantly less often than people 
who did revise their judgment (χ2  = 4.17, df = 1, p < 0.04).  The same procedure was carried 
out, on the data from people in receipt of the Forested Miles algorithm, and again, the result 
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was non-significant – people in receipt of this algorithm were just as likely not to revise their 
judgment post-advice (χ2 = 1.0, df = 1, p < 0.32).  However, where people did not receive the 
Forested Miles algorithm more people were predisposed not to revise their judgments post-
advice (χ2 = 7.54, df = 1, p < 0.06).  These findings suggest that the US Mail algorithm was no 
more effective in facilitating judgment change, than the Forested Miles algorithm.  Further, it 
is possible to infer that participants in receipt of both the US Mail algorithm and the Forested 
Miles algorithm appear to be just as likely not to revise their unaided estimate as to revise their 
unaided estimate, after considering the output of the algorithm.  In so far as these findings are 
consistent with a conformity to advice account, it is only possible to say that the provision of 
purportedly beneficial algorithms marginally tips the balance of the chance of a participant 
revising their judgment post-advice from probably not likely, on average, to as likely to as not, 
where algorithms are provided.  
 
However, whilst the US Mail algorithm may not be any more effective in facilitating judgment 
change, than the Forested Miles algorithm, consideration was next given to whether the US 
Mail algorithm facilitated a greater extent of judgment change, than the Forested Miles 
algorithm.  This might be so, as the US mail algorithm was more complex (i.e. contained more 
sub-component steps) than the Forested Miles algorithm.  The absolute difference between a 
participant‘s unaided estimate, and the same participant‘s estimate post-advice, was calculated 
for each participant, and subsequently aggregated for each of the algorithm conditions.  The 
raw scores did not satisfy the assumption of normality, and so were Log transformed,   A 
significance test was performed to determine whether participants who had worked through the 
US Mail algorithm (and who changed judgment, N = 13) ( x  = 2.65, sd = 2.11) changed 
judgment to a greater degree, than participant‘s who had worked through the Forested Miles 
algorithm (and who changed judgment, N = 10) ( x  = 3.12 sd = 4.59).  No significant 
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difference between conditions, in terms of the extent of judgment change participant‘s 
reported, post-advice, was found (t = - 1.0, df = 9.00, p < 0.34).  Whilst participants in receipt 
of the Forested Miles problem, and who changed judgment post-advice, recorded a greater 
degree of judgment change, than participants in receipt of the US Mail problem, this difference 
did not reach significance.  The greater complexity of the US Mail algorithm, did not result in 
a significantly greater degree of judgment change, than participants in receipt (of the less 
complex) Forested Miles algorithm.   
 
Having established that participants in receipt of the US Mail algorithm changed judgment to 
no greater extent, and no more often, than people in receipt of the Forested Miles algorithm, 
the influence of advice (the numerical output-of-algorithm) was next considered.  A measure of 
judgment change relative to advice was utilized, expressed as ¦pre-advice estimate – advice¦ - 
¦post-advice estimate – advice¦.  Should the product of this measure be positively signed, it is 
possible to infer that the absolute difference between a participant‘s post-advice estimate, and 
advice, is less than the absolute difference between a participant‘s pre-advice estimate, and 
advice.  Such a finding indicates that where a participant revised their estimate post-advice, 
they did so by ‗shifting‘ their judgment in the direction of the advice (see Table 7.4).   
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Table 7.4  Judgment change relative to advice (output-of-algorithm) (1,000,000s) 
Estimation problem 
Judgment change relative to 
advice 
x  
sd 
No. items of US Mail in 
1987  
(N = 13) 
235.92 446.11 
No. of Forested Miles in 
Oregon 
(N = 10) 
2,100,001 6640781.33 
 
Table 7.4 shows that participants in receipt of algorithmic decompositions, revised their 
judgment, by ‗shifting‘ towards advice (output-of-algorithm), (i.e. the product of the dependent 
measure in each condition is positively signed).  Further, a significance test on the data in 
Table 7.5 revealed a significant difference between conditions (U = 32.0, N1 = 10, N2 = 13, p < 
0.04).  Hence, it is possible to infer that participants ‗shifted‘ their post-advice estimates, 
towards advice (output-of-algorithm), to a greater extent where people were in receipt of the 
Forested Miles algorithm, than when in receipt of the US Mail algorithm.  Recall, that 
participants in receipt of the Forested Miles problem became less accurate post-advice, on 
average.  In itself, this may not be surprising as the ratio between participant‘s pre-advice 
initial estimates and advice, for participants in receipt of the Forested Miles problem, was 
much greater than the ratio between participant‘s pre-advice initial estimates and advice for 
participants in receipt of the US Mail algorithm, on average.  I now turn to measures of the 
perceived utility of each of the algorithms provided to participants. 
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The complexity of the US Mail algorithm, in comparison to the Forested Miles algorithm, is 
certainly reflected in the finding that people in receipt of the US Mail algorithm, attributed to 
it, greater utility ratings, than those reported by participants in receipt of the Forested Miles 
algorithm, irrespective of whether they revised their judgment post-advice, on average (U = 
194.5, N1 = 24, N2 = 25, p < 0.03).  This pattern of results also obtained for people who did not 
revise their judgment, post-advice.  These participants also attributed higher utility ratings to 
the US Mail algorithm, than ratings attributed by participants in receipt of the Forested Miles 
algorithm (U = 45.0, N1 = 11, N2 = 15, p < 0.05).  Participants who did revise their judgment 
post-advice, valued both algorithms to the same degree (U = 52.5, N1 = 13, N2 = 10, p < 0.45).  
These findings support the idea that participant‘s perceived the US Mail algorithm to be useful 
(i.e. it superficially appears systematic); but ultimately participants who revised their judgment 
post-advice, did not perceive this algorithm to hold any greater utility, than the ratings 
participants attributed to the Forested Miles algorithmic decomposition.  In sum, neither 
algorithmic decomposition was any more effective than the other - the differences between 
conditions in terms of post-advice accuracy can be accounted for by ‗estimate inflation‘.  The 
findings from this study show that the benefits of algorithmic decomposition, in terms of 
estimating uncertain quantities are constrained, and problematic.  Those participant‘s who 
revised their pre-advice estimates, did so by reducing the difference between their pre-advice 
estimate and the available advice, on average, post-advice.  
 
One remaining issue concerns the idea that the extent of judgment revision may depend upon 
the discrepancy between a participant‘s pre-advice unaided estimate, and the available advice, 
on average.  This idea was supported when the absolute numerical difference between 
participants‘ pre-advice estimates and the advice (output-of-algorithm) was considered.   The 
numerical value of the absolute difference between participants‘ pre-advice estimates and 
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advice was calculated, and aggregated for each condition.  These raw scores were subsequently 
Log transformed to satisfy the assumption of normality.  It was then possible to determine, if 
the difference between participants‘ pre-advice estimate, and advice, differed between 
conditions, for people who changed judgment, post-advice, on average (see Table 7.5).  As the 
result of this test was significant (t = 2.80, df = 21, p < 0.01), the possibility that people in 
receipt of the algorithmic decompositions changed judgment, on the basis that the absolute 
numerical difference between a participant‘s pre-advice estimates, and the available advice, 
was different between advice conditions is supported.   This relationship is not linear however, 
as it should be recalled that the advice available to participants in receipt of the US Mail 
algorithm was numerically greater than participants‘ pre-advice estimates by a factor of 0.01 
million, on average.  Contrastingly, advice available to participants in receipt of the Forested 
Miles algorithm was numerically greater than participants‘ pre-advice estimates by a factor of 
1.54 million, on average.  This may indicate that people were more disposed to revise their 
judgment to a greater degree when the available advice was more similar to the same 
participants‘ pre-advice intuitive estimate. 
Table 7.5  Mean absolute Log transformed numerical differences between pre-advice estimate, 
and advice (output-of-algorithm) for participants who revised their judgment post-advice. 
 
 N x  sd 
US Mail 13 21.53 2.63 
Forested Miles 10 15.51 7.18 
 
This account is further supported when the pre-advice estimates of people who subsequently 
changed judgment, post-advice, are considered.  Recall that MacGregor et al. argue that people 
in receipt of the Forested Miles algorithm, are able to make less erroneous pre-advice 
estimates, than people in receipt of the US Mail algorithm.  These authors speculate that this is 
because (i) the true numerical answer to the US Mail problem (89,000,000,000) greatly 
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exceeds the true numerical answer to the Forested Miles problem (47,506) (ii) people are likely 
to be more familiar with the Forested Miles of Oregon task, than the US Mail problem.  
Support for these premises is found here.  The idea that participants in the Forested Miles 
condition were able to provide more accurate estimates pre-advice, than people tasked with 
estimating the number of items handled by the US Mail in 1987, is supported (see Table 7.6).  
Prior to performing a significance test, the raw scores were Log transformed to meet the 
assumptions of normality.  For people who subsequently changed judgment, there was a 
significant difference between conditions, in terms of pre-advice accuracy (t = 11.88, df = 
9.002, p < 0.0005).   
Table 7.6  Mean absolute Log transformed numerical differences between pre-advice estimate, 
and the true answer (pre-advice accuracy), for people who changed judgment post-advice. 
 N x  sd 
US Mail 13 25.20 0.34 
Forested Miles 10 14.21 0.92 
 
These findings support the view that the benefits of algorithmic decomposition, in terms of 
estimating uncertain quantities, are largely a product of post-advice ‗estimate inflation‘, for 
people estimating the size of large quantities, (Lichtenstein et al. 1982; Henrion, 1983).  The 
next stage of the analysis involved testing predictive models of ultimate estimation accuracy, 
and judgment change through multiple, and logistic regression (see Chapter 6, p217-22 for 
justification of approach and selection of predictor variables).  Prior to reporting the results of 
this analysis checks for violations of assumptions of the model involving multicollinearity, and 
hetereoscedascity, were carried out and no violations were found.     
  
A multiple linear regression was performed on the data from participants in receipt of the US 
Mail problem, where ultimate estimation accuracy was the dependent measure, and pre-advice 
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initial estimation accuracy, pre-advice initial confidence, and the accuracy of the advice 
(output-of-algorithm) were entered into the model as predictor variables (see Table 7.7).  The 
model was a poor fit (R2Adj = 0.12), and the overall relationship was not significant (F(4, 19) = 
1.79, p < 0.17).  Inspection of the standardized beta weights in Table 7.6 lead to the 
formulation of a regression equation that predicts a 1% change in ultimate estimation  
accuracy -  
1% change in ultimate estimation accuracy = 0.007 LN post-advice confidence + 0.32 LN 
advice accuracy + 0.33 LN initial accuracy. 
This regression equation can be interpreted as for every 1 unit decrease in LN post-advice 
confidence, ultimate estimation improves by 0.007% (this is because increasingly ‗wide‘ 
confidence intervals imply less confidence), holding other variables constant.  Similarly, for 
every one unit decrease in LN advice accuracy, ultimate estimation accuracy increases by 
0.32% (this is because values approaching zero indicate greater accuracy), holding other 
variables constant.   For every one unit increase in LN initial accuracy, ultimate estimation 
accuracy is predicted to increase by 0.33%.  However, none of the variables entered into the 
regression were significant predictors of ultimate estimation accuracy.  
237 
 
Table 7.7  Multiple regression – predictors of ultimate estimation accuracy 
 
Next, the data from participants in receipt of the US Mail problem was examined in order to 
ascertain the determinants of judgment change.  A logistic regression was performed with 
judgment change as the DV and initial participant confidence, initial estimation accuracy, 
accuracy of advice, and perceived utility of advice as sub-scales of the LSI-R, as predictor 
variables (see Table 7.8).  A total of 24 cases were analyzed, but the full model was not 
significantly reliable (χ2 = 4.44, df = 4, p < 0.35).  However, the model adequately fitted the 
data (Hosmer and Lemeshow χ2 = 4.53, df = 8, p < 0.81).  This model accounted for between 
16.9% and 22.6% of the variance in judgment change, with 84.6% of the participant‘s who 
changed judgment post-advice successfully predicted.  63.6% of predictions for the group of 
Experimental 
condition 
Variable B SE Beta t p 
Forested Miles constant -3.51 3.66  -0.96 0.35 
 
LN Final 
CI 
695,933,080,676 2,901,927,706,333 0.06 0.24 0.81 
 
LN 
Advice 
accuracy 
4,408,371,024,658 1,655,784,211,602 0.68 2.66 0.01* 
 
LN E1 
accuracy 
-2,086,866,409,171 4,022,063,023,334 -0.14 -0.52 0.61 
US Mail constant 81,549,663,785 2,449,225,411  33.30 0.0005 
 
LN Final 
CI 
345,434,954 23,54,074,879 0.007 0.03 0.97 
 
LN 
Advice 
accuracy 
473,275,422 308,281,273 0.32 1.54 0.14 
 
LN E1 
accuracy 
458,275,180 290,233,125 0.33 1.60 0.13 
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participants who did not change judgment post-advice were accurate.  Overall, 75% of 
predictions were accurate.  None of the proposed predictor variables proved to be significant. 
Table 7.8  Logistic regression – determinants of judgment change 
 
The data from participants in receipt of the Forested Miles problem was examined next.  A 
multiple linear regression was performed on the data from participants in receipt of the 
Forested Miles problem, where ultimate estimation accuracy was the dependent measure, and 
pre-advice initial estimation accuracy, pre-advice initial confidence, and the accuracy of the 
Experimental 
condition 
Variable B SE Wald df p Exp(B) 
Forested 
Miles 
constant 23.66 10.63 4.96 1 0.03 18,932,217,891 
 
LN 
initial CI 
-0.60 0.41 2.17 1 0.14 0.55 
 
LN 
Advice 
accuracy 
0.55 0.30 3.48 1 0.06 1.73 
 
LN E1 
accuracy 
-1.62 0.85 3.65 1 0.06 0.20 
 
Advice 
rating 
-1.63 1.02 2.54 1 0.11 0.20 
US Mail constant 0.43 2.06 0.04 1 0.84 1.54 
 
LN 
initial CI 
0.73 1.51 0.23 1 0.63 2.07 
 
LN 
Advice 
accuracy 
0.07 0.19 0.15 1 0.70 1.08 
 
LN E1 
accuracy 
0.16 0.18 0.80 1 0.37 1.18 
 
Advice 
rating 
-0.80 0.48 2.77 1 0.10 0.45 
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advice (output-of-algorithm) were entered into the model as predictor variables (see Table 7.7).  
The model was a fair fit (R2Adj = 0.29), and the overall relationship was significant (F(3, 20) = 
4.18, p < 0.02).  Inspection of the standardized beta weights in Table 7.6, lead to the 
formulation of a regression equation that predicts a 1% change in ultimate estimation accuracy 
–  
1% change in ultimate estimation accuracy = 0.06 LN post-advice confidence + 0.68 LN 
advice accuracy – 0.14 LN initial accuracy. 
This regression equation can be interpreted as for every 1 unit decrease in LN post-advice 
confidence, ultimate estimation improves by 0.06% (this is because increasingly ‗wide‘ 
confidence intervals imply less confidence), holding other variables constant.  Similarly, for 
every one unit decrease in LN advice accuracy, ultimate estimation accuracy increases by 
0.68% (this is because values approaching zero indicate greater accuracy), holding other 
variables constant.   For every one unit increase in LN initial accuracy, ultimate estimation 
accuracy is predicted to decrease by 0.14%.  However, only LN Advice accuracy was a 
significant predictor of ultimate estimation accuracy (t = 2.66, df = 20, p < 0.01).  
 
Next, the data from participants in receipt of the Forested Miles problem was examined in 
order to ascertain the determinants of judgment change.  A logistic regression was performed 
with judgment change as the DV and initial participant confidence, initial estimation accuracy, 
accuracy of advice, and perceived utility of advice as sub-scales of the LSI-R, as predictor 
variables (see Table 7.8).  A total of 24 cases were analyzed and the full model was 
significantly reliable (χ2 = 19.05, df = 4, p < 0.001).  In addition, the model adequately fitted 
the data (Hosmer and Lemeshow χ2 = 5.85, df = 8, p < 0.66).  This model accounted for 
between 54.8% and 74.7% of the variance in judgment change, with 88.9% of the participant‘s 
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who changed judgment post-advice successfully predicted.  93.3% of predictions for the group 
of participants who did not change judgment post-advice were accurate.  Overall, 91.7% of 
predictions were accurate.  None of the proposed predictor variables proved to be significant.  
  
7.4 Discussion 
 
The present study has shown that knowledge of the process of advice generation is not   a 
clearly beneficial influence on judgment change.  The claimed effectiveness of algorithmic 
decomposition, in terms of estimating uncertain quantities, can be explained by means other 
than the algorithmic approach.  It is contended here that the improvements in estimation 
accuracy reported by MacGregor et al. for participants in receipt of their algorithmic 
decomposition of the US Mail problem, can be accounted for by (i) the tendency of people to 
underestimate particularly large quantities pre-advice, and (ii) the idea that algorithmic 
decompositions have the potential to ‗inflate‘ people‘s estimates post-advice (Lichtenstein et 
al. 1982; Henrion, 1983).  Moreover, the argument that people in receipt of the Forested Miles 
problem were able to formulate less erroneous pre-advice estimates, than people in receipt of 
the US Mail problem is explainable by an alternative account.  The idea that people in receipt 
of the Forested Miles problem (47, 506 [or 5 digits]), were unable to improve their estimation 
accuracy, post-advice, because the quantity to be estimated was substantially numerically less, 
than the quantity to be estimated in the US Mail problem (89,000,000,000 [or 11 digits]) is 
problematic.  This is because participants in the current study overestimated the true value of 
the number of Forested miles in Oregon, pre-advice.  However, the data analyzed here may 
point to alternative account, where participants in receipt of the Forested Miles problem 
evaluate the advice available from the output of the algorithm as ‗similar‘ to their own 
intuitions, and subsequently are more likely to incorporate advice into their post-advice 
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deliberations irrespective of the numerical accuracy, or perceived utility of the advice – in this 
instance leading to greater inaccuracy.   
 
The analysis presented here, suggests neither algorithm was any more effective than another, in 
terms of the number of judgment revisions, or the amount of judgment change post-advice.  
Instead, participants shifted a proportion of the absolute numerical value between their pre-
advice estimate, and the advice (output-of-algorithm), post-advice, on average (i.e. people 
conformed to advice under conditions by revising their pre-advice estimate – a little).  Further 
evidence for conformity to advice was found when the measure of judgment change relative to 
advice was considered.  Here, participant‘s where they did revise their judgment post-advice 
tended to shift their estimate in the direction of the advice, post advice.  That participants were 
insensitive to the asymmetries of advice quality was also found where perceived utility of 
advice was measured.  Here, where participants revised their estimate post-advice, they valued 
the US mail algorithm, and the Forested miles algorithm equally, on average.  However, a 
person‘s propensity to revise their judgment is influenced by how similar the numerical 
component of advice is to the same individual‘s initial intuition.  
 
The cognitive mechanisms that determine ultimate estimation accuracy, and also judgment 
change were investigated through the use of multiple linear, and logistic, regression statistical 
procedures.  No significant models were found for the determinants of ultimate estimation 
accuracy from the data of participants in receipt of the US Mail problem.  Neither did the 
logistic regression procedure successfully model the determinants of judgment change for the 
same participants.  However, participants in receipt of the Forested Miles problem reported a 
significant model that determined ultimate estimation accuracy.  Here, participants were 
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influenced by what they perceived as the accuracy of advice (output-of-algorithm), even 
though this did ultimately lead to greater inaccuracy, post-advice.   
 
Currently, the results presented here are limited to the two algorithms reported by MacGregor 
et al. and it is as yet unclear whether these findings generalize more widely to the algorithmic 
approach.  A further limitation to the results reported here, are the relatively low numbers of 
participants in each condition who changed judgment post-advice.  Recall that the majority of 
participants in this study did not change judgment post-advice, and the analysis presented here 
has focused upon participants who changed judgment post-advice.  Further, where people did 
revise their judgment post-advice, they did so in a very conservative fashion.  Studies that have 
measured judgment change by a participants who have received advice from ‗advisors‘ other 
than themselves, report judgment change that is in the region of 20-30% of the absolute 
numerical difference between an unaided estimate and advice (Yaniv and Kleinberger, 2000; 
Yaniv 2004a; Yaniv 2004b; Harvey and Fischer, 1997).  Hence, it remains unclear whether the 
limited evidence of judgment change reported in this study, is due to the difference between 
individual judgment, and social interaction with advisor(s), or due to the low number of 
participants taking part in this study. 
 
In conclusion, what can be stated with some degree of confidence is that the claims of 
theorists, who advocate the algorithmic approach to estimating uncertain quantities, should be 
closely scrutinized.  Where conformity to advice results in post-advice estimate inflation or 
deflation; an illusion of beneficial judgment change may disguise the weakness of the 
particular algorithmic decomposition being used.  The preceding account has concentrated 
upon estimation problems where the quantities to be estimated are typically ‗large‘ (i.e. seven 
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digits or more).  Of further interest then, is whether the conformity to advice account extends 
to explain observed behaviour where the quantities to be estimated are constituted as relative 
frequencies (e.g. 1 in 5000, or 1 in 100,000). 
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Chapter 8:  Knowledge of advice generation when estimating relative frequencies. 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
Given that both the results of my own algorithmic decompositions of estimation problems 
reported in Chapter 6, and the partial replication of MacGregor et al. (1988), reported in 
Chapter 7, showed evidence of conformity to advice, and simultaneously failed to show clear 
evidence of the benefits of algorithmic decomposition for quantities that were highly uncertain 
(i.e. seven digits or more), I next considered if knowledge of the process of advice generation 
could possibly benefit estimators of small quantities.   In their discussion of what constitutes 
‗extremity‘ (usually calculated as the number of digits that the true answer of some quantity to 
be estimated contains), Armstrong and MacGregor (1994) also state that, ―extremity could also 
be defined in terms of small numbers.  An example would be, ‗What is the chance that a 
person in the US will die next year because of botulism? (The answer is 1/100,000,000)‘, 
(p496).  The symmetry of the argument is clear – if algorithmic decomposition benefits 
enhanced estimation accuracy for extremely large quantities, it should also benefit extremely 
small quantities.  Likewise, knowledge of the process of advice generation should enable 
participants to evaluate advice against participant‘s unaided intuition.  Of interest here then, is 
the veracity of the claims of advocates of algorithmic decomposition, and the veracity of an 
alternative account of conformity to advice.  This assertion was tested experimentally.  
 
Algorithmic decomposition with small quantities 
 
In their definition of extreme, but small, numerical quantities, MacGregor and Armstrong 
(1994), indicate that algorithmic decompositions of estimation (problems) of small quantities 
are often expressed in terms of relative frequencies (i.e. the ‗chance‘ of some event occurring 
can be described as the ratio of a single instance of the target quantity, to the number of 
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possible instances of the target quantity).  Hence, the ‗botulism fatality‘ example cited by 
MacGregor and Armstrong, (1994) is expressed as 1/100,000,000.  Of interest, is whether 
knowledge of the process by which advice is generated for target quantities expressed as 
relative frequencies, could facilitate judgment change and potentially deliver more accurate 
estimates, than unaided holistic estimation.  Equally important is whether the conformity to 
advice account is sufficient to explain the observed behaviour of participants.  Consistent with 
Armstrong and MacGregor‘s definition of extreme but small numerical target quantities, I 
developed two algorithmic decompositions of estimation problems concerning unlikely life 
events.  Participants were tasked with estimating either the relative frequency of the chance 
that a person would be killed in a road traffic accident in the UK in 2005, or the relative 
frequency of the chance that a single maternity in the UK in 2005, would result in triplet births 
(no participants were asked to complete both estimation problems) (see Appendix V).  
 
8.2 Method 
 
 
Participants 
 
 
Participants (N = 134) were all students attending the University of Durham (UK).  Of our 
sample, 133 students provided demographic data.  Hence our sample consisted of 51 males 
(age x  = 24.37 years, sd = 2.69 years), and 82 females (age x  = 24.07 years, sd = 2.30 years).  
Participants were recruited by the author (with the permission of staff colleagues) in a lecture 
theatre at the University of Durham, where students had gathered to attend their studies.  
Participation in the experiment was voluntary, and participants had the right to withdraw at any 
time – fortunately none chose to do so.  All participants took approximately the same amount 
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of time to complete the questionnaire.  No payments were made for participation in the 
experiment. 
 
Stimuli and Materials 
 
Participants were tasked with completing questionnaire booklets of either the ‗road fatalities‘, 
or the ‗triplet births‘ estimation problem (see Appendix V).  These booklets were set out so 
that participants completed the estimation task unaided (page 1 of the questionnaire booklet), 
prior to receiving advice (page 2 of the questionnaire booklet), then participants had an 
opportunity to re-visit the estimation problem in the light of advice (page 3 of the questionnaire 
booklet).  Some participants received questionnaire booklets that were identical to the road 
fatalities problem, or the triplet birth problem, but they did not contain advice.  Instead, these 
participants were tasked with completing a distractor task - the 18-item Need for Cognition 
(NFC) Scale (Petty, Kao and Caccioppo, 1982).  People in this condition provided a baseline 
‗think again‘ measure.   
 
Participants in receipt of the road fatalities problem were provided with background 
information about road safety and the difficulties surrounding the compilation of accurate 
statistics (see below). 
Road safety has become an increasingly important issue both for the UK 
government, and the general public in recent years - given the increases in the 
numbers of motorists, year on year.  Regrettably, fatal accidents occur throughout 
the year on Great Britain‘s road network involving both motorists and pedestrians.  
In the absence of accurate statistics, or where the cost of obtaining such 
information is prohibitively high, how would road safety managers assess the 
chance of a pedestrian being killed in a motor vehicle accident during the 12 
months of 2006?  This brief questionnaire is designed to elicit how you would go 
about such a problem.   
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Hence, participants were encouraged to believe that the experiment was concerned with road 
safety issues, but in fact the true purpose of the experiment was to determine whether 
knowledge of the process of advice generation (where the quantity to be estimated was a small 
quantity expressed as a relative frequency) is a sufficient cue for participants to engage in 
beneficial judgment revision.  Knowledge of the process of advice generation is here 
operationalized as an eleven step algorithm, purportedly provided to participants by an 
anonymous advisor (named either ‗Joe‘ or ‗Kate‘) that could offer a solution to the estimation 
problem. In using the algorithm, participants had to estimate numerical inputs for the sub-
components of the algorithm.  If participants utilized the advice, the algorithm ultimately 
resolved in a single numerical value expressing the chance of a pedestrian becoming a fatality 
in a motor vehicle accident in the UK in 2006 (see Appendix V).  Participants were then 
invited to evaluate the advisor‘s advice on a 5-point Likert-type scale anchored at one end by 
‗1‘ (no use at all), and at the other by ‗5‘ (absolutely invaluable).  Participants were then tasked 
with deciding whether to revise their unaided estimate in the light of the advisor‘s advice.  
Should a participant decide to revise his/her pre-advice estimate, a place to do so was clearly 
indicated on the questionnaire. 
 
Similarly, participants in receipt of the triplet birth problem were provided with background 
information about the difficulties health managers face when trying to assess the chance that a 
maternity will result in a triplet birth (see below). 
Clinicians generally regard triplet maternities as more problematic and potentially 
dangerous for mothers, and babies, than single births.  These maternities often 
require different medical resources than single births, so a salient question for 
health managers is how likely it is that a pregnancy will result in a triplet birth  In 
the absence of accurate statistics, or where the cost of obtaining such information 
is prohibitively high, how are managers able to determine the chance of a triplet 
birth?  This brief questionnaire is designed to elicit how you would go about such 
a problem.   
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Knowledge of the process of advice generation is here operationalized as an eight step 
algorithm, purportedly provided to participants by an anonymous advisor (‗Joe‘ or ‗Kate‘) that 
could offer a solution to the triplet birth estimation problem.  Participants had to estimate 
numerical inputs for the sub-components of the algorithm.  Should the algorithm be utilized by 
participants, it ultimately resolved in a single numerical value expressing the chance that a 
single maternity would result in a triplet birth in 2005 in the UK.  Participants were then 
invited to evaluate the advisor‘s advice on a 5-point Likert-type scale anchored at one end by 
‗1‘ (no use at all), and at the other by ‗5‘ (absolutely invaluable).  Participants were then given 
an opportunity to revise their unaided estimate in the light of the advisor‘s advice.  Should a 
participant decide to revise his/her pre-advice estimate, a place to do so was clearly marked on 
the questionnaire. 
 
Procedure 
 
Participants were randomly assigned to either the road fatalities estimation problem, or the 
triplet births estimation problem (see Appendix V), and asked to complete a questionnaire 
booklet.  Some of my participants were provided with algorithmic decompositions of the road 
fatalities problem, and others were provided with the triplet birth problem in their 
questionnaire booklet, a third group of participants were tasked with completing the estimation 
task unaided, and then completing the short form of the Need-for-Cognition Scale (Cacioppo, 
Petty and Kao, 1982), that was contained in their questionnaire booklet (no participant 
completed more than one questionnaire booklet).  The distractor task was utilized to ensure 
that all participants took approximately the same amount of time to complete the questionnaire.  
In order to convince participants that completing the distractor task was a meaningful exercise, 
an introductory line of text preceded the NFC scale – ‗We now move on to ask you about your 
general reasoning style‘.  On completion of the distractor task these participants were asked to 
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re-consider the estimation problem since they had ‗had time to think about the issue‘ (see 
Appendix V).  
 
Where participants were in receipt of either the eleven step algorithmic decomposition of the 
road fatalities problem, or the eight step triplet birth problem, it was necessary for them to 
submit sub-component estimates to the algorithm, and complete simple mathematically 
operations in order to combine sub-component estimates into a single value that constituted the 
advice from ‗Joe‘ or ‗Kate‘.  Once a single output-of-algorithm value was available, 
participants were invited to evaluate the utility of the advice on 5-point Likert-type scale 
anchored at one end by ‗1‘ (no use at all), and at the other by ‗5‘ (absolutely invaluable).  
Finally, all participants were invited to reconsider their estimate, and could choose to provide a 
different estimate to the one they had given pre-advice.  Lastly, participants were thanked for 
their participation. 
 
8.3 Results 
 
Prior to analysing the data it was necessary to determine that participants provided sufficient 
responses for the purpose of data analysis.  Table 8.1 shows this to be the case. 
Table 8.1 Number of responses 
Participants N = 134 
Unaided 
estimate 
Post-advice 
estimate 
Perceived utility of 
advice rating 
Responses N 132 133 93 
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Initially, participants pre-advice, advice (output-of-algorithm), and post-advice estimates were 
aggregated and tabulated.  Inspection of participant‘s pre-advice estimates, and post-advice 
estimates revealed that the data was not normally distributed.  Natural Log transformation of 
pre-advice initial estimates, and post-advice estimates, allowed the assumptions of normality to 
be met and facilitated the use of parametric statistical techniques.  Next, consideration was 
given to judgment change relative to advice – should the product of this measure be positive, it 
is possible to infer that participants, when they did revise their judgment post-advice, did so by 
reducing the absolute difference between their pre-advice intuitive estimate and the advice, 
post-advice.  This analysis was followed by an examination of the perceived utility ratings that 
participants attributed to either the road fatalities problem, or the triplet maternities problem.  It 
might be expected (if people indiscriminately conform to any available advice), that no 
significant differences in the perceived utility ratings of advice would be reported by 
participants.  The aforementioned analyses were supported by consideration of both the 
amount of judgment change (number of judgment revisions), and the extent of judgment 
change (absolute difference between pre-advice initial estimate and post-advice estimate).   
Ultimately, the analysis concludes with testing potential explanatory models through 
regression.  The regression modelling approach is appropriate as it allows (i) the determination 
of the percentage variance in a criterion variable, based upon the simultaneous consideration of 
multiple predictor variables, and (ii) where a criterion variable such as judgment change 
(yes/no) is dichotomous, logistic regression is an appropriate procedure for the simultaneous 
consideration of multiple predictor variables.  First, the data of participants‘ unaided pre-
advice estimates, advice (output-of-algorithm), and post-advice estimates were aggregated and 
tabulated (see Table 8.2 below).  
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Table 8.2 reveals that participants greatly overestimated the relative frequency of the chance 
that a pedestrian would become a road fatality, and also overestimated the chance that a 
maternity would result in triplets.  Moreover, the output-of-algorithm (advice), for both of the 
decompositions presented to participants, resulted in values numerically greater than 
participants‘ pre-advice estimates, on average.  Participants in receipt of the road fatalities 
algorithmic decomposition do not appear to have revised their pre-advice estimates to any 
great extent post-advice, on average; similarly participants in receipt of the triplet maternities 
algorithm also do not appear to have revised their pre-advice estimates to any great extent post-
advice, on average.  
 
A significance test was performed on the transformed values reported in Table 8.2 to determine 
if participants‘ post-advice estimates differed from their pre-advice estimates.  For participants 
in receipt of the road fatalities problem, there was no significant difference between pre-advice 
estimates, and post-advice estimates, on average (t = 1.92, df = 51, p < 0.06, two-tailed).  
Similarly, there were no significant differences between pre-advice estimates, and post-advice 
estimates for people in receipt of the triplet maternities (t = 0.83, df = 38, p < 0.41, two-tailed).   
In sum, where participants are in receipt of an algorithmic decomposition of some extremely 
small quantity, expressed as a relative frequency, the algorithm does not significantly either 
‗inflate‘, or ‗deflate‘, post-advice estimates.   
 
Given that people do not appear to be significantly revising judgment post-advice, a measure 
of judgment change relative to advice (expressed as ¦pre-advice estimate – advice¦ - ¦post-
advice estimate – advice¦), was formulated to determine if, where people did revise their 
judgment, they did so by reducing the absolute numerical difference between their pre-advice 
estimate, and the advice, post-advice (see Table 8.3).  Should the product of this measure be 
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positively signed, it is possible to infer that participants ‗shifted‘ their judgment towards the 
advice (output-of-algorithm) post-advice, on average. 
Table 8.3  Mean judgment change relative to advice 
Estimation problem 
Judgment change relative to 
advice 
x  
sd 
Road fatalities 
(N = 10) 
- 0.00267 0.04465 
Triplet maternities problem  
 (N = 8) 
0.00591 0.06404 
 
Table 8.3 shows that the product of the measure judgment change relative to advice is 
positively signed for participants in receipt of the triplet maternities problem, but negatively 
signed for participants in receipt of the road fatalities problem.  This implies that people in 
receipt of the triplet maternities algorithm reduced the absolute numerical difference between 
their pre-advice initial estimate, and the advice (output-of-algorithm), post-advice.  However, 
participants in receipt of the road fatalities algorithm increased the absolute numerical 
difference between their pre-advice initial estimate, and the advice (output-of-algorithm), post-
advice.  To determine whether this pattern of results was the result of chance, or a statistically 
significant effect of the quality of the two algorithms, a significance test was performed on the 
data in Table 8.3 (t = - 0.34, df = 16, p < 0.74).  This finding indicates that although people 
appear to be following the advice (output-of-algorithm) when in receipt of the triplet 
maternities problem, and rejecting advice when in receipt of the road fatalities problem the 
difference between the two conditions is not statistically significant in terms of the measure of 
judgment change relative to advice.  Further, a one-sample t test was performed on the mean 
judgment change relative to advice data from participants in receipt of the Road fatalities 
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problem.  Here, it was found that the observed value was not significantly different from zero 
(t = 0.19, df = 9, p < 0.85).   Similarly, a one-sample t test was performed on the mean 
judgment change relative to advice data from participants in receipt of the Triplet maternities 
problem.  Here, it was found that the observed value was not significantly different from zero 
(t = 0.26, df = 7, p < 0.80).    
 
 
Given that there was no real difference in the reduction (or increase) of the absolute numerical 
difference between participants‘ pre-advice estimate and advice, post-advice, on average; and 
that this proportionate shift is not dependent on the experimental condition that they were 
randomly assigned to, it is possible to infer that these participants are indiscriminate in their 
judgment revisions.  Further support for this assertion would be forthcoming, if people did not 
distinguish between the two algorithmic decompositions, in terms of the value, or utility, that 
people placed upon them post-advice.  The utility ratings of participants who changed their 
judgment post advice, were cross-tabulated, and no significant relationship was found to exist 
between experimental condition and utility ratings (χ2 = 7.34, df = 3, p < 0.06).  Hence, it is 
possible to infer that there was no difference in the utility ratings that participants (who 
changed judgment post-advice) attributed to the algorithmic decompositions of the estimation 
problems.  
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Consideration was next given to the number of judgment changes for each experimental 
condition (see Table 8.4). 
Table 8.4  Number of judgment changes  
 Change judgment Do not change judgment 
Road fatalities problem  10 (19.2%) 42 (80.8%) 
Road fatalities control 3 (21.4%) 11 (78.6%) 
Triplet maternities problem 7 (17.9%) 32 (82.1%) 
Triplet maternities control 5 (18.5%) 22 (81.5%) 
 
Table 8.4 shows that the majority of participants did not change judgment, irrespective of 
whether they received the algorithmic decomposition of the estimation problem.  Further, there 
were only small percentage differences between the numbers of participants in each condition 
who did change judgment.  A significance test was performed to determine if the number of 
judgment revisions in each treatment condition differed - this proved not to be the case (χ2 = 
0.02, df = 1, p < 0.88).   
 
Given that participants did not differ in the number of judgment revisions irrespective of 
treatment condition, the degree, or amount of judgment change was next considered. The mean 
amount of judgment change was calculated as the absolute difference between an individual 
participant‘s pre-advice initial estimate, and the same participant‘s post advice estimate, 
aggregated by condition.  Table 8.5 shows the mean absolute difference between participants‘ 
pre-advice estimates, and post-advice estimates, for each condition. 
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Table 8.5  Amount of judgment change: Mean absolute difference between pre-advice 
estimates and post-advice estimates 
 
 
Absolute 
difference 
between pre-
advice estimate 
and post-advice 
estimate 
x  
sd 
Log absolute 
difference 
between pre-
advice 
estimate and 
post-advice 
estimate 
x  
sd 
Road fatalities 
problem  
N = 10 
0.03090 0.03067 - 4.4482 2.1073 
Road fatalities 
control 
N = 3 
0.13340 0.15267 - 4.0080 3.9436 
Triplet 
maternities 
problem  
N = 8 
0.03094 0.05520 - 8.0866 4.8584 
Triplet 
maternities 
control  
N = 5 
0.00036 0.000564 - 9.7395 2.7365 
 
 
As N is low in each of the cells in Table 8.5, performing a test of significance between 
conditions is not very meaningful due to low statistical power – particularly as the 
untransformed scores did not meet the assumptions of normality.  However, inspection of the 
mean values in Table 8.5 suggests that those participants in receipt of algorithmic 
decompositions of the estimation problems appear to have revised their judgment to the same 
amount, on average.  It is not possible to make meaningful comments about the mean values 
for people in receipt of the distractor task for the triplet maternities problem, and the road 
fatalities problem beyond noting that a single observation appears to have inflated the mean 
value. 
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Of further interest, were the potential determinants of ultimate estimation accuracy, and 
judgment change – analyzed here by regressing potential predictor variables upon a criterion 
variable, similar to the analytical procedures carried out in Chapter 6 (see p217-22).  Second, a 
logistic regression procedure is carried out to determine what factors are influential in 
judgment change.  A multiple linear regression was performed on the data from participants in 
receipt of the Road fatalities problem (N = 52), where ultimate estimation accuracy was the 
dependent measure, and natural log transformations of pre-advice initial estimation accuracy, 
and advice accuracy were predictor variables.  The model was a fair fit (R2 Adj = 0.40), and the 
overall relationship was significant (F(2, 49) = 17.89, p < 0.0005).   Inspection of the beta 
weights reported in Table 8.6, leads to the formulation of a regression equation that predicts a 
1% change in ultimate estimation accuracy.  – 
1% change in ultimate estimation accuracy = 0.63 LN E1 initial accuracy + 0.08 LN advice 
accuracy. 
It is possible to interpret this regression equation as every 1 unit decrease in LN E1 initial 
accuracy, ultimate estimation accuracy improves by 0.63%, holding other variables constant.  
Likewise, for every 1 unit decrease in LN advice accuracy, ultimate estimation accuracy 
improves by 0.08% (recall that advice accuracy improves as values approach zero), holding 
other variables constant.  However, only LN E1 Initial accuracy was a significant predictor 
of ultimate estimation accuracy (t = 5.71, df = 51, p < 0.0005).  This is unsurprising, given 
that there was no significant revision of pre-advice judgment, post-advice.  
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Table 8.6  Multiple regression – ultimate estimation accuracy 
Experimental 
condition 
variable B SE Beta t p 
Road 
fatalities 
constant 0.14 0.022  6.16 0.0005 
 
LN E1 
initial 
accuracy 
0.02 0.003 0.63 5.71 0.0005 
 
LN 
advice 
accuracy 
0.002 0.002 0.08 0.71 0.49 
Triplet 
maternities 
constant 0.20 0.02  
12.77 
 
0.0005 
 
LN E1 
initial 
accuracy 
0.03 0.003 0.78 9.40 0.0005 
 
LN 
advice 
accuracy 
0.01 0.002 0.21 2.53 0.02 
 
Next, the determinants of ultimate estimation accuracy (natural log transformations of pre-
advice initial estimation accuracy, and accuracy of advice) were entered into the regression 
model for participants in receipt of the triplet maternities problem (N = 39).  The model was a 
good fit (R2 Adj = 0.78), and the overall relationship was significant (F(2, 36) = 69.09, p < 0.0005).   
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Inspection of the standardized beta weights for participants in receipt of the triplet maternities 
problem (see Table 8.6) lead to the formulation of a regression equation that could predict a 
1% change in ultimate estimation accuracy –  
1% change in ultimate estimation accuracy = 0.78 LN Initial accuracy + 0.21 LN Advice 
accuracy. 
The regression equation can be interpreted such that, a single unit decrease in initial estimate 
accuracy increases ultimate estimation accuracy by 0.78% (holding LN Advice accuracy 
constant).  This is because high values of initial estimate accuracy are indicative of less 
accuracy.  Similarly, each unit decrease in the accuracy of advice increases ultimate estimation 
accuracy by 0.21% (holding LN Initial accuracy constant).  LN Initial accuracy (t = 9.40, df = 
38, p < 0.0005), and LN Advice accuracy  (t = 2.53, df = 38, p < 0.02), were both significant 
predictors of ultimate estimation accuracy.  Whilst the finding that initial estimation accuracy 
accounted for variance in ultimate estimation accuracy is not surprising, the finding that advice 
accuracy accounts for some of the variance in ultimate estimation accuracy (for people in 
receipt of the triplet maternities problem) is.  This is because participants largely ignored 
advice and did not significantly revise their initial pre-advice judgments.  It is possible that, as 
the accuracy of advice (  = -5.57, sd = 2.13) was no more accurate than participant‘s pre-
advice intuitions (  = -5.31, sd = 1.71),  (t = 0.76 df = 38, p < 0.45), those few participants who 
did act upon advice, did so no more beneficially than those who did not. 
 
Next, the determinants of judgment change for participants in receipt of the road fatalities 
problem were sought through logistic regression.  A logistic regression was performed with 
judgment change as the DV and initial estimation accuracy, accuracy of advice, and perceived 
utility of advice as sub-scales of the LSI-R, as predictor variables.  A total of 52 cases were 
analyzed and the full model was significantly reliable (χ2 = 10.55, df = 3, p < 0.01), and the 
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model fitted the data adequately (Hosmer and Lemeshow χ2 = 10.00, df = 8, p < 0.27).  This 
model accounted for between 18.4% and 29.4% of the variance in judgment change, with 30% 
of the participant‘s who changed judgment post-advice successfully predicted.  However, 
90.5% of predictions for the group of participants who did not change judgment post-advice 
were accurate.  Overall, 78.8% of predictions were accurate.  Only the perceived utility of 
advice significantly predicted judgment change.  Table 8.7 shows that for every one unit 
increase in the perceived utility of advice, the likelihood of judgment change increases by a 
factor of 0.39.  This finding is intuitive – judgment change is more likely when people perceive 
advice to be useful.   
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Table 8.7 Logistic regression – predictors of judgment change 
 
* p < 0.05 
Experimental 
condition 
Variable B SE Wald df p Exp(B) 
Road fatalities constant 1.68 1.39 1.46 1 0.23 5.35 
 
LN Advice 
accuracy 
-0.095 0.12 0.66 1 0.42 0.91 
 
LN E1 
accuracy 
-0.22 0.15 1.96 1 0.16 0.81 
 
Advice 
rating 
-0.93 0.39 5.61 1 0.02* 0.39 
Triplet maternities constant 66.76 43.00 2.41 1 0.12 9.89 
 
LN Advice 
accuracy 
9.00 6.38 1.99 1 0.16 0.76 
 
LN E1 
accuracy 
-0.24 0.56 0.19 1 0.67 0.79 
 
Advice 
rating 
-3.47 1.55 5.03 1 0.03* 0.03 
 262 
Consideration was next given to the determinants of judgment change for participants in 
receipt of the triplet maternities problem.  A logistic regression was performed with judgment 
change as the DV and initial estimation accuracy, accuracy of advice, and perceived utility of 
advice as sub-scales of the LSI-R, as predictor variables.  A total of 39 cases were analyzed 
and the full model was significantly reliable (χ2 = 26.82, df = 3 p < 0.0005), and the model 
fitted the data adequately (Hosmer and Lemeshow χ2 = 2.53 df = 8 p < 0.96).  This model 
accounted for between 49.7% and 81.5% of the variance in judgment change, with 85.7% of 
the participant‘s who changed judgment post-advice successfully predicted.  However, 96.9% 
of predictions for the group of participants who did not change judgment post-advice were 
accurate.  Overall, 94.9% of predictions were accurate.  Table 8.6 gives coefficients and the 
Wald statistic and associated degrees of freedom and probability values for each of the 
predictor variables.   
 
Table 8.7 shows that for every one unit increase in the perceived utility of advice, the 
likelihood of judgment change increases by a factor of 0.03 for participants in receipt of the 
triplet births estimation problem.  Although this finding might appear intuitive (judgment 
change is more likely when people perceive advice to be useful), it is clearly less influential 
than the weight that participants attach to their perceptions of advice utility when considering 
the output-of-algorithm in the road fatalities problem.  It is difficult to ascertain why this might 
be so given the low N of participants who did change judgment in this study, but one 
explanation may include the differences in task characteristics between estimation problems.  
Road traffic accidents are often newsworthy both at a local and national level in the UK, so 
people may weight their perceptions of these events more so than less common (or 
newsworthy) events such as triplet births.  Put another way, all pedestrians (irrespective of 
gender) may be susceptible to road safety issues at one time or another, but it is only women 
who personally experience childbirth.  Further, it is a small proportion of maternities that result 
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in triplets.  Hence, on average people may weight the seriousness of road traffic accidents more 
so, than the chance of any single maternity resulting in a triplet birth. 
 
8.4 Discussion 
 
The results reported here do not support the idea that knowledge of the process of advice 
generation benefits estimates of both extremely large, and extremely small, numerical 
quantities (Armstrong and MacGregor, 1994).  Nor do the preceding results provide strong 
evidence for the idea that people indiscriminately conform to (self-generated) advice.  Instead, 
this study demonstrated that irrespective of either of the two algorithmic decompositions 
presented, participants who change judgment do so because they perceive advice to be useful 
(even though advice in this study could potentially degrade estimation accuracy post-advice, 
on average).  This finding is particularly disconcerting as far as interventions such as 
algorithmic decomposition are concerned, as without knowing a priori the beneficial effects of 
this approach, it is unlikely that by using the decomposition method, a participant will be able 
to make estimation accuracy improvements, beyond those available by guessing.  In part, this 
finding highlights the advantage of regression based analysis in JAS studies, as opposed to 
measures derived from difference scores (Cronbach and Furby, 1970).  These findings also 
echo those of Lichtenstein and Weathers (1998), who found that, even when people were 
trained to create their own algorithmic decompositions (of estimates of uncertain quantities), 
performance was not improved to any great degree.  Further, these authors also found that, on 
some occasions, the use of algorithmic decomposition could inhibit accurate estimation (Study 
2).  Similarly, Henrion et al. (1993) compared the accuracy of estimates of subjective 
probability distributions produced by (i) people generating their own decompositions and (ii) 
people working through algorithmic decompositions provided by an experimenter.  They found 
no differences in the accuracy of the outputs of these two conditions.  Instead, Henrion et al. 
found that algorithmic decomposition ‗inflated‘ people‘s estimates, in comparison to a control 
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condition.  Hence, people who underestimated a target quantity initially, and persisted in 
underestimating (to a lesser degree) a target quantity after working through an algorithmic 
decomposition can be expected to improve their estimation accuracy.  Conversely, people who 
overestimate a target quantity, initially, can expect to diminish their estimation accuracy after 
working through an algorithmic decomposition.   
 
The ‗inflationary‘ nature of algorithms used to decompose estimation problems involving 
extremely large numerical quantities was not observed in this study, however.  Instead, no 
significant effect upon participants‘ post-advice estimates was observed, in comparison to pre-
advice estimates.  However, when people did revise their judgment post-advice, the shift in 
judgment was negligible.  This finding may point towards the notion that, having invested 
cognitive resources in ‗working through‘ an algorithmic decomposition that ‗aids‘ estimation 
of an uncertain quantity, people who revise their judgment do not always do so by accepting 
the veracity of the output of the algorithm (Bonaccio and Dalal, 2006).   
 
In this study regression modelling was able to show some of the determinants of ultimate 
estimation accuracy, and judgment change.  Analysis of the data from participants in receipt of 
the road fatalities algorithm, and the triplet maternities algorithm, indicated that pre-advice 
initial estimation accuracy is influential in terms of ultimate estimation accuracy.  This finding 
is unsurprising as there was no significant difference between participant‘s pre-advice initial 
estimates, and post-advice estimates in either experimental condition.   The data from both 
estimation problems suggests that the perceived utility of advice is influential in judgment 
revision.   
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This study shows that, in conditions where people make estimates of extremely small 
numerical quantities (expressed as relative frequencies), they are unable to use an algorithmic 
decomposition to mechanically combine sub-component estimates into a useful estimate of the 
quantity in question.  This may imply that in such circumstances people are more likely to 
utilize peripheral environmental cues, rather than invest cognitive resources, in what 
potentially maybe a fruitless effort, to evaluate the quality of advice on offer (in conditions of 
less uncertainty it is possible that people may be able to successfully scrutinize the quality of 
advice).  Moreover, where people have little or no task relevant knowledge, and are unable to 
input more accurate sub-component estimates into an algorithmic decomposition than what 
may be achievable by a global holistic evaluation of an estimation problem, then algorithmic 
decomposition may not be of any greater utility than holistic estimation.  Further, given the 
circumstances outlined above, it is likely that people are insufficiently motivated (at least in 
this study) to commit cognitive resources to a potentially fruitless evaluation of advice.  This is 
because where people have little or no task relevant knowledge it is difficult to evaluate the 
quality of advice.  Also, evaluations of advice based upon ‗world knowledge‘ are insufficient 
for the purposes of distinguishing between poor and good advice.  Lichtenstein (1990) makes a 
similar point in reporting the results of her second study, where she argues that algorithmic 
decomposition is of little utility where it is (i) poorly understood, and (ii) ‗noisy‘ due to the 
poor quality information generated by participants, coupled with a lack of arithmetic skills - 
which are necessary to combine the various component steps of the algorithm.  She goes on to 
argue that the conditions for the successful use of algorithmic decomposition are likely to 
involve the careful and deliberate design of algorithms, and various computational aids for 
participants.   
 
In sum, the findings from this study suggest that people tend to overestimate the chances of the 
occurrence of rare events (at least in the two estimation tasks completed by participants here).  
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Further, algorithm decompositions of estimates of small quantities produce values that exceed 
unaided estimates (much in the same way that algorithms inflated pre-advice estimates in 
Chapter 7).  However, where the results differ from those of the study reported in Chapter 7 
pre-advice estimate inflation due to the use of algorithmic decompositions of estimation 
problems was not carried over to post-advice estimates.  Here, only a small number of 
participants revised their post-advice estimates, and such revision was not sufficient to create a 
significant difference between the mean values of estimates pre-advice, and the mean values of 
estimates post-advice.  However, people valued the algorithmic decompositions equally, on 
average, irrespective of condition.  Moreover, it was participants perceptions of the utility of 
the algorithms that was the only significant variable (determined by logistic regression) that 
influenced their propensity to revise their judgment post-advice.  It is also interesting to 
speculate over the influence of the different characteristics of each task in participants‘ 
deliberations.  However, such speculations will need to be developed and investigated in future 
work as there is insufficient data in this study to form even tentative conclusions.   
 
The preceding results add to my understanding of some of the influences upon human 
judgment revision, in so far as future studies will have to consider knowledge of the process of 
advice generation as a multi-dimensional construct – rather than as the unitary construct 
presented here, and in Chapter 7.  It has become clear that people may be able to assess the 
utility of the process of advice generation, but are constrained in their abilities to successfully 
use this knowledge to formulate beneficial judgment revision.  Algorithmic decompositions 
may inflate pre-advice estimates, leading to either an illusion of enhanced estimation (or 
enhanced estimation error).  An individual‘s cognitive evaluation of advice is further mediated 
by the task domain from which estimation problems are drawn, and the specific characteristics 
of a particular estimation problem.  It may be that the mechanical nature of an algorithmic 
decomposition of some troublesome estimation problem is not a sufficient cue to effortful and 
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relevant cognition – despite its mathematical tractability.  This idea has some credence given 
the nature of the tasks presented here – people are aware of the nature of traffic accidents and 
of complications in childbirth - possibly to a greater extent than the number of pieces of mail 
handled by the US postal service, or the number of forested square miles in the US state of 
Oregon.  Given the limitations that this study has highlighted about the utility of knowledge of 
the process of advice generation when estimating relative frequencies, and the difficulty of 
sustaining the symmetry of the algorithmic approach to estimation, future studies could 
fruitfully explore whether people are able to distinguish between objectively ‗good‘ and ‗poor‘ 
advice.  If people are sensitive to appropriate cues in the way that advisor(s) formulate advice, 
this may serve as proxy cues to the accuracy and utility of such advice.  
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Chapter 9:  Distinguishing between objectively ‘good’ and ‘poor’ advice - perceptions of 
infant mortality rates. 
 
   
9.1 Introduction 
 
In a situation where an individual is engaged in making a quantitative estimate to some 
question or quantity of interest, and precise numerical information is not available and/or 
retrievable from memory, such an individual is theorized to be making ‗plausible inferences‘ 
between their own world knowledge, and the target item; further, in order to produce a 
meaningful estimate, a (numerical) value must, ultimately, be attached to the target item 
(Collins, Warnock, Aiello and Miller, 1975; Collins, and Michalski, 1989).  The dilemma for a 
decision maker in these circumstances, is whether an unaided intuitive estimate should be 
revised when additional information, (in the form of quantitative advice), becomes available.  
In sum, the issue of interest here is whether people are able to adequately discriminate between 
poor, and good advice, or whether conformity to advice obtains, when forming an estimate 
under conditions of poor, or at best incomplete domain knowledge. 
 
Why attend to ‘poor’ advice?  
 
It is unremarkable to assert that people occasionally attend to poor advice - however, what is 
noteworthy is that they may do so for very good reasons.  Consider a scenario where the advice 
available to a judge maybe poor (i.e. complying with the advice results in sub-optimal 
estimation accuracy), but does contain information or alternatives that are unfamiliar to a judge 
- potentially enriching the basis for any subsequent estimate (Heath and Gonzales, 1995).  
Alternatively, interacting with advice may cause a judge to think of the decision problem in a 
different, and potentially more beneficial, way (Schotter, 2003; Druckman, 2001).  Further, 
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improvements in estimation accuracy can be obtained by integrating (numerical) advice from 
independent and/or uncorrelated sources (Budescu and Rantilla, 2000; Yaniv 2004a; Yaniv and 
Kleinberger 2000).  Moreover, people seek out, and pay attention to advice, not only to 
improve the accuracy of their decisions, but to share responsibility for those decisions; also 
judges are reticent to completely reject advice that is freely given – irrespective of its quality.  
Here, a ‗token‘ shift by judges towards the position of the advisor(s) has been observed 
(Sniezek and Buckley, 1995; Harvey and Fischer, 1997; Yaniv, 2004a; Yaniv 2004b).  In sum, 
people are susceptible to the influence of inappropriate advice under conditions of uncertainty.   
 
Can people differentiate between ‘poor’ and ‘good’ advice? 
 
The preceding discussion outlines why people may choose to attend to poor advice under 
conditions of uncertainty.  It is equally true that people may choose to attend to good advice 
under conditions of uncertainty, but the question of interest addressed in this study is whether 
people are able to adequately differentiate between poor and good advice, when attempting to 
make an accurate estimate of some quantity.  Moreover, where people hold little confidence in 
their ability to make accurate estimates of target quantities, they may be disposed to attend to 
any advice (irrespective of its quality) from a credible source in attempting to improve 
estimation accuracy (Yaniv and Kleinberger, 2000; Yaniv, 2004b).  These findings suggest that 
people find distinguishing between potentially beneficial, and poor advice, cognitively 
demanding.  People may seek to relax the constraints upon cognition, by recognizing 
environmental cues that potentially serve as substitutes for direct feedback about the veracity, 
and accuracy of their unaided estimate(s).  Previous research has shown the influence of trust 
(Van Swol et al. 2001), advisor confidence (Sniezek et al. 1995), and source credibility 
(Reinard, 1988), as some of the cues that are inferred to relax cognitive demands, and 
potentially influence the estimation performance of judges.  Lee (2007, unpublished) sought to 
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develop the idea that people utilize ‗proxy‘ cues when attempting to make quantitative 
estimates under conditions of uncertainty.  This author reasoned that people may generate 
quantitative estimates on the basis of ecologically valid proxy cues, and that people will 
successfully distinguish between potentially beneficial and unhelpful cues.  Such a 
rationalization was operationalized in terms of a task where participants sought to estimate the 
Infant Mortality Rate (hereafter IMR) of several countries.  IMRs are defined as the number of 
children who die (irrespective of cause) prior to reaching one year old, per every one thousand 
live births.  Hence, an IMR of 35.8 would indicate that, on average, in every 1000 live births, 
35.8 children under the age of twelve months die.  Some participants were aided in this task 
through the provision of numerical information of each of the target countries‘ per capita 
(US$) Gross Domestic Product (hereafter GDP).  It was theorized that ‗national wealth‘ is an 
objectively good cue to national IMRs as, on average a nation‘s GDP is negatively correlated 
with its IMR.  Other participants were similarly aided in making estimates of countries‘ IMRs, 
by the provision of accurate population estimates of each of the target countries.  Such an 
operationalization facilitated a comparison in terms of post-advice estimation accuracy 
between people in receipt of GDP advice, and people in receipt of Population estimate advice.  
Various measures of estimation performance, or estimation accuracy, have been utilized in 
JAS research; the following section discusses two such measures – metric and ordinal 
accuracy.   
 
Measures of estimation accuracy 
 
Typically, in JAS research, improvements in estimation accuracy are derived from the absolute 
difference between an unaided point estimate and the true value, prior to accessing advice, and 
a point estimate and the true value post-advice (hereafter ‗metric‘ accuracy).  If the latter 
measurement is less than the former measurement, then it is not unreasonable to conclude that 
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a participant has improved their estimation accuracy.  However, Gigerenzer, Todd and the 
ABC Research Group (1999), propose a further measure of estimation accuracy for 
participants attempting to make estimates of (numerical) quantities, under conditions of 
imperfect domain knowledge.  They argue that people are able to recognize predictive 
information in an estimation task, and recall cues that enable individuals to rank order target 
items (hereafter ‗ordinal‘ accuracy).  This is a useful distinction as, on average, people find 
estimating numbers and statistics such as IMRs difficult, as the exact values of such statistics 
are rarely widely known.  Hence, the ability of people to recognize predictive information, and 
recollect cues sufficient to rank order target items – as Gigerenzer et al. argue - is clearly 
ecologically useful. 
   
The significance of recognizing the differences between metric and ordinal accuracy is that 
these two measures may well be independent – people might simultaneously make poor metric 
estimates of a country‘s IMR, while accurately rank ordering several countries by IMR.     Lee 
(2007 unpublished) tasked his participants with rank ordering 58 countries by IMR, whilst 
simultaneously providing highly predictive information (each country‘s GDP per capita US$) 
as an aid (Study 4).  Here, people improved their ordinal estimation accuracy.  In a second 
condition, Lee‘s participants were provided with information that is not predictive of a 
country‘s IMR (i.e. the population figures for each of the same 58 representatively sampled 
countries).  Here, there were negligible ordinal estimation accuracy improvements.  
Participants received both GDP information, and Population estimate information in a third 
condition, here, ordinal accuracy did not surpass that achieved by participants who only 
received GDP information in condition 1.  However, the critical issue for the purposes of this 
study, is that estimation accuracy improvements for participants in receipt of ‗predictive‘ 
advice, in conjunction with negligible estimation accuracy improvements for participants in 
receipt of ‗non-predictive‘ advice is entirely consistent with the idea that participants are 
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constrained in their abilities to evaluate ‗good‘ or ‗poor‘ advice, and revise post-advice 
estimates by conforming (to a degree) with any available advice.  
 
Conformity to advice 
 
The findings from previous chapters have strongly suggested that people (i) prefer reasons-
based evidence in addition to numeric advice (ii) are disposed to attend to advice from a 
credible source (iii) egocentrically discount solely numeric advice, and reason-based advice to 
the same degree (iv) under conditions of uncertainty  are disposed to conform to advice.  The 
latter finding, is largely due to the relative positions of a participant‘s unaided estimate, the 
true (but unknown to the participant) value that an estimate is sought for, and the available 
advice.  Where a participant revises an unaided estimated, by reducing the absolute numerical 
distance between the estimate and the available advice, that simultaneously reduces the 
absolute numerical distance between the estimate and the true answer to an estimation 
problem, improvements in estimation accuracy can be expected.  
  
Given the preceding exposition of conformity effects, the idea that people report estimation 
accuracy improvements when in receipt of ‗predictive‘ advice, and no such estimation 
accuracy improvements when in receipt of ‗non-predictive‘ advice (Lee, 2007, unpublished) is 
not inconsistent with a conformity effect.  Recall that Lee tasked his participants with 
estimating the IMRs of 58 countries, and provided GDP advice, Population estimate advice, or 
GDP and Population estimate advice, as an aid to participants (a participant was exposed to no 
more than one of the advice types).  This implies that should people conform to advice in such 
a task, estimation accuracy improvements can be expected for participants in receipt of GDP 
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advice, and GDP and Population estimate advice – but not for participants in receipt of solely 
Population estimate advice.   
This reasoning leads to the hypothesis –  
H1:  Average ordinal and metric accuracy will improve from pre to post-advice for 
participants in receipt of GDP information alone, or in combination with 
Population estimate information, but participants in receipt of Population estimate 
information only, will not report improvement in estimation accuracy. 
 
Consideration is next given to the issue of advice quality.  The notion of advice quality is 
difficult for JAS theorists for a number of reasons.  Firstly, few studies in the extant JAS 
literature have operationalized advice as anything other than numeric or statistical.  Second, at 
an individual level, advice quality is difficult to isolate from an individual‘s specific domain 
knowledge, and thirdly cognitive limitations imply that people may imperfectly both assess, 
and use, advice in estimation (Harvey et al. 2000).  However, the estimation of quantities such 
as IMRs may offer a way through some of these difficulties.  Recall that Lee‘s (2007 
unpublished) study not only involved the metric and ordinal estimation of various countries 
IMR figures, but in three conditions offered GDP information, Population estimate 
information, or GDP and Population estimate information as advice.  Here, both GDP and 
Population estimates were numerically accurate, so at one level this advice was equivalent in 
terms of its quality.  However, GDP information is highly predictive of IMRs, whereas 
Population estimate advice is not.  Participants were not made aware of the predictiveness of 
the advice in Lee‘s study, but were made aware of the accuracy of the advice.  If participants 
had been asked to rate the utility of advice (where advice was made available to participants), 
it might be expected that there would be no differences between participants in receipt of GDP 
advice, and participants in receipt of Population estimate advice, as long as people were 
focused on advice accuracy as an aid in resolving the estimation problem.  If, however, people 
were able to recognize the predictive superiority of GDP advice over Population estimate 
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advice, in resolving the estimation problem, then Population estimate advice would have been 
rated less highly than GDP advice.  That Lee did not ask his participants to rate the utility of 
the GDP, Population estimate, and GDP and Population estimate information in aiding the 
formation of an estimate of a specific country‘s IMR is unfortunate, as the ‗perceived utility‘ 
of such advice is likely to be a factor in participants‘ estimation metric and ordinal accuracy.  
The preceding discussion leads to the following hypothesis – 
H2:  If participants can distinguish between ‗good‘ and ‗poor‘ advice, then 
participants will value GDP information more highly, than participants in receipt 
of Population estimate advice.  Participants in receipt of both GDP and Population 
estimate information, will value advice more highly than participants in receipt of 
solely Population estimate information, on average.   
 
 
9.2 Method 
 
 
Participants 
 
Participants (N =118) for the study were drawn from staff and students (age x  = 24.5 years, sd 
= 8.37 years) attending the University of Durham.  The sample consisted of 79 males (age x  = 
24.78 years, sd = 9.22 years), and 38 females (age x  = 23.89 years, sd = 6.32 years) – one 
participant did not provide age data.  Members of staff at Durham Business School were 
recruited by the author via a personal approach; however the majority of participants were 
students at the University of Durham.  Students were recruited by the author (with the 
permission of staff colleagues) in a lecture theatre at the University of Durham, where students 
had gathered to attend their studies.  Participation in the experiment was voluntary, and 
participants had the right to withdraw at any time – fortunately none chose to do so.  All 
participants took approximately the same amount of time to complete the questionnaire.  No 
payments were made for participation in the experiment. 
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Materials and Stimuli 
 
Participants were tasked with completing questionnaire booklets, where the experimental task 
was to estimate the IMRs of ten countries.   Four versions of the questionnaire booklet were 
constructed so that three booklets contained advice (GDP advice, Population advice, GDP and 
Population advice – no booklet contained more than one advice type), and one booklet did not 
contain advice.  The booklet that did not contain advice instead contained a distractor task.  
  
The front covers of all four questionnaire booklets were identical, and informed participants 
that the study ‗examines the perceptions people may hold about infant mortality rates (IMR) in 
various countries throughout the world‘ (see Appendix VI).  The inside cover of the 
questionnaire booklet was identical for all four questionnaire booklets - a paragraph of text 
explained the nature of IMRs and how they are calculated (see below). 
IMR is the ratio of infant mortality per 1000 live births (e.g. an IMR of 5.5 is 
representative of 5.5 infant deaths per 1000 live births on average; an IMR of 500 
would indicate that 1 in 2 children die within the first 12 months of life; whilst an 
IMR of 995 per 1000 live births would indicate that nearly all children die within 
the first 12 months of life).  Whilst statistics such as these are compiled by 
governments and various international health organisations, most non-expert 
people have only a vague idea of the true rate of infant mortality in their own, or in 
other peoples‘ countries.  
 
In order to prevent participants ‗anchoring‘ upon the numerical information in the 
paragraph above, three other versions were created that randomised the presentation 
order of the numerical information (see below). 
IMR is the ratio of infant mortality per 1000 live births (e.g. an IMR of 995 per 
1000 live births would indicate that nearly all children die within the first 12 
months of life; an IMR of 500 would be indicate that 1 in 2 children die within the 
first 12 months of life, whilst an IMR of 5.5 is representative of 5.5 infant deaths 
per 1000 live births, on average).  Whilst statistics such as these are compiled by 
governments and various international health organisations, most non-expert 
people have only a vague idea of the true rate of infant mortality in their own, or in 
other peoples‘ countries.  
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IMR is the ratio of infant mortality per 1000 live births (e.g. an IMR of 5.5 is 
representative of 5.5 infant deaths per 1000 live births on average; an IMR of 500 
would indicate that 1 in 2 children die within the first 12 months of life; an IMR of 
995 per 1000 live births would indicate that nearly all children die within the first 
12 months of life).  Whilst statistics such as these are compiled by governments 
and various international health organisations, most non-expert people have only a 
vague idea of the true rate of infant mortality in their own, or in other peoples‘ 
countries.  
IMR is the ratio of infant mortality per 1000 live births (e.g. an IMR of 995 per 
1000 live births would indicate that nearly all children die within the first 12 
months of life; an IMR of 500 would indicate that 1 in 2 children die within the 
first 12 months of life; an IMR of 5.5 is representative of 5.5 infant deaths per 
1000 live births, on average).  Whilst statistics such as these are compiled by 
governments and various international health organisations, most non-expert 
people have only a vague idea of the true rate of infant mortality in their own, or in 
other peoples‘ countries.  
 
The preceding randomization of numerical information in the explanation and examples of 
IMRs was designed to ensure that any ‗anchoring‘ effects that participants engaged in would 
be mitigated by the random allocation of participants between experimental conditions.  
Participants were asked to provide details of their age and gender on the same page.   
 
The third page of the questionnaire booklet tasked participants with rank ordering ten countries 
in order of highest IMR, then providing a point estimate of IMR for each country. 
 
A fourth page in the questionnaire booklet provided participants with advice.  In one version of 
the questionnaire booklet GDP advice was provided.  A paragraph of text informed 
participants that IMRs are often not widely understood, and that accurate GDP information for 
each of the ten countries they had previously estimated IMRs for, would now be provided.  A 
similar paragraph of text was provided for questionnaires that contained Population estimate 
advice, and GDP and Population estimate advice (see Appendix VI).  Participants were 
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instructed to copy the information they had entered on page 3 into the appropriate text boxes 
on page 4.  Subsequently, participants were able to choose (or not) to revise their original 
estimates in the light of advice.  Finally, participants were asked to evaluate the advisor‘s 
advice on a 5-point Likert-type scale anchored at one end by ‗1‘ (no use at all), and at the other 
by ‗5‘ (absolutely invaluable).  Participants were then thanked for their participation. 
 
Where participants did not receive advice, they received instead (commencing on page 4 of the 
questionnaire), a distractor task - the 18-item NFC Scale (Petty, Kao and Caccioppo, 1982) 
(see Appendix VI).  Participants were encouraged to believe that the distractor task was 
meaningful (and approximately as meaningful, on average, as the tasks participants completed 
in the advice conditions) by an introductory sentence at the top of page four of the 
questionnaire – ‗This next section is concerned with your individual thinking style.  Please 
complete all questions‘.  On completion of the distractor task, participants were directed to re-
visit their unaided estimates of IMRs by the sentence, ‗since you have now had a short period 
of time upon which to reflect about the infant mortality rates (IMR) of 10 different countries, 
please re-evaluate your previous estimate of each IMR for the 10 countries below‘.  The 
purpose of this direction was to establish a baseline ‗think again‘ condition. 
 
Procedure 
 
Participants were tasked with estimating the IMRs of ten countries.  The selected countries 
were drawn from the CIA Factbook (2007), on the basis of their GDP – five countries with the 
highest GDP, and the five countries with the lowest GDP.  Presentation order of these 
countries was randomized.  The introductory remarks in the questionnaire booklet informed 
participants of the purpose of the study (to estimate IMRs), and explained how IMRs were 
derived, and also informed participants of the actual range of IMRs (2-185) across the ten 
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selected countries.  Participants were then asked to provide both their age, and their gender.  
Participants were then tasked with estimating the IMR of each of the ten selected countries.  
The estimation process had two phases.  In Phase I participants were tasked with ranking the 
ten countries in order of IMR (a rank of ‗1‘ = country with lowest IMR figure, and a country 
given the rank of ‗10‘ = the country with the highest IMR figure), and then estimating the 
actual rate of IMR in each of the ten countries.   
 
In Phase II participants were randomly allocated between the experimental conditions of 
control group (no advice), and conditions in which participants were exposed to GDP advice 
(accurate numerical estimates of each countries‘ GDP); Population estimate advice (accurate 
numerical estimates of each country‘s population); or GDP and Population estimate advice 
(where participants were exposed to accurate GDP information, and accurate Population 
estimate information for each of the ten countries).  An individual participant was exposed to 
only one of the three types of advice information.  Participants were asked to copy the 
estimates they had provided in Phase I of the estimation process, into the spaces provided in 
the questionnaire booklet prior to commencing Phase II of the experiment.  In Phase II of the 
experiment, participants were tasked with revisiting their original estimates in the light of the 
advice information (or reconsidering their estimates after completing a distracter task in the 
case of the control group), and were able to revise their unaided estimates if they so chose.  
Finally, participants were asked to rate how useful they found the available advice, in forming 
estimates of national IMRs on a 5 point Likert type scale (anchored at one end by 0 = no use at 
all; anchored at 5 = absolutely invaluable).  Participants were thanked for their participation, 
but were not paid for their participation. 
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9.3 Results 
 
Prior to analysis the number of responses from participants was tabulated (see Table 9.1). 
Table 9.1 Number of responses 
Participants N = 
118 
Pre-advice 
estimate 
Pre-advice 
Rank order 
Post-advice 
estimate 
Post-advice 
Rank order 
Responses N 188 188 139 167 
 
The primary hypothesis addressed by this study, involved determining the ordinal and metric 
post-advice accuracy of participants in receipt of advice.  Specifically, should people be 
constrained in their abilities to discriminate between potentially beneficial advice, and poor 
advice, and subsequently indiscriminately conform to any available advice, it was predicted 
that participants in receipt of GDP advice would improve both their ordinal and metric 
accuracy, more so, than participants in receipt of Population estimate advice.  Participants in 
receipt of GDP and Population estimate advice are also expected to improve their ordinal and 
metric accuracy, more so, than participants in receipt of Population estimate advice, but not to 
exceed the post-advice accuracy achieved by participants in receipt of GDP advice.  For the 
purposes of analysis, ordinal accuracy is defined as the strength of association between 
participants‘ rank orderings of ten target countries (in terms of IMR), and the true rank order of 
the same 10 countries.  If participants improved in terms of ordinal accuracy, then we might 
expect that there would be a stronger association between participants‘ rank orderings post-
advice and the true rank order (of the 10 target countries by IMR), than pre-advice.  For ordinal 
accuracy to improve it is necessary for some participants to revise their rank ordering of 
countries in terms of national IMRs.  Of interest then, is the number of judgment revisions 
made by participants.   
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In order to examine the number of judgment revisions participants made in terms of ordinal 
accuracy, the number of judgment revisions was tallied for each participant, and for each 
estimation question.  Subsequently, these data were aggregated for the purpose of comparison 
(see Table 9.2).  
Table 9.2 Ordinal accuracy revisions 
Condition Number of ordinal revisions 
No advice Controls 
(N = 44) 
127/439 
(28.92%) 
GDP advice 
(N = 36) 
224/360 
(62.22%) 
Population estimate advice (N = 16) 
67/160 
(41.88%) 
GDP & Population estimate advice (N 
= 22) 
132/220 
(60%) 
All (N = 118) 
550/1179 
(46.65%) 
 
Table 9.2 shows that, on average, approximately half of my participants (46.65%) revised their 
judgments post-advice.  Whilst this finding in isolation is not particularly meaningful, it is 
clear from Table 9.2 that participants in receipt of advice (57.16%) proportionately changed 
judgment more often than people who did not receive advice (28.92%).  Further, it appears that 
participants in receipt of Population estimate advice proportionately revised their judgments to 
a lesser extent (41.88%) than either GDP advice (62.22%), or GDP and Population estimate 
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advice (60%).  Possibly, this finding may be attributable to the low N in the Population 
estimate advice condition.  However, in order to determine whether there were differences 
between conditions in terms of ordinal accuracy, it was necessary to ascertain the strength of 
association between participants pre-advice ordinal accuracy, and compare it with participants‘ 
post-advice ordinal accuracy.  Hence, Spearman‘s r correlation coefficients were calculated 
between the true rank order of countries (by IMR), and those reported by participant‘s pre-
advice, and post-advice (see Table 9.3). 
Table 9.3 Ordinal accuracy:  Strength of association between pre-advice rankings and true rank 
order of 10 countries (IMR), and post-advice rankings and true rank order of 10 countries 
(IMR). 
Advice 
Participants 
N 
Strength of 
association 
between pre-
advice ranks and 
true rankings 
 
p 
Strength of 
association 
between post-
advice ranks 
and true 
rankings 
 
p 
Control 
(no advice) 
44 rs = - 0.286 0.0005 rs =  - 0.432 0.0005 
GDP 36 rs = - 0.193 0.0005 rs =  0.263 0.0005 
Population 
estimate 
16 rs =  0.012 0.877 rs =  0.221 0.0005 
GDP and 
Population 
estimate 
22 rs = - 0.071 0.298 rs = 0.022 0.747 
 
Table 9.3 reveals some interesting results, in so far as participants‘ rankings of the ten 
countries (by IMR) appear to vary prior to exposure to any advice.  Participants allocated to the 
GDP advice condition, for example, showed a significant, but weak, negative correlation 
between participants‘ rankings pre-advice and the true rankings.  Participants allocated to the 
Population estimate advice condition, and the GDP and Population estimate advice condition, 
report non-significant correlations between their pre-advice rankings and the true rank order of 
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the ten countries (by IMR).  Post-advice, participants allocated to the GDP advice condition, 
and the Population estimate advice condition, showed significant correlations between their 
post-advice rankings, and the true rank order of the ten countries (by IMR).  However, people 
allocated to the GDP and Population estimate advice condition, did not report a significant 
correlation between their rankings, and the true rank order of countries by IMR, post-advice. 
 
To determine if ordinal accuracy improves for any of our participants, it was necessary to test 
whether the correlation between participants‘ rankings of countries by national IMRs, and the 
true rank ordering of countries by national IMRs, remained statistically non-significant post-
advice.  Traditionally, this test of non-independent correlation coefficients has been addressed 
by Hotelling‘s ‗t‘ (1931).   However following the work of Williams (1959), Dunn and Clark 
(1969), and Steiger (1980), it is clear that ‗t‘ can be overestimated when computing Hotelling‘s 
statistic in some circumstances.  Instead, the statistic suggested by Steiger is utilized – Z1.  This 
is a test of whether the correlation coefficient (pre-advice rankings compared to true rank 
order), is the same as the correlation efficient (post-advice rankings compared to true ranks).  
Table 9.4 below reports the results of the significance tests.   
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Table 9.4 Significance test of correlations pre and post advice. 
Advice Z1 
Control (no advice) 
(N = 44) 
3.40606 
GDP advice 
(N = 36) 
- 7.301668 
Population estimate advice 
(N = 16) 
- 2.590401 
GDP and Population estimate advice 
(N = 22) 
- 1.228691 
 
Examining the critical values from a Z distribution shows that for significance of p < 0.05 to be 
reached, the test statistic must exceed plus/minus 1.96 for a two-tailed test, or plus/minus 1.65 
(in the hypothesized direction) for a one-tailed test.  Clearly, Table 9.4 shows that the 
correlations between participants‘ rankings of countries (by IMR) and the true rank order, pre-
advice was not the same as the correlation post-advice - for people who did not receive advice, 
for people in receipt of GDP advice, and people in receipt of Population estimate advice.  For 
participants not in receipt of advice, it is possible to infer that, as the correlation coefficient 
between pre-advice rank ordering of countries by IMR, and the true rank order, is greater than 
the correlation coefficient post-advice, the strength of association between participants‘ 
rankings of countries by IMR, and the true rank order, became weaker for people who did not 
receive any advice (controls).  This is because the correlation coefficient between pre-advice 
rank ordering of countries by IMR, and the true rank order is negative, and post-advice the 
correlation coefficient remains negative but larger (see Table 9.3).  However, the strength of 
association between participants‘ rankings of countries by IMR, and the true rank order, 
became stronger for participants in receipt of GDP advice, and participants in receipt of 
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Population estimate advice.  It is not appropriate to infer that the correlation between pre-
advice rank orderings, and the true rank order, and the correlation between post-advice rank 
orderings and the true rank order, are significantly different for participants in receipt of GDP 
and Population estimate advice, as the test statistic (Z1 = - 1.228691) does not exceed the 
critical value for Z1.  
 
In sum, the strength of association between participants‘ rank ordering of countries by IMR, 
and the true rank order became stronger (i.e. ordinal accuracy improved) for participants in 
receipt of GDP advice, and participants in receipt of Population estimate advice.   Recall that 
the hypothesis being tested concerns whether people in receipt of GDP advice are able to 
improve their ordinal accuracy to a greater extent than people in receipt of Population estimate 
advice.  This prediction was tested by comparing the post-advice correlation coefficient (i.e. 
the strength of association between participant‘s post-advice rankings and the true rank order 
of countries by IMR) of people in receipt of GDP advice, with the post-advice correlation 
coefficient of people in receipt of Population estimate advice (i.e. to determine which set of 
participants‘ rankings are more closely associated with the true ranking).  This test revealed 
that it is inappropriate to reject the null hypothesis that the two independent correlations are 
equal (z = 0.465, p < 0.321, 1 tail).  In sum, the hypothesis concerning ordinal estimation 
accuracy is partially supported.  Participants who were in receipt of no advice (controls) appear 
to have become more error prone, in terms of ordinal accuracy, by revisiting the estimation 
problems.  Participants in receipt of GDP advice, and participants in receipt of Population 
estimate advice, significantly improved their ordinal accuracy by about the same amount, on 
average, whilst participants in receipt of GDP and Population estimate advice did not 
significantly improve (or degrade) their ordinal estimation accuracy.  Consideration is next 
given to metric accuracy. 
 285 
Recall that metric accuracy can be defined as the absolute numerical difference between a 
participant‘s unaided estimate of some quantity and the true value of the quantity, and a 
participant‘s post-advice estimate, and the true value of the quantity.  Should the absolute 
numerical difference between a participant‘s unaided estimate of some quantity and the true 
value of the quantity be greater than the latter, then it is possible to infer that estimation 
accuracy has improved.  It was hypothesized that participants in receipt of solely Population 
estimate advice would not significantly improve their post-advice accuracy; that participants in 
receipt of GDP and Population estimate advice would achieve a greater degree of post-advice 
accuracy than participants in receipt of Population estimate advice, but not exceed the accuracy 
achieved by participants solely in receipt of GDP advice.  To test our hypothesis, two measures 
of metric accuracy were utilized (Lee, 2007, unpublished).  First, Signed Order of Magnitude 
(SOME) error was calculated for each participant.  SOME was derived as the Log10 of each 
participants IMR estimate, after dividing the estimate by the actual IMR of the country being 
estimated.  Positive SOME values indicate overestimation, and negative SOME values indicate 
underestimation, on average.  A second measure of metric accuracy was derived as Order of 
Magnitude Error (OME).  Here, OME is the absolute SOME score for each participant.  Mean 
OME is a measure of absolute accuracy, so that an OME = 1.0 describes an error of one order 
of magnitude.  SOME scores satisfied the assumption that our data were normally distributed, 
but the OME scores were not normally distributed.  Hence, non-parametric tests are reported 
for data that is not normally distributed.  First, I examined the proportion of participants who 
revised their metric estimate (SOME scores) post-advice. 
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Table 9.5 Metric accuracy revisions (SOME) scores 
Condition Number of metric revisions 
No advice Controls 
(N = 44) 
283/438 
(64.61%) 
GDP advice 
(N = 36) 
262/360 
(72.78%) 
Population estimate advice (N = 16) 
84/151 
(55.63%) 
GDP & Population estimate advice (N 
= 22) 
158/220 
(71.82%) 
All (N = 118) 
550/1179 
(67.32%) 
 
Table 9.5 shows that overall approximately two-thirds (67.32%) of participants revised their 
post-advice point estimate of a countries‘ IMR.  Interestingly, even participants who did not 
receive advice revised their estimates (64.61%) more often than not.  Participants in receipt of 
GDP advice revise their judgment (72.78%), marginally more so than participants in receipt of 
GDP and Population estimate advice (71.82%), but both conditions contain more judgment 
revisions than participants in receipt of Population estimate advice (55%).  On average, 
inspection of the data presented in Table 9.4 and 9.5 shows that participants were more 
disposed to revise their judgment when considering a point estimate of a countries‘ IMR, than 
when considering the rank order of countries according to their IMR.  Whilst this finding may 
be anticipated due to the ‗fine grained‘ nature of point estimation, in comparison to the ‗blunt‘ 
nature of rank ordering by IMR, it is of interest to determine if the accuracy improvements 
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suggested by the analysis of the ordinal data are mirrored in the analysis of the metric data.  
Analysis of SOME scores and OME scores is tabulated in Table 9.6 and 9.7.  
 
Table 9.6 and Table 9.7 show that participants were unable to significantly reduce their 
estimation error, and hence improve their metric estimation accuracy.  On average, all 
participants overestimate the IMRs of the ten target countries, both prior to the receipt of 
advice, and post-advice.  Participants in the no advice (control) condition make an even larger 
overestimate of the IMRs of the ten target countries post-advice than they did pre-advice 
(although this difference did not reach significance).  Where participants were in receipt of 
advice, they made a smaller overestimate of the ten target countries IMRs post-advice than pre-
advice, but not significantly so.  Inspection of the mean OME scores in Table 9.4 shows that 
participants non-significantly increased their error pre to post advice when in receipt of GDP 
and Population estimate advice, but all other participants non-significantly reduced error pre to 
post advice.  In sum, taking into account measurements of ordinal accuracy and metric 
accuracy, there is only partial support for this hypothesis.  It is clear that participants in receipt 
of GDP advice are able to significantly improve their ordinal, but not their metric accuracy.  
However, participants in receipt of GDP and Population estimate advice were unable to 
improve either their ordinal or metric accuracy, whilst participants in receipt of Population 
estimate advice were able to improve their ordinal accuracy, but not their metric accuracy. 
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The results reported so far paint an inconsistent picture so far as ordinal and metric accuracy 
are concerned.  All participants overestimate the actual IMR of each target country on average, 
both prior to, and post-advice.  No one group of participants was able to improve metric 
accuracy, and only participants in receipt of GDP advice, or Population estimate advice, were 
able to improve their ordinal accuracy.  These results are somewhat puzzling, as the cue 
validities for GDP advice and Population estimate advice, are clearly different.  When advice 
was linearly regressed upon the true IMRs for the ten countries utilized in the experimental 
task, (F(2, 7) = 30.57, p < 0.0005; Adjusted R
2 = 0.87), only GDP advice emerged as a 
significant predictor (beta = - 0.004, t = - 7.55, p < 0.0005).  Put another way, there is a 
significant correlation between GDP advice and the true value of the ten target countries‘ 
IMRs, on average (rs =
 - 0.63, p < 0.05).  However, there is no significant correlation between 
Population estimate advice and the true IMRs of the target countries, on average (rs = - 0.067, 
p < 0.85).   
 
Further support for the idea that participants were insensitive to the cue validities of advice was 
found when consideration was given to the amount of judgment change between pre and post-
advice IMR estimates.  The absolute numerical difference between a participant‘s pre-advice 
IMR estimate, and post-advice IMR estimate was calculated for each question, and then 
aggregated for the purposes of comparisons between conditions (see Table 9.8).  These scores 
did not satisfy the assumption that the data was normally distributed, hence the Log10 
transformed scores were entered into tests of significance.   
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Table 9.8 Mean absolute difference scores (IMR) 
Condition N x  sd 
Log10 
x  
sd 
No advice 
(control) 
38 25.45 36.08 0.97 0.70 
GDP 31 33.84 51.28 1.23 0.60 
Population 
estimate 
12 28.27 16.80 1.31 0.47 
GDP and 
Population 
estimate 
21 34.34 43.96 1.24 0.55 
 
A one-way ANOVA was performed on the data in Table 9.8 in order to determine if there were 
any significant differences in the amount of judgment change attributable to experimental 
condition – no evidence of a main effect of condition was found (F(3, 98) = 1.63, p < 0.19).  
Further, no evidence of differences in the absolute amount of judgment change was found 
when follow-up planned comparisons were performed on the data. 
 
One resolution to the difficulty of explaining the preceding results lies in the possibility that 
participants become more error prone post-advice in terms of metric accuracy.  This might be 
so, as participants in this study were informed of the true range of possible IMR values at the 
outset.  In order to investigate this possibility, the absolute difference between a participant‘s 
unaided estimate, and the true IMR, was calculated for each question and aggregated for the 
purposes of comparison.  Similarly, the absolute difference between a participant‘s post-advice 
estimate, and the true IMR was calculated, and aggregated for the purposes of comparison.  
Marginal (non-significant) increases in estimation error appear to be common to participants in 
receipt of advice (see Table 9.9). 
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Table 9.9  Pre-advice and post-advice IMR accuracy 
 
Observations 
N 
Error prior to 
receipt of 
advice 
x  
sd 
Error post-
advice  
x  
sd 
No advice 
(N = 44) 
439 
 
96.35 
 
149.52 88.32 130.81 
GDP advice 
(N = 36) 
360 55.38 67.83 60.07 95.44 
Population 
estimate 
advice 
(N = 16) 
160 56.43 75.36 56.66 76.29 
GDP and 
Population 
estimate 
advice 
(N = 22) 
220 67.54 107.91 69.23 121.49 
 
The table above shows that participants in receipt of advice increased their estimation error 
post-advice (albeit such increases in estimation error are statistically non-significant).  This 
may suggest that participants were susceptible to a conformity effect, where judgment revision 
is towards the available advice (metric) even though estimation revision is not beneficial.  To 
investigate this issue further, the correlation between advice and rank order of countries prior 
to, and post-advice was considered. 
 
If people are unable to adequately discriminate between good and poor advice, it might be 
expected that participants in receipt of advice will strengthen the association between advice, 
and participants rank orderings of the ten target countries post-advice.  The correlation 
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coefficients between advice and participants rank order of the ten target countries is shown in 
Table 9.10.  Inspection of the data in Table 9.10 shows support for the idea that people are 
conforming to advice irrespective of its quality.  This is because the correlation coefficient 
representing the strength of association between advice and the rank order (by IMRs) of the ten 
target countries is greater post-advice, in all advice conditions. 
Table 9.10  Correlations between rank order of question items and advice 
 N rs 
Rank order pre-advice 
and GDP advice 
36 0.674 
Rank order post-advice 
and GDP advice 
36 0.891 
Rank order pre-advice 
and GDP and Population 
estimate advice 
22 0.645 
Rank order post-advice 
and GDP and Population 
estimate advice 
22 0.777 
Rank order pre-advice 
and Population estimate 
advice 
16 0.168 
Rank order post-advice 
and Population estimate 
advice 
16 0.228 
 
Next, a test of related correlation coefficients was performed (Steiger‘s Z1), which tests the 
hypothesis that the correlation between the pre-advice rank order of question items, is the same 
as the correlation between the post-advice rank order of question items and advice.   
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Table 9.11 Significance tests of related correlation coefficients 
Advice Z1 
GDP advice 
(N = 36) 
- 3.479758 
Population estimate advice 
(N = 16) 
- 1.30168 
GDP and Population estimate advice 
(N = 22) 
- 0.3792976 
 
Although all participants in receipt of advice strengthened the association between rank order 
of the ten target countries and advice post-advice, only participants in receipt of GDP advice 
did so significantly.  This is because the test statistic (Z1) must exceed plus/minus 1.96 for a 
two-tailed test, or plus/minus 1.65 (in the hypothesized direction) for a one-tailed test, from the 
critical values in a Z distribution for significance of p < 0.05 to be reached.  In part, the non-
significant results of the preceding significance tests of related correlation coefficients may be 
explainable by the different numbers of participants in the three advice conditions, which could 
have resulted in low statistical power.  However, it is of interest to determine why participants 
in receipt of Population estimate advice were able to improve their ordinal accuracy (despite a 
relatively low N = 16). 
 
One remaining issue is to determine why participants in receipt of non-predictive advice 
(Population estimate advice), were able to improve their ordinal accuracy, to the same extent as 
participants in receipt of ‗predictive advice‘ (GDP advice).  One possible explanation for this 
finding concerns individual differences in the degree of ‗world‘ knowledge that participants 
held prior to the experiment.  Although no measure of prior knowledge held by participants of 
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the target countries, utilized in the experiment, was taken a priori, inspection of the distribution 
of age ranges between the experimental conditions revealed that the participants in receipt of 
Population estimate advice were older, on average, than participants in the other experimental 
advice groups (see Table 9.12).  This may suggest that this group was able to bring a greater 
degree of ‗world‘ knowledge to bear on the estimation task (if one accepts that greater life 
experience results in greater world knowledge), than other participants, and subsequently be 
able to improve ordinal estimation on the basis of Population estimate advice. 
Table 9.12  Distribution of age ranges 
Advice N 
Age 
x  
 
Age 
sd 
Age 
Median 
Age 
Range 
None (control) 44 23 2 23 9 
GDP 36 20 7 19 40 
Population 16 32 11 32 28 
GDP and 
Population 
22 29 12 27 45 
 
The age data did not meet the assumptions of a normal distribution, hence a non-parametric 
significance test was performed in order to determine if the differences in age ranges between 
advice groups were non-random (χ2 = 18.81, df = 2, p < 0.0005).  Consideration was next given 
to whether the advice groups differed in shape or location in terms of age.  Table 9.13 shows 
that there were significant differences in the shape and location of the distribution of age data 
between groups (χ2 = 12.44, df = 2, p < 0.002).  Inspection of the data in Table 9.13 shows that 
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the main difference was between people in receipt of GDP advice, and people in receipt of 
Population estimate advice.   
Table 9.13  Frequency of age data 
 GDP advice 
Population estimate 
advice 
GDP and Population 
estimate advice 
> median 9 11 13 
<= median 27 4 9 
 
This account is leant further support when consideration is given to the frequency of judgment 
change data.  If participants were sensitive to the cue validities of each type of advice that was 
provided to them, it might be expected that judgment change would be a function of advice 
type.  To explore this possibility the number of judgment changes reported by participants 
were calculated, and it is clear from Table 9.14 that participants in receipt of advice changed 
judgment more often than not.  Moreover, people in receipt of GDP advice, and GDP and 
Population estimate advice, changed judgment more often than people in receipt of solely 
Population estimate advice (χ2 = 14.80, df = 2, p < 0.001).  In conjunction with the age range 
data, and the frequency of judgment change data for people in receipt of Population estimate 
advice, suggests that participants were changing judgment approximately 50% of the time (i.e. 
participants were no more likely to change judgment, than not change judgment); hence it is 
difficult to discern the influence of advice upon judgment change.  Rather, this group may have 
been able to improve ordinal accuracy through possession of a higher degree of ‗world‘ 
knowledge than the other experimental advice groups.   
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Table 9.14  Number of judgment changes 
 Change Judgment Do not change judgment 
No advice 
(N = 44) 
266 174 
GDP advice 
(N = 36) 
255 105 
Population advice 
(N = 16) 
86 74 
GDP and Population 
advice 
(N = 22) 
149 71 
 
Further support for a ‗conformity to advice‘ effect is found when the perceived utility of advice 
measure was examined.  Recall that it was hypothesized that should participants be able to 
adequately distinguish between ‗good‘ and ‗poor‘ advice, they should be able to differentially 
rate the available advice on the dimension of perceived utility.  Should participants be sensitive 
to the cue validities of objectively good and poor advice, then this sensitivity should be 
reflected in the ratings participants attribute to the perceived utility of the advice, on average. 
Table 9.15  Frequencies of perceived utility of advice scores 
 
 GDP advice Population advice 
GDP and population 
advice 
> median 17 3 12 
<= median 19 13 10 
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Table 9.15 shows the frequency of median scores above, or below, the overall median (= 3), 
irrespective of advice group membership.   Inspection of Table 9.14 reveals that there are a 
greater number of scores that below the overall median value, than above it, for people who 
were in receipt of Population estimate advice.  This finding could suggest that people valued 
Population estimate advice to a significantly lesser extent than they valued either GDP, or GDP 
and Population estimate advice.  However, a Median test confirmed that there were no 
significant differences in location or shape, in the median ratings attributed by participants 
between groups (χ2 = 5.29, df = 2, p < 0.071).  This finding suggests that participants were 
largely insensitive to the cue validities of the available advice. 
 
9.4 Discussion 
 
The focus of this study was to determine if people are able to differentiate between objectively 
‗good‘ and ‗poor‘ advice, in order to improve ordinal and metric estimation accuracy.  
Previous research (Gigerenzer, Todd and the ABC Research Group (1999); Lee [unpublished], 
2007) theorized that people are able to recognize predictive information in an estimation task, 
and recall cues that enable individuals to rank order target items (ordinal accuracy).  These 
authors go on to argue that the cognitive processes involved in ordinal estimation are 
independent from the processes that facilitate estimation that ultimately resolves in measures 
of metric accuracy.  Lee (unpublished, 2007) supported this position, finding that participants 
tasked with estimating IMRs were able to improve their ordinal accuracy when in receipt of 
predictive information (accurate GDP information for target countries, or accurate GDP and 
Population estimate information for target countries), but participants were not able to improve 
ordinal accuracy when in receipt of non-predictive information (accurate Population estimate 
information for target countries).  Participants in this study reported no improvements in metric 
accuracy, but simultaneously reported improvements in ordinal accuracy, both for participants 
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in receipt of predictive advice (GDP information), and for participants in receipt of non-
predictive advice (Population estimate information).  One possible explanation for the findings 
reported here is that conforming to advice is a good strategy for accurate estimation of national 
IMRs when the advice is predictive of the target quantity.  Not conforming to advice appears to 
be a good strategy for ordinal estimation when an individual can bring ‗world knowledge‘ to 
bear on the issue. 
   
It may be true that the results of the analysis of ordinal accuracy may be confounded in this 
study by the fact that a concentration of older people (arguably with more developed world 
knowledge) appeared in the experiment.  However, as discussed in the introduction to this 
study, participants may attend to poor advice for good reasons.  It is possible that participants 
in receipt of Population estimate advice, found such advice unfamiliar, but were able to utilize 
the advice to enrich the basis for ordinal estimation (Heath and Gonzales, 1995).  
Alternatively, interacting with Population estimate advice may have caused participants to 
think of the estimation problem in a different, and potentially more beneficial, way (Schotter, 
2003; Druckman, 2001).  Moreover, people seek out, and pay attention to advice, not only to 
improve the accuracy of their decisions, but to share responsibility for those decisions; and 
hence participants may have been reticent to reject Population estimate advice that they 
perceived to be freely given (Sniezek and Buckley, 1995; Harvey and Fischer, 1997; Yaniv, 
2004a; Yaniv 2004b).   
 
Of interest then is why the results of this study differ markedly from the results obtained by 
Lee (2007, unpublished).  Participants in this study did not show improvements in either metric 
or ordinal accuracy when in receipt of GDP and Population estimate advice (N= 22).  Recall 
that Lee‘s participants reported improvements in ordinal accuracy (Study 4) for participants in 
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receipt of GDP and Population estimate advice (N = 24); such ordinal accuracy improvement 
did not surpass the accuracy improvement of participants solely in receipt of GDP advice.  The 
main difference between the two experimental procedures is that the actual range of IMRs (2-
147 per 1000 live births) was unknown to participants in Lee‘s studies (where metric accuracy 
was recorded in Study 1-3).  Lee‘s participants were instructed to respond on a scale anchored 
at one end by zero (no infant mortalities), and at the other by 1000 (all children die).  Hence, it 
is not surprising that (i) Lee predicted that people would generally overestimate IMRs, and (ii) 
people generally did overestimate IMRs.  Under these conditions metric accuracy will almost 
inevitably be poor – any estimation strategy based upon central tendency (mean, median) will 
invariably lead to overestimation - as the true range of IMRs for the countries included in 
Lee‘s study, is in the extreme lower 20% of the response range that participants were informed 
of (i.e. 0-1000).  Conversely, at one level ordinal accuracy is unaffected by the response scale 
used to determine metric accuracy (participants were tasked with ordering a list of countries by 
IMR).  Lee argues that his results demonstrate that people are unable to define an ecologically 
valid range of values for target items where domain knowledge is weak, and this largely 
accounts for poor metric accuracy.  
  
However, an alternative account might posit that participants may have been inhibited from 
forming an ecologically valid response range for target items, because participants were cued 
by the experimenter that the range of true values for each country‘s IMR was somewhere 
between 0 and 1000 – a far wider range than the actual range of values (2-147).  Where people 
have incomplete domain knowledge and perhaps little confidence in their own intuition; they 
may be susceptible to the demand characteristics of the experimental situation.  Hence, being 
told that the response range of quantities to be estimated is 0-1000 could induce participants to 
believe, that the values of the target items to be estimated, are normally distributed about the 
arithmetic mean (i.e. 500) of the known range.  Under these circumstances non-ordinal 
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accuracy measures capture both metric accuracy, and an experimenter bias.  In contrast, 
participants in this study were informed of the true range of IMRs of target countries, hence 
relaxing the constraints upon the formation of an ecologically valid response range.  However, 
participants in the present study overestimated the actual IMRs of target countries both prior to 
the receipt of advice, and post-advice.  Hence, if the instruments designed to capture 
measurements of accuracy are not well calibrated, the disassociation between ordinal and 
metric accuracy, may not be so clear-cut.  This is because participants in this study 
strengthened the association between the rank order of target countries, with advice, post-
advice (although only participants in receipt of GDP advice did so significantly).  This finding 
shows that participants in the current study utilized advice to inform their deliberations of the 
rank order of the target countries, but did not have to formulate a valid response range (this 
was provided to participants).  This difference in experimental design between the current 
study and Lee (unpublished 2007), may account for the fact that in the current study 
participants in receipt of GDP and Population advice did not show improvements in metric or 
ordinal accuracy, while participants in Lee‘s experiment (Study 4)  did show improvements in 
metric and ordinal accuracy (group Ns were similar).  Support for this idea is found when the 
data from participants in receipt of GDP and Population estimate advice was analyzed – people 
appeared to be insensitive to the asymmetries of advice information, and hence were not able 
to recognize, (or if they did recognize were not able to use) the benefit of GDP advice, in 
comparison to Population estimate advice.  This idea appears consistent with the work of 
Harvey et al. (1999) who make an identical argument that people may be able to assess the 
utility of advice, but may not be able to use such assessments to beneficially utilize advice.  
Such a position is consistent with the idea of bounded cognition, and points towards the 
practical benefits of decision aids, or interventions, that lighten the demands on cognition in 
estimation tasks.  The issue of perception of asymmetries in the quality advice is considered 
next. 
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 Central to the argument that people are able to differentiate between objectively ‗good‘ and 
‗poor‘ advice, is the idea that people recognize the predictiveness, or utility of advice, and are 
subsequently able to either incorporate good advice into their deliberations, or at least reject 
poor advice.  However, there was little support for this position found in this study.  
Participants were tasked with providing a rating of the perceived utility of advice on a 5-point 
Likert-type scale, and no differences in perceived utility of advice ratings were found between 
experimental advice conditions.  In sum, the findings from this study show that the people 
were not sensitive to asymmetries in the quality of advice.  
  
Perhaps the most important limitation to this study (and one that is shared by Lee‘s Study) is 
that currently, there is no comprehensive paradigm through which ordinal accuracy can be 
studied.  In this study, the conventional estimate–advice-estimate format, that much JAS 
research is predicated upon, has been utilized.  However, it is difficult to develop a study that 
captures the nuances of ordinal estimation in such a paradigm, and subsequently current 
understandings of the cognitive processes that underpin ordinal estimation are incomplete.  
Clearly, further work in this area is necessary if a fuller understanding of the cognitive 
architectures that facilitate ordinal estimation is to be developed.   
 
A further limitation of this study is that individual differences between participants have not 
been sufficiently controlled for in this study, and/or the random allocation of participants to 
experimental treatment conditions may not have been successful.  Recall, that ordinal 
estimation accuracy improved for participants in receipt of Population estimate advice, despite 
the fact that such advice was not predictive of national IMRs.  This finding suggests that some 
measure of ‗world‘ knowledge, or specific domain knowledge should be recorded prior to 
exposure to advice, in order to exert greater experimental control.  This may suggest a 
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potentially fruitful avenue, in terms of directions for future studies, as individual differences 
may mediate the cognitive mechanisms that facilitate both metric and ordinal estimation. 
 
In conclusion, under conditions of uncertainty people are susceptible to the influence of both 
good and poor advice, and may conform to either.  This may imply that further research could 
fruitfully be employed in discovering if, how, and to what extent, judges and estimators search 
out information about the potential utility that advisors may offer, above that of credibility of 
the source of information. 
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 Chapter 10:  Conclusions, suggestions for methodological improvements, and directions 
for future research. 
 
 
10.1 The central problem addressed in the current work  
 
The central problem addressed in the current work concerns the fallibility of human judgment, 
and understanding some influences upon human judgments that potentially result in beneficial 
judgment revision.  Here, a fundamental assumption is that judgmental fallibility is based upon 
the limitations of cognition.  Further, it is important to distinguish between the cognitive 
processes that underpin choice, and the processes that facilitate judgment, as there is strong 
evidence that each of these processes is supported by different cognitive architectures (Billings 
and Scherer, 1988).  The focus of the current work is human judgment. 
 
Some researchers have taken a pessimistic view of human judgment, seeing people as 
‗cognitive misers‘ (Simon, 1982), who base judgment upon a sub-optimal ‗satisficing‘ 
strategy.  Here, both due to the limitations on individual cognitions and the practicalities of 
comprehensive information search (resources and time), people often accept the first 
acceptable solution to any particular task involving judgment.  Other researchers have 
catalogued how people making judgments are susceptible to cognitive biases, because of the 
use of cognitive shortcuts, or heuristics (Gleitman et al. 2004; Tversky and Kahneman, 1982).  
Much of the time the individual use of heuristics results in acceptable judgmental outcomes 
that satisfy the environmental context, but in some circumstances using heuristics may result in 
errors that have important consequences (safety, medicine, commerce etc.).   
 
Not all researchers take such a pessimistic view of human judgment however.  Instead of 
judgment being prone to systematic cognitive biases, these researchers argue that judgment 
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should be conceived as an adaptive system, measured in terms of its ‗fit to reality‘ (Gigerenzer, 
2006).  Under this rubric measuring human judgment in terms of probabilistic reasoning is 
mistaken, as probability theory cannot apply to single events.   Moreover, these researchers see 
this adaptive system of judgment as ‗fast and frugal‘ - judgments are fast because they are 
frugal in terms of what information is taken into account.   
 
Given the preceding discussion over the fallibility of human judgment, it is perhaps 
encouraging to acknowledge the advantages of simple interventions designed to enhance 
human judgment in comparison to holistic estimation (Dawes, Faust and Meehl, 1989; Grove 
et al. 2000; Grove and Meehl, 1996).  This programme of research suggests that the condition 
of human judgment can be improved.  Moreover, people intuitively seek to improve the quality 
of their judgments by the solicitation of advice.  People often seek out advice in circumstances 
where the resource implications for comprehensive information search are prohibitive.  People 
may accept and act upon advice both to improve the quality of judgment and for social reasons.  
The social context of advice giving and taking is an underdeveloped area of enquiry in the 
extant literature, and hence, the problem addressed in the current work is to determine some of 
the factors that are influential in beneficial judgment revision (or at least to point to 
circumstances where some factors are not influential in beneficial judgment revision) when an 
advisor gives advice to a judge.  To that end, the current work empirically examined advice 
giving and taking (defined as information exchanged between an advisor and judge in a single 
episode), in the context of JAS research and algorithmic decomposition (knowledge of the 
process of advice generation), prior to attempting to ascertain whether, in fact, people are able 
to recognize and utilize objectively ‗good‘ advice. 
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10.2 Summary of the main findings of this investigation 
 
The results of the investigations conducted in the current work can be grouped under a number 
of headings.  These are summarized below - 
Advice preference  
 
 People prefer reasons-based advice to solely numeric advice, and are sensitive to 
advice evidenced by authority (Chapter 4, p105-12, p115-118, p124-27).   
Depth of information search 
 
 People search for information in a non-random way (Chapter 4, p133), but do not hold 
preconceived ideas about the utility of advice messages (Chapter 4, p131-32). 
 People search for decision relevant information to the same extent - irrespective of 
whether people consider advice or not.  People also give greater consideration to 
reasons-based advice (Chapter 4, p133-34). 
Confidence 
 
 Attending to advice bolsters peoples‘ post-advice confidence in their estimates 
(Chapter 4, p134-35).  There is some evidence that changes in the levels of confidence 
are attributable to the type of advice people attended to (Chapter 4, p136). 
Perceived quality of advice 
 
 People seem insensitive to the quality of the advice they prefer, and perceptions of the 
utility of advice are not predictive of subsequent judgment revision (Chapter 4, p117-9, 
Chapter 5, p165, Chapter 6, p211-13, Chapter 7, p261-62, Chapter 8, p288, Chapter 9, 
p326, p328). 
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People cannot easily discriminate between potentially beneficial and poor advice 
 
 People are not able to easily tell the difference between ‗good‘ and ‗bad‘ advice 
(Chapter 4, p120, Chapter 5, p171-72, Chapter 6, p206-8, p213, Chapter 7, p264-65, 
Chapter 8, p288, Chapter 9, p328).  
Cognitive weight placed upon advice 
 
 People are resistant to advice and prefer their own judgments.   However, where people 
do not discount advice, they tend to conform to advice indiscriminately (Chapter 5, 
p166-69).   
Propensity to revise judgment 
 
 People in receipt of advice revise their judgment more often than people who do not 
consider advice (Chapter 4, p110, Chapter 5, p165, Chapter 6, p201-5, Chapter 7, 
p260-61). 
Direction of judgment revision 
 
 People who preferred reasons-based advice tended to change judgment in the 
‗direction‘ of advice, on average - irrespective of the sub-type of advice (Chapter 5, 
p171-76, Chapter 6, p208-13, 221-22, Chapter 7, p263).  People who preferred solely 
numeric advice did not significantly revise judgment in the ‗direction‘ of advice 
(Chapter 4, p113-14).   
Influence of knowledge of the process of advice 
 
 Where people use algorithms to arrive at an estimate of some large quantity, their post-
advice estimates are likely to be greater than their pre-advice estimates Chapter 6, 
p198-200, Chapter 7, p259-60).  Where algorithms are utilized to estimate relative 
frequencies no estimate ‗inflation‘ is evident (Chapter 8, p285-86). 
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 In terms of the extent of judgment revisions, people are not sensitive to the quality or 
complexity of the algorithms utilized (Chapter 6, p209-10, Chapter 7, p262-64).   
 However, there is some evidence that people are sensitive to the proximity of the value 
of an individual‘s unaided estimate to the numerical value of advice, in terms of a 
propensity to revise judgment (Chapter 7, p266-67).    
Determinants of accuracy 
 
 Acting upon advice may not help people make more accurate estimates than people 
who did not attend to advice.  This is because where an individual‘s estimate falls 
between advice and the true answer, people tend to revise their judgment in the 
direction of advice (irrespective of its quality), suggesting that people indiscriminately 
conform to advice (Chapter 4, p118-20). 
 Factors which influence ultimate estimation accuracy include initial estimation 
accuracy, the accuracy of advice, and post-advice confidence (Chapter 6, p238-41, 
Chapter 7, p269-70, Chapter 8, p291-3). 
Determinants of judgment revision 
 
 Most predictor variables that may have predicted judgment revision proved to be non-
significant, however there is some evidence that the perceived utility of advice is 
influential (Chapter 6, p242), particularly when estimating relative frequencies 
(Chapter 8, p293-97). 
People are constrained in their abilities to assess and use advice in their deliberations 
even when advice is objectively ‘good’. 
 
 People in receipt of advice (irrespective of quality) revise judgment more so than 
people not in receipt of advice (Chapter 9, p315-16, p321). 
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 People overestimate target quantities expressed as relative frequencies (Chapter 9, 
p322). 
 People are successful in improving accuracy when tasked with rank ordering target 
quantities (ordinal accuracy), and in receipt of a single advice type (irrespective of the 
quality of advice).  Ordinal accuracy does not improve where an individual is in receipt 
of advice that is predictive of a target quantity and advice that is not predictive of a 
target quantity (Chapter 9, p322-25). 
 Point estimates of quantities improve when advice is utilized.  Where ‗compound‘ 
advice (both predictive and non-predictive advice) is utilized, metric accuracy does not 
improve post-advice (Chapter 9, p325).  However, there are no significant differences, 
on average, between advice types when the absolute amount of judgment change is 
considered (Chapter 9, p326). 
 
10.3 Relationship between the results reported here and the extant advice giving and 
taking literature. 
 
Advice preference  
 
The result of the exploratory study in Chapter 4 of this thesis indicated that people prefer 
reasons-based advice to solely numeric advice, and are sensitive to advice evidenced by 
authority (Chapter 4, p105-12, p115-118, p124-27), in a single judge-advisor interaction.  It is 
clear that devoid of preconceptions of the nature of any available advice, people prefer 
reasons-based advice, to solely numeric advice, when deliberating over an issue that may be 
troublesome.   Research by Dalal and Bonaccio (2010) supports this position.  In two 
experiments these authors presented participants with various fictional scenarios such as 
deciding which job to apply for.  Participants were then offered various different permutations 
of advice (a recommendation for a particular job, a recommendation against a particular job, 
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advice on how to make the decision, sympathy over the predicament or information about the 
jobs under consideration).  Participants consistently preferred information about the jobs under 
consideration.  A second experiment introduced more varied decision-making scenarios, where 
advice could be solicited from an expert (with domain relevant knowledge).  Results indicate 
that participants preferred information in addition to recommendations about the decision 
scenarios.  These findings compliment my own, as my participants overwhelmingly preferred 
reasons-based advice, in preference to solely numeric advice when given the choice.  The 
reasons why people may consistently prefer ‗elaborated‘ advice are further discussed next. 
 
People may prefer information rich and elaborated advice (i.e. a recommendation accompanied 
by reasons) when considering a troublesome estimation issue, because processing solely 
numeric information is cognitively demanding.  In order to reduce the processing load upon 
human cognition, that consideration of solely numeric information may require, people may 
seek out environmental cues (Yalch and Elmore-Yalch, 1984).  In other words, solely numeric 
advice may predispose people to attend to peripheral cues to determine the veracity and utility 
of advice, in preference to expending significant cognitive resources upon centrally processing 
the contents of the advice message (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986). The results reported from 
experimentation in this thesis are consistent with the insights provided by Yalch and Elmore-
Yalch (1984), in so far as an important environmental factor in judgment revision highlighted 
in Chapter 4, was the credibility of the source of advice (Reinard, 1988).  This factor loomed 
large in the deliberations of participants, and is significant in so far as it can be seen to relax 
the cognitive demands of estimation - in part by allowing participants to share responsibility 
for the outcome of the estimate through the perceived expertise of the advisor (Harvey and 
Fischer, 1997).  This insight suggests that judgment revision maybe unlikely when participants 
are exposed to advice that is high in quantification.  This has implications for JAS researchers, 
who up till now have operationalized advice largely in solely numeric terms. 
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Depth of information search 
 
In terms of depth of information search, participants in Chapter 4 of this thesis indicated that 
they held no preconceptions about the utility of advice messages initially, but gave 
considerable attention to reasons-based advice, irrespective of whether they subsequently 
revised judgment post-advice.  Indirectly, this finding may support the work of Harvey et al. 
(2000), as participants appear to have assessed advice, but have been unable to use the advice 
to successfully improve performance.  I argue a similar point here – my participants may have 
found the task in Chapter 4 of this thesis cognitively demanding, and despite a thorough 
information search may not have been able to subsequently use advice to improve 
performance.  In sum, my participants may have applied significant cognitive resources to 
information search and evaluation, which left them without sufficient cognitive resources to 
combine advice with their unaided intuitions in order to improve performance.  This finding is 
partially echoed in the extant literature, in so far as task complexity has been shown to 
decrease information search and induce simplification strategies in order to conserve 
individual‘s cognitive processing resources (Schrah et al. 2006; Johnson and Bruce, 2008).  
However, participants in my study were sensitive to peripheral cues (such as the credibility of 
the source of advice) which may indicate that my participants were adopting simplifying 
strategies as a means of reducing task related cognitive demands.  Further, evidence from the 
extant literature of consumer psychology may suggest that, where people are not highly 
motivated to critically evaluate the central elements of an attempt at persuasion, numerate 
advice is likely to be perceived as cognitively demanding.  Hence, people may seek to 
conserve cognitive resources by attending to peripheral environmental cues, in place of 
centrally processing advice, in order to determine the veracity and utility of such advice (Yalch 
and Elmore-Yalch, 1984; Petty and Cacioppo, 1986).  
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Confidence 
 
Participants‘ levels of confidence were bolstered by attending to advice (Chapter 4, 134-45), 
which is consistent with the findings of Cooper (1991), who observed that less confident 
judges have been observed to seek advice to a greater extent, than confident judges, prior to 
making a final determination in a decision task.  There is some evidence, however, that post-
advice confidence is not well calibrated with post-advice accuracy (Heath and Gonzales, 1995; 
Savadori et al. 2001).  Indeed, it is well established in the extant literature that a perfect match 
between judgmental accuracy and confidence is not the default position of human cognition 
(Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, and Phillips, 1982; Alpert and Raiffa, 1982; McClelland and Bolger, 
1994; Brenner, et al. 1996; Teigen and Jorgenson, 2005).  This is particularly so in decision 
scenarios where judges have limited domain relevant knowledge – as is the case in the current 
work.  Hence, it is perhaps not surprising that post-advice confidence did not reflect the 
observed level of accuracy achieved by my participants, and that my participants were 
susceptible to becoming overconfident post-advice (Alpert and Raiffa, 1982, Sniezek and 
Buckley 1995).  Unlike the decision dyads formulated in the current work, overconfidence may 
be reduced in a situation where advice is solicited from multiple advisors who disagree over 
the veracity of the advice (Sniezek and Buckley 1995).  Ultimately, interactions between 
judges and advisors involving the exchange of advice may not optimally increase the ultimate 
quality of judgments, but may increase confidence in those judgments, and hence 
overconfidence (Heath and Gonzales, 1995).   
 
Perceived quality of advice 
 
One of the most significant findings of the current work is that participants appeared to be 
insensitive to the quality of advice (irrespective of whether the advice was reasons-based, 
solely numeric, or algorithmic).  Furthermore, perceptions of the quality of advice do not 
appear to be strong predictors of subsequent judgment revision (Chapter 4, p117-9, Chapter 5, 
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p165, Chapter 6, p211-13, Chapter 7, p261-62, Chapter 8, p288, Chapter 9, p326, p328).  This 
finding is deleterious to people seeking accurate estimates of some quantity when ‗one-shot‘ 
advice is poor.  However, JAS research has shown that people do have abilities to differentiate 
between potentially beneficial and deleterious advice where advisors are repeatedly solicited 
for advice.  Under this scenario, Yaniv and Kleinberger (2000), investigated the formation of 
advisors‘ reputations and found that decision makers update appraisals of advisors 
asymmetrically. Specifically, a good appraisal was quickly downgraded after bad advice—
advisors were susceptible to losing a ‗good‘ reputation.  Yaniv and Kleinberger found that 
decision makers can judge advisors‘ performance accurately, and purchase information only 
from good advisors. Luan et al. (2004) also found that judges are able to correctly judge the 
performance of different sources of advice.  Further, experiments by Celen, Kariv and Schotter 
(2005), Kameda and Nakanishi (2003), and Yaniv (Yaniv, 2004a), show that even naïve 
participants tend to give useful advice, and that social learning generally improves 
performance.  These findings suggest that decision-makers should be particularly wary of non-
routine decisions, but if the necessity to solicit advice arises, judges should access advice from 
advisor(s) with domain relevant knowledge and an established reputation for accuracy.  
Clearly, non-routine and novel situations are instances of when advice is most likely to be 
sought. 
  
Propensity to revise judgment 
 
Given that people are likely to seek advice in order to improve the quality of their judgments, 
to reduce the complexity of the decision, and to share responsibility for decision outcomes, it is 
unsurprising that people in receipt of advice revised judgement post-advice more often than 
people who did not choose to attend to advice (Chapter 4, p110, Chapter 5, p165, Chapter 6, 
p201-5, Chapter 7, p260-61).  However, this propensity to revise judgment following receipt of 
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advice did not optimally result in accuracy improvements.  These findings – across different 
task domains – suggest that post-advice judgment revision is dominated by issues of social 
conformity at the expense of estimation accuracy.  Similar conclusions were reached by 
Harvey and Fischer, (1997), Lim and O‘Connor, 1995, Yaniv, (2004), and Yaniv & 
Kleinberger, (2000) where judges were observed to revise judgement by a sub-optimal ‗token 
shift‘ of 20-30%  in the direction of the position held by advisor(s).  
 
Cognitive weight placed upon advice 
 
Significantly, the data reported here suggests that some people weight their own judgments far 
more than those of an advisor (Chapter 5, p166-69).  In other words, some people are not 
disposed to revise their judgment, on average.  Krueger (2003) and Harvey and Harries (2004) 
explain such reticence on the part of judges to revise their judgments in the light of advice as 
‗egocentrism‘ (a long term belief that one‘s own judgments are superior to those of others – 
including those of advisors).  Egocentrism, according to Krueger (2003), occurs when people 
are engaged in making judgments about novel situations, which implies that judges are unable 
to adequately evaluate advice, and adjust judgment accordingly.  This explanation is consistent 
with the results I have reported in this thesis, in so far as people who did not revise their 
judgments appear to have reported higher levels of pre-advice confidence, on average, than 
participants who subsequently did revise their judgments post-advice.   
 
Chapter 5 of this thesis considered the Weight of Advice (WOA) measure (Yaniv, 2004a) as a 
means of quantifying the cognitive weight people placed upon both their own judgments, and 
the judgments of an advisor.  In response to the 14-item historical quiz that participants were 
tasked with completing in Chapter 5, people discounted advice and preferred their own 
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judgments on average.  However, comparing each experimental condition to the situation 
where people placed equal weight upon their own judgments and advice (0.5), only 
participants in receipt of inaccurate numerical advice and very weak reasons significantly 
discounted advice.  This may indicate a ‗boundary condition‘ where the limited plausibility of 
spurious advice is exceeded.   Yates et al. (1996) report similar findings in their discussion of 
overconfidence - there are limits to the extent that confidence can dominate advice quality.  
Here, judges perceived advisors‘ expressions of confidence that were close to 100%, in a 
probabilistic forecast (dichotomous choice) task, as reckless, rather than confident.  Hence, 
such advice is perceived as exceeding some latitude of plausibility. 
 
A further finding in Chapter 7 of this thesis was that some participants may have revised their 
judgments on the basis that the advice they considered was similar to their own unaided 
intuitive estimates.  In other words, my participants may have placed greater cognitive weight 
upon advice that was similar to their unaided judgments, than advice that was dissimilar.  
Evidence for this contention was found in Chapter 7 of this thesis where the absolute numerical 
difference between participants‘ pre-advice estimates and the advice (output-of-algorithm) was 
considered.   A significant difference was found between the scores of participants who revised 
their judgment and those who did not.  This finding supports the idea that people in receipt of 
algorithmic decompositions (US Mail and Forested Miles estimation problems) changed 
judgment, on the basis that the absolute numerical difference between a participant‘s pre-
advice estimates, and the available advice, was less for participants who subsequently revised 
their judgment, than for participants who did not revise their judgment.  
  
Judgment revision on the basis of the proximity of advice to an individual‘s unaided intuition 
may be facilitated by the same processes that underpin attitude revision.  Social cognition 
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research has established that attitude revision is more likely where the ‗reforming‘ attitude is 
less divergent from an individual‘s initial judgment (Kunda and Oleson, 1997).  This view is 
further supported by the studies reported by Yaniv (2004), and Yaniv and Harries (2004), who 
tested this idea empirically in the context of JAS.   Specifically, Yaniv (2004) examined the 
mediating role of the numerical ‗distance‘ between a judge‘s initial unaided intuition, and 
advice, upon an individual‘s cognitive weighting policy of advice (Study 2).  Here, it was 
hypothesized that an individual judge would weight advice that was numerically distant from 
advice, less so, than advice that was numerically close to a judge‘s initial unaided judgment.  
Analysis of the advice weighting policies of participants indicated that high knowledge 
participants weighted advice less as the distance between a judge‘s unaided estimate and 
advice increased.  Contrastingly, low knowledge participants did not report any systematic 
pattern in their advice weighting policies.  The preceding manipulation was repeated (Study 3), 
where advice was constituted as a constant that either ‗helped‘ judges (acceptance and acting 
upon advice could improve estimation accuracy), or hindered judges (accepting and acting 
upon advice would be deleterious to estimation accuracy).  Similar results obtained as those 
found in Study 2.  These data can be explained by the idea that high knowledge participants 
may be constrained in terms of cognition and motivation to expend significant resources 
evaluating advice messages that are highly discrepant from their own.  In constrast, low 
knowledge participants are constrained in evaluating advice because of limits on cognition and 
motivation, but also have little in the way of a pre-existing knowledge base from which to 
facilitate discrimination between spurious and useful advice.  Here, it is perhaps no surprise 
that any advice is evaluated as potentially useful.  In part, this may explain the findings 
presented in the current work, in so far as many participants chose not to revise their judgments 
post-advice (i.e. the numerical distance between a participant‘s pre-advice judgement and 
advice was large, on average, particularly in Chapters 6, 7, 8 and 9).  Hence, participants in 
receipt of advice that was not dissimilar to their own judgment pre-advice, may have been 
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more pre-disposed to revise judgment as the demands of elaborated cognition may have been 
less, than where a participant would have to ‗bridge‘ a larger cognitive ‗gap‘ between pre-
advice judgment and advice. Similarly, Yaniv and Harries (2004), report that judges are less 
likely to accept the recommendations of advisors whose advice is highly atypical of advice 
from other advisors in a multiple advisor-judge JAS polyad.  The preceding discussion 
suggests that similarity between a judge‘s unaided intuition and advice may be influential in 
the judge‘s decision to revise judgment.   
 
Determinants of judgment revision 
 
Multiple regression analysis was utilized in this thesis to determine which variables 
significantly predict judgment revision (Chapters 6-8).  However, most predictor variables that 
may have predicted judgment revision proved to be non-significant, with the exception of the 
perceived utility of advice.  Here, this variable proved to be influential upon a participant‘s 
disposition to revise judgment, on average (Chapter 6, p242), particularly when estimating 
relative frequencies (Chapter 8, p293-97).  Intuitively, advice that is evaluated positively is 
likely to be more heavily weighted in a person‘s deliberations over some issue than advice that 
is evaluated less so.  However, the measure of perceived utility of advice used in the studies 
reported in Chapters 6-8 of this thesis could be held to be overly reductionist, as there is much 
research to suggest that perceived quality of advice is a complex construct (Feng and Burleson, 
2008).  Moreover, the processes that individuals employ to evaluate advice positively, or 
negatively is currently not well understood.  Feng and Burleson comment that, ―we still know 
little about the features of advice messages that lead to positive advice outcomes such as 
positive evaluations of advice quality and strong intentions to implement the advice‖ (p850).  
Hence, the findings reported in this thesis highlight the importance of perceptions of advice 
quality in determining judgment revision, whilst simultaneously pointing to the 
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underdeveloped nature of current understanding over how people form evaluations of advice - 
a potentially fruitful avenue for future research. 
 
Direction of judgment revision 
 
Whilst perceptions of the quality advice may be influential in an individuals tendency to revise 
judgment, and people who attend to advice revise judgment post-advice more often than 
people who do not attend advice; the issue of the ‗direction‘ of judgment revision remains 
important.  The findings reported in the current work suggest that people who preferred 
reasons-based advice tended to change judgment in the ‗direction‘ of advice, on average - 
irrespective of the sub-type of advice (Chapter 5, p171-6, Chapter 6 p208-13, Chapter 7, p263).  
In contrast, people who preferred solely numeric advice did not significantly revise judgment 
in the ‗direction‘ of advice (Chapter 4, p113-14).  These findings indicate that people conform 
(to a degree) to reasons-based advice irrespective of its quality.   
 
The notion that conformity to advice is an important determinant of the direction of judgment 
revision for individuals is not universally recognized in JAS research.  Notably, Salvadori et al. 
(2001) have argued that the dynamics of a JAS interaction work against conformity to advice, 
and that, ‗JAS dynamics have lower conformity pressure than other group decision 
dyads/polyads‘ (p742).  This idea is antithetical to the findings presented here, as participants 
revised judgment such that the absolute numerical difference between a participant‘s pre-
advice initial estimate and the available advice was greater than the absolute numerical 
difference between participants post-advice and the available advice.  This pattern of results 
can be explained by the relative numerical positions of participants‘ pre-advice initial 
estimates, the numerical component of advice, and the true numerical value of the estimate.  
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Where advice and the true answer are numerically greater than a participant‘s pre-advice initial 
estimate, then any revision of judgment in the direction of advice or the true answer will be 
beneficial on average.  Where a participant‘s numerical pre-advice initial estimate falls 
between advice, and the true answer, judgment revision is in the direction of advice on 
average.  This pattern of results obtained across the experiments reported here, with the 
exception of the study reported in Chapter 8.  Here, algorithms were provided to participants as 
an aid to estimate relative frequencies, and no significant effect post-advice was reported.  
Conformity to advice appears to be an important aspect of my participant‘s estimation 
behaviour that is robust over a number of different task domains, (where relative frequencies 
did not constitute the target quantity), irrespective of whether experimental tasks were 
operationalized in terms of a JAS, or an algorithmic decomposition of some estimation 
problem.   
 
Influence of knowledge of the process of advice 
 
One influence upon judgment, and revisions of judgment, is the idea that knowledge of the 
process of advice generation should allow people to evaluate advice.  Should advice be 
evaluated positively (on the basis that the process by which the advice has been formulated is 
logical and coherent) then the advice should benefit a judge.  However, the findings reported in 
Chapters 6-8 indicate that limited improvements in estimation accuracy are available for the 
tasks that my participants completed.  Instead, my findings suggest that where people use 
algorithms to arrive at an estimate of some large quantity, their post-advice estimates are likely 
to be greater than their pre-advice estimates (Chapter 6, p198-200, Chapter 7, p259-60), but 
where algorithms are utilized to estimate relative frequencies no estimate ‗inflation‘ is evident 
(Chapter 8, p285-6).  These findings echo those of (Lichtenstein et al. 1982), in that 
participants in my studies tended to overestimate small quantities, and underestimate large 
quantities.  Relying upon ‗advice‘ in this context, by using an algorithm to relieve some of the 
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processing demands upon human cognition, could (and often did) result in sub-optimal post-
advice estimation.  Further, in terms of the extent of judgment revisions, people are not 
sensitive to the quality or complexity of algorithms utilized (Chapter 6, p209-10, Chapter 7, 
p262-64).  However, there is some evidence that people are sensitive to the proximity of the 
value of an individual‘s unaided estimate to the numerical value of advice, in terms of a 
propensity to revise judgment (Chapter 7, p266-67).  In part, MacGregor and Armstrong 
(1994) acknowledged the limitations of the algorithmic approach to estimation, by setting out 
the limited conditions under which improvements in estimation accuracy can be expected.  The 
findings reported in this thesis reinforce the idea that algorithmic decomposition (knowledge of 
the process of advice generation), is only likely to be an effective cue leading to enhanced 
estimation accuracy, where the algorithm utilized is known to be effective a priori, where the 
quantity to be estimated is ‗large‘ (six or more digits), and the quantity to be estimated is able 
to be decomposed into sub-component estimates.  The responses to the sub-component 
estimates should also not be correlated – otherwise error will exponentially increase when the 
sub-component responses are combined by the algorithm to produce advice.  These conditions 
are difficult to meet in a general sense – hence the value of algorithmic decomposition 
(knowledge of the process of advice) in terms of its general utility to estimators is limited. 
 
Determinants of accuracy 
 
Acting upon advice may not help people make more accurate estimates than people who do not 
attend to advice.  This is because where an individual‘s estimate falls between advice and the 
true answer, people tend to revise their judgment in the direction of advice (irrespective of its 
quality), suggesting that people indiscriminately conform to advice (Chapter 4, p118-120).  
Multiple regression analysis in Chapters 6-8 sought to determine the determinants of 
estimation accuracy.  Here, participants‘ performance was sensitive to the influence of initial 
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estimation accuracy, the accuracy of advice, and post-advice confidence (Chapter 6, p238-41, 
Chapter 7, p269-70, Chapter 8, p291-93).  These findings do little to suggest that algorithmic 
decomposition is generally effective in relaxing the cognitive demands upon people when they 
conjure with a troublesome estimation problem.  Instead, these findings highlight the domain 
and task specific nature of the existing findings in the extant literature, where it is proposed 
that decomposition, in some form, facilitates rigorous consideration of each attribute in 
complex estimation problems (Fischer, 1977; Kleinmuntz 1990; MacGregor, 1988, 1991, 
2001).  Indeed the findings reported in the current work are more aligned to the conclusions of 
Lichtenstein and Weathers (1998), who found that, even when people were trained to create 
their own algorithmic decompositions (to estimate uncertain quantities), performance was not 
improved to any great degree.  Moreover, these authors also found that on some occasions the 
use of algorithmic decomposition could inhibit accurate estimation (Study 2).  In short, 
knowledge of the process of advice generation was not a sufficient cue to participants in the 
studies reported here, to facilitate significant improvements in estimation accuracy.  The 
findings reported in this thesis instead point to the robust influence of the conformity to advice 
account.  Where estimators‘ unaided intuitive estimates were more accurate than advice from 
an advisor, any revision of judgment in the direction of advice will be deleterious in terms of 
ultimate estimation accuracy.  For accuracy to be beneficial for estimators, it clearly must be 
more accurate than the level of performance that estimators are able to achieve unaided.  This 
account does not support the idea that even inaccurate advice is spur to enhanced ‗cognitive 
activation‘ (Brehmer and Hagafors, 1986) that may be a route to improved ultimate estimation 
accuracy. 
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People are constrained in their abilities to assess and use advice in their deliberations 
even when advice is objectively ‘good’. 
 
In the absence of feedback that enables people to beneficially revise their intuitions of some 
estimate, or quantity, people are constrained and limited in their abilities to separate out advice 
that is potentially beneficial (if acted upon), and spurious advice.  Instead, the studies reported 
here indicate that people may be inclined to act upon any advice irrespective of its quality - if 
they choose to revise their own intuitions in a ‗one-shot‘ advice giving exchange.  This idea is 
evidenced by the observation that people are not able to easily tell the difference between 
‗good‘ and ‗bad‘ advice (Chapter 4, p120, Chapter 5, p171-72, Chapter 6, p206-8, Chapter 7, 
p264-65, Chapter 8, p288, Chapter 9, p315-16, p321).  
 
However, research by Soll and Larick (2009), suggests that at least in part, people are able to 
mitigate the worst effects of constraints upon advice evaluation by employing a repertoire of 
weighted averaging and choosing strategies.  For these authors, the gap between a normative 
benchmark of accuracy and sub-optimal estimation accuracy following advice, can be 
explained by people‘s inability to discern when to apply a weighted averaging strategy, or a 
choosing strategy in response to advice offered by advisors.  The data in this thesis does not 
address this issue directly, but does show that people are insensitive to the quality of advice 
across various domains and tasks.  Soll and Larick show experimentally that an averaging 
strategy should dominate a choosing strategy in a variety of environmental contexts.  Indeed, 
Herzog and Hertwig (2009) concur that an averaging strategy over the judgments of a judge 
and advisor is desirable in terms of extracting the ‗good‘ portion of advice from a ‗one-shot‘ 
advice giving scenario. These authors go further however, by arguing that an averaging 
strategy is also possible for individuals - providing that an individual forms at least two 
judgments about some estimation issue, and that each judgment is based on a different source 
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of information.  Under this account errors and biases largely cancel each other out, leading to 
improved estimation accuracy.   
 
Chapter 9 in this thesis however, tasked people with estimating the IMRs of ten countries.  
Here, advice was constituted as GDP advice (which was predictive of the target quantity), 
Population advice (which was not predictive of the target IMR) and GDP and Population 
advice.  Both Population estimate advice and GDP advice were accurate, and taken from the 
CIA Factbook.  Hence neither, averaging or choosing was an optimal strategy for estimating 
IMRs.  Under these conditions where people revise judgment post-advice, the influence of 
GDP advice is likely to be beneficial in terms of accurately estimating IMRs, whilst Population 
estimate advice was not.  Consistent with the results of reported in Chapters 4-8, people in 
receipt of advice (irrespective of quality) revised judgment more often than people not in 
receipt of advice (Chapter 9, p315-16), and overestimated IMRs pre-advice, on average (p312) 
(Lichtenstein et al. 1982). 
 
Where the results of the study reported in Chapter 9 differed markedly from the previous 
studies (Chapters 4-8), was the analysis of participants‘ ability to rank order countries by IMRs 
– ordinal accuracy.  Here, results suggested that people are successful in improving accuracy 
when tasked with rank ordering countries by IMRs (ordinal accuracy), and in receipt of a 
single advice type (irrespective of the quality of advice).  This was somewhat surprising given 
that Population estimate advice was not predictive of the target quantity.  It was suggested that 
this might be explained by a failure to successfully randomly allocate participants between 
experimental conditions – participants in the Population estimate advice group were older than 
those in the GDP advice group, on average, and may have possessed greater world knowledge.  
Moreover, ordinal accuracy does not improve where an individual is in receipt of both advice 
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types (Chapter 9, p322-5).  This may suggest that due to cognitive limitations, people were 
unable to assess and use the potentially beneficial GDP component of advice to improve 
ordinal accuracy.  This position is further supported in so far as metric accuracy for 
participants in the GDP and Population estimate advice group, did not improve post-advice 
(Chapter 9, p323).  These findings do not fully support the idea that people are able to 
recognize predictive information in an estimation task, and recall cues that enable individuals 
to rank order target items (ordinal accuracy). (Gigerenzer, et al. 1999), because where advice 
was constituted as a combination of predictive and non-predictive information (GDP and 
Population estimate advice), people were unable to separate out the predictive (GDP element) 
of advice to improve metric estimation accuracy.  Instead, there is limited support for the idea 
that by conforming to advice that is predictive of the target quantity (solely GDP advice), 
people are able to improve estimation accuracy.   This account was leant further support when 
the absolute amount of judgment change data was examined - there were no significant 
differences, on average, between advice types (Chapter 9, p326).  These findings strongly 
suggest that people are unable to adequately differentiate between potentially beneficial advice, 
and poor advice in a ‗one-shot‘ advice exchange. 
 
10.4 Implication of the findings from the current work for the real world  
 
The preceding discussion leads to consideration of what implications these findings might have 
in an applied sense.  Perhaps the most important theme here is that human judgment is 
influenced by a number of factors, and should not be examined outside of its social context.  
The preceding discussion has also shown that the psychological construct of advice is multi-
faceted, and that people are not well equipped to differentiate between potentially beneficial 
and poor advice across a range of task domains (in a single advice exchange episode).  
However, the findings reported in this thesis can make some contributions to how individuals 
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can improve their judgments, and also show how some organizational decisions and judgments 
(employment decisions, mentoring and socialization) can be viewed as analogous to the judge-
advisor informational exchange.  
 
Advice for judges 
 
In order to fully utilize the cognitive capacity for judgment, judges should avoid (where 
possible) single judge-advisor information exchanges (particular where a judgment concerns a 
non-routine, or novel decision).  This is because people are ill equipped to differentiate 
between potentially beneficial and poor advice under these circumstances, and often seek to 
lighten the demands of cognitive processing by over-weighting peripheral cues - such as the 
credibility of the advisor(s).  Second, if circumstances dictate that a single judge-advisor 
information exchange is necessary judges should aggregate their own judgments with those of 
the advisor (where a clear solution to the problem of judgment is not evident).  Judges should 
discount unelaborated advice (i.e. solely numeric advice), in favour of (at least) statistical, or 
elaborated reasons-based advice.  If a judge finds it necessary to enter a single judge-advisor 
interaction, where a clear solution to a problem of judgment is not evident, and unelaborated 
advice is not available, but numeric advice is available, judges should rank order multiple 
pieces of advice by some target criterion variable.  Where advice is constituted in solely 
numeric terms, judges should revert to a simple averaging strategy, as this likely to be the least 
deleterious course of action, on average.  
 
Advice for Advisors 
 
Advisors who wish to influence judges should provide advice that is elaborated and reasons-
based, low in quantification, with information evidenced by a credible source.  Advisors may 
also wish to ‗pitch‘ their advice close to the unaided intuitive judgments of the judge 
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(proximity between a judge‘s judgment and that of an advisor may be more likely to result in 
revisions of judgment on the part of the judge).  Algorithmic decompositions of estimation 
problems may only be persuasive under limited and defined circumstances (MacGregor and 
Armstrong, 1994).  Here, advisors should not provide algorithms for estimates of extremely 
small quantities, or quantities expressed as relative frequencies.  The following sections focus 
upon some implications for the organizational sciences based upon the findings of the current 
work. 
 
Employment decisions 
 
The extant literature of the organizational sciences has typically viewed employment decisions 
from the perspective of the organization, yet the results presented in this thesis potentially 
speak to employment decisions from the perspective of the employee.  This is because as 
Slaugher and Highhouse (2003, p12) argue that, ―choices among job alternatives are almost 
never made in isolation.  Individuals choosing among jobs are likely to consult those with 
whom they have social contact, such as friends, and those individuals for whom the decision 
will have indirect yet important consequences, such as family members‖.  This position invites 
many issues that this thesis does not address, yet the results presented here do suggest that 
employment decisions maybe influenced by elaborated, or reasons-based advice, and that less 
confident potential employees may seek out more job related advice than more confident 
potential employees.  Furthermore, potential employees who face a complex employment 
decision task, maybe susceptible to seeking more advice and being inappropriately influenced 
by peripheral cues within that advice, in order to reduce the complexity of the decision.  A 
particularly salient scenario might be an employee‘s decision to leave an organization.  Here, 
advice from a variety of sources is likely to be sought, including co-workers, family and 
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friends.  Inappropriately, weighting advice in this context, or inappropriately discounting 
advice, could prove significantly costly to an individual.   
 
Mentoring 
 
It is easy to recognise the outlines of a prototypical JAS dyad (or polyad) when considering the 
role that mentors or protégés assume in an organizational context. Here, protégés can be seen 
in the role of a judge, and mentors can be viewed as an advisor.   The psychological or 
emotional content that potentially characterizes a mentor-protégé advice exchange is not within 
the parameters of the present work (but perhaps should be considered in conceptualizing the 
psychological construct of advice).  However, the advisory exchange (concerning strategies for 
achieving work related objectives in an organizational context), can encompass 
recommendations for particular courses of action.  Given the social nature of the relationship 
between mentor and protégé, it perhaps should not be expected that protégés should, or would, 
egocentrically discount advice to any great extent.  However, the findings presented in this 
thesis suggest that the propensity of a judge to accept and act upon the advice of an advisor is 
likely to be mediated by the perceived confidence of the advisor, or the similarity between the 
judge‘s unaided judgment and the advice proffered by the advisor.  
 
Socialization 
 
Although currently there is no general model (either prescriptive or descriptive) for how new 
recruits become socialized within an organization, it is possible to discern how new recruits 
might seek out advice from members of an organization - both formally and informally.  Dalal 
and Bonaccio (2006) make the observation that such an information search is akin to judges 
seeking advice from advisor(s).  Further, JAS research might be the lens through which the 
degree and extent of judgment revisions on the part of new recruits to an organization could be 
examined (when presented with advice from both confident and less confident advisors – who 
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provide elaborated or unelaborated judgments/advice).  Further, judgment revision could be 
influenced by the extent a new recruit possesses previous work related, or domain related, 
experience and is hence resistant to the influence of advice. 
 
10.5 Caveats, limitations and some perils of conducting research in the area of advice 
giving and taking. 
 
This section will discuss certain caveats to the findings of the current research, before 
considering some of the methodological pitfalls that researchers may face when undertaking 
similar research in the future. 
 
The findings reported in this thesis should be accepted with a number of caveats in mind.  
Firstly, the studies reported here address the situation of a single judge-advisor informational 
exchange.  Here, a strong theme that emerges is that people are constrained in their abilities to 
differentiate between potentially beneficial advice and poor advice.  In part this can be 
attributed to the limitations of human cognition, and it could be easy to conclude that this 
might be the central message from this research.  However, it is clear from the extant literature 
that people can differentiate between potentially beneficial and poor advice where advice is 
sought and considered from advisor(s) repeatedly (Yaniv and Kleinberger, 2000).  Here, 
judges weight the advice from accurate advisors more so than advice from less accurate 
advisors.  Further, evidence emerged in Chapter 9 of this thesis that the constraints upon 
people to differentiate between potentially beneficial and poor advice, may not be absolute.  
People retain some ability to rank order target quantities by some criterion variable even where 
the judge-advisor exchange is limited to a single episode.  Hence, the results reported in this 
thesis are limited in so far as they address only a single judge-advisor exchange of information. 
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A second caveat concerns the operationalization of the advice construct used in the current 
work.  A major limitation in the extant JAS literature is that advice has been operationalized by 
experimental considerations, rather than in an ecological sense.  Defining advice in solely 
numeric terms (which is common in JAS research) is clearly unsatisfactory because this does 
not fully acknowledge the social interaction implicit in real world advice giving and taking 
scenarios (Heath and Gonzales, 1995; Gibbons, 2003).  There are many elements of advice not 
captured by solely numeric advice - the provision of social support to a judge, or the 
endorsement of a judge‘s decision in addition to the provision of information or rationales for 
alternatives not originally considered by a judge.  A step towards a broader conceptualization 
of the nature of advice, and operationalizations for experimental purposes, has been attempted 
in this thesis where advice has been constituted as reasons-based (in argumentative form, in 
variance in the quality of supporting rationales, and in the provision of process information).  
However, the current work can only be accepted if the limitations of the operationalizations of 
advice presented here are acknowledged. 
 
In a similar vein, it is necessary to acknowledge the possible limitations to the use of solely 
numeric advice as a meaningful form of advice. Arguably, such an advice form lacks 
ecological validity, and is perhaps not likely to be offered or accepted without additional 
contextual information - given the prevailing social mores in the UK.  Further, solely numeric 
advice may prime people to attend to peripheral environmental cues.  This is because people 
are predisposed to conserve cognitive resources, instead of expending cognitive resources 
centrally processing the message content of advice high in quantification.  Statistical 
information constituted as advice may be a more meaningful way to convey a numeric advice 
message.  This is because statistical information may suggest associations about the population 
from which the statistic is drawn beyond the actual figures conveyed. 
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Further caveats need to be acknowledged in terms of the operationalization of reason-based 
advice in the current work.  All the reasons-based advice was formulated by the author and 
none was provided by any advisor(s).  Clearly, this deception raises the issue over whether 
participants actually believed that the reasons-based advice in Chapter 4 and 5, emanated from 
real advisors, and whether the methods proposed by advisors in Chapters 6, 7 and 8 for 
solutions to the estimation problems were actual solutions from real people, or merely the 
product of the author.  Whilst there appears to be little evidence to favour one alternative over 
another, missing data might be indicative of the idea that participants were not totally 
convinced of the ‗cover story‘.  These considerations raise further questions of the 
appropriateness of the use of almanac ‗quiz‘ type tasks, and laboratory experiments generally.  
Clearly, tasks such as these, under typically artificial circumstances may not produce data that 
can meaningfully address potential influences upon human judgment.  This is a potentially 
serious issue for both the current work, and for research in the area of advice giving and advice 
taking generally. 
 
There are numerous potential pitfalls researchers may face when attempting empirical work in 
the field of human judgments.  Discussion of some of the methodological shortcomings 
evident in the current work may serve as a guide to future researchers about pitfalls they may 
wish to avoid.  Perhaps the most obvious issue that is apparent from a reading of Chapter 4 in 
this thesis concerns the issue of counterbalancing the experimental stimuli.  Here, the 
numerical value of advice (both reasons-based and solely numerical) was not adequately 
counterbalanced.  This meant that reasons-based advice was less error prone (35 years, on 
average), than solely numerical advice (48 years, on average) (see Table 4.1).  Although this 
counterbalancing scheme does not appear to have significantly biased the results of the study, 
the manipulation could have been better formulated so that the aggregate numerical component 
of each advice type matched.  Further, that the numerical component of each piece of reasons-
 331 
based advice was identical to a piece of numeric advice.  In a wider sense this issue highlights 
the pitfalls researchers may face when constructing experimental materials.  This issue is 
significant as a participant‘s propensity to accept and act on advice is mediated by the nature of 
the estimation task.  One example of the mediating influence of the experimental task, upon a 
person‘s propensity to attend to and act upon advice, is the perceived complexity of the 
experimental task.  The idea that task complexity may mediate judgment revision should be 
further scrutinized. This is because ‗complexity‘ has been defined in several different ways.  
Gino and Moore (2007) for example, defined ‗complexity‘ on the basis of clear or blurred 
photographs utilized for the purpose of experimental stimuli.  Clearly, the construct of 
‗complexity‘ can be (and perhaps should be) defined in a multiplicity of ways, and the effects 
upon judgment revision tested empirically. 
 
A further idea explored in Studies 6-8 in this thesis was that knowledge of the process of 
advice generation (algorithmic decompositions of estimation problems), should be a sufficient 
cue to allow participants to evaluate advice.  However, it is clear from the results reported here 
that knowledge of the process of advice is not an effective cue for distinguishing quality of 
advice, when advice is constituted as an algorithmic decomposition of known (and unknown) 
effectiveness.  However, this does not necessarily imply that knowledge of the process of 
advice is never a successful environmental cue to the quality of advice.  The results from the 
studies reported in Chapters 6-8 are of limited generalizability – because the population from 
which participants were drawn consisted of mostly students from a specific socio-economic 
background, tasked with completing novel and unfamiliar estimation problems, for which they 
may not have been adequately motivated.  Clearly, this does not imply all estimation aids 
based upon syllogistic logic, or Socratic intervention, are by implication as limited as the 
algorithmic approach utilized in these studies.  On the contrary, commercial airline pilots are 
trained to rely upon instructional algorithms (that are high in ecological validity) to control 
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aircraft, and avert potential dangers to safe travel.  Here, knowledge of how the instructional 
algorithms for controlling aircraft were produced is clearly important to the acceptance of the 
advice that such algorithms provide to aircrew (Scriven, 2000).  This observation implies that 
knowledge of the process of advice generation is an important issue that requires further 
investigation (i.e. the formulation and manipulation of algorithms that are ecologically valid, 
and meaningful to participants), in order that the effects can observed in terms of judgment 
revision (or not).  Researchers may wish in future to pre-test the effectiveness of a repertoire of 
algorithms, and match these algorithms to different task domains prior to designing studies.  
   
A related issue to the development of estimation tasks for experimentation, concerns validity.  
A major pitfall for researchers is that laboratory based estimation problems (usually of almanac 
type questions), may not simulate either the task domains, or the conditions, under which 
people make estimates of quantities in their everyday experience.  This has significant 
implications for understanding the cognitive processes that facilitate decisions and estimates.  
It is parsimonious to suppose that in everyday life many judge-advisor(s) exchanges are 
loosely structured, informal, often (but not always) face-to-face, and based upon a history of 
trust between a judge and his/her advisors.  Capturing this reality within the confines of an 
experiment is likely to be problematic, yet it should be possible for researchers to at least 
develop experimental materials that are more centrally situated within the everyday experience 
of participants – to a far greater extent than has been accomplished in this thesis, or in the 
extant literature. 
 
The ecological validity of experimental materials must also address the issue of participant 
motivation in future studies.  Often this issue has been addressed by some nominal financial 
payment for participation (Budescu and Rantilla, 2000; Yaniv, 2004), rather than performance, 
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in the extant advice giving and advice taking literature.  Clearly, the motivation of participants 
in the studies reported in the current work may have been variable, given the number of 
missing data entry values in some cells of the experiments.  This issue could possibly be 
mitigated by the formulation of more valid experimental tasks which may intrinsically 
motivate participants, and by linking payments only to levels of performance (extrinsic 
motivation). 
 
The vast majority of participants in the studies reported in this thesis were students, and hence 
it is difficult to make the argument that findings generalize to populations other than students.  
Whilst this is a perennial debate in social science research, researchers in the field of advice 
giving and advice taking should at least consider careful representative sampling of target 
populations.  For reasons of practicality, sampling issues were dominated by concerns about 
accessibility to participants in this thesis. 
 
Moreover, the use of IT, and online surveys should be carefully evaluated during the design of 
studies.  Two of the studies in this thesis were developed so that participants could respond 
online.  Future researchers should approach online methods of data capture with caution, as 
some knowledge of IT hardware (the servers on which the survey is to be hosted, the 
programming language in which the survey will be written, and the means by which data will 
be stored and retrieved) is essential for success in this area.  The author naively assumed that 
these issues were easily surmountable – when they were not.  Hence, some of the missing data 
reported in each study could be attributable to IT issues such as validation of data entries.  
Further, the author‘s lack of IT skills may have not allowed a full exploration of the 
capabilities of the MouseLabWeb software used in Chapter 4.  Here, the experimental design 
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could have been extended in ways that made more meaningful use of process tracing methods 
to investigate judge-advisor interactions. 
 
A further issue that is clearly important, yet not fully acknowledged in the extant JAS literature 
concerns the measures that researchers have used to analyze judgment revision.  Many studies 
of advice utilization in JAS research have used measures based upon absolute difference 
scores, where the judge‘s final decision is the combination of an initial intuition mediated by 
some form of advice from an advisor.  Harvey and Fischer (1997), for example defined advice 
taking as a ratio of two differences – the difference between a judge‘s post-advice estimate and 
the same judge‘s pre-advice estimate, divided by the difference between an advisors 
recommendation and the judge‘s pre-advice estimate.  I used a similar measure in Chapter 5 – 
WOA (Yaniv, 2004).  Here, WOA can be defined as ¦f – i¦ / ¦a – i¦, where i, f, and a, represent 
initial, final and advice respectively.  Further, it is argued that the weight of advice is well 
defined if the final estimate falls between the initial estimate and the advice.  Expressed as a 
proportion, WOA reflects the weight that a participant places upon advice (it is inversely 
related to the extent that the advice is discounted).  Hence, advice weighted as ‗0‘ indicates that 
a participant has completely discounted the advice and is fully convinced of the veracity of 
their own judgment, whereas a WOA of ‗1‘ indicates that a participant has jettisoned their own 
initial judgment and entirely adopted the advice available to them in determining a final 
estimate.  A WOA of 0.5 would indicate that both the advice and a participant‘s initial 
judgment were weighted equally.  Similarly, Yaniv and Kleinberger (2000), defined a further 
measure – weight of own estimate (WOE).  Here, WOE can be defined as ¦a – f¦ / ¦a – i¦, where 
i, f, and a, represent initial, final and advice respectively.  There are a number of issues of 
concern to JAS researchers, that are implied by the use of measures of absolute difference 
scores discussed below. 
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Perhaps an obvious problem for researchers when analyzing data derived from the measures of 
absolute difference, outlined in the preceding paragraph, is that where advice is the same as a 
judge‘s initial estimate, the denominator in each of the ratios is zero.  However, it may not be 
the case that zero indicates absolutely no consideration of advice, and hence the product of the 
measure is ill-defined.  A similar problem arises in the case of both Harvey‘s (1997) advice 
taking measure, and Yaniv‘s (2004), WOA, if a judge‘s final estimate is no different from the 
same judge‘s initial estimate.  Here, the product of the measure – zero, may not be indicative 
of absolutely no consideration of advice.  In these circumstances it might be that the advice 
served only to confirm the judge in the veracity of his/her initial intuition.  Further, the WOA 
measure does not adequately differentiate situations where a judge‘s final estimate approaches 
advice, from situations where a judge‘s final estimate moves away from advice.  Possibly, such 
a scenario may be captured by measures of confidence - which may increase as a result.  
Where a judge‘s final estimate is identical to advice when the WOE is considered, this 
indicates that no weight is attached to the judge‘s initial intuition.  Further, this measure does 
not distinguish situations where a judge‘s final estimate approaches the numerical value of 
advice, or ‗overshoots‘ the numerical value of advice.  Both WOA and WOE are bounded at 
the lower extremity by zero, yet have no upper bound – ‗overshoots‘ are typically 
characterized by values greater than 1.00 for WOA, or moves away from advice (in numerical 
terms) for WOE.  Lastly, these measures fail to treat relative changes differently.  A judge who 
revises his/her  initial intuition from 50 to 75 on receipt of advice of 100, is no different from a 
different judge who revises their initial intuition from 20 to 40 on receipt of advice of 100.  
Both judges are measured as revising their judgment by 50%.  This is problematic in so far as 
the study reported in Chapter 6 found that the propensity of a judge to revise their judgment is 
linked to the proximity of a judge‘s initial intuition to advice.  One alternative to the problems 
associated with measures based upon absolute difference scores is approaches based upon 
regression, which I now turn to. 
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Regression based modelling was utilized in the studies in Chapters 6, 7 and 8 in this thesis, and 
is an approach that could be further explored by JAS researchers.  Essentially, the percentage 
variance in an endogenous criterion variable is predicted by multiple exogenous variables.  In 
other words, a judge‘s final deliberation is regressed upon multiple sources of information 
simultaneously.  Further, where judges‘ face several decision problems, future studies could 
contemplate the computation of advice utilization indices within judges, rather than between 
judges which is implied by the use of measures based upon absolute difference scores.  Hence, 
there is a strong argument for the development of regression based approaches in future JAS 
studies.  One further issue of measurement is considered next, that of ordinal accuracy. 
 
The study reported in Chapter 9 raised the possibility that ordinal (i.e. rank order of target 
items) accuracy, and metric (i.e. point estimate) accuracy, may be dependent on independent 
cognitive processes.  Whilst the results of this study did not fully support this proposition, JAS 
experimental studies have not, to date, examined how judges utilize advice to facilitate ordinal 
estimates.  This appears to be a potentially fruitful line of enquiry that, in conjunction with 
some or all, of the recommendations made here could produce insights into the cognitive 
architecture that makes judgment revision possible.   
 
10.6 Future directions 
 
Perhaps the main difficulty in setting out future directions for research can be attributed to the 
current lack of a unifying comprehensive theoretical framework for studies in the area of 
advice giving and advice taking.  This is unfortunate, as comparisons between studies, and 
across studies, are problematic due to the hetereogeneity of approaches, methods, and levels of 
analysis reported by researchers.  What has been attempted in the current work is to examine 
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influences upon judgments where advice is provided in a single judge-advisor exchange.  
Whilst this may appear limiting, people often base their judgments on such an interaction (e.g. 
when accessing advice from government bodies, medical and legal professionals).  Clearly, the 
preceding scenarios are not comprehensive in terms of any taxonomy of judge-advisor 
interactions, nor do they preclude instances of repeated judge-advisor interactions where 
judgments may be revised and updated in the light of new information.  However, it is 
parsimonious to suppose that the single judge-advisor episode is not uncommon and hence 
deserves serious consideration.  Future research could usefully further examine the 
circumstances in which beneficial judgment revision is the outcome of such an exchange.  A 
significant first step might be to address the issue of what constitutes advice, and then move on 
to discuss operationalizations of advice for experimental purposes. 
   
Investigations under a wider rubric of advice will no doubt operationalize advice as a multi-
dimensional construct, where ‘advice‘ is analyzed in terms of its many component factors 
(Dalal and Bonaccio, 2006).  The appeal for research of this nature was motivated by the work 
of Cross, Borgatti and Parker (2001), who identified five types of advice ordered along a single 
dimension: solutions, meta-knowledge, problem reformulation, validation, and legitimization.  
These authors argue that an advisor was likely to provide advice characterized by solutions, 
followed by the remaining four advice types, when advice was sought in an organizational or 
workplace context.  Such a conceptualization of advice is somewhat removed from the current 
operationalization of advice in JAS research.  Hence, future JAS studies should acknowledge 
advice as a multi-dimensional construct, and operationalize measures for the purpose of 
experimentation.  A useful example of the utility of a re-conceptualization of advice in a judge-
advisor interaction is provided by Dalal and Bonaccio (2006), who drawing on the work of 
Goldsmith (2000), argue that advice may overcome a judge‘s reticence to revise an unaided 
judgment, if it was to follow emotional support (p47).  Hence, a re-conceptualization and 
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operationalization of exactly what constitutes ‗advice‘; in the context of JAS research is a 
necessary precursor to a greater understanding of the cognitive architecture which facilitates 
beneficial judgment revision. 
 
A second issue for future research concerns the formulation of ecologically valid experimental 
tasks, and the recruitment of participants whose experience encompasses familiarity with such 
tasks.  The author was aware of some of these issues prior to embarking on the current project, 
but was constrained in terms of time and resources in my ability to fully address these issues in 
this thesis.  Unfortunately, this leaves many potential avenues of interest unexplored.  The 
ecological validity of the experimental tasks participants carried out in the current work is 
seriously limiting.  These tasks were novel and unfamiliar to participants and clearly do not 
reveal the full extent of influences upon judgment revision.  Future research could beneficially 
focus upon experimental tasks that more fully simulate real world activities that people 
commonly engage in.  This may be achievable by collaborations with ‗real world‘ 
organizations, where researchers could possibly conduct experiments disguised as work related 
activities.  This possibility could also simultaneously limit experimental demand 
characteristics, achieve acceptable levels of participant motivation, and more realistically 
simulate judge-advisor interactions that may provide both theoretical and applied knowledge 
about the cognitive processes that underpin advice solicitation, evaluation of advice, and 
combining advice with a judge‘s unaided intuition. 
 
A related issue concerns the population from which participants for the current work were 
drawn.  The majority of participants were undergraduate students enrolled at the University of 
Durham (UK).  Hence, the findings from the current work are limited in terms of generalizing 
to other populations (in terms of age, experience, social background etc.).  Engaging with real 
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world organizations (as previously discussed) offers one way to relax some of the constraints 
upon the generalizability of findings.  Organizations offer researchers potential populations of 
participants with a wider range of characteristics (in terms of age, experience, motivation and 
social background), and is currently an underdeveloped area of research from the perspective 
of single judge-advisor exchange episodes – which would be an appropriate area for future 
research.   
 
Participants in the current work were randomly allocated between experimental conditions 
(although there may have been a problem with this experimental control procedure in Chapter 
9).  However, no attempt was made to match participants on important characteristics between 
conditions – no measure of task relevant knowledge was taken prior to the experimental 
procedure, and hence individual differences between important characteristics of participants 
may not have been normally distributed across experimental conditions.  This is an important 
issue that should be incorporated into future experimental designs. 
 
A range of experimental design issues were encountered by the author in the current work, and 
perhaps the most obvious concerns control.  The counterbalancing scheme involving the 
accuracy of the numerical component of advice in Chapter 4 was not well thought out, and 
future research should ensure that stricter experimental control procedures are adhered to.  
Furthermore, a tension appears in Chapter 9 between the author‘s attempt to ensure random 
allocation of participants between experimental conditions and the overall balance of numbers 
of participants in each experimental condition.  Ultimately, this resulted in some cells in the 
subsequent analysis having such low N‘s that it was impossible to have confidence that any 
significant differences that were found by statistical testing were real, or merely random.  
Clearly, the issues of random allocation of participants and an approximate balance of numbers 
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of participants in each cell of the analysis should be seriously considered during the data 
collection stage of subsequent research. 
 
A further important direction for future research is to establish the cognitive processes that 
allow people to make evaluations of advice.  This thesis has established that people prefer 
elaborated rationales as an aid that relaxes some of the cognitive demands upon centrally 
processing advice messages, yet it has not yet been established what attributes of elaborated, or 
reasons-based advice are most significant in this respect.  Clearly, individual differences 
between people in terms of the degree of knowledge that can be mustered to address estimation 
problems, in conjunction with the motivation and confidence of individuals to estimate 
accurately, coupled with the similarity of advice to an individual‘s unaided intuition may 
interact to facilitate the process of evaluation.  However, in what proportion and in what 
configuration remains an empirical question. 
 
Moreover, an important and under-researched issue is the influence of a judge upon an 
advisor‘s propensity to provide appropriate advice (Jonas and Frey, 2003).  One of the few 
extant studies to consider this issue conducted by Gibbons et al. (2003) examined the influence 
of a judge‘s unaided intuition upon an advisor‘s subsequent recommendation and confidence.  
Here, advisors were able to offer advice to a judge where the judge‘s initial unaided intuition 
conflicted with the judgment of a judge.  In these circumstances, advisors were more disposed 
to offer advice.  Here, research is necessary to determine the mediating variables of the 
confidence of a judge (in terms of self-efficacy), the confidence of the judge in the abilities of 
the advisor(s) to provide useful advice, the influence upon the advisor of the elaborated nature 
of information flows in committees, and the influence of organizational hierarchy upon both 
the propensity, and content of advice advisor(s) may offer.   
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Ultimately, future research should acknowledge the influence of advice timing upon judgment 
revision post-advice.  Some JAS studies have precluded judges from forming initial intuitions 
in advance of an experimental task and associated advice (Budescu and Rantilla, 2000; Harvey 
et al. 2000, Sniezek and Van Swol, 2001).  Participants in these studies were prevented from 
accessing their own autonomous cognitions prior to receiving advice, and hence are ‗cued‘ 
towards the recommendation of the advisor.  One result of ‗cueing‘ is that participants may 
differentially process information, spending less cognitive resources considering ‗uncued‘ 
information, and generally becoming overconfident in the value of the information that is 
processed (Sniezek and Buckley, 1995).  A further consequence of preventing judges forming 
a judgment prior to the advent of advice is that judges may be unaware of the influence of 
advice, upon the formation of their ‗own‘ judgment (Koehler and Beauregard, 2006).  These 
authors suggest that judges are either unaware of the influence of advice, when forming their 
‗own‘ judgments; or unable to separate advice from their own cognitions and deliberations 
when making judgments (Koehler and Beauregard, 2006).  Clearly, the interaction between the 
temporal presentation of advice and other variables is likely to influence the outcome of 
judgment.   
 
In sum, the preceding experimental studies have framed, explored, and operationalized, 
significant questions of interest of concern to JAS researchers.  Further, recommendations for 
methodological improvements have been made in the design, operationalization, and execution 
of future JAS studies.  Ultimately, this contribution is consistent with the appeal of theorists 
such as Payne et al.(1993) in so far as, ‗the social context of decisions has been a neglected 
part of decision research . . . and is a area worthy of much greater study‘ (p255). 
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Appendix 1 
 
MouseLabWeb interface screens 
 
Screen 1 
 
Start of experiment 
Subject name:  
  
 
 
Screen 2 
 
 
Introduction and Instructions 
 
In this questionnaire you will be asked to estimate the date of notable events that have occurred 
within the last 300 years. Below, we ask you to make estimates to three questions about which 
you may have very little knowledge. Even though you may find these questions difficult, we 
ask that you do your best to make the most accurate assessment that you can. Please answer all 
the questions that follow, and avoid the use of the backspace key in empty text boxes.  
 
 
Next Page
 
 
 
 343 
 Screen 3 
 
Below, we ask you to make an estimate to a question concerning a specific historical event that 
has occurred in the last 300 years (1700 - 2006) - about which you may have very little 
knowledge. Even though you may find the question difficult, we ask that you do your best to 
make the most accurate assessment that you can.  
 
In what year was the first Japanese railway opened?  
 
Put your answer here  
 
Since you may not know the exact answer to the question, we now move on to assess how 
confident that you are in the answer of you have just given.  
 
We ask that you put both a lower year and a higher year, such that you are fairly sure that the 
true year of the opening of the first Japanese railway lies between these lower, and higher 
bounds.  
 
Please provide a lower bound, and a higher bound between which you are 95% certain that the 
true answer – whatever that might be – lies. 
Lower bound . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .true answer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Upper bound  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
 
 
Next Page
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Recall that your estimate of the year that the first Japanese railway opened was - ****  
Recall that you were 95% certain that the true answer (whatever that might be) was a number 
between **** and ****  
 
Which person‘s answer did you find most helpful?  
 
None 
 
Person A 
 
Person B 
 
Person C 
 
Person D 
 
Person E 
 
Person F 
 
Person G 
 
Person H 
In light of the above responses, do you wish to amend your previous 
answer?  
  
If you have answered 'YES' to the above question, you MUST put your revised estimate here 
 
 
 
Next Page
 
 
 
 
No 
 
Yes 
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Screen 5 
Recall that your estimate of the year that the first Japanese railway opened 
was - ****  
Recall that you were 95% certain that the true answer (whatever that may 
be) was a number between **** and ****  
Recall that your new best estimate of the year that the first Japanese 
railway opened was -  
Recall that the advice that you found useful was -  
None of the advice was useful to you 
Please tell us the reasons why you changed your judgment in the box below.  
 
If you did not change your judgment, please tell us the reasons why you did not 
change judgment in the box below.  
 
 
Next Page
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Screen 6 
Recall that your estimate of the year that the first Japanese railway opened 
was - ****  
Recall that you were 95% certain that the true answer (whatever that may 
be) was a number between **** and ****  
Recall that your revised estimate of the year that the first Japanese 
Railway opened was -  
Recall that the advice that you found useful was -  
None of the advice was useful to you 
How confident are you that your revised estimate is accurate? If you have not 
revised your estimate, then how confident are you that your unrevised estimate 
is accurate? 
 
Please provide a lower bound, and a higher bound between which you are 95 % 
certain that the true answer – whatever that may be – lies.  
 
Lower bound . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .true answer . . . . . . . . . . . . .Higher bound  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   
 
Next Page
 
Thanks! 
Thanks for joining this experiment.  
You can close the browser window.
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Appendix II 
 
Appendix II:  14 questionnaire items and correct dates 
 
1. In what year was the telephone invented by Alexander Bell? (1876) 
2. In what year did India gain independence from Britain? (1947) 
3. In what year did Henry Ford first produce the Model T car? (1908) 
4. In what year did Mao Zedung and Zhu De lead communists on the ‗Long March‘ 
through China? (1934) 
5. In what year were diamonds first discovered at Kimberley in South Africa? (1867) 
6. In what year was the first general election held in Japan? (1890) 
7. In what year did Egypt nationalise the Suez Canal? (1956) 
8. In what year was Rev. Martin Luther King assassinated? (1968) 
9. In what year was the ‗Boxer Rebellion‘ in China? (1900) 
10. In what year was the first Camp David summit between Egypt and Israel hosted by the 
United States? (1978) 
11. In what year did Thomas Eddison invent the light bulb? (1883) 
12. In what year did Britain receive a mandate to govern Palestine? (1920) 
13. In what year did Thomas Jefferson become president of the United States? (1801) 
14. In what year was the first Japanese railway opened? (1872) 
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5
5
 
I
t
 
w
a
s
 
d
e
f
i
n
it
e
l
y
 
s
h
o
r
t
l
y
 
a
f
t
e
r
 
W
W
 
I
I
.
 
I
n
d
i
a
n
 
i
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
c
e
 
w
a
s
 
n
e
g
o
t
ia
t
e
d
 
b
y
 
L
o
r
d
 
M
o
u
n
t
b
a
t
t
e
n
 
–
 
t
h
e
 
l
a
s
t
 
B
r
it
i
s
h
 
V
ic
e
r
o
y
 
–
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
v
a
r
io
u
s
 
p
o
l
it
ic
a
l
 
p
a
r
t
ie
s
 
i
n
 
I
n
d
i
a
 
f
o
l
lo
w
i
n
g
 
W
W
 
I
I
.
 
 
T
h
i
s
 
m
a
y
 
h
a
v
e
 
t
a
k
e
n
 
s
o
m
e
 
y
e
a
r
s
 
t
o
 
f
i
n
a
l
i
s
e
.
 
 
M
y
 
g
r
a
n
d
f
a
t
h
e
r
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 
I
n
d
i
a
 
s
h
o
r
t
l
y
 
b
e
f
o
r
e
 
t
h
e
 
g
r
a
n
t
i
n
g
 
o
f
 
I
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
c
e
.
 
 
I
n
 
w
h
a
t
 
y
e
a
r
 
d
id
 
H
e
n
r
y
 
F
o
r
d
 
f
i
r
s
t
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
e
 t
h
e
 
M
o
d
e
l 
T
 
c
a
r
?
 
 
1
9
0
8
 
1
9
1
5
 
I
 
d
o
n
‘
t
 
k
n
o
w
 
i
f
 
t
h
e
 
M
o
d
e
l 
T
 
w
a
s
 t
h
e
 
f
ir
s
t
 
c
a
r
 t
o
 
b
e
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
e
d
, 
b
u
t
 
it
 
m
u
s
t
 
h
a
v
e
 
b
e
e
n
 
a
m
o
n
g
s
t
 
t
h
e
 
f
i
r
s
t
.
 
 
 
F
o
r
d
 
p
r
o
b
a
b
l
y
 
w
a
s
n
‘
t
 
t
h
e
 
f
i
r
s
t
 
c
a
r
 
m
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
e
r
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
a
u
t
o
m
o
t
i
v
e
 
b
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
.
 
 
F
o
r
d
 
m
a
d
e
 
c
a
r
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
o
r
d
i
n
a
r
y
 
p
e
o
p
le
 
c
o
u
ld
 
a
f
f
o
r
d
,
 
s
o
 
it
 
m
u
s
t
 
h
a
v
e
 
b
e
e
n
 
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
s
t
a
r
t
 
o
f
 
m
a
s
s
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
io
n
 
a
r
o
u
n
d
 
t
h
e
 t
i
m
e
 
o
f
 
W
W
 
I
 
i
n
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
 
I
‘
m
 
a
 
b
it
 
o
f
 
a
 
F
o
r
d
 
e
n
t
h
u
s
i
a
s
t
 
–
 
u
n
f
a
s
h
io
n
a
b
l
e
 
a
s
 
it
 
i
s
 
n
o
w
a
d
a
y
s
.
 
 
P
u
r
e
l
y
 
o
u
t
 
o
f
 
c
u
r
io
s
it
y
 
I
 
d
id
 
a
 
f
e
w
 
i
n
t
e
r
n
e
t
 
s
e
a
r
c
h
e
s
 
t
o
 
f
i
n
d
 
o
u
t
 
a
b
o
u
t
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
m
p
a
n
y
 
a
n
d
 
it
s
 
h
i
s
t
o
r
y
.
 
 
T
h
a
t
‘
s
 
h
o
w
 
I
 
k
n
o
w
 
w
h
e
n
 
t
h
e
 
M
o
d
e
l 
T
 
w
a
s
 
f
ir
s
t
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
e
d
.
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 A
p
p
e
n
d
ix
 I
I:
  
A
d
v
ic
e 
a
v
a
il
a
b
le
 t
o
 p
a
r
ti
ci
p
a
n
ts
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I
n
 
w
h
a
t
 
y
e
a
r
 
d
i
d
 
M
a
o
 
Z
e
d
u
n
g
 
a
n
d
 
Z
h
u
 
D
e
 
l
e
a
d
 
c
o
m
m
u
n
i
s
t
s
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
‗
L
o
n
g
 
M
a
r
c
h
‘
 
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
 
C
h
i
n
a
?
 
 
1
9
3
4
 
1
9
2
5
 
C
h
i
n
a
 
o
n
l
y
 
b
e
c
a
m
e
 
f
u
l
l
y
 
c
o
m
m
u
n
i
s
t
 
a
f
t
e
r
 
W
W
 
I
I
,
 
b
u
t
 
M
a
o
‘
s
 
L
o
n
g
 
M
a
r
c
h
 
w
a
s
 
b
e
f
o
r
e
 
t
h
a
t
.
 
 
T
h
e
 
C
h
i
n
e
s
e
 
c
o
m
m
u
n
i
s
t
s
 
d
i
d
n
‘
t
 
s
e
i
z
e
 
p
o
w
e
r
 
u
n
t
i
l
 
a
f
t
e
r
 
W
W
I
I
,
 
J
a
p
a
n
 
i
n
v
a
d
e
d
 
C
h
i
n
a
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
l
a
t
e
 
1
9
3
0
‘
s
 
s
o
 
t
h
e
 
L
o
n
g
 
M
a
r
c
h
 
m
u
s
t
 
h
a
v
e
 
b
e
e
n
 
d
u
r
i
n
g
 
a
 
c
i
v
i
l
 
w
a
r
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
 
s
o
m
e
 
t
i
m
e
 
b
e
f
o
r
e
 
t
h
e
 
J
a
p
a
n
e
s
e
 
i
n
v
a
s
i
o
n
.
 
T
h
e
 
o
r
i
g
i
n
s
 
o
f
 
c
o
m
m
u
n
i
s
t
 
C
h
i
n
a
 
a
r
e
 
p
a
r
t
 
o
f
 
m
y
 
u
n
d
e
r
g
r
a
d
u
a
t
e
 
s
t
u
d
i
e
s
.
 
 
T
h
a
t
‘
s
 
h
o
w
 
I
 
k
n
o
w
 
w
h
e
n
 
t
h
e
 
‗
L
o
n
g
 
M
a
r
c
h
‘
 
o
c
c
u
r
r
e
d
.
 
I
n
 
w
h
a
t
 
y
e
a
r
 
w
e
r
e
 
d
i
a
m
o
n
d
s
 
f
i
r
s
t
 
d
i
s
c
o
v
e
r
e
d
 
a
t
 
K
i
m
b
e
r
l
e
y
 
i
n
 
S
o
u
t
h
 
A
f
r
i
c
a
?
 
 
1
8
6
7
 
1
8
9
5
 
I
n
t
u
i
t
i
v
e
l
y
,
 
t
h
e
 
S
o
u
t
h
 
A
f
r
i
c
a
n
 
d
i
a
m
o
n
d
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
f
e
e
l
s
 
q
u
i
t
e
 
o
l
d
,
 
p
r
o
b
a
b
l
y
 
d
u
r
i
n
g
 
 
V
i
c
t
o
r
i
a
n
 
t
i
m
e
s
.
 
 
S
o
 
I
‘
m
 
s
o
r
t
 
o
f
 
g
u
e
s
s
i
n
g
 
h
e
r
e
.
 
C
e
c
i
l
 
R
h
o
d
e
s
 
i
s
 
a
s
s
o
c
i
a
t
e
d
 
w
i
t
h
 
d
i
a
m
o
n
d
 
m
i
n
i
n
g
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
D
e
 
B
e
e
r
‘
s
 
d
i
a
m
o
n
d
 
c
o
m
p
a
n
y
.
 
 
T
h
e
 
d
i
a
m
o
n
d
s
 
w
e
r
e
 
d
i
s
c
o
v
e
r
e
d
 
s
h
o
r
t
l
y
 
b
e
f
o
r
e
 
R
h
o
d
e
s
 
w
e
n
t
 
t
o
 
S
o
u
t
h
 
A
f
r
i
c
a
.
 
M
y
 
f
a
t
h
e
r
 
w
o
r
k
e
d
 
f
o
r
 
D
e
B
e
e
r
's
 
a
n
d
 
b
o
r
e
d
 
m
e
 
t
o
 
d
e
a
t
h
 
w
i
t
h
 
f
a
c
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
f
i
g
u
r
e
s
 
a
b
o
u
t
 
n
i
n
e
t
e
e
n
t
h
 
c
e
n
t
u
r
y
 
m
i
n
e
r
a
l
 
d
i
s
c
o
v
e
r
i
e
s
.
 
 
I
 
n
e
v
e
r
 
t
h
o
u
g
h
t
 
t
h
a
t
 
s
u
c
h
 
u
s
e
l
e
s
s
 
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
w
o
u
l
d
 
c
o
m
e
 
i
n
 
u
s
e
f
u
l
 
u
n
t
i
l
 
n
o
w
.
 
I
n
 
w
h
a
t
 
y
e
a
r
 
w
a
s
 
t
h
e
 
f
i
r
s
t
 
g
e
n
e
r
a
l
 
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
h
e
l
d
 
i
n
 
J
a
p
a
n
?
 
 
1
8
9
0
 
1
9
3
0
 
E
v
e
n
 
u
n
d
e
r
 
t
h
e
 
E
m
p
e
r
o
r
 
t
h
e
y
 
h
a
d
 
s
o
m
e
 
f
o
r
m
 
o
f
 
c
a
b
i
n
e
t
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
,
 
s
o
 
a
 
g
e
n
e
r
a
l
 
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
m
a
y
 
h
a
v
e
 
t
a
k
e
n
 
p
l
a
c
e
 
b
e
f
o
r
e
 
W
W
I
I
.
 
 
 
J
a
p
a
n
 
a
d
o
p
t
e
d
 
w
e
s
t
e
r
n
 
i
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
i
o
n
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
n
i
n
e
t
e
e
n
t
h
 
c
e
n
t
u
r
y
,
 
s
o
 
t
h
e
 
f
i
r
s
t
 
g
e
n
e
r
a
l
 
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
c
o
u
l
d
n
‘
t
 
h
a
v
e
 
o
c
c
u
r
r
e
d
 
b
e
f
o
r
e
 
t
h
e
 
l
a
t
e
 
n
i
n
e
t
e
e
n
t
h
 
c
e
n
t
u
r
y
.
 
I
 
h
a
v
e
 
s
t
u
d
i
e
d
 
J
a
p
a
n
e
s
e
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
.
 
 
W
e
s
t
e
r
n
 
i
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
i
o
n
s
 
w
e
r
e
 
a
d
o
p
t
e
d
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
t
i
m
e
 
o
f
 
E
m
p
e
r
o
r
 
M
e
j
i
 
i
n
 
1
8
6
8
.
 
 
C
o
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
w
a
s
 
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
e
d
 
i
n
 
1
8
8
5
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
g
e
n
e
r
a
l
 
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
f
o
l
l
o
w
e
d
 
s
o
m
e
 
y
e
a
r
s
 
l
a
t
e
r
.
 
I
n
 
w
h
a
t
 
y
e
a
r
 
d
i
d
 
E
g
y
p
t
 
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
i
z
e
 
t
h
e
 
S
u
e
z
 
C
a
n
a
l
?
 
 
1
9
5
6
 
1
9
5
0
 
I
 
t
h
i
n
k
 
t
h
e
 
S
u
e
z
 
C
a
n
a
l
 
w
a
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
h
a
n
d
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
B
r
i
t
i
s
h
 
&
 
F
r
e
n
c
h
 
a
f
t
e
r
 
W
W
 
I
I
,
 
a
n
d
 
I
 
d
o
n
‘
t
 
t
h
i
n
k
 
i
t
 
w
a
s
 
a
f
t
e
r
 
t
h
e
 
a
s
s
a
s
s
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
J
F
K
 
i
n
 
‘
6
3
.
 
T
h
e
 
r
i
s
e
 
o
f
 
A
r
a
b
 
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
i
s
m
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
l
a
t
e
 
1
9
4
0
‘
s
 
a
n
d
 
5
0
‘
s
,
 
l
e
a
d
 
t
o
 
i
n
t
e
r
v
e
n
t
i
o
n
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
e
x
-
c
o
l
o
n
i
a
l
 
p
o
w
e
r
s
 
t
o
 
h
o
l
d
 
o
n
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
c
a
n
a
l
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
w
a
s
 
u
l
t
i
m
a
t
e
l
y
 
u
n
s
u
c
c
e
s
s
f
u
l
.
 
 
B
r
i
t
i
s
h
,
 
F
r
e
n
c
h
 
a
n
d
 
I
s
r
a
e
l
i
 
f
o
r
c
e
s
 
a
t
t
e
m
p
t
e
d
 
t
o
 
i
n
t
e
r
v
e
n
e
 
t
o
 
s
t
o
p
 
t
h
e
 
E
g
y
p
t
i
a
n
 
l
e
a
d
e
r
 
N
a
s
s
e
r
 
f
r
o
m
 
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
i
z
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
c
a
n
a
l
,
 
b
u
t
 
w
e
r
e
 
f
o
r
c
e
d
 
t
o
 
w
i
t
h
d
r
a
w
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
A
m
e
r
i
c
a
n
 
P
r
e
s
i
d
e
n
t
 
E
i
s
e
n
h
o
w
e
r
.
 
 
A
 
p
a
r
t
i
c
u
l
a
r
l
y
 
m
e
m
o
r
a
b
l
e
 
d
a
t
e
.
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I
n
 w
h
a
t 
y
e
a
r
 w
a
s
 R
e
v
. 
M
a
r
ti
n
 L
u
th
e
r
 K
in
g
 
a
s
s
a
s
s
in
a
te
d
?
  
1
9
6
8
 
1
9
6
4
 
I
n
 t
h
e
 6
0
‘s
. 
 
A
t 
th
e
 h
e
ig
h
t 
o
f 
th
e
 c
iv
il
 
r
ig
h
ts
 p
r
o
te
s
ts
. 
M
a
r
ti
n
 L
u
th
e
r
 
K
in
g
 i
s
 c
e
le
b
r
a
te
d
 
a
s
 t
h
e
 l
e
a
d
e
r
 o
f 
th
e
 
U
S
 c
iv
il
 r
ig
h
ts
 
m
o
v
e
m
e
n
t,
 t
h
is
 
w
a
s
 a
 t
u
r
b
u
le
n
t 
ti
m
e
 i
n
 t
h
e
 U
S
 a
n
d
 
d
a
te
s
 K
in
g
‘s
 d
e
a
th
 
to
 t
h
e
 1
9
6
0
‘s
. 
  
T
h
is
 y
e
a
r
 w
a
s
 n
o
ta
b
le
 
n
o
t 
o
n
ly
 f
o
r
 t
h
e
 
a
s
s
a
s
s
in
a
t
io
n
 o
f 
M
a
r
t
in
 
L
u
th
e
r
 K
in
g
, 
b
u
t 
a
ls
o
 f
o
r
 
th
e
 a
s
s
a
s
s
in
a
t
io
n
 o
f 
B
o
b
b
y
 K
e
n
n
e
d
y
 a
n
d
 t
h
e
 
s
u
p
p
r
e
s
s
io
n
 o
f 
th
e
 
‗P
r
a
g
u
e
 S
p
r
in
g
‘ 
b
y
 t
h
e
 
U
S
S
R
. 
I
n
 w
h
a
t 
y
e
a
r
 w
a
s
 
th
e
‗B
o
x
e
r
 R
e
b
e
ll
io
n
‘ 
in
 C
h
in
a
?
  
1
9
0
0
 
1
8
8
5
 
W
a
s
n
‘t
 t
h
e
r
e
 a
 
f
il
m
 s
ta
r
r
in
g
 
C
h
a
r
lt
o
n
 
H
e
s
to
n
 a
b
o
u
t 
th
is
?
  
F
r
o
m
 
w
h
a
t 
I
 r
e
c
a
ll
 i
t 
w
a
s
 s
e
t 
a
r
o
u
n
d
 
th
e
 t
u
r
n
 o
f 
th
e
 
c
e
n
tu
r
y
. 
T
h
is
 s
o
u
n
d
s
 l
ik
e
 a
 
r
e
a
c
ti
o
n
 a
g
a
in
s
t 
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
p
e
n
e
tr
a
ti
o
n
 o
f 
C
h
in
e
s
e
 s
o
c
ie
t
y
, 
s
o
 I
 w
o
u
ld
 
im
a
g
in
e
 i
t 
to
o
k
 
p
la
c
e
 i
n
 t
h
e
 l
a
tt
e
r
 
y
e
a
r
s
 o
f 
th
e
 
n
in
e
te
e
n
th
 
c
e
n
tu
r
y
, 
a
n
d
 
c
e
r
ta
in
ly
 b
e
fo
r
e
 
W
W
I
. 
T
h
e
 ‗
B
o
x
e
r
 r
e
b
e
ll
io
n
‘ 
w
a
s
 a
 r
e
a
c
ti
o
n
 a
g
a
in
s
t 
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 d
e
m
a
n
d
s
 f
o
r
 
te
r
r
it
o
r
ia
l,
 r
a
il
r
o
a
d
 a
n
d
 
m
in
in
g
 c
o
n
c
e
s
s
io
n
s
 i
n
 
C
h
in
a
. 
 I
‘v
e
 r
e
a
d
 a
 b
o
o
k
 
a
b
o
u
t 
it
, 
s
o
 I
 k
n
o
w
 w
h
e
n
 
th
e
 e
v
e
n
ts
 t
o
o
k
 p
la
c
e
. 
I
n
 w
h
a
t 
y
e
a
r
 w
a
s
 t
h
e
 
f
ir
s
t 
C
a
m
p
 D
a
v
id
 
s
u
m
m
it
 b
e
tw
e
e
n
 
E
g
y
p
t 
a
n
d
 I
s
r
a
e
l 
h
o
s
te
d
 b
y
 t
h
e
 U
n
it
e
d
 
S
ta
te
s
?
  
1
9
7
8
 
1
9
8
5
 
T
h
is
 w
a
s
 o
n
 
th
e
 n
e
w
s
 y
e
a
r
s
 
a
g
o
, 
s
o
 i
n
 m
y
 
li
f
e
t
im
e
 -
 
p
r
o
b
a
b
ly
 
d
u
r
in
g
 t
h
e
 
1
9
7
0
‘s
 o
r
 
8
0
‘s
. 
I
 t
h
in
k
 t
h
is
 f
a
m
o
u
s
 
s
u
m
m
it
 e
n
d
e
d
 
fo
r
m
a
l 
h
o
s
ti
li
t
ie
s
 
b
e
tw
e
e
n
 E
g
y
p
t 
a
n
d
 I
s
r
a
e
l,
 d
e
s
p
it
e
 
E
g
y
p
ti
a
n
 
te
r
r
it
o
r
ia
l 
lo
s
s
e
s
 i
n
 
th
e
 v
a
r
io
u
s
 A
r
a
b
-
I
s
r
a
e
li
 w
a
r
s
. 
 I
t‘
s
 
g
o
t 
b
e
 a
t 
le
a
s
t 
2
0
 
y
e
a
r
s
 a
g
o
. 
 E
it
h
e
r
 
d
u
r
in
g
 t
h
e
 C
a
r
te
r
 
o
r
 R
e
a
g
a
n
 y
e
a
r
s
. 
T
h
is
 w
a
s
 t
h
e
 
c
o
n
tr
o
v
e
r
s
ia
l 
s
u
m
m
it
 
b
e
tw
e
e
n
 S
a
d
a
t 
a
n
d
 
B
e
g
in
, 
h
o
s
te
d
 b
y
 
P
r
e
s
id
e
n
t 
C
a
r
te
r
. 
 T
h
e
 
s
u
m
m
it
 l
e
d
 t
o
 t
h
e
 l
a
te
r
 
E
g
y
p
ti
a
n
-
I
s
r
a
e
li
 p
e
a
c
e
 
tr
e
a
ty
. 
 
 353 
In
 w
h
a
t 
y
e
a
r 
d
id
 
T
h
o
m
a
s
 E
d
d
is
o
n
 
in
v
e
n
t 
th
e
 l
ig
h
t 
b
u
lb
?
  
1
8
8
3
 
1
8
6
3
 
E
le
c
tr
ic
 
li
g
h
ti
n
g
 h
a
s
 
b
e
e
n
 a
ro
u
n
d
 
fo
r 
s
o
m
e
 
ti
m
e
 –
 a
t 
le
a
s
t 
o
n
e
 
h
u
n
d
re
d
 
y
e
a
rs
. 
  
E
d
d
is
o
n
 i
s
 a
ls
o
 
a
s
s
o
c
ia
te
d
 w
it
h
 
li
g
h
th
o
u
s
e
s
. 
 I
 
th
in
k
 t
h
e
y
 w
e
re
 
in
tr
o
d
u
c
e
d
 
a
ro
u
n
d
 t
h
e
 
m
id
d
le
 o
f 
th
e
 
n
in
e
te
e
n
th
 
c
e
n
tu
ry
, 
o
r 
m
a
y
b
e
 
a
 l
it
tl
e
 l
a
te
r.
  
H
o
w
e
v
e
r,
 t
h
e
 
li
g
h
t 
b
u
lb
 w
o
u
ld
 
h
a
v
e
 b
e
e
n
 l
a
te
r 
s
ti
ll
. 
T
h
e
re
’s
 s
o
m
e
 
c
o
n
tr
o
v
e
rs
y
 o
v
e
r 
w
h
o
 
in
v
e
n
te
d
 i
t 
fi
rs
t,
 b
u
t 
m
o
s
t 
p
e
o
p
le
 c
re
d
it
 
E
d
d
is
o
n
 w
it
h
 i
t.
  
It
’s
 a
 
g
e
n
e
ra
l 
k
n
o
w
le
d
g
e
 
th
in
g
 t
h
a
t 
I 
ju
s
t 
h
a
p
p
e
n
 t
o
 k
n
o
w
. 
In
 w
h
a
t 
y
e
a
r 
d
id
 
B
ri
ta
in
 r
e
c
e
iv
e
 a
 
m
a
n
d
a
te
 t
o
 g
o
v
e
rn
 
P
a
le
s
ti
n
e
?
  
1
9
2
0
 
1
9
3
0
 
In
 t
h
e
 
in
te
rw
a
r 
y
e
a
rs
. 
 B
ri
ta
in
 
g
o
t 
o
u
t 
s
h
o
rt
ly
 a
ft
e
r 
W
W
II
. 
S
h
o
rt
ly
 a
ft
e
r 
W
W
II
 t
h
e
 B
ri
ti
s
h
 
g
o
t 
o
u
t,
 s
o
 i
t 
m
u
s
t 
h
a
v
e
 g
ra
n
te
d
 b
y
 
th
e
 L
e
a
g
u
e
 o
f 
N
a
ti
o
n
s
 i
n
 
b
e
tw
e
e
n
 t
h
e
 t
w
o
 
w
o
rl
d
 w
a
rs
. 
B
ri
ta
in
 r
e
c
e
iv
e
d
 a
 
m
a
n
d
a
te
 f
ro
m
 t
h
e
 
L
e
a
g
u
e
 o
f 
N
a
ti
o
n
s
 t
o
 
g
o
v
e
rn
 t
e
rr
it
o
ri
e
s
 
s
e
iz
e
d
 i
n
 t
h
e
 b
re
a
k
-u
p
 
o
f 
th
e
 O
tt
o
m
a
n
 
e
m
p
ir
e
 a
ft
e
r 
W
W
 I
. 
 I
 
k
n
o
w
 t
h
is
 a
s
 I
 h
a
v
e
 
b
e
e
n
 f
o
ll
o
w
in
g
 t
h
e
 T
V
 
c
o
v
e
ra
g
e
 a
n
d
 a
n
a
ly
s
is
 
o
f 
th
e
 G
a
z
a
 p
u
ll
o
u
t 
b
y
 
Is
ra
e
l 
re
c
e
n
tl
y
. 
 
 354 
 In
 w
h
a
t 
y
e
a
r 
d
id
 T
h
o
m
a
s 
Je
ff
e
rs
o
n
 
b
e
c
o
m
e
 
p
re
si
d
e
n
t 
o
f 
th
e
 U
n
it
e
d
 
S
ta
te
s?
  
1
8
0
1
 
1
7
8
5
 
W
e
ll
, 
I 
k
n
o
w
 t
h
a
t 
th
e
 
A
m
e
ri
c
a
n
 D
e
c
la
ra
ti
o
n
 
o
f 
In
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
c
e
 w
a
s 
1
7
7
6
. 
 G
e
o
rg
e
 
W
a
sh
in
g
to
n
 w
a
s 
th
e
 
fi
rs
t 
p
re
si
d
e
n
t 
b
u
t 
I 
d
o
n
‘t
 k
n
o
w
 h
o
w
 l
o
n
g
 
h
e
 s
e
rv
e
d
 f
o
r 
o
r 
w
h
o
 
w
a
s 
th
e
 n
e
x
t 
p
re
si
d
e
n
t.
 
T
h
o
m
a
s 
Je
ff
e
rs
o
n
 w
a
s 
o
n
e
 o
f 
th
e
 f
o
u
n
d
in
g
 
fa
th
e
rs
 o
f 
th
e
 A
m
e
ri
c
a
n
 
C
o
n
st
it
u
ti
o
n
, 
so
 I
 t
h
in
k
 
h
e
 m
u
st
 h
a
v
e
 s
u
c
c
e
e
d
e
d
 
to
 t
h
e
 p
re
si
d
e
n
c
y
 a
ft
e
r 
W
a
sh
in
g
to
n
. 
Je
ff
e
rs
o
n
 d
ra
ft
e
d
 t
h
e
 
D
e
c
la
ra
ti
o
n
 o
f 
In
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
c
e
 a
n
d
 w
a
s 
th
e
 
3
rd
 P
re
si
d
e
n
t 
o
f 
th
e
 U
S
 
fo
ll
o
w
in
g
 W
a
sh
in
g
to
n
 
a
n
d
 A
d
a
m
s.
  
 
In
 w
h
a
t 
y
e
a
r 
w
a
s 
th
e
 f
ir
st
 
Ja
p
a
n
e
se
 
ra
il
w
a
y
 
o
p
e
n
e
d
?
  
1
8
7
2
 
1
8
9
2
 
T
h
e
y
 w
e
re
 p
ro
b
a
b
ly
 
b
u
il
d
in
g
 r
a
il
w
a
y
s 
a
ro
u
n
d
 t
h
e
 s
a
m
e
 t
im
e
, 
a
s 
th
e
 U
S
 w
a
s,
 s
o
 
m
a
y
b
e
 t
h
e
 l
a
te
 1
8
0
0
‘s
. 
T
h
e
 J
a
p
a
n
e
se
 r
a
il
 
sy
st
e
m
 m
u
st
 h
a
v
e
 
b
e
g
u
n
 s
o
m
e
w
h
a
t 
la
te
r 
th
a
n
 t
h
e
 g
re
a
t 
ra
il
ro
a
d
 
n
e
tw
o
rk
 i
n
 A
m
e
ri
c
a
. 
 
A
s 
th
a
t 
c
o
in
c
id
e
d
 w
it
h
 
th
e
 e
n
d
 o
f 
th
e
 I
n
d
ia
n
 
W
a
rs
, 
I 
th
in
k
 J
a
p
a
n
‘s
 
ra
il
 n
e
tw
o
rk
 b
e
g
u
n
 a
t 
th
e
 e
n
d
 o
f 
th
e
 
n
in
e
te
e
n
th
 c
e
n
tu
ry
. 
 
T
h
e
 i
n
tr
o
d
u
c
ti
o
n
 o
f 
w
e
st
e
rn
 i
n
st
it
u
ti
o
n
s 
c
a
m
e
 
a
b
o
u
t 
in
 t
h
e
 M
e
ji
 
R
e
st
o
ra
ti
o
n
 p
e
ri
o
d
 o
f 
Ja
p
a
n
e
se
 h
is
to
ry
. 
 B
ri
ta
in
 
su
c
c
e
ss
fu
ll
y
 t
e
n
d
e
re
d
 f
o
r 
th
e
 c
o
n
tr
a
c
t 
to
 b
u
il
d
 t
h
e
 
n
a
rr
o
w
 g
a
u
g
e
 r
a
il
w
a
y
 
b
e
tw
e
e
n
 T
o
k
y
o
 a
n
d
 
Y
o
k
o
h
a
m
a
. 
 I
t 
h
e
lp
s 
w
h
e
n
 
y
o
u
‘r
e
 a
 t
ra
in
 s
p
o
tt
e
r!
 
 355 
Appendix II:  Permutations of reasons and advice 
 
Reasons Very weak Weak Strong 
Advice accurate accurate accurate 
 inaccurate inaccurate inaccurate 
 
Statistical advice (estimates of the dates of historical events are held constant 
across conditions) i.e. if the advice offered by advisor K to a question is ‗1830‘ 
in the statistical condition, ‗1830‘ is also the numerical advice offered in 
response to the same question in the reasons advice condition.    
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Appendix III 
Appendix III:  Experimental condition:  control 
 
Instructions 
 
 
The following questions are intended to determine how you go about estimating 
uncertain quantities. You are asked to estimate a numerical answer to four 
questions involving uncertain quantities - it is highly unlikely that you will 
know the exact numerical answer. Nevertheless, we would like you to form 
your best estimate of the quantity in question, and tell us how confident you are 
in your answer. Also, you are asked to answer questions concerning how you 
think generally about estimation. 
Please answer all questions in sequential order. 
 
 
Many thanks for your participation 
 
 
 
 
{Instructions were identical for all experimental conditions} 
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1. This question asks you to estimate the number of National Lottery tickets 
(main lotto game) that were sold in shops, garages, post offices etc., in the first 
week of June 2006 in the UK. 
 
 
You are unlikely to know the actual number of National Lottery tickets sold 
each week in the UK, but you should be able to make an informed guess or 
estimate.  
 
What is your best estimate? Put that amount here __________ 
 
We next move on to ask you to say how confident you are that your best 
estimate, above, is correct. Please write below where indicated, a low estimate 
and a high estimate, such that that you are 90% confident that the true answer, 
whatever it is, lies between these points. Obviously, the low and the high 
estimates should, between them, contain your best estimate, that you wrote 
above.  
 
For example, if your best estimate is 25 million, then you might be 90% 
confident that the true number lies between 20 and 30 million as shown below. 
 
True value 
Low =      20 million - - - - - - - - - ¦ - - - - - - - - -  High = 30 million 
 
Write your high and low values in the spaces provided below. 
True value 
Low  =  __________ - - - - - - - - - ¦ - - - - - - - - -  High = __________ 
 
 358 
Please enter your best estimate again here __________ 
 
Please enter the reasons for your best estimate (of the number of National 
Lottery tickets sold in the first week of June 2006) below – 
 
 
 
As you have now had an opportunity to think about this issue do you wish to 
change the best estimate that you gave in answer to the question?  
 
Please circle "yes" or "no" 
  
     Yes      No  
 
If you now wish to change your best estimate do so now - otherwise move on to 
another question by. Please enter the changed estimate you are making here 
__________ 
  
We next move on to ask you to say how confident you are that your changed 
estimate, above, is correct. Please write below where indicated, a low estimate 
and a high estimate, such that you are 90% confident that the true answer, 
whatever it is, lies between these points. Obviously, the low and the high 
estimates should contain your changed estimate. Write your high and low 
values in the spaces, below.  
 
True value 
Low  = __________ - - - - - - - - - ¦ - - - - - - - - -  High = __________ 
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2.  This question asks you to estimate the number of people who enrolled for 
the first time at Higher Education Institutions in the UK in 2004/5. 
 
  
You are unlikely to know the actual number of people enrolled in UK Higher 
Education institutions in 2004/5, but you should be able to make an informed 
guess or estimate.  
 
What is your best estimate?  
 
Put that amount here __________ 
 
We next move on to ask you to say how confident you are that your best 
estimate, above, is correct. Please enter below, where indicated, a low estimate 
and a high estimate, such that you are 90% confident that the true answer, 
whatever it is, lies between these points. Obviously the low and the high 
estimates, should, between them, contain your best estimate, that you wrote 
above. Enter your high and low values in the spaces provided, below.  
 
 
 
True value 
Low  =  __________- - - - - - - - - ¦ - - - - - - - - -  High = __________ 
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Please enter your best estimate again here __________ 
 
Please enter the reasons for your best estimate (of the number of people who 
enrolled in Higher Education institutions in 2004/5) below – 
 
 
 
As you have now had an opportunity to think about this issue do you wish to 
change the best estimate that you gave in answer to the question?  
 
Please circle "yes" or "no"  
 
     Yes      No  
 
If you now wish to change your best estimate do so now - otherwise move on to 
another question. Please enter the changed estimate you are making here 
__________ 
 
We next move on to ask you to say how confident you are that your changed 
estimate, above, is correct. Please write below where indicated, a low estimate 
and a high estimate, such that you are 90% confident that the true answer, 
whatever it is, lies between these points. Obviously, the low and the high 
estimates should contain your changed estimate. Write your high and low 
values in the spaces, below.  
 
True value 
Low  =  __________ - - - - - - - - - ¦ - - - - - - - - -  High = __________ 
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3.  This question asks you to estimate the number of fatalities that resulted from 
UK road accidents in 2004.  
 
 
You are unlikely to know the actual number of UK road accidents that resulted 
in fatalities in 2004, but you should be able to make an informed guess or 
estimate. 
  
What is your best estimate?  
 
Put that amount here __________ 
 
We next move on to ask you to say how confident you are that your best 
estimate, above, is correct. Please enter below, where indicated, a low estimate 
and a high estimate, such that you are 90% confident that the true answer, 
whatever it is, lies between these points. Obviously, the low and the high 
estimates should, between them, contain your best estimate, Please write below 
where indicated, a low estimate and a high estimate, so that that you are 90% 
confident that the true answer lies between these points. You are 90% confident 
that the true answer lies between -  
 
 
 
True value 
Low  =  __________- - - - - - - - - ¦ - - - - - - - - -  High = __________ 
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Please enter your best estimate again here __________ 
 
Please enter the reasons for your best estimate (of the number of fatalities 
resulting from road accidents in the UK in 2004) below - 
 
 
As you have now had an opportunity to think about this issue do you wish to 
change the best estimate that you gave in answer to the question?  
 
Please indicate "yes" or "no"  
 
     Yes      No  
 
If you now wish to change your best estimate do so now - otherwise move on to 
another question.  
 
Please enter the changed estimate you are making here __________ 
 
We next move on to ask you to say how confident you are that your changed 
estimate, above, is correct. Please write below where indicated, a low estimate 
and a high estimate, such that you are 90% confident that the true answer, 
whatever it is, lies between these points. Obviously, the low and the high 
estimates should contain your changed estimate. Write your high and low 
values in the spaces, below.  
 
True value 
Low  = __________ - - - - - - - - - ¦ - - - - - - - - -  High = __________ 
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4.  This question asks you to estimate the number of passengers per year that 
travel through Durham Tees Airport.  
 
You are unlikely to know the actual number passengers that travel through 
Durham Tees Airport each year, but you should be able to make an informed 
guess or estimate.  
 
What is your best estimate?  
 
Put that amount here __________ 
  
We next move on to ask you to say how confident you are that your best 
estimate, above, is correct. Please write below where indicated, a low estimate 
and a high estimate, such that that you are 90% confident that the true answer, 
whatever it is, lies between these points. Obviously, the low and the high 
estimates should, between them, contain your best estimate, that you wrote 
above. Write your high and low values in the spaces provided below.  
  
 
 
 
True value 
Low  =  __________ - - - - - - - - - ¦ - - - - - - - - -  High = __________ 
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Please enter your best estimate again here __________ 
 
Please enter the reasons for your best estimate (of the number of passengers per 
year that travel through Durham Tees Airport) below - 
 
 
As you have now had an opportunity to think about this issue do you wish to 
change the best estimate that you gave in answer to the question?  
 
Please indicate "yes" or "no"  
 
     Yes      No  
 
If you now wish to change your best estimate do so now - otherwise move on to 
another question.  Please enter the changed estimate you are making here 
__________ 
 
We next move on to ask you to say how confident you are that your changed 
estimate, above, is correct. Please write below where indicated, a low estimate 
and a high estimate, such that you are 90% confident that the true answer, 
whatever it is, lies between these points. Obviously, the low and the high 
estimates should contain your changed estimate. Write your high and low 
values in the spaces, below.  
 
 
True value 
Low  =  __________ - - - - - - - - - ¦ - - - - - - - - -  High = __________ 
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Appendix III - Experimental condition:  Process advice 
 
1. This question asks you to estimate the number of National Lottery tickets 
(main lotto game) that were sold in shops, garages, post offices etc., in the first 
week of June 2006 in the UK.  
 
You are unlikely to know the actual number of National Lottery tickets sold 
each week in the UK, but you should be able to make an informed guess or 
estimate.  
 
What is your best estimate? Put that amount here __________ 
 
We next move on to ask you to say how confident you are that your best 
estimate, above, is correct. Please write below where indicated, a low estimate 
and a high estimate, such that that you are 90% confident that the true answer, 
whatever it is, lies between these points. Obviously, the low and the high 
estimates should, between them, contain your best estimate, that you wrote 
above.  
 
For example, if your best estimate is 25 million, then you might be 90% 
confident that the true number lies between 20 and 30 million as shown below. 
True value 
Low = 20 million - - - - - - - - - ¦ - - - - - - - - - High = 30 million 
Write your high and low values in the spaces provided below. 
 
True value 
Low = __________ - - - - - - - - - ¦ - - - - - - - - - High = __________
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Anonymous advisor ‗Joe‘ states that one way to form an estimate to this 
problem is to follow the instructions below. Please follow the instructions 
and write estimates where indicated –  
 
(Step A) What is the average number of lottery terminals in a typical UK 
town/city?  
 
Your answer __________ 
 
(Step B) How many towns/cities are there in the UK? 
 
Your answer __________ 
 
(Step C) Multiply (A) times (B) to get the total number of lottery terminals in 
the UK. 
  
(A) multiplied by (B) = __________ 
 
(Step D) How many tickets does each terminal issue per draw, on average?  
 
Your answer __________ 
  
(Step E) Multiply (C) times (D) to get the total number of lottery tickets sold 
per draw for all lottery terminals.  
 
(C) multiplied by (D) = __________ 
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(Step F) How many main lottery draws are there per week?  
 
Your answer __________ 
 
(Step G) Multiply (E) times (F) to get the total number of UK National Lottery 
tickets sold each week.  
 
(E) multiplied by (F) = __________ 
 
This final figure is the outcome of Joe's advice to you. This advice may have 
helped you make a better estimate of the number of National Lottery tickets 
sold in the first week of June 2006 at outlets in the UK.  
 
 
How useful was Joe's advice to you in estimating the correct answer to the 
question?  
 
Please indicate your evaluation of the advice by ticking one box below –  
 
 
No use at all                                                                    absolutely invaluable  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Please write your previous best estimate here __________ 
 
Please write the estimate you calculated following Joe's advice  
here __________ 
 
Given Joe's advice, do you wish to change the best estimate that you gave in 
answer to the question?  
 
Please circle "yes" or "no‖ below - 
 
     Yes     No 
 
If you answered ‗No‘ above, then move onto the next question.  If you 
answered ‗Yes‘ please fill in below.   
 
Please enter the changed estimate you are making in the light of the advice you 
received from Joe, here __________ 
 
We next move on to ask you to say how confident you are that your changed 
estimate, above is correct. Please write below a low estimate and a high 
estimate, such that you are 90% confident that the true answer, whatever it is, 
lies between these points. Obviously, the low and the high estimates should 
contain your changed estimate.  Write your high and low values in the spaces 
below.  
 
True value 
Low = __________ - - - - - - - - - ¦ - - - - - - - - - High = __________ 
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2. This question asks you to estimate the number of people who enrolled for the 
first time at Higher Education Institutions in the UK in 2004/5. 
 
  
You are unlikely to know the actual number of people enrolled in UK Higher 
Education institutions in 2004/5, but you should be able to make an informed 
guess or estimate.  
 
What is your best estimate?  
 
Put that amount here __________ 
 
 
We next move on to ask you to say how confident you are that your best 
estimate, above, is correct. Please write below, where indicated, a low estimate 
and a high estimate, such that you are 90% confident that the true answer, 
whatever it is, lies between these points. Obviously the low and the high 
estimates, should, between them, contain your best estimate, that you wrote 
above. Write your high and low values in the spaces provided, below.  
 
 
 
 
True value 
Low =  __________- - - - - - - - - ¦ - - - - - - - - -  High = __________ 
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Anonymous advisor ‗Kate‘ states that one way to form an estimate to this 
problem is to follow the instructions below. Please follow the instructions and 
write estimates where indicated –  
 
(Step A) What is the average number of institutions of Higher Education in 
each Higher Education region of the UK?  
 
Your answer __________ 
 
(Step B) How many Higher Education regions are there in the UK?  
 
Your answer __________ 
 
(Step C) Multiply (A) times (B) to get the total number of Higher Education 
institutions in the UK.  
 
(A) multiplied by (B) = __________ 
 
(Step D) What is the average number of students applying to each institution of 
Higher Education?  
 
Your answer __________ 
 
(Step E) Multiply (C) times (D) to get the total number of students applying for 
places in Higher Education 2004/5.  
(C) multiplied by (D) = __________  
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(Step F) What proportion of (E) successfully applied for a place in Higher 
Education 2004/5?  
 
Your answer __________  
 
G. Multiply (E) times (F) to get the total number of people enrolled in Higher 
Education institutions in 2004/5  
 
(E) multiplied by (F) = __________ 
 
This final figure is the outcome of Kate's advice to you. This advice may have 
helped you make a better estimate of the number of people who enrolled at 
Higher Education institutions in 2004/5 in the UK.  
 
How useful was Kate's advice to you in estimating the correct answer to the 
question?  
 
Please indicate your evaluation of the advice by ticking one box below –  
 
 
No use at all                                                                   absolutely invaluable  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Please write your previous best estimate here __________ 
 
Please write the estimate you calculated following Kate's advice here 
__________ 
 
Given Kate's advice, do you wish to change the best estimate that you gave in 
answer to the question?  
 
Please circle "yes" or "no" below – 
 
     Yes     No 
  
If you answered ‗No‘ above, then move onto the next question.  If you 
answered ‗Yes‘ please fill in below.   
 
Please enter the changed estimate you are making in the light of the advice you 
received from Kate, here __________ 
 
We next move on to ask you to say how confident you are that your changed 
estimate, above is correct. Please write below a low estimate and a high 
estimate, such that you are 90% confident that the true answer, whatever it is, 
lies between these points. Obviously, the low and the high estimates should 
contain your changed estimate. Write your high and low values in the spaces 
below.  
 
True value 
Low = __________- - - - - - - - - ¦ - - - - - - - - - High = __________ 
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3.  This question asks you to estimate the number of fatalities that resulted from 
UK road accidents in 2004.  
 
You are unlikely to know the actual number of UK road accidents that resulted 
in fatalities in 2004, but you should be able to make an informed guess or 
estimate. 
  
What is your best estimate?  
 
Put that amount here __________ 
 
We next move on to ask you to say how confident you are that your best 
estimate, above, is correct. Please write below, where indicated, a low estimate 
and a high estimate, such that you are 90% confident that the true answer, 
whatever it is, lies between these points. Obviously, the low and the high 
estimates should, between them, contain your best estimate, Please write below 
where indicated, a low estimate and a high estimate, so that that you are 90% 
confident that the true answer lies between these points. You are 90% confident 
that the true answer lies between –  
 
 
 
 
 
True value 
Low = __________- - - - - - - - - ¦ - - - - - - - - - High = __________ 
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Anonymous advisor ‗David‘ states that one way to form an estimate to this 
problem is to follow the instructions below. Please follow the instructions and 
write your estimate where indicated –  
 
(Step A) How many people in the UK hold driving licences?  
 
Your answer = __________ 
  
(Step B) What proportion of (A) actually drives?  
 
Your Answer __________ 
 
C. Multiply (A) times (B) to get the total number of car drivers in the UK.  
 
(A) multiplied by (B) = __________ 
 
(Step D) How many accidents does the average driver have per year?  
 
Your answer __________  
 
(Step E) Multiply (C) times (D) to get the total number of road accidents per 
year.  
 
(C) multiplied by (D) = __________ 
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(Step F) What proportion of (E) are fatal accidents?  
 
Your answer __________  
 
(Step G) Multiply (E) times (F) to get the total number of fatal road accidents in 
the UK in 2004.  
 
(E) multiplied by (F) = __________ 
 
This final figure is the outcome of David's advice to you. This advice may have 
helped you make a better estimate of the number of fatalities that resulted from 
UK road accidents in 2004.  
 
How useful was David's advice to you in estimating the correct answer to the 
question?  
 
Please indicate your evaluation of the advice by ticking one box below –  
 
 
No use at all                                                                   absolutely invaluable  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Please write your previous best estimate here __________ 
 
Please write the estimate you calculated following David‘s advice  
here __________ 
 
Given David's advice, do you wish to change the best estimate that you gave in 
answer to the question?  
 
Please circle "yes" or "no" below - 
 
     Yes     No  
 
If you answered ‗No‘ above, then move onto the next question.  If you 
answered ‗Yes‘ please fill in below.   
 
Please enter the changed estimate you are making in the light of the advice you 
received from David, here __________ 
We next move on to ask you to say how confident you are that your changed 
estimate, above is correct. Please write below a low estimate and a high 
estimate, such that you are 90% confident that the true answer, whatever it is, 
lies between these points. Obviously, the low and the high estimates should 
contain your changed estimate. Write your high and low values in the spaces 
below.  
 
True value 
Low = __________ - - - - - - - - - ¦ - - - - - - - - - High = __________ 
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4.  This question asks you to estimate the number of passengers per year that 
travel through Durham Tees Airport.  
 
You are unlikely to know the actual number of passengers that travel through 
Durham Tees Airport each year, but you should be able to make an informed 
guess or estimate.  
 
What is your best estimate?  
 
Put that amount here __________ 
  
We next move on to ask you to say how confident you are that your best 
estimate, above, is correct. Please write below where indicated, a low estimate 
and a high estimate, such that that you are 90% confident that the true answer, 
whatever it is, lies between these points. Obviously, the low and the high 
estimates should, between them, contain your best estimate, that you wrote 
above. Write your high and low values in the spaces provided below.  
  
 
 
 
True value 
Low = __________ - - - - - - - - - ¦ - - - - - - - - - High = __________ 
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Anonymous advisor ‗Tina‘ states that one way to form an estimate to this 
problem is to follow the instructions below. Please follow the instructions and 
write your estimates where indicated –  
(Step A) How many passenger airlines fly to/from Durham Tees?  
 
Your answer __________ 
 
(Step B) How many landings/takeoff flights a day does an average passenger 
airline make from Durham Tees Airport?  
 
Your answer __________  
 
(Step C) Multiply (A) times (B) to get the total number of flights per day 
utilizing Durham Tees Airport.  
 
(A) multiplied by (B) = __________ 
 
(Step D) What is the average number of passengers on each flight that 
departs/lands at Durham Tees Airport?  
 
Your answer __________  
 
(Step E) Multiply (C) times (D) to get the average number of passengers per 
day that travel through Durham Tees Airport.  
(C) multiplied by (D) = __________ 
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(Step F) How many days in a year?  
 
Your answer __________ 
 
(Step G) Multiply (E) times (F) to get the total number of passengers that travel 
through Durham Tees Airport per year.  
 
(E) multiplied by (F) = __________ 
 
This final figure is the outcome of Tina's advice to you. This advice may have 
helped you make a better estimate of the number of passengers that travel 
through Durham Tees Airport per year.  
 
How useful was Tina's advice to you in estimating the correct answer to the 
question?  
 
Please indicate your evaluation of the advice by ticking one box below –  
 
 
No use at all                                                                   absolutely invaluable  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
     
 
 
 
 380 
Please write your previous best estimate here __________ 
 
 
Please write the estimate you calculated following Tina‘s advice  
here __________ 
 
Given Tina's advice, do you wish to change the best estimate that you gave in 
answer to the question?  
 
Please circle "yes" or "no" below -  
 
     Yes     No 
 
If you answered ‗No‘ above, then move onto the next question.  If you 
answered ‗Yes‘ please fill in below.   
 
Please enter the changed estimate you are making in the light of the advice you 
received from Tina, here __________ 
 
We next move on to ask you to say how confident you are that your changed 
estimate, above is correct. Please write below a low estimate and a high 
estimate, such that you are 90% confident that the true answer, whatever it is, 
lies between these points. Obviously, the low and the high estimates should 
contain your changed estimate. Write your high and low values in the spaces 
below.  
 
                                                     True value 
Low = __________- - - - - - - - - ¦ - - - - - - - - - High = ____________ 
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Appendix III - Experimental conditions:  Non-Process advice 
 
1. This question asks you to estimate the number of National Lottery tickets 
(main lotto game) that were sold in shops, garages, post offices etc., in the first 
week of June 2006 in the UK. 
 
You are unlikely to know the actual number of National Lottery tickets sold 
each week in the UK, but you should be able to make an informed guess or 
estimate.  
 
What is your best estimate? Put that amount here __________ 
 
We next move on to ask you to say how confident you are that your best 
estimate, above, is correct. Please write below where indicated, a low estimate 
and a high estimate, such that that you are 90% confident that the true answer, 
whatever it is, lies between these points. Obviously, the low and the high 
estimates should, between them, contain your best estimate, that you wrote 
above.  
 
For example, if your best estimate is 25 million, then you might be 90% 
confident that the true number lies between 20 and 30 million as shown below. 
True value 
Low =      20 million - - - - - - - - - ¦ - - - - - - - - -  High = 30 million 
 
Write your high and low values in the spaces provided below. 
True value 
Low =  __________ - - - - - - - - - ¦ - - - - - - - - -  High = __________ 
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Anonymous advisor ‗Joe‘ advises you that-  
Not everyone in the UK participates in the National Lottery, and there are 
other games such as scratchcards. The main draw is on a Saturday night, 
but there is another draw on a Wednesday. So, I would think that 
approximately 20 million people participated in the National Lottery in 
the first week of June 2006.  
This final figure is the outcome of Joe's advice to you. This advice may have 
helped you make a better estimate of the number of National Lottery tickets 
sold in the first week of June 2006 at outlets in the UK.  
 
How useful was Joe's advice to you in estimating the correct answer to the 
question?  
 
Please indicate your evaluation of the advice by ticking one box below –  
 
No use at all                                                                   absolutely invaluable  
1 2 3 4 5 
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Please write your previous best estimate here __________ 
 
Please write the estimate you calculated following Joe's advice  
here __________ 
 
Given Joe's advice, do you wish to change the best estimate that you gave in 
answer to the question?  
 
Please circle "yes" or "no‖ below - 
 
     Yes     No 
 
If you now wish to change your best estimate in the light of Joe's advice you 
can do so now - otherwise move on to another question.  Please write the 
changed estimate you are making in the light of the advice you received from 
Joe, here __________ 
 
We next move on to ask you to say how confident you are that your changed 
estimate, above is correct. Please write below a low estimate and a high 
estimate, such that you are 90% confident that the true answer, whatever it is, 
lies between these points. Obviously, the low and the high estimates should 
contain your changed estimate. Write your high and low values in the spaces 
below.  
 
 
                                                      True value 
Low = __________ - - - - - - - - - ¦ - - - - - - - - -  High = __________ 
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2. This question asks you to estimate the number of people who enrolled for the 
first time at Higher Education Institutions in the UK in 2004/5. 
 
 
You are unlikely to know the actual number of people enrolled in UK Higher 
Education institutions in 2004/5, but you should be able to make an informed 
guess or estimate.  
 
What is your best estimate?  
 
Put that amount here __________ 
 
 
We next move on to ask you to say how confident you are that your best 
estimate, above, is correct. Please write below, where indicated, a low estimate 
and a high estimate, such that you are 90% confident that the true answer, 
whatever it is, lies between these points. Obviously the low and the high 
estimates, should, between them, contain your best estimate, that you wrote 
above. Write your high and low values in the spaces provided, below.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                       True value 
Low =  __________- - - - - - - - - ¦ - - - - - - - - -  High = __________ 
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Anonymous advisor ‗Kate‘ advises you that –  
I suppose you would have to take into account UK school leavers, 
international students, and adult returners. Also, I think the government 
had a target of half all school leavers going on to higher education. So, I 
think that it is approximately 50 million.  
This final figure is the outcome of Kate's advice to you. This advice may have 
helped you make a better estimate of the number of people who enrolled at 
Higher Education institutions in 2004/5 in the UK.  
 
How useful was Kate's advice to you in estimating the correct answer to the 
question?  
 
Please indicate your evaluation of the advice by ticking one box below –  
 
No use at all                                                                                      absolutely 
invaluable  
1 2 3 4 5 
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Please write your previous best estimate here __________ 
 
Please write the estimate you calculated following Kate's advice  
here __________ 
 
Given Kate's advice, do you wish to change the best estimate that you gave in 
answer to the question?  
 
Please circle "yes" or "no" below – 
 
     Yes     No 
  
If you now wish to change your best estimate in light of Kate's advice you can 
do so now - otherwise move on to answer the next question. Please write the 
changed estimate you are now making in the light of the advice you received 
from Kate, here __________ 
 
We next move on to ask you to say how confident you are that your changed 
estimate, above is correct. Please write below a low estimate and a high 
estimate, such that you are 90% confident that the true answer, whatever it is, 
lies between these points. Obviously, the low and the high estimates should 
contain your changed estimate. Write your high and low values in the spaces 
below.  
 
 
                                                       True value 
Low = __________- - - - - - - - - ¦ - - - - - - - - - High = __________ 
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3.  This question asks you to estimate the number of fatalities that resulted from 
UK road accidents in 2004.  
 
You are unlikely to know the actual number of UK road accidents that resulted 
in fatalities in 2004, but you should be able to make an informed guess or 
estimate. 
  
What is your best estimate?  
 
Put that amount here __________ 
 
We next move on to ask you to say how confident you are that your best 
estimate, above, is correct. Please write below, where indicated, a low estimate 
and a high estimate, such that you are 90% confident that the true answer, 
whatever it is, lies between these points. Obviously, the low and the high 
estimates should, between them, contain your best estimate, Please write below 
where indicated, a low estimate and a high estimate, so that that you are 90% 
confident that the true answer lies between these points. You are 90% confident 
that the true answer lies between -  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      True value 
Low = __________- - - - - - - - - ¦ - - - - - - - - -  High = __________ 
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 Anonymous advisor ‗David‘ advises you that –  
Deaths on the road are quite commonplace – you hear about them on the 
news all the time. Over a year, the figures must be in there thousands, so, 
I would say approximately 10,000.  
This final figure is the outcome of David's advice to you. This advice may have 
helped you make a better estimate of the number of fatalities that resulted from 
UK road accidents in 2004.  
 
How useful was David's advice to you in estimating the correct answer to the 
question?  
 
Please indicate your evaluation of the advice by ticking one box below –  
 
No use at all                                                                   absolutely invaluable  
1 2 3 4 5 
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Please write your previous best estimate here __________ 
 
Please write the estimate you calculated following David‘s advice  
here __________ 
 
Given David's advice, do you wish to change the best estimate that you gave in 
answer to the question?  
 
Please circle "yes" or "no" below - 
 
     Yes     No  
 
If you now wish to change your best estimate in light of David's advice you can 
do so now - otherwise move on to another question. Please write the changed 
estimate you are making in the light of the advice you received from David, 
here __________ 
 
We next move on to ask you to say how confident you are that your changed 
estimate, above is correct. Please write below a low estimate and a high 
estimate, such that you are 90% confident that the true answer, whatever it is, 
lies between these points. Obviously, the low and the high estimates should 
contain your changed estimate. Write your high and low values in the spaces 
below.  
 
 
True value 
Low = __________  - - - - - - - - - ¦ - - - - - - - - -  High = __________ 
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4.  This question asks you to estimate the number of passengers per year that 
travel through Durham Tees Airport.  
 
You are unlikely to know the actual number of passengers that travel through 
Durham Tees Airport each year, but you should be able to make an informed 
guess or estimate.  
 
What is your best estimate?  
 
Put that amount here __________ 
  
We next move on to ask you to say how confident you are that your best 
estimate, above, is correct. Please write below where indicated, a low estimate 
and a high estimate, such that that you are 90% confident that the true answer, 
whatever it is, lies between these points. Obviously, the low and the high 
estimates should, between them, contain your best estimate, that you wrote 
above. Write your high and low values in the spaces provided below.  
  
 
 
 
                                                       True value 
Low = __________ - - - - - - - - - ¦ - - - - - - - - -  High = __________ 
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Anonymous advisor ‗Tina‘ advises you that –  
Durham Tees Airport is not one of the major UK airports, and there are 
other airports such as Newcastle fairly close by. You would have to 
account for passenger arrivals and departures each day, and adjust for 
seasonal variations. So, I would say approximately 500,000.  
This final figure is the outcome of Tina's advice to you. This advice may have 
helped you make a better estimate of the number of passengers that travel 
through Durham Tees Airport per year.  
 
How useful was Tina's advice to you in estimating the correct answer to the 
question?  
 
Please indicate your evaluation of the advice by ticking one box below –  
 
No use at all                                                                   absolutely invaluable  
1 2 3 4 5 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 392 
Please write your previous best estimate here __________ 
 
Please write the estimate you calculated following Tina‘s advice  
here __________ 
 
Given Tina's advice, do you wish to change the best estimate that you gave in 
answer to the question?  
 
Please circle "yes" or "no" below -  
 
     Yes     No 
 
If you now wish to change your best estimate in light of Tina's advice you can 
do so now - otherwise move on to another question. Please write the changed 
estimate you are making in the light of the advice you received from Tina, here 
__________ 
 
We next move on to ask you to say how confident you are that your changed 
estimate, above is correct. Please write below a low estimate and a high 
estimate, such that you are 90% confident that the true answer, whatever it is, 
lies between these points. Obviously, the low and the high estimates should 
contain your changed estimate. Write your high and low values in the spaces 
below.  
 
 
True value 
      Low = __________- - - - - - - - - ¦ - - - - - - - - -  High = ____________ 
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Appendix IV 
 
Appendix IV:  US mail estimation problem 
 
Instructions 
 
The following question is intended to determine how you go about estimating 
an uncertain quantity. However, it is highly unlikely that you will know the 
exact numerical answer. Nevertheless, we would like you to form your best 
estimate of the quantity in question, and tell us how confident you are in your 
answer. 
Question:  How many pieces of mail were handled by the US postal service 
in 1987? 
What is your best estimate? Put that amount here __________ 
We next move on to ask you to say how confident you are that your best 
estimate, above, is correct. Please write below where indicated, a low estimate 
and a high estimate, such that that you are 90% confident that the true answer, 
whatever it is, lies between these points. Obviously, the low and the high 
estimates should, between them, contain your best estimate, that you wrote 
above.  
 
For example, if your best estimate is 25 million, then you might be 90% 
confident that the true number lies between 20 and 30 million as shown below. 
True value 
Low =      20 million - - - - - - - - - ¦ - - - - - - - - -  High = 30 million 
 
 
Write your high and low values in the spaces provided below. 
True value 
Low = __________ - - - - - - - - - ¦ - - - - - - - - -  High = __________ 
 394 
Anonymous advisor ‗Joe‘ states that one way to form an estimate 
to this problem is to follow the instructions below. Please follow 
the instructions and write estimates where indicated – 
 
A.  What was the average number of post offices per state in the USA in 
1987?  Put your estimate here _________ 
 
B.  What is the number of states in the USA?   
 
Put your estimate here _________ 
 
C.  Multiply (A) times (B) to get the total number of post offices in the 
USA in 1987.  (A) x (B) = __________ 
 
D.  How many pieces of mail per day were handled by the average post 
office in 1987?  Put your estimate here _________ 
 
E.  Multiply (C) times (D) to get the total pieces of mail per day for all 
post-offices in the USA in 1987.  (C) x (D) = __________ 
 
F.  How many days are there in a year?   
 
Put your estimate here _________ 
 
G.  Multiply (E) times (F) to get the number of pieces of mail handled in 
a year by the US postal service in 1987.   
(E) x (F) = __________ 
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This final figure is the outcome of Joe's advice to you. This advice may have 
helped you make a better estimate of the number of pieces of mail that the US 
postal service handled in 1987.   
How useful was Joe's advice to you in estimating the correct answer to the 
question?  
 
Please indicate your evaluation of the advice by ticking one box below –  
 
 
No use at all                                                                   absolutely invaluable  
1 2 3 4 5 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 396 
Please write your previous best estimate here __________ 
 
Please write the estimate you calculated following Joe's advice  
here __________ 
 
Given Joe's advice, do you wish to change the best estimate that you gave in 
answer to the question?  
 
Please circle "yes" or "no‖ below - 
 
     Yes     No 
 
If you now wish to change your best estimate in the light of Joe's advice you 
can do so now.  Please write the changed estimate you are making in the light 
of the advice you received from Joe, here __________ 
 
We next move on to ask you to say how confident you are that your changed 
estimate, above is correct. Please write below a low estimate and a high 
estimate, such that you are 90% confident that the true answer, whatever it is, 
lies between these points. Obviously, the low and the high estimates should 
contain your changed estimate.  Write your high and low values in the spaces 
below.  
 
True value 
Low = __________ - - - - - - - - - ¦ - - - - - - - - -  High = __________ 
 
Thanks for your participation 
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Appendix IV:  Forested Miles in Oregon estimation problem 
 
Instructions 
The following question is intended to determine how you go about estimating 
an uncertain quantity. However, it is highly unlikely that you will know the 
exact numerical answer. Nevertheless, we would like you to form your best 
estimate of the quantity in question, and tell us how confident you are in your 
answer. 
Question:  How many Forested Miles are there in the US state of Oregon? 
What is your best estimate? Put that amount here __________ 
We next move on to ask you to say how confident you are that your best 
estimate, above, is correct. Please write below where indicated, a low estimate 
and a high estimate, such that that you are 90% confident that the true answer, 
whatever it is, lies between these points. Obviously, the low and the high 
estimates should, between them, contain your best estimate, that you wrote 
above.  
For example, if your best estimate is 25 million, then you might be 90% 
confident that the true number lies between 20 and 30 million as shown below. 
 
True value 
Low =      20 million - - - - - - - - - ¦ - - - - - - - - -  High = 30 million 
 
 
Write your high and low values in the spaces provided below. 
 
True value 
Low = __________ - - - - - - - - - ¦ - - - - - - - - -  High = __________ 
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Anonymous advisor ‗Kate‘ states that one way to form an estimate 
to this problem is to follow the instructions below. Please follow 
the instructions and write estimates where indicated – 
 
A.  What is the distance in miles between the Oregon/California border 
and the Oregon/Washington border? 
 
Put your estimate here _________ 
 
B.  What is the distance in miles between the Oregon coast and the 
Oregon/Idaho border?  Put your estimate here _________ 
 
C.  Multiply (A) times (B) to get an estimate of the area of Oregon in 
square miles.  (A) x (B) = __________ 
 
D.  What proportion of Oregon is forested? 
Put your estimate here _________ 
 
E.  Multiply (C) times (D) to get the number of Forested Miles in 
Oregon.  (C) x (D) = __________ 
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This final figure is the outcome of Kate's advice to you. This advice may have 
helped you make a better estimate of the number of Forested Miles in the US 
state of Oregon.    How useful was Kate‘s advice to you in estimating the 
correct answer to the question?  
 
Please indicate your evaluation of the advice by ticking one box below –  
 
 
No use at all                                                                                      absolutely 
invaluable  
1 2 3 4 5 
     
 
 400 
Please write your previous best estimate here __________ 
 
Please write the estimate you calculated following Kate's advice  
here __________ 
 
Given Kate's advice, do you wish to change the best estimate that you gave in 
answer to the question?  
 
Please circle "yes" or "no‖ below - 
 
     Yes     No 
 
If you now wish to change your best estimate in the light of Kate‘s advice you 
can do so now.  Please write the changed estimate you are making in the light 
of the advice you received from Kate, here __________ 
 
We next move on to ask you to say how confident you are that your changed 
estimate, above is correct. Please write below a low estimate and a high 
estimate, such that you are 90% confident that the true answer, whatever it is, 
lies between these points. Obviously, the low and the high estimates should 
contain your changed estimate.  Write your high and low values in the spaces 
below.  
True value 
 Low = __________ - - - - - - - - - ¦ - - - - - - - - -  High = __________ 
 
 
Thanks for your participation 
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Appendix V 
 
Appendix V:  Road fatalities estimation problem 
 
Instructions 
Road safety has become an increasingly important issue both for the UK 
government, and the general public in recent years - given the increases in the 
numbers of motorists, year on year.  Regrettably, fatal accidents occur 
throughout the year on Great Britain‘s road network involving both motorists 
and pedestrians.  In the absence of accurate statistics, or where the cost of 
obtaining such information is prohibitively high, how would road safety 
managers assess the chance of a pedestrian being killed in a motor vehicle 
accident during the 12 months of 2006?  This brief questionnaire is designed to 
elicit how you would go about such a problem.   
Before you begin, please indicate your age and gender below – 
Age:  _____ 
Gender:  _____ (male or female) 
One way of expressing chance is by measuring a specific event‘s historical 
relative frequency.  This is the ratio between the historic incidence of the target 
event, and the total number of incidences in which the target event could have 
occurred (e.g. a relative frequency of 1 in 1 is an absolute certainty that an 
event will happen; whilst a relative frequency of 1 in 2 is greater than a relative 
frequency of 1 in 10,000 that an event will happen). 
The following question is intended to determine how you go about estimating 
the relative frequency of a specific event. However, it is highly unlikely that 
you will know the exact numerical answer. Nevertheless, we would like you to 
form your best estimate of the relative frequency in question. 
Question:  What was the chance (expressed as a relative frequency) that any 
individual pedestrian would die in a motor vehicle traffic accident in Great 
Britain in 2006? 
So, your task is to determine the relative frequency of a (random) pedestrian 
being killed in a motor vehicle accident in 2006.   Your best estimate of the 
chance (expressed as a relative frequency) that any individual pedestrian is 
killed in a motor vehicle accident in 2006 is: 1 in __________  (Put your 
answer in the space provided). 
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Anonymous advisor ‗Joe‘ states that one way to form an estimate to this 
problem is to follow the instructions below. Sometimes you will be asked to 
estimate proportions, to do so please write these proportional quantities as 
numbers between 0 and 1 in the spaces provided.  (Hence one-tenth is 
expressed as 0.1; ½ is expressed as 0.5; and nine-tenths is expressed as 0.9)  
Please follow the instructions and write estimates where indicated – 
 
What was the chance (expressed as a relative frequency) that any individual 
pedestrian would die in a motor vehicle traffic accident in Great Britain (GB) in 
2006? 
 
A.  What was the total population of GB in 2006?  ______  
 
B.  What proportion of A owned a licensed motor vehicle in 2006?  ____ 
 
C.  Multiply A x B to calculate the total number of motor vehicles in GB in 
2006  __________  
 
D.  For every 1000 motor vehicles on the roads in GB in 2006, how many were 
involved in a road traffic accident?  __________  
 
E.  Divide D by 1000  __________  
 
F.  Multiply C x E to calculate the number of motor vehicle accidents in GB in 
2006  __________   
 
G.  For every 1000 motor vehicle accidents that occurred in GB in 2006, how 
many resulted in fatalities?  __________  
 
H.  Divide G by 1000  _____  
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I.  Multiply F x H  to calculate the total number of motor vehicle accident 
fatalities in GB in 2006  ___________  
 
J.  Of the number you have calculated in step I, how many were pedestrians?  
____  
 
K.  Divide A by J, to calculate the probability that a pedestrian died in a motor 
vehicle accident in GB in 2006: 1 in  ____  
 
This final figure is the outcome of Joe's advice to you. This advice may help 
you to make a better estimate of the chance (expressed as a relative frequency) 
of any individual pedestrian being killed in a motor vehicle accident in 2006.  
How useful was Joe's advice to you in estimating the correct answer to the 
question?  
 
Please indicate your evaluation of the advice by ticking one box below –  
 
 
No use at all                                                                absolutely invaluable  
1 2 3 4 5 
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Please write your original best estimate of the chance (expressed as a relative 
frequency) that any individual pedestrian would be killed in a motor vehicle 
accident in 2006 here: 1 in  __________ 
 
Please write the estimate of the chance (expressed as a relative frequency) you 
calculated following Joe's advice here: 1 in  __________ 
 
Given Joe's advice, do you wish to change the original best estimate that you 
gave in answer to the question?  
 
Please circle "yes" or "no‖ below - 
 
     Yes     No 
 
If you now wish to change your original best estimate of the chance (expressed 
as a relative frequency) that any individual pedestrian is killed in a motor 
vehicle accident in 2006, in the light of Joe's advice, you can do so now.  Please 
write the changed estimate you are making in the light of the advice you 
received from Joe, here: 1 in  __________ 
 
 
 
Thanks for your participation 
 
 
 
 
   
 405 
Appendix V: Multiple maternities problem 
 
Instructions 
Clinicians generally regard multiple maternities as more problematic and 
potentially dangerous for mothers, and babies, than single births.  These 
maternities often require different medical resources than single births, so a 
salient question for health managers is how likely it is that a pregnancy will 
result in a triplet birth  In the absence of accurate statistics, or where the cost of 
obtaining such information is prohibitively high, how are managers able to 
determine the chance of a triplet birth?  This brief questionnaire is designed to 
elicit how you would go about such a problem.   
Before you begin, please indicate your age and gender below – 
Age:  _____ 
Gender:  _____ (male or female) 
One way of expressing chance is by measuring a specific event‘s historical 
relative frequency.  This is the ratio between the historic incidence of the target 
event, and the total number of incidences in which the target event could have 
occurred.  (e.g. a relative frequency of 1 in 1 is an absolute certainty that an 
event will happen; whilst a relative frequency of 1 in 2 is greater than a relative 
frequency of 1 in 10,000 that an event will happen). 
The following question is intended to determine how you go about estimating 
the relative frequency of a specific event. However, it is highly unlikely that 
you will know the exact numerical answer. Nevertheless, we would like you to 
form your best estimate of the relative frequency of the event in question. 
Question:  What is the chance (expressed as a relative frequency) that, in 
2005, a pregnancy would result in a triplet birth in the UK? 
So, your task is to determine the relative frequency of a triplet birth resulting 
from a pregnancy in 2005 in the UK.  
Your best estimate that the chance (expressed as a relative frequency) of a 
pregnancy in 2005 resulting in a triplet birth in the UK is:   
1 in __________  (Put your answer in the space provided). 
Anonymous advisor ‗Kate‘ states that one way to form an estimate to this 
problem is to follow the instructions below. Sometimes you will be asked to 
estimate proportions, to do so please write these proportional quantities as 
numbers between 0 and 1 in the spaces provided.  (Hence one-tenth is 
expressed as 0.1; ½ is expressed as 0.5; and nine-tenths is expressed as 0.9)  
Please follow the instructions and write estimates where indicated – 
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What is the chance (expressed as a relative frequency) that, in 2005, a 
pregnancy would result in a triplet birth in the UK? 
 
A.  How many females were there in the UK in 2005?  _____ 
 
B.  What proportion of A were females able to have children (i.e. aged 16 – 40 
years)?  _____ 
 
C.  Multiply A x B to calculate the number of potential maternities in 2005  
_____ 
 
D.  What proportion of C were pregnant in 2005?  _____ 
 
E.  Multiply C x D to calculate the number of maternities in 2005  _____ 
 
F.  How many births in E were multiple maternities?  _____ 
 
G.  Divide E by F  __________ 
 
H.  The chance (expressed as a relative frequency) of a pregnancy resulting in a 
triplet birth in 2005 was 1 in   _____ (insert the number you calculated in step 
G in the space provided here). 
 
This final figure is the outcome of Kate's advice to you. This advice may help 
you to make a better estimate of the chance (expressed as a relative frequency) 
of a pregnancy in the UK in 2005 resulting in a triplet birth.   
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How useful was Kate's advice to you in estimating the correct answer to the 
question?  
 
Please indicate your evaluation of the advice by ticking one box below –  
 
No use at all                                                                                   absolutely 
invaluable  
1 2 3 4 5 
     
 
Please write your original best estimate of the chance (expressed as a relative 
frequency) of a pregnancy resulting in a triplet birth in the UK in 2005 here: 1 
in  __________ 
 
Please write the estimate of chance you calculated following Kate's advice here: 
1 in  __________ 
 
Given Kate's advice, do you wish to change the original best estimate that you 
gave in answer to the question?  
 
Please circle "yes" or "no‖ below - 
 
     Yes     No 
 
If you now wish to change your original best estimate of the chance (expressed 
as a relative frequency) of a pregnancy in the UK in 2005 resulting in a triplet 
birth, in the light of Kate's advice, you can do so now.  Please write the changed 
estimate you are making in the light of the advice you received from Kate, here: 
1 in  __________ 
 
Thanks for your participation 
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Appendix VI 
 
 
 
Perceptions about international rates of infant mortality 
This study examines the perceptions people may hold about infant mortality rates (IMR) in various 
countries throughout the world. 
On the following pages you will be asked to make simple quantitative estimates about IMR's in ten 
different countries. 
No complex calculations are necessary, you need only use your existing knowledge (and maybe a bit of 
guesswork!) to complete the questionnaire. 
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Introduction & Instructions  
This questionnaire is concerned with the perceptions people may hold about infant mortality rates 
(IMR) in various countries around the world.  
IMR is the ratio of infant mortality per 1000 live births (e.g. an IMR of 5.5 is representative of 5.5 
infant deaths per 1000 live births on average;  an IMR of 500 would indicate that 1 in 2 children die 
within the first 12 months of life; whilst an IMR of 995 per 1000 live births would indicate that nearly 
all children die within the first 12 months of life).  Whilst statistics such as these are compiled by 
governments and various international health organisations, most non-expert people have only a vague 
idea of the true rate of infant mortality in their own, or in other peoples‘ countries.  
The purpose of this study is to determine the extent of your knowledge of international infant mortality 
rates (IMR).  On the following page you will be asked to estimate the IMR for 10 countries.    
Before you continue could you tell us a little about yourself by indicating your Age, and Gender below. 
  
 
Age ____ 
 
Gender:  Male   Female             (tick the appropriate box) 
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Your estimate of international infant mortality rates 
Please estimate the infant mortality rates (IMR) of the 10 countries listed below.  This task has two 
components.  
First, rank order the countries below, by what you think is each individual country‘s infant mortality 
rate (IMR).  Place a number between 1- 10 in the left column of the table below - ‗1‘ indicates the 
country with the LOWEST rate of infant mortality, and ‗10‘ indicates the country with the 
HIGHEST rate of infant mortality.  No two countries have the same rate of infant mortality, so each 
number between 1-10 can only be used once.  
Second, make an estimate of the actual rate of infant mortality in each of the countries below (place 
your estimate in the right column of the table below).  Recall that the rate of infant mortality is 
calculated as the number of infant fatalities per 1000 live births.  
 
Rank 
Order 
by IMR 
Country Estimate of actual IMR 
(infant deaths per 1000 
live births) 
 Mozambique  
 Niger  
 Liberia  
 Sierra-Leone  
 Angola  
 Iceland  
 Hong Kong  
 Japan  
 Sweden  
 Singapore  
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Appendix VI:  Control condition (including Need for Cognition scale) 
 
This next section concerns your individual thinking style, please complete all questions. 
 
For each of the statements below, please indicate to what extent the statement is characteristic of you.  If 
the statement is extremely uncharacteristic of you (not at all like you) please circle  ―1‖; if the statement 
is extremely characteristic of you (very much like you) please circle ―5‖ under the question. Of course, a 
statement may be neither extremely uncharacteristic nor extremely characteristic of you; if so, please 
circle the number in the middle of the scale that describes the best fit. Please keep the following scale in 
mind as you rate each of the statements below: 1 = extremely uncharacteristic; 2 = somewhat 
uncharacteristic; 3 = uncertain; 4 = somewhat characteristic; 5 = extremely characteristic.  
 
1. I would prefer complex to simple problems.                         
                1      2      3      4      5 
 
2. I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of thinking. 
                  1      2      3      4      5 
 
3. Thinking is not my idea of fun. 
                1      2      3      4      5 
                                   
4. I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure to 
             challenge my thinking abilities.     
                1      2      3      4      5 
                                                            
5. I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is likely a chance I will have to 
             think in depth about something.                                                                            
                1      2      3      4      5 
 
6. I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours.                 
                1      2      3      4      5 
 
7. I only think as hard as I have to.                                        
               1      2      3      4      5 
 
8. I prefer to think about small, daily projects to long-term ones.       
               1      2      3      4      5 
 
 
9. I like tasks that require little thought once I‘ve learned them.       
               1      2      3      4      5 
412 
 
10. The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me. 
                1      2      3      4      5 
  
11. I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems. 
                1      2      3      4      5 
 
12. Learning new ways to think doesn‘t excite me very much. 
                1      2      3      4      5 
   
13. I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve. 
               1      2      3      4      5 
   
14. The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me. 
               1      2      3      4      5 
  
15. I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that is 
             somewhat important but does not require much thought. 
               1      2      3      4      5 
 
 
16. I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that required a lot of  
             mental effort. 
               1      2      3      4      5 
 
17. It‘s enough for me that something gets the job done; I don‘t care how or why it  
             works.  
               1      2      3      4      5 
 
18. I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me 
             personally. 
               1      2      3      4      5 
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Since you have now had a short period of time upon which to reflect about the infant mortality rates 
(IMR) of 10 different countries, please re-evaluate your previous estimate of each IMR for the 10 
countries below. 
 
First, you should copy the information you provided on page 3 into the first two columns on the left of 
the table below.  Next, follow the same procedure as you did earlier by rank ordering the 10 countries 
by each state's infant mortality rate (IMR). Place a number between 1- 10 in the left column of the table 
below - ‗1‘ indicates the country with the LOWEST rate of infant mortality, and ‗10‘ indicates the 
country with the HIGHEST rate of infant mortality. No two countries have the same rate of infant 
mortality, so each number between 1-10 can only be used once.  Should you decide not to revise your 
estimate, please copy your original estimate into the appropriate column in the right of the table below. 
 
Second, revise your estimate of the actual rate of infant mortality in each of the countries below (place 
your estimate in the appropriate right column of the table below). Recall that the rate of infant mortality 
is calculated as the number of infant fatalities per 1000 live births.  Should you decide not to revise your 
estimate, please copy your original estimate into the appropriate column in the right of the table below.  
 
Your original 
rank 
ordering 
by IMR 
Your original 
estimate of 
actual IMR 
(infant deaths 
per 1000 live 
births) 
Country Revised 
rank order 
by IMR 
Revised estimate 
of actual IMR 
(infant deaths 
per 1000 live 
births) 
  Mozambique   
  Niger   
  Liberia   
  Sierra-Leone   
  Angola   
  Iceland   
  Hong Kong   
  Japan   
  Sweden   
  Singapore   
 
 
 
That concludes our questionnaire – many thanks for your participation! 
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Perceptions about international rates of infant mortality 
This study examines the perceptions people may hold about infant mortality rates (IMR) in various 
countries throughout the world. 
On the following pages you will be asked to make simple quantitative estimates about IMRs in ten 
different countries. 
No complex calculations are necessary, you need only use your existing knowledge (and maybe a bit of 
guesswork!) to complete the questionnaire. 
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Introduction and Instructions  
This questionnaire is concerned with the perceptions people may hold about infant mortality rates 
(IMR) in various countries around the world.  
IMR is the ratio of infant mortality per 1000 live births (e.g. an IMR of 995 per 1000 live births would 
indicate that nearly all children die within the first 12 months of life; an IMR of 500 would indicate that 
1 in 2 children die within the first 12 months of life; an IMR of 5.5 is representative of 5.5 infant deaths 
per 1000 live births, on average).  Whilst statistics such as these are compiled by governments and 
various international health organisations, most non-expert people have only a vague idea of the true 
rate of infant mortality in their own, or in other peoples‘ countries.  
The purpose of this study is to determine the extent of your knowledge of international infant mortality 
rates (IMR).  On the following page you will be asked to estimate the IMR for 10 countries.    
Before you continue tell us a little about yourself by indicating your Age, and Gender below.   
 
Age ____ 
 
Gender:  Male   Female             (tick the appropriate box) 
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Your estimate of international infant mortality rates 
Please estimate the infant mortality rates (IMR) of the 10 countries listed below.  This task has two 
components.  
First, rank order the countries below, by what you think is each individual country‘s infant mortality 
rate (IMR).  Place a number between 1- 10 in the left column of the table below - ‗1‘ indicates the 
country with the LOWEST rate of infant mortality, and ‗10‘ indicates the country with the 
HIGHEST rate of infant mortality.  No two countries have the same rate of infant mortality, so each 
number between 1-10 can only be used once.  
Second, make an estimate of the actual rate of infant mortality in each of the countries below (place 
your estimate in the right column of the table below).  Although the rate of infant mortality is 
calculated as the number of infant fatalities per 1000 live births, the infant mortality rates for all of 
the countries below are between 2 deaths per 1000 live births, and 185 deaths per 1000 live births.    
 
Rank 
Order 
by IMR 
Country Estimate actual IMR 
(infant deaths per 1000 
live births) 
 Singapore  
 Sweden  
 Japan  
 Hong Kong  
 Iceland  
 Angola  
 Sierra-Leone  
 Liberia  
 Niger  
 Mozambique  
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Appendix VI:  Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($ per capita) 
 
Most people make poor estimates of infant mortality rates (IMRs), either because they are unfamiliar 
with such statistics, and/or they have insufficient knowledge of other countries to form an accurate 
estimate.  It may be that you would have been able to make a more accurate estimate of a countries‘ 
IMR, if you had access to some accurate additional information.  In this section we provide you with 
accurate per capita GDP ($) figures for each of the ten countries under consideration, (Source: 2007 
CIA Factbook).  Per capita GDP is the value of how much a person produces in a year. It is calculated 
by dividing the Gross Domestic Product for a country by the number of people who live there.  Here, 
you will have an opportunity to re-consider your original responses in the light of this additional 
information, and make new estimates that are potentially more accurate than those you made initially.   
First, you should copy the information you provided on page 3 into the first two columns on the left of 
the table below.  Second, please re-assess the rank order that you assigned the 10 countries below in the 
light of the additional GDP information, and enter your revised estimate in the appropriate column on 
the right of the table below.  Should you decide not to amend your estimate, please copy your original 
estimate into the appropriate column in the right of the table below. 
Next, please re-evaluate your original estimate of each country‘s infant mortality rate (IMR) in the light 
of the additional GDP information, and enter your revised estimate in the appropriate column in the 
right of the table below.  Although the rate of infant mortality is calculated as the number of infant 
fatalities per 1000 live births, the infant mortality rates for all of the countries below are between 2 
deaths per 1000 live births, and 185 deaths per 1000 live births.   Should you decide not to amend your 
estimate, please copy your original estimate into the appropriate column in the right of the table below. 
Your 
original rank 
ordering 
by IMR 
Your original 
estimate of 
actual IMR 
(infant deaths 
per 1000 live 
births) 
Country GDP 
Per capita 
($) 
Revised 
rank order 
by IMR 
Revised 
estimate of 
actual IMR 
(infant deaths 
per 1000 live 
births) 
  Singapore $31400   
  Sweden $32200   
  Japan $33100   
  Hong Kong $37300   
  Iceland $38000   
  Angola $4400   
  Sierra-Leone $900   
  Liberia $900   
  Niger $1000   
  Mozambique $1500   
 
Finally, we want to know how useful you found the additional information of each country‘s per capita 
GDP. 
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How useful was information of each countries‘ per capita GDP ($) to you in estimating the true infant 
mortality rate (IMR) of each country?   
Please indicate your evaluation of the advice by ticking one box below –  
 
No use at all                                                                                       absolutely invaluable  
1 2 3 4 5 
     
 
 
That concludes our questionnaire – Many thanks for your participation! 
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Perceptions about international rates of infant mortality 
This study examines the perceptions people may hold about infant mortality rates (IMR) in 
various countries throughout the world. 
On the following pages you will be asked to make simple quantitative estimates about IMRs in 
ten different countries. 
No complex calculations are necessary, you need only use your existing knowledge (and 
maybe a bit of guesswork!) to complete the questionnaire. 
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Introduction and Instructions  
This questionnaire is concerned with the perceptions people may hold about infant mortality rates 
(IMR) in various countries around the world.  
IMR is the ratio of infant mortality per 1000 live births (e.g. an IMR of 995 per 1000 live births would 
indicate that nearly all children die within the first 12 months of life; an IMR of 500 would indicate that 
1 in 2 children die within the first 12 months of life; an IMR of 5.5 is representative of 5.5 infant deaths 
per 1000 live births, on average).  Whilst statistics such as these are compiled by governments and 
various international health organisations, most non-expert people have only a vague idea of the true 
rate of infant mortality in their own, or in other peoples‘ countries.  
The purpose of this study is to determine the extent of your knowledge of international infant mortality 
rates (IMR).  On the following page you will be asked to estimate the IMR for 10 countries.    
Before you continue could you tell us a little about yourself by indicating your Age, and Gender below. 
  
 
Age ____ 
 
Gender:  Male   Female             (tick the appropriate box) 
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Your estimate of international infant mortality rates 
Please estimate the infant mortality rates (IMR) of the 10 countries listed below.  This task has two 
components.  
First, rank order the countries below, by what you think is each individual country‘s infant mortality 
rate (IMR).  Place a number between 1- 10 in the left column of the table below - ‗1‘ indicates the 
country with the LOWEST rate of infant mortality, and ‗10‘ indicates the country with the 
HIGHEST rate of infant mortality.  No two countries have the same rate of infant mortality, so each 
number between 1-10 can only be used once.  
Second, make an estimate of the actual rate of infant mortality in each of the countries below (place 
your estimate in the right column of the table below).  Although the rate of infant mortality is 
calculated as the number of infant fatalities per 1000 live births, the infant mortality rates for all of 
the countries below are between 2 deaths per 1000 live births, and 185 deaths per 1000 live births.    
Rank 
Order 
by IMR 
Country Estimate actual IMR 
(infant deaths per 1000 
live births) 
 Singapore  
 Sweden  
 Japan  
 Hong Kong  
 Iceland  
 Angola  
 Sierra-Leone  
 Liberia  
 Niger  
 Mozambique  
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Appendix VI:  Population statistics 
 
Most people make poor estimates of infant mortality rates (IMRs), either because they are unfamiliar 
with such statistics, and/or they have insufficient knowledge of other countries to form an accurate 
estimate.  It may be that you would have been able to make a more accurate estimate of a countries‘ 
IMR, if you had access to some accurate information.  In this section we provide you with accurate 
population estimates for each of the ten countries under consideration, (Source: 2007 CIA Factbook).  
Here, you will have an opportunity to re-consider your original responses in the light of this additional 
information, and make new estimates that are potentially more accurate than those you made initially.   
First, you should copy the information you provided on page 3 into the first two columns on the left of 
the table below.  Second, please re-assess the rank order that you assigned the 10 countries below in the 
light of the additional population estimate information, and enter your revised estimate in the 
appropriate column on the right of the table below.  Should you decide not to amend your estimate, 
please copy your original estimate into the appropriate column in the right of the table below. 
Next, please re-evaluate your original estimate of each country‘s infant mortality rate (IMR) in the light 
of the additional population estimate information, and enter your revised estimate in the appropriate 
column in the right of the table below.  Although the rate of infant mortality is calculated as the number 
of infant fatalities per 1000 live births, the infant mortality rates for all of the countries below are 
between 2 deaths per 1000 live births, and 185 deaths per 1000 live births.   Should you decide not to 
amend your estimate, please copy your original estimate into the appropriate column in the right of the 
table below. 
Your 
original 
rank 
ordering 
by IMR 
Your original 
estimate of 
actual IMR 
(infant deaths 
per 1000 live 
births) 
Country Population 
estimate 
Revised 
rank order 
by IMR 
Revised 
estimate of 
actual IMR 
(infant deaths 
per 1000 live 
births) 
  Singapore 4,553,009   
  Sweden 9,031,088   
  Japan 127,433,494   
  Hong Kong 6,980,412   
  Iceland 301,931   
  Angola 12,263,596   
  Sierra-Leone 6,144,562   
  Liberia 3,195,931   
  Niger 12,894,865   
  Mozambique 20,905,585   
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Finally, we want to know how useful you found the additional population estimate information for each 
country. 
How useful was information of each country‘s population estimate to you in estimating the true infant 
mortality rate (IMR) of each country?   
Please indicate your evaluation of the advice by ticking one box below –  
 
No use at all                                                                                       absolutely invaluable  
1 2 3 4 5 
     
 
 
That concludes our questionnaire – Many thanks for your participation! 
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Perceptions about international rates of infant mortality 
This study examines the perceptions people may hold about infant mortality rates (IMR) in 
various countries throughout the world. 
On the following pages you will be asked to make simple quantitative estimates about IMRs in 
ten different countries. 
No complex calculations are necessary, you need only use your existing knowledge (and 
maybe a bit of guesswork!) to complete the questionnaire. 
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Introduction and Instructions  
This questionnaire is concerned with the perceptions people may hold about infant mortality rates 
(IMR) in various countries around the world.  
IMR is the ratio of infant mortality per 1000 live births (e.g. an IMR of 5.5 is representative of 5.5 
infant deaths per 1000 live births on average;  an IMR of 500 would indicate that 1 in 2 children die 
within the first 12 months of life; whilst an IMR of 995 per 1000 live births would indicate that nearly 
all children die within the first 12 months of life).  Whilst statistics such as these are compiled by 
governments and various international health organisations, most non-expert people have only a vague 
idea of the true rate of infant mortality in their own, or in other peoples‘ countries.  
The purpose of this study is to determine the extent of your knowledge of international infant mortality 
rates (IMR).  On the following page you will be asked to estimate the IMR for 10 countries.    
Before you continue could you tell us a little about yourself by indicating your Age, and Gender below. 
  
 
Age ____ 
 
Gender:  Male   Female         (    (tick the appropriate box) 
               
  
426 
 
Your estimate of international infant mortality rates 
Please estimate the infant mortality rates (IMR) of the 10 countries listed below.  This task has two 
components.  
First, rank order the countries below, by what you think is each individual country‘s infant mortality 
rate (IMR).  Place a number between 1- 10 in the left column of the table below - ‗1‘ indicates the 
country with the LOWEST rate of infant mortality, and ‗10‘ indicates the country with the 
HIGHEST rate of infant mortality.  No two countries have the same rate of infant mortality, so each 
number between 1-10 can only be used once.  
Second, make an estimate of the actual rate of infant mortality in each of the countries below (place 
your estimate in the right column of the table below).  Recall that the rate of infant mortality is 
calculated as the number of infant fatalities per 1000 live births. 
Rank 
Order 
by IMR 
Country Estimate actual IMR 
(infant deaths per 1000 
live births) 
 Mozambique  
 Niger  
 Liberia  
 Sierra-Leone  
 Angola  
 Iceland  
 Hong Kong  
 Japan  
 Sweden  
 Singapore  
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Appendix VI:  GDP per capita ($) and Population statistics 
 
Most people make poor estimates of infant mortality rates (IMRs), either because they are unfamiliar 
with such statistics, and/or they have insufficient knowledge of other countries to form an accurate 
estimate.  It may be that you would have been able to make a more accurate estimate of a countries‘ 
IMR, if you had access to some accurate information.  In this section we provide you with accurate per 
capita GDP ($), and population estimates for each of the ten countries under consideration, (Source: 
2007 CIA Factbook).  Per capita GDP is the value of how much a person produces in a year. It is 
calculated by dividing the Gross Domestic Product for a country by the number of people who live 
there. Here, you will have an opportunity to re-consider your original responses in the light of this 
additional information, and make new estimates that are potentially more accurate than those you made 
initially.   
First, you should copy the information you provided on page 3 into the first two columns on the left of 
the table below.  Second, please re-assess the rank order that you assigned the 10 countries below in the 
light of the additional GDP and population estimate information, and enter your revised estimate in the 
appropriate column on the right of the table below.  Should you decide not to amend your estimate, 
please copy your original estimate into the appropriate column in the right of the table below. 
Next, please re-evaluate your original estimate of each country‘s infant mortality rate (IMR) in the light 
of the additional GDP and population estimate information, and enter your revised estimate in the 
appropriate column in the right of the table below.  Although the rate of infant mortality is calculated as 
the number of infant fatalities per 1000 live births, the infant mortality rates for all of the countries 
below are between 2 deaths per 1000 live births, and 185 deaths per 1000 live births.   Should you 
decide not to amend your estimate, please copy your original estimate into the appropriate column in the 
right of the table below. 
Your 
original 
rank 
ordering 
by IMR 
Your 
original 
estimate of 
actual IMR 
(infant 
deaths per 
1000 live 
births) 
Country GDP 
Per capita ($) 
Population 
estimate 
Revised 
rank 
order by 
IMR 
Revised 
estimate of 
actual IMR 
(infant deaths 
per 1000 live 
births) 
  Mozambique $1500 20,905,585   
  Niger $1000 12,894,865   
  Liberia $900 3,195,931   
  Sierra-Leone $900 6,144,562   
  Angola $4400 12,263,596   
  Iceland $38000 301,931   
  Hong Kong $37300 6,980,412   
  Japan $33100 127,433,494   
  Sweden $32200 9,031,088   
  Singapore $31400 4,553,009   
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Finally, we want to know how useful you found the additional information of each countries per capita 
GDP, and population estimate. 
 
 
How useful was information of each countries‘ per capita GDP ($), and population estimate, to you in 
estimating the true infant mortality rate (IMR) of each country?   
 
Please indicate your evaluation of the advice by ticking one box below –  
 
 
No use at all                                                                                       absolutely invaluable  
1 2 3 4 5 
     
 
 
 
 
 
That concludes our questionnaire – Many thanks for your participation! 
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